Diese Ausgabe enthält mit den "Regulae ad directionem ingenii" und den sachlich korrespondierenden "Cogitationes privatae" zwei frühe Texte Descartes’ aus der Zeit von 1619 bis 1628; erstere in einer völlig neuen, letztere erstmalig in einer deutschen Übersetzung. Grundlage für die Wiedergabe des lateinischen Textes der Regulae und der Übersetzung dieses größten Fragments aus der Zeit vor Descartes’ Übersiedlung in die Niederlande ist die kritische Ausgabe von Giovanni Crapulli, La Haye 1966, die der schwierigen Überlieferungslage der erst postum aus (...) dem Nachlaß publizierten Schrift am ehesten gerecht wird; die von Springmeyer in seiner 1973 innerhalb der "Philosophischen Bibliothek" vorgelegten und seither mehrfach nachgedruckten Ausgabe des Textes vorgenommenen Eingriffe in die Textgestalt werden daher in dieser Neuausgabe nicht beibehalten. Gegenstand der Regulae und auch der "Cogitationes privatae" ist die Frage nach der Methode zur Erlangung sicherer Erkenntnis. In Descartes’ Philosophie bleibt die Frage nach der Methode durchgängig aktuell, auch dort, wo metaphysische, physikalische oder ethische Inhalte verhandelt werden. Und so verwundert es auch nicht, daß er das Manuskript der Regulae, an das er wohl 1628 zuletzt Hand angelegt hatte, noch 1649 mit auf seine letzte Reise nach Stockholm nahm, obwohl ihm 1637 mit dem anonym publizierten "Discours de la Méthode pour bien conduire sa Raison" bereits der große Durchbruch gelungen war und seine darin auf vier Regeln reduzierte Methode allgemeine Beachtung gefunden hatte. (shrink)

Zu Beginn seiner Abhandlung *Über das einsame Leben* (De vita solitaria) schreibt Francesco Petrarca 1346: *Niemand schafft es, lange unter Wasser zu leben. Es ist unausweichlich, dass er auftaucht und das Antlitz, das er verbarg, offen zeigt.* René Descartes dagegen, in seinen Cogitationes privatae, notiert dreihundert Jahre später: *Wie die Komödianten [...] Masken anziehen, so schreite ich, der ich am Schauspiel dieser Welt [...] teilzunehmen gedenke, mit einer Maske bedeckt voran.*-Einmal die offene, einmal die verdeckte Konfrontation: bei Petrarca (...) ein Ich, das sich schrittweise erst aus dem mittelalterlich-scholastischen Gefüge herauswindet; bei Descartes ein selbstbewusstes, aber skeptisches Subjekt, das sich angesichts der Erfahrungen der Inquisition lieber verdeckt auf die Bühne des Theatrum mundi begibt. Zwischen diesen beiden Selbstentwürfen liegt eine komplexe geistesgeschichtliche Entwicklung, der Thomas Leinkauf in seiner grossangelegten, materialreichen Studie zur Philosophie des Humanismus und der Renaissance zwischen 1350 und etwa 1600 detailliert nachgeht. Auf allerhöchstem Niveau, dabei die historischen Grundbedingungen wie die rasante Wissensentwicklung und Weltexploration, Protestantismus und Konfessionalisierung, aber auch Faktoren wie die Ausbreitung der Pest und die Rivalität zum kirchlich-scholastischen Denken im Blick behaltend, beschreibt das Werk die faszinierende, komplizierte, von gegensätzlichen Kräften und Denkschulen vorangetriebene Entwicklung hin zum modernen Denken. Eine Einleitung, ausführliche Register und eine Bibliographie erschliessen das Werk.--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

This article is devoted to some of the dominant positions in the philosophy of mathematics, in Descartes and in Leibniz, and to their consequences drawn by these authors in mathematical analysis. I shall treat of Descartes’ epistemological conceptions of analysis and of the primacy of order, both of which are excellently exposited in the _Rules for the direction of the mind_ and of various mathematical devices which he developed later, from the time of the _Cogitationes privatae_ until the _Géométrie_.

«Au moment de monter sur ce théâtre du monde [...], j'avance masqué». Cette déclaration de Descartes dans le Préambule des Cogitationes Privatae n'est pas que l'aveu d'un jeune philosophe à l'aube du XVIIe siècle, mais marque une stratégie maintenant séculaire selon laquelle philosophie et théologie devraient être séparées tant dans leurs disciplines que dans leur corpus. Jean-Luc Marion, témoin exemplaire de cette dichotomie, use ainsi de la démarche dionysienne de l'homme caché devant Dieu comme justification théologique de l'avance (...) masquée du philosophe . Le gain unilatéral pour la philosophie est cependant une perte pour la théologie. À partir de la double hypothèse bonaventurienne du «Dieu proche» et de la «monadologie trinitaire», cet article trace une autre voie pour notre aujourd'hui - non pas contraire à la précédente, mais la poussant en quelque sorte «à son terme», ne craignant pas cette fois de revendiquer la fécondité explicite de la phénoménologie pour la théologie elle-même: non larvatus sed détecta fonte prodeo - j'avance non pas voilé mais à visage découvert. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 261 de Descartes," he writes, "n'est pas une th~se sur la philosophie de Descartes." Alqui6 here (and only here) excludes not only all purely mathematical texts but also those on mechanics, optics, acoustics, hydraulics, automata, etc., and even epistemologically significant items like "hi omni questione debet dari aliquod medium," "Si funis," and the full text of the ars memoriae passage. The only exception is Descartes' answer to (...) Beeckman's problem regarding free fall, truncated at the point where Descartes with the characteristic dlan of these years continues: "Ut autem hujus scientiae fundamenta jaciam...". AlquiCs general justification for the exclusion of "mathematics" rests upon the evidence that Descartes himself considered his "philosophy" autonomous. But this was the view of the mature Descartes who had a philosophy, not that of the young French officer who had just been shocked out of his pleasant intellectual dolce far niente by the encounter with Isaac Beeckman, the embodiment of the new spirit of "physico-mathematics," who suddenly showed Descartes a revolutionary alternative to Scholastic speculation. The Cogitationes privatae are the record of an awakening; "philosophical" texts among them, which Alqui6, accepting Henri Gouhier's brilliant hypothetical reconstruction, presents as "Praeambula" and "Olympica," mark the turning point: Descartes accepts, in the wake of his Dream, from the "Spirit of Truth" the mission to philosophize. The notion of philosophizing is still nebulous; of the new lands to be conquered, only "physico-mathematics" is already widlin his grasp. Of this impact of "physico-mathematics" almost nothing survives in the new edition. The "philosophical" items stand alone as if this were all that was philosophically significant at this starting point of a great itinerary. This imbalance (which half a dozen added pages could have redressed) is apt to affect the reader's judgment concerning the bigger question of the role of physics in the formation and direction of Descartes' thought. It also prevents him from recognizing how many lifelong concerns appear already at that first stage. With no early texts pointing forward toward it, the Trait~ de la m(canique of 1637 now stands forlornly at the end of the volume, and the reader may well wonder what it is doing there. This is the only point where Professor AlquiCs editorial principles work against instead of for him. Once the edition passes beyond these years of turmoil and self-discovery, it does full justice to the philosopher and the reader. Professor Alqui6's introductions are models of brevity and firm scholarship, and his annotations could hardly be more helpful. Difficult terms are patiently explained, including the seemingly simple ones which easily trip the reader; complex matters are admirably disentangled. These annotations, a running commentary, are a contribution to Descartesian scolarship in their own right. When this edition is complete it will supersede all currently available study editions. The near-perfect first volume is unique in organization and scope; as a tool of study to serve alongside AT and AM it does not have its like. GREGOR SEBBA Emory University Descartes und die Neuzeitliche Naturwissenschaft. By C. F. yon Weizs~icker. (Hamburg: Selbst-verlag der Universit~it Hamburg, 1962. Pp. 30. DM 2.) The primary aim of this brief and lucid essay is to clarify the precise sense in which Descartes sought to establish physical science on a firm mathematical foundation. In light of the development of post-Cartesian science, it is commonly supposed that Descartes helped pioneer the conception that science is a domain in which mathematics may be fruitfully applied. Professor Weizs~icker emphatically rejects this watered-down interpreta- 262 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY tion of Descartes' intentions. According to Descartes, physical science is mathematics. For only then can it consist of clear and distinct concepts wrought out of pure 9 9Descartes' argument, as Weizsiicker interprets it, is as follows. Physical science is a domain of certain knowledge only in so far as it has for its subject matter clear and distinct concepts. But apart from thought itself, our clear and distinct concepts are confined to mathematics. Thus if physics is to be a science in the strict sense, it must be mathematics. Now physical science can be mathematics if it is geometry. If nature... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:468 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY explanation of this in terms of "Aristotelian" categories is not Plotinus at his most convincing. Certainly Aristotle could not possibly have accepted the use of the categories of potentiality and actuality that O'Daly finds at VI. 2.20.20ff., and it is difficult to see how anyone could regard as seriously illuminatinga solution in which there is a "reciprocal" relationship between part (or particular) and whole such (...) that the whole is potentially the part, which is, actually, while simultaneously the part is potentially the whole, which is, actually. Throughout, O'Daly strives to avoid obscurantistic appeals in explicating Plotinus's thought. As typical of his approach I would cite his philological solution of the puzzling passage at V. 1.7.4-6 where Plotinus seems either to claim that the One produces intelligence by intelligence's acting in a certain way, or uncharacteristicallyto attribute thought to the One. Plotinus is not asking, O'Daly claims, how the One produces nous, but rather how it is that what is produced is nous. The solution is both neat and clear. I was disappointed, for this reason, with the concluding lines of the book. O'Daly is determined, as we have seen, to find the self preserved in the mystical union with the One. Unable to find this in Plotinus's characterization of the self in terms of nous orpsych~ he turns to the One itself to find a clue, for the One is an egregious instance of self. The move renders "selfhood, for Plotinus... in strict contrast to individuality" (p. 91), which is perplexing enough in view of O'Daly's previous stress on the identity of the self at its various levels. But it also provides him with the concept of epibol~, the "simple intuitive approach to Itself" (p. 93) that characterizes the One at VI. 7. 38. 10-39ff. and is used to characterize the approach to the One at III. 8.9. 20ff. O'Daly seizes on this concept to provide a perfectly obscure solution to his problem in these mysterious concluding words: "The term epibol~ links the two passages [III. 8.9 and VI. 7. 38]: both seem to corroborate the assertions that, on the one hand, the One is a Self, and, on the other, that, of the faculty experiencing unio, we can say no more than that it is--'the self'"(p. 94). O'Daly is forced to this pass, 1 believe, by his taking the mystical experience as too central in Plotinus's thought, as the cornerstone of his system, while, in reality, the heart of this system lies in the intelligible realm and its ties to the phenomenal. The union with the super-real, I suggest, serves only to indicate to the individual that he has overreached himself and needs, in good Platonic fashion, to return to the realm of intelligibility,that realm of nous and soul that O'Daly has spent the bulk of his time usefully examining. JEROME P. SCHILLER Washington University Descartes. By Jonathon R6e. (New YOrk: Pica Press, 1975. Pp. 204) Like the Discours de la m~thode, this is an "elegant essay," clear, condensed, and orderly. It analyzes in brief the Cartesian system of philosophy, pointing out that Descartes's approach to science was philosophical, although his philosophy was an attempt to discover the most scientific forms of description. And science for this "nouveau philosophe" was not qualitative but quantitative. The book furnishes an antidote to the myth popularized by Voltaire that misrepresents Descartes as an unscientific rationalizer whose fantastic physics was entirely superseded by Newton's. "The habit of classifying thinkers into warring schools," warns the author, "has resulted in a completely mistaken image of Descartes" (p. 13). Newtonian physics R6e sees as in the Cartesian tradition. After an analytical table of contents, ~t la Descartes, the book starts with a one-page chronological table, from which one regrettably misses the Cogitationes privatae, the Recherche de la v~rit~ par la lumi~re naturelle, the Primae cogitationes circa generationem animalium, and the Trait6 des passions de l'ame. A brief introduction is followed by sixteen short chapters and two appendices. The first appendix... (shrink)

1996 marks the 400th anniversary of Descartes' birth, and it seems only appropriate that it should bring a reevaluation of Descartes' thought and his place in the history of philosophy. Dennis Sepper's new book on the role of the imagination offers such a rethinking, proposing that--contrary to popular rumor--Descartes' entire corpus was centrally concerned with the proper uses of imagination, a concern initially informed by medieval doctrines of the internal senses and imagination. Sepper argues that Descartes' earliest work, especially the (...) Cogitatione Privatae, places enormous confidence in the power and scope of imagination, a confidence based on a view of the cosmos as a network of resemblances and analogous relations, providing an unproblematic fit between mind and world. The role of imagination here is not to construct objects wholesale, but to allow understanding through figures, figures that stand in analogical and symbolic relations to the objects of conception so that they can be grasped under a particular aspect. Sepper calls this a "biplanar" model of understanding, whereby an object present to cognition is imaginatively configured in another "plane," allowing us both to focus and shift attention. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:260 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Christian business" is not knowledge but experience. He founds religious certainty on individual inspiration and emphasizes charity against external written law. A man inspired by God becomes autonomous and acquires a mind of his own--independent of external authorities. This valuable study (pp. 5-109) is followed by an extensive bibliography (pp. 113--209) in which it could be added that Vald~s' Al[abeto Cristiano was reprinted in 1948 (...) by the Editorial "La Aurora" of Buenos Aires. In 1946 this publisher considered (in the Preface to his reprint of Vald~s' Dicilogo de Doctrina Cristiana, p. 12) republishing also Vald6s' Ciento y diez consideraciones divinas. PAUL T. FUrIRMAN~ Columbia Theological Seminary Descartes. Oeuvres philosophiques. Tome I (1618-1637.) Textes 6tablis, pr6sent6s et annot6s par Ferdinand Alqui6. l~dition illustr6e. (Paris: Garnier Fr6res, 1965. [Glassiques Garnier.] Pp. 829 + 12 plates.) The publication of this massive paperbound volume is an event in Descartes studies. It is the first in a three-volume edition of Descartes' complete philosophical works in French, an edition which is original in its plan, up-to-date in scholarship, worked from the sources, and superbly annotated, the only truly new edition since Charles Adam completed the great AT in 1913. Professor Alqui6 defines the word "philosophical" almost as broadly as Descartes did. To the specifically philosophical texts he adds generous portions of the non-mathematical scientific works. All Latin texts are given in French translation (the Meditations are to appear bilingually.) The spelling is modern. The AT pagination appears in the margin, but the volume number should be given there too. Scholars working with AT and AM (Adam-Milhaud's Correspondance de D.) should take note of the textual corrections and emendations in this Edition dlquid. In the battle of Descartes interpretation Professor Alqui6 takes the chronological stand. Where Martial Gueroult sees a marvellously wrought monolithic system, there Alqui6 sees development and growth: to understand Descartes one must follow his "itin6raire philosophique" step by step. In his new role as editor he practices what he preached. This is the first edition to take us in unbroken, rigorously chronological sequence from the first extant writing through the year of the Discours de la mdthode. Even the correspondence is broken up and inserted between the writings in its chronological place. (Just about half of Descartes' letters of this period--none written to him--are given:.58 as against 27 in the Pl6i'ade edition.) The volume opens with a few (too few) paragraphs from the Compendium Musicae of 1618 and sections from the Cogitationes privatae, including the complete text of Baillet's account of the Dream of Descartes. The Regulae appear in a new, annotated translation by Jacques Brunschvicg. Le Monde et le Traitd de l'Homme, treated as one manuscript, is here, all but complete. After the Discours de la mdthode we get the first six chapters of the Dioptrique and four of the ten chapters of Mdtdores. All omitted chapters are summarized. The little Traitd de la m~canique brings up the rear. The missing Gdom(trie is to appear in a companion volume of collected mathematical writings, promised for some later date. The reader who never read all of Descartes' writings between 1618 and 1637 in fl~eir chronological order will find a new vista opening up. This is particularly true of the sixty-odd pages of earliest writings. But here the editor's principle of excluding "mathematical " texts works against his clear intention of keeping interpretation out: "Une ~dition BOOK REVIEWS 261 de Descartes," he writes, "n'est pas une th~se sur la philosophie de Descartes." Alqui6 here (and only here) excludes not only all purely mathematical texts but also those on mechanics, optics, acoustics, hydraulics, automata, etc., and even epistemologically significant items like "hi omni questione debet dari aliquod medium," "Si funis," and the full text of the ars memoriae passage. The only exception is Descartes' answer to Beeckman's problem regarding free fall, truncated at the point where Descartes with the characteristic dlan of these years continues: "Ut autem hujus scientiae fundamenta jaciam...". AlquiCs general justification for the exclusion of "mathematics" rests upon the evidence that Descartes himself... (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Descartes developed an early theory of happiness, which he rhetorically claimed to have stemmed from his choice of vocation in 1619. I provide a sketch of his theory in the Discours, noting, however, some problems with the historicity of the text. I then turn to his Olympica and associated writings that date from this period, where he literally asked, “What way in life shall I follow?” I take Descartes’ dreams as allegorical and provide an (...) interpretation of his curious claim that poets are better equipped to discover truth than philosophers, made at a time when he chose to become a philosopher and not a poet. My way out of this conundrum is to identify in this text a philosophical psychology that I argue is consistent with the Regulae and the Discours, is part of what he took to be his “foundation of the wonderful science,” and is the essence of his early theory of happiness. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:"If You Are Led by the Spirit, You Are Not Under the Law":Lex Privata and Veritas Vitae as a Divine Personal VocationJustin M. AndersonCharles Taylor, not assuming that Western secularity is without its own ethic, has described the moral impulses shaping modern lives as an "ethic of authenticity."1 Among the various marks one might discern in today's wider ethic is a desire to take seriously the particularities unique to (...) each human life. This means that any method of validly describing or prescribing for the modern person must show itself able of genuinely engaging with the particularities of an unrepeatable person enmeshed in a distinct and unique situation. Under such a predisposition, in so far as a moral matrix proves itself incapable of performing on such an individual and particular level, to that extent it is seen as artificial and even inhumane. By its modern hearer, such a morality is necessarily limited. It is perceived as a purely deductive morality that can merely apply general and undifferentiated norms without grasping with the variances in person and situations that lead to the potentially infinite variation of right values and actions. This pervasive, wider Western secular ethic of authenticity is worth considering the true locus of the rejection of the classical Christian affirmation of "absolute moral norms" or the "intrinsically evil acts" those norms prohibit. For his or her part, the Catholic moral theologian is left either attempting to explain how this classic Christian ethic is one that in fact bequeaths life and joy despite its apparent [End Page 1297] rigorism and insensitivity, or abandoning it altogether. The modern Catholic in turn would only be forced to consider their own decision making as "out of touch with real people" or to abandon their own intellectual tradition as having been so.At first glance, luminaries like Thomas Aquinas and others of his scholastic guild seem ill-equipped to help us. There is a serious reason for this, namely Aquinas's own Aristotelian method. According to the Aristotelian method, true scientific knowledge can be had only about universals, not particulars. This simple truth, which Aquinas embraced, entailed a focus on natures, essences, and causes, each of which were universals, and therefore capable of being meaningfully treated as part of any science, including sacra doctrina. Particulars mattered, but particulars simply needed to be perceived, since they were not per se universals.2While this method generally meant that Thomas did not speak at length of particulars, this itself is only a general rule. For there are places in his oeuvre where, like many Christian authors before him, Aquinas does give attention to individual cases of divine vocation in apparent contradiction of a divine commandment given to all. He treats the individual case of Abraham being called to sacrifice Isaac. But such treatments often fall only to biblical examples. Unfortunately, however, this means such cases are all very particular. For precisely that reason, if one wishes to move to reflections on modern human life, one needs to be willing to claim the same sort of inspiration that Abraham could.3 A second kind of particularity Aquinas [End Page 1298] addresses constitutes an oft-ignored portion of the secunda pars of the Summa theologiae (ST). Here he treats of charismatic gifts, states of life, and hierarchical offices.4 Yet here again is not the moral particularity for which the modern reader wishes. These do not touch on every human life, and Thomas gives only a generic understanding of these gifts, states, and offices. A third kind of particularity arises when Thomas is attempting to help confessors guide individual penitents. In such rarified places Aquinas distinguishes between two fora where a particular person was to be counselled. The first was a public forum, like a local diocesan marriage tribunal (forum exterius Ecclesiae), and the other was the forum of conscience (forum conscientiae), most obviously present in the context of sacramental confession and equipped with its own rules and guidelines.5 While the situations that arise out of such differentiation of fora are fascinating, the cases usually deal with agents in circumstances of rare moral perplexity and framing any wider moral matrix out of such... (shrink)

En plaçant sous son microscope les cicisbei – les « sigisbées » en français – et le système italien du sigisbéisme, Roberto Bizzocchi ne renonce pas à ouvrir la focale. D’un phénomène qui peut nous sembler ténu, marginal et exotique, les sigisbées de la noblesse italienne du xviiie siècle, il tire des conclusions qui portent sur l’histoire politique des élites italiennes, l’historiographie du xixe siècle, la perception de la diversité européenne, et l’histoire du genre. Il démontre comment, l...

The article argues that descartes' inclusion under the label 'thought' ("cogitatio") of willing, Perceiving, Feeling, Etc., Is a deliberate and ("pace" anscombe and geach) idiosyncratic move. It is not an arbitrary extension of usage, But requires careful diagnosis. The proper diagnosis reveals the philosophical reason for the labelling: the various operations listed are "cogitationes" only and precisely insofar as they include a reflective cognitive act-The mind's intellectual awareness of itself which descartes terms "conscientia". The upshot is that when descartes (...) calls himself a "res cogitans" there is an important and illuminating sense in which he means precisely that-A thing which "thinks". (shrink)

Obwohl ‚conscientia’ ein zentraler Grundbegriff der cartesischen Metaphysik ist, sagt Descartes nirgends explizit, was er damit meint. Auch aus der Art und Weise, in der er das Wort verwendet, lässt sich dessen Bedeutung nicht vollends erschließen. Insbesondere handelt es sich nicht um einen reflexiven Denkakt (cogitatio), nicht um eine Disposition zum Haben solcher cogitationes und nicht um eine Art Aufmerksamkeit. Um die Bedeutung des Begriffes zu klären, schlage ich vor, auf klassische Texte von Augustinus, Thomas von Aquin und jesuitischen (...) Autoren zurückzugreifen. Es ergibt sich, dass man unter der conscientia traditionell ein Wissen um den moralischen Wert einer Handlung verstand, das der Handelnde mit einem idealen Beobachter (d.i. Gott) teilt. Ich behaupte, dass sich diese Begriffsbestimmung mehr oder weniger analog auf Descartes übertragen lässt. Die cartesische conscientia ist demnach ein Wissen um den spezifischen Wert eines Gedanken, das der Denker mit einem idealen Beobachter teilt. (shrink)

Although Descartes is often said to have coined the modern notion of 'consciousness', he nowhere defines the according Latin term (conscientia), neither explicitly nor implicitly. This may either imply that he used the word in a sense that he did not make sufficiently clear, that he was not the first to use 'conscientia' in its modern psychological sense, or that he still used it in its traditional sense. I argue for the third assumption: Descartes used 'conscientia' according to the traditional (...) meaning that we also find in the writings of St. Paul, Augustine, Aquinas and later scholastics. Thus for Descartes, conscientia is not a kind of speculative self-knowledge, inner observation or reflexive awareness. Rather, it is a kind of practical knowledge. This is a bold claim. I will argue for it (1) by closely examining the key passages in the Cartesian writings and (2) by re-evaluating the traditional use of the Latin 'conscientia'. Then I will (3) draw some consequences. 1. Descartes makes rather clear what consciousness (conscientia) is not. To take only the most likely candidates. Consciousness is not a thought (cogitatio), since every thought must be accompanied by consciousness. Further, it is not a disposition. Descartes claims that the object of our consciousness never is a possible, but always must be an actual thought. It would be difficult to see how a disposition could be about an actual thought rather than a possible one. But consciousness is also not an attribute of a thought, since Descartes always ascribes it to the thinker herself. 2. In classical and mediaeval Latin, 'conscientia' did not mean 'consciousness', but also not exactly the same as 'moral conscience'. Three aspects are involved in the traditional meaning of the term. First, conscientia is shared knowledge. At least since Augustine, this knowledge is said to be shared between particular human agents and God. Second, conscientia concerns the specific (moral) value of an action. Even more, as Aquinas maintains, actions acquire their rationality and normativity only by being subject to conscientia. On this basis, later scholastics thirdly defined conscientia as a kind of practical knowledge. As such, conscientia is in some sense the cause of what it understands. Put in late scholastic terms, it is the formal cause of its moral being (esse morale). This account of the meaning of 'conscientia' will be shown to be largely compatible with the Cartesian use of the term; the only change to be made being that it deals with thoughts (cogitationes) and their specific value rather than with actions. Hence for Descartes, consciousness is a kind of practical knowledge about thoughts that is shared with an ideal observer (God) and that causes the specific value of the thought that is its object. 3. This reading has several important implications. For instance, it provides us with a reason for the claim that the consciousness is not itself a thought of the thinker who has it. Our the consciousness turns something into a thought by taking it as its object and thereby endowing it with the specific value that it has as a thought. This value might be truth, correctness, adequacy or something along these lines. Now every particular judgment of value can itself be false, incorrect, or inadequate. Hence, every particular reflexive thought would itself be subject to a further consciousness. The only conscientia that can stop this regress is Gods knowledge of our thoughts. This knowledge cannot be wrong. As a consequence, the suggested reading directs us away from the assumption that the mind contains only incorporeal thoughts that are privately known to the thinker. As for the first, Descartes himself claims that most of our thoughts depend on the body. The object of our consciousness may then be some event happening in our brain. Consciousness turns this event into something that is also in some respect incorporeal by endowing it with a value. As thought, it is then not a mere corporeal thing. (The modern reader may add: as thought, but not as bodily event, it is equivalent with other brain events.) As for the second part of the above claim, the Cartesian mind must be radically public, since we always share our conscientia with an ideal observer. Finally, we come to see why Descartes proceeds so easily from his cogito, sum to a proof of the existence of God. Since every thought must be subject to a conscientia, there must always have been an ideal observer. God's existence can be shown because it must already have been presupposed. In fact, the Cartesian meditator was never alone. (shrink)

It appears that Rousseau has annulled the dichotomy between man and citizen for the benefit of the citizen – after all, the social contract implies the “total alienation of each associate, together with all his rights, to the whole community”. Does this not mean the individual is completely absorbed by the collectivity? The paper takes up the role of religion for politics in Rousseau’s work to show that even civil religion cannot help to re-establish the lost unity between man and (...) citizen, on the contrary, it only makes this division visible. As long as the individual is part of the body politic, he or she has to accept having a fragmented existence. The text aims to clarify that Rousseau blamed the protagonists of the established churches as well as his fellow Enlightenment philosophers for striving to overcome the contradictions of human existence, while Rousseau himself defended the distinction between “res privata” and “res publica” and the tensions it might cause in the individual. The paper therefore suggests a liberal reading of Rousseau. (shrink)

Eine Untersuchung der Präpositionen bei Leibniz kann aufgrund ihrer synkatego-rematischen Natur zeigen, in welchem Sinne die Sprache - als strukturiertes, bedeutendes Zeichensystem – das logische Verhältnis unter den Notionen ausdrü-cken kann, und damit der Zusammenhang zwischen Grammatik und Semantik einerseits, und Logik anderseits, erhellen. Meiner Ansicht nach bekommt auch Leibniz' Versuch des Aufbaus einer characteristica universalis dank dieser Per-spektive ein neues Forschungsinteresse. Um das Interesse für diese Redeteile zu wecken, werde ich zuvor in einem kurzen Exkurs die vorgängige Tradition dar-stellen. (...) Das Ziel ist, zu zeigen, was die Unterscheidung zwischen Kategoremen und Synkategoremen innerhalb der Tradition der sogenannten Mentalsprache im-pliziert; welche Fragen ihre Analyse erhoben hat und was diese Unterscheidung bei einem für Leibniz wichtigen Denker, wie Joachim Jungius, bedeutet. Beson-ders zeige ich, wie die Unterscheidung Kategoreme – Synkategoreme der zwi-schen Begriff und modi des Begreifens entspricht. Danach analysiere ich die viel-fältige Betrachtung dieser Redeteile bei Leibniz in Bezug auf seine Zurückfüh-rung der Präpositionen auf eine räumliche Grundbedeutung. Zum Schluss versu-che ich zu zeigen, warum diese Redeteile als cogitationes caecae bei Leibniz interpretiert werden können und welche Schlüsse man aus dieser Bestimmung im Rahmen von Leibniz‟ Sprachphilosophie ziehen darf. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Le prime quattro Collationes Parisienses sulle tracce di Giovanni Duns ScotoFrancesco Fiorentino (bio)Come si è visto altrove, l'attribuzione delle Collationes è abbastanza dubbia, propriamente parlando: questa opera non può essere ricondotta a Giovanni Duns Scoto in quanto autore secondo i concetti moderni di proprietà intellettuale e di responsabilità privata, che non risultano pertinenti ai processi materiali di produzione del libro tardo-medievale in quanto opera collettiva, fondata sulla co-autorialità distribuita (...) tra maestro in quanto ideatore e apprendista in quanto compilatore. Questa impossibilità consegue al genere letterario delle Collationes in quanto esercitazioni baccellierali o studentesche, sotto la supervisione di un magister studentium.1 I contemporanei a Scoto non rispettavano i criteri filologici del Terzo Millennio al punto da includere, nel corpus scotiano, il primo libro del commento sentenziario di Enrico di Harclay secondo la redazione del ms. Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 13687.2Tuttavia, la considerazione di questi fattori materiali non svaluta né le Collationes che attestano l'esistenza di un ambiente culturale, prossimo a Scoto, né lo stesso Scoto che ha probabilmente partecipato alle Collationes come moderatore o come interlocutore.3 Questa particolare natura delle Collationes ne condiziona l'attribuzione che non può essere associata con la ricerca dell'autore in senso stretto, ma con la considerazione di un plesso di opinioni concorrenti e risalenti all'insegnamento [End Page 115] di Scoto, non sempre in prima scena.4 Scoto, in cinque luoghi testuali dell'Ordinatio, si riferisce apertamente alle Collationes che sono incluse in un discreto numero di testimoni manoscritti del trecento e del quattrocento che tramandano opere sicuramente scotiane, e nella Tabula Scoti redatta da Giacomo d'Ascoli. Guglielmo di Alnwick si dichiara reportator di una collatio, presumibilmente di Parigi, sulla connessione delle virtù morali.5Queste evidenze consentono d'inserire le Collationes nel corpus scotiano, secondo un grado di autenticità significativo, ma non perfettamente conforme ai criteri filologici attuali. Ciò non significa de virtute sermonis che le Collationes sono di Scoto o che non sono di Scoto, ma, più precisamente, che le Collationes non possono essere attribuite a Scoto secondo i criteri filologici attuali, pur avendo avuto buona probabilità di essere attribuite a Scoto dai suoi contemporanei secondo i loro specifici criteri filologici. Infatti è la cornice che dà significato al quadro, è l'orizzonte che dà senso al paesaggio, è la forma che fa la sostanza. Queste ultime annotazioni apparentemente erudite potrebbero risultare scomode per un eventuale progetto di edizione critica che volesse sostenere una stretta autorialità scotiana delle Collationes. Sarebbe più saggio mantenere l'anonimato dell'opera nel rispetto del rigore scientifico sperimentale.A seconda del luogo in cui queste conferenze sono state svolte, ossia Parigi o Oxford, le Collationes sono state distinte in Parisienses e Oxonienses. Queste ultime sono state edite da Marina Fedeli e Guido Alliney.6 Alliney e Fedeli hanno messo in luce la natura, la tradizione, la datazione, l'attribuzione e i contenuti storico-dottrinali di tutte le Collationes, incluse quelle di Parigi.Le Collationes Parisienses sono conservate in sette testimoni manoscritti già descritti da Carlo Balic, Guido Alliney, Marina Fedeli e Franz Pelster7: [End Page 116]Cambridge, Peterhouse College, MS 241, fols. 1r–45r;London, British Library, Add MS 7696, fols. 2r–38v;Cittá Vaticana, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 876, fols. 311r–323v;Oxford, Balliol College, MS 209, fols. 114r–141v;Oxford, Magdalen College, MS 194, fols. 2v–20v;Oxford, Merton College, MS 65, fols. 90r–109v;Oxford, Merton College, MS 90, fols. 155r–199VQuesti testimoni sembrano essere distribuiti in due redazioni distinte: l'una completa e l'altra incompleta. La prima appare tramandata dai primi due testimoni, entrambi risalenti al secolo XV, mentre la seconda redazione si trova negli altri testimoni di cui solo il ms. Vat. lat. 876 data al secolo XIV. A questi testimoni occorre aggiungere altri due: il ms. Cittá Vaticana, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 890, fols. 4v–5v che contiene solo un estratto, e il ms. Barcelona, Arxiu de la Corona d'Aragó, ms. Ripoll 95, ff. 35r–37r che custodisce solo la prima collatio di Parigi.8Le Collationes Parisienses si dividono almeno in quattro gruppi: il primo gruppo, dalla prima alla quarta collatio, verte sulle virtù morali... (shrink)

Cet article propose de lire la séquence de AT VII 27, l. 18 à AT VII 29, l. 18 (B Op I 716-718) de la Méditation II de Descartes comme une description de nature « phénoménologique » que le méditant fait de ses actes mentaux, afin de redéfinir la sensibilité et l’imagination. Ceci ne conduit pas simplement à leur inclusion dans la res cogitans (à titre de cogitationes), mais à une resignification qui permet leur unification et, en même temps, (...) leur distinction sous la cogitatio ; ou autrement dit, ce qui permet de les distinguer l’une de l’autre et toutes les deux de l’intellection. (shrink)

Le lettere che compongono il carteggio intercorso fra Benedetto Croce e Giosue Carducci sfuggono, per l'una e l'altra parte, alle classificazioni dell'epistolografia e vari sono i motivi: la limitata consistenza delle lettere, in tutto ventiquattro, inclusive di carte da visita e telegramma, che si susseguono, talvolta a lunghi intervalli e in numero decrescente, nell'arco di tempo 1887-1906; la distanza anagrafica che si dà tra i due interlocutori: l'uno, il 'poeta vate' che alla data dell'incontro, pur ancora in piena attività, inizia (...) o ha già iniziato la sua parabola di lento declino; l'altro, il brillante dotto erudito e futuro filosofo, ma già orientato a studiare la scienza estetica attraverso il filosofare sulla storia, che, nel pieno delle forze intellettuali, percorre la propria con agilità. Non frammenti di vita privata, non sfumature psicologiche, non ideologie politiche, non teorie filosofiche emergono da questo carteggio bensì, salvo rari gesti di cortesia, esigenze di ordine intellettuale, di ricerca e di studio. L'impressione che se ne ricava è comunque quella di entrare nell''officina' dei due 'grandi operai' della cultura. E, sotto questo aspetto, il carteggio acquista interesse, innanzi tutto per la statura dei personaggi, due titani del sapere, e, in secondo luogo, proprio in ragione di quei tempi 'vuoti' o 'morti' che interrompono il flusso temporale dello scambio di lettere, ma che si rivelano 'pieni' ove si ricorra alla saggistica di entrambe le parti, che ha attinenza con gli argomenti trattati e che instaura un 'dialogo' tra lettere e opere. Un dialogo che trova anche consistenza e validità attraverso il manufatto, il 'libro', ovvero le edizioni a stampa delle proprie opere delle quali i due interlocutori avrebbero fatto dono l'un l'altro. (shrink)

L'uomo è un animale razionale, oltreché politico, socievole, come dice Aristotele. Ma quello del pensiero occidentale è un cammino, non sempre lineare, lungo momenti di apertura e ripiegamento della ragione. Quando la ragione è strumento del conoscere è in una fase di apertura, in cui fioriscono le scoperte scientifiche, l'arte, il pensiero politico ed economico; quando invece la stessa ragione perde il suo carattere strumentale divenendo pensiero assoluto, ripiegato su di sé, cede il passo alla follia, fino agli orrori del (...) Nazismo. La follia è il capitolo oscuro di un logos assolutizzato, che non lascia spazio alla molteplicità dei punti di vista, è la deriva di una ragione non 'addomesticata', privata del contraddittorio con il reale. Con un linguaggio preciso ma accessibile, Campana Comparini, al dualismo ragione 'aperta' e feconda/ragione 'chiusa' e assolutizzata, oppone una diversa categoria filosofica di lettura del reale: la follia della croce; ovvero una prospettiva in cui la fede nel Cristo-uomo diventa la base da cui partire per rifondare la principale caratteristica dell'uomo, cioè il pensiero. La 'follia della croce' non è tanto un'alternativa, quanto il terreno su cui reimpiantare la logica della razionalità umana, poiché viene prima di essa. Una lettura per guardare da un'altra prospettiva le origini del pensiero occidentale."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

For Descartes, nature must be interpreted through a limited number of simple laws used to describe the multiplicity of the real, focusing on the rule and normality rather than on the exception and monstrosity. Nevertheless, monstrosity has a vital function in Descartes' philosophy. By offering a new reading of the evil genius and the deceiver God in terms of absolute monstrosity, I intend to demonstrate the novel role played by the will in this philosophical ‘teratomachy’. Examining the peculiar status Admiration (...) occupies in the economy of the passions, I also analyze a passage from the Cogitationes circa generatione animalium , the only text in which Descartes explicitly discusses physical monstrosities. I argue that these pages, in which Descartes subscribes to a rigidly mechanistic, epigenetic view of embryology, are in tension with his doctrine of final causes and the idea of continuous creation. My theory is that the entire philosophy of Descartes can be read as a veritable war against a certain idea of monstrosity. (shrink)

Che cos'è l'amicizia? Un legame più o meno intenso dell'amore passionale? È solo una questione privata o, come pensavano i greci, mi mette in gioco totalmente e racchiude la mia natura di animale politico? Come può aiutarci a definirla il dialogo con Socrate, Aristotele, Platone e Montaigne? E in che cosa consiste "l'amicizia stellare" di cui parla il Nietzsche? Un nuovo appassionante viaggio della felicità--Back cover.

Nombreux signes montrent qu’Aristote a conçu la Poétique en continuité avec les livres de la Politique consacrés au problème de l’éducation. Lue à la lumière de ces textes, la Poétique manisfeste la volonté de son auteur d’attribuer à la poésie, et en particulier à la poésie tragique, la fonction d’aider les hommes adultes dont le caractère a déjà été formé, à développer la phronèsis, la sagesse pratique qui guide de manière rationnelle le comportement et stabilise l’équilibre des émotions de l’agent. (...) Si cette fonction n’est pas rendue explicite dans les pages de ce traité, c’est probablement dû à la conscience à laquelle Aristote est arrivé de ce que la tragédie peut atteindre sa finalité sans une représentation publique, au moyen de la seule lecture privée de son texte. Cette idée suffit à relâcher les liens entre la réflexion sur la poésie et l’étude des institutions politiques de la cité et de leurs tâches éducatives.RiassuntoPer molti indizi la Poetica di Aristotele si revela concepita in continuità con i libri della Politica dedicati al problema educativo. Letta alla luce di questi scritti, la Poetica manifesta la volontà dei suo autore di attribuire alla poesia, specialmente tragica, la funzione di aiutare a sviluppare negli uomini adulti e già preventivamente formati nel carattere la phronesis, la sagezza pratica che guida razionalmente il comportamento e stabilisce l’equilibrio emotivo degli agenti. Se poi questa funzione non è resa esplicata nelle pagine dei trattato, cio si deve probabilmente alla nuova consapevolezza maturata da Aristotele che la tragedia potrebbe ottenere il suo scopo anche senza la pubblica rappresentazione e mediante la sola lettura privata dei testo. Questa intuizione basta ad allentare i legami tra la riflessione sulla poesia e lo studio delle istituzioni politiche cittadine e dei loro compiti educativi. (shrink)

Obwohl 'conscientia' ein zentraler Grundbegriff der cartesischen Metaphysik ist, sagt Descartes nirgends explizit, was er damit meint. Auch aus der Art und Weise, in der er das Wort verwendet, lässt sich dessen Bedeutung nicht vollends erschließen. Insbesondere handelt es sich nicht um einen reflexiven Denkakt (cogitatio), nicht um eine Disposition zum Haben solcher cogitationes und nicht um eine Art Aufmerksamkeit. Um die Bedeutung des Begriffes zu klären, schlage ich vor, auf klassische Texte von Augustinus, Thomas von Aquin und jesuitischen (...) Autoren zurückzugreifen. Es ergibt sich, dass man unter der conscientia traditionell ein Wissen um den moralischen Wert einer Handlung verstand, das der Handelnde mit einem idealen Beobachter (d.i. Gott) teilt. Ich behaupte, dass sich diese Begriffsbestimmung mehr oder weniger analog auf Descartes übertragen lässt. Die cartesische conscientia ist demnach ein Wissen um den spezifischen Wert eines Gedanken, das der Denker mit einem idealen Beobachter teilt. (shrink)

The paper is a contribution to the phenomenological analysis of the process of the inner perception as understood by Husserl and Pato?ka. It draws on the four stratas of the "stream of cogitationes" from Pato?ka´s Introduction to Husserl's Phenomenology: the stratum of the real transcendence , the stratum of the real immanence , the stratum of the reel immanence , and the stratum of reel transcendence . The author discusses the process of phenomenalization with the background as its clue (...) element, on which, like on a screen, the appearances are displayed. The background is seen as making the appearance "clare et distincte" in its original cartesian form possible. At the same time the background is seen as a whole, a context, a horizon. (shrink)

The most obvious cases of ego-involvement in conscious life are those which Husserl calls conscious acts or cogitationes.[2] They are the most obvious cases because they are the ones in which the ego explicitly involves himself in some way ; they exhibit the character of being engaged in by the ego or having been engaged in by him. This ego-quality or character belongs demonstrably to every conscious process in which the ego engages or lives. In the ego's conscious life, (...) the life to which his, her, or its acts belong, there also occur mental or intentive processes in which the ego does not or did not engage, and these Husserl calls passive or non-actional processes as contrasted with the active or actional processes characterized by egoengagement. (shrink)

Summary The way patrimonial procuratorships (of the patrimonium, ratio privata, and res privata) functioned at the beginning of the 3rd century CE remains controversial. A recently published inscription from Proconsular Africa featuring a new equestrian procurator rationis patrimonii of ducenarius rank, combined with re-interpreting the patrimonial procuratorships held by M. Aquilius Felix, argues convincingly that the reform of the administration of imperial property carried out at the beginning of Septimius Severus’ reign may have been more comprehensive than previously believed.

Although the advent of the Kingdom of God in Jesus contains as an intrinsic quality the opportunity for repentance as often as required, the Church of the first five-hundred years shows serious difficulties with the opportunity of conversion after a relapse in sinning after baptism. The Church allowed only one chance of repentance. Requirement for the reconciliation were a public confession and the acceptance of severe penances, especially after committing the mortal sin of apostasy, fornication or murder. As severe as (...) this paenitentia canonica appears, its entire conception especially in the eastern part of the Church, the Oriental Church, is a remedial one: sin represents an ailment of the soul, the one, who received the confession, is called upon to meet the confessing person as a spiritual physician or soul-friend. Penance does not mean punishment, but healing like a salutary remedy. Nevertheless, the lack of privacy led to the unwanted practice of postponing repentance and even baptism on the deathbed. An alternative procedure of repentance arose from the sixth century onwards in the Irish Church as well as the Continental Church under the influence of Irish missionaries and the South-West-British and later the English Church. In treatises about repentance, called penitentials, ecclesiastical authorities of the sixth to the eight centuries wrote down regulations, how to deal with the different capital sins and minor trespasses committed by monks, clerics and laypeople. Church-representatives like Finnian, Columbanus, the anonymous author of the Ambrosianum, Cummean and Theodore developed a new conception of repentance that protected privacy and guaranteed a discrete, an affordable as well as a predictable penance, the paenitentia privata. They not only connected to the therapeutic aspect of repentance in the Oriental Church by adopting basic ideas of Basil of Caesarea and John Cassian, they also established an astonishing network in using their mutual interrelations. Here the earlier penitentials served as source for the later ones. But it is remarkable that the authors in no way appeared as simple copyists, but also as creative revisers, who took regard of the pastoral necessities of the entrusted flock. They appeared as engaged in the goal to improve their ecclesiastical as well as their civil life-circumstances to make it possible that the penitents of the different ecclesiastical estates could perform their conversion and become reconciled in a dignified way. The aim of the authors was to enable the confessors to do the healing dialogue qualitatively in a high standard; quantity was not their goal. The penitents should feel themselves healed, not punished. (shrink)

Il saggio intende sviluppare una fenomenologia della violenza, a partire dagli Scritti di Franco Basaglia, che ha studiato il problema della violenza nell’istituzione psichiatrica e ha riflettuto sulla questione in una prospettiva fenomenologica. La sua tesi fondamentale è stata che la violenza dell’istituzione consista in una sostituzione e in un’alienazione. Il corpo vissuto, l’identità originaria di una persona, le sue esperienze e i suoi pensieri sarebbero rimpiazzati da quelli dell’istituzione, che diverrebbe così il ‘corpo’ di quella persona. La fenomenologia di (...) Basaglia traccia quindi, al seguito di Husserl, un’opposizione netta tra esperienza vissuta e istituzione, soggettività e segno sociale, identità privata e marca culturale. Possiamo tuttavia accogliere questa opposizione tanto semplice e trasparente? E in caso negativo, se la violenza non potesse essere descritta come la semplice irruzione dell’istituzione nello spazio del soggetto, se questa irruzione dell’Altro fosse anzi costitutiva del soggetto stesso, come pensare la violenza? Come definire una ‘politica’ di questa violenza originaria?This essay tries to develop a phenomenology of violence. Its approach is based on the Writings of Franco Basaglia, who studied the phaenomenon of violence in the psychiatric institutions and reflected on this issue from a phenomenological point of view. His main theses was that institutional violence means substitution and alienation. The lived body, the originary identity of a person, his experiences and thoughts are replaced by those of the institution. The institution itself becomes the ‘body’ of that person. Basaglia’s phenomenology thus traces, with Husserl, a neat opposition between lived experience and institution, subjectivity and social sign, private identity and cultural mark. Can we trust this simple and transparent opposition? And if violence cannot be described as an irruption of the institution in the subject’s space, if this irruption of the Other is constitutive of the subject itself, how to define violence? And how to define a ‘politics’ of this originary violence? (shrink)

La pittura islamica e in particolare l’illustrazione dei manoscritti, opere a circolazione limitata e prevalentemente privata, ha avuto una notevole diffusione godendo del patrocinio delle corti. Alcune pitture, soprattutto quelle che illustrano l’Ascensione celeste del profeta Muhammad, ma anche le Storie dei Profeti, pitture datate al XIV e XV secolo, rappresentano l’uno e gli altri col volto scoperto. Solo relativamente tardi, in particolare nel mondo iranico, ma anche presso gli ottomani o i Moghul dell’India, il volto del Profeta diventa una (...) convenzione iconografica. Un versetto coranico afferma che Dio parla all’uomo o per Rivelazione o dietro a un velame. Per questo nell’iconografia della pittura islamica si constata che il Profeta o altri personaggi possono figurare con il volto coperto da un velo. Questo segno di rispetto, col tempo, si trasformerà in parola e il sembiante del Profeta sarà reso calligraficamente. Islamic painting and particularly miniature painting illustrating manuscripts, books restricted to few people and for personal use, had a considerable circulation thanks to the patronage of courts. Some paintings, chiefly those illustrating the heavenly Ascent of the prophet Muhammad, but also Histories of Prophets, paintings dated to the XIV and XV century, show him and the others barefaced. Only fairly later, particularly in the iranian world, but also among Ottomans or the Moghuls of India, the face of the Prophet becomes an iconographic convention. According to a Koranic verse God speaks to man either through Revelation of behind a veil. For this reason in the iconography of islamic painting the Prophet or other people may appear with the face covered by a veil. This sign of respect, in the course of time, changed and the countenance of the Prophet was rendered in words, that is calligraphically. (shrink)

Dopo un'introduzione che delinea lo status questionis relativo alla discussione sul diritto di proprietà nel sec. XIII, l'articolo si divide in tre parti: nella prima si discute la relazione tra gli ideali della fede cristiana e la proprietà comune, con particolare riguardo per l'origine dei diritti di proprietà; la seconda tratta gli argomenti che concernono il diritto alla proprietà privata, mentre la terza approfondisce il tema della proprietà condivisa. I testi sui quali viene condotta l'indagine sono il Tractatus brevis de (...) periculis novissimorum temporum di Guglielmo di Saint-Amour, il Contra adversarium perfectionis di Gerardo di Abbeville e le questioni quodlibetali di Enrico di Gand e di Goffredo di Fontaines, scritte a Parigi dal 1280 al 1290. Si mette in risalto l'uso della concezione aristotelica della proprietà contro l'ideale di assoluta povertà promosso da parte degli ambienti francescani. (shrink)

La concezione tradizionale che vede la sinistra e la critica sociale volte al rovesciamento del sistema economico-sociale si fonda su quattro presupposti: 1) la proprietÀ privata č la radice del dominio sociale; 2) č possibile pensare un regime di proprietÀ e di organizzazione economica diverso da quello capitalistico, accettabile in termini di equitÀ ed efficienza; 3) č possibile individuare nell'ordine sociale esistente le forze sociali che lo rovesceranno; 4) il cambiamento verso il nuovo ordine sociale puň essere realizzato con l'azione (...) politica. Il saggio prova a dimostrare perché queste quattro condizioni non si danno, e come, se la sinistra riesce ad accettarlo, possa pensare la sua azione come cambiamento reale dei rapporti sociali esistenti, e non come il loro rovesciamento. (shrink)

Beginning with Descartes' caution not “imprudently” to “take some other object in place of myself”, I consider first the problems of self-identification confronted by various amnesiacs , both ordinary and Cartesian. Noting that cogitationes as such do not individuate, I proceed to examine conclusions drawn from certain sorts of “body-switching” thought experiments. This, in turn, gives rise to a general critique of “psychological connectedness” or “unity of consciousness” as a candidate criterion of personal identity. I conclude that our ability (...) to apply any notion of personal identity is parasitic upon the existence of a conceptual apparatus for individuating, identifying, and reidentifying objects. Finally, I argue that, if ‘person’ is a proper sortal predicate to begin with, Descartes' res cogitans cannot be understood as a species of the genus res , distinct from res extensa and only problematically in “interaction” with it. Cartesian dualism is a multiply untenable doctrine. (shrink)

Sokrates var inte bara en filosofisk nydanare. Genom sitt sätt att involvera sina samtalspartners i den filosofiska processen var han också i hög utsträckning en pedagogisk nydanare. Hans pedagogiska grundidé var den så kallade majeutiska metoden – det vill säga ”barnmorskemetoden”. Med det menade han att han inte överförde sina egna färdiga tankar till den han talade med utan han hjälpte sin samtalspartner att föda sina egna tankar. Inom pedagogiken är det vanligt att använda den så kallade ”Sokratiska metoden” vilket (...) i sin enklaste form bara innebär att man ställer frågor till studenterna. Den här artikeln kommer emellertid att handla om en mer sofistikerad metod som används för begreppsanalys/begreppsdefinition i grupp. Metoden är inspirerad av Sokrates men skiljer sig också en del från hur Sokrates själv grep sig an sina dialoger – åtminstone så som de beskrivs av Platon. Artikeln innehåller en kort historisk och pedagogisk bakgrund men syftar framför allt till att utgöra en praktisk vägledning för genomförande av sokratiska dialoger i filosofiundervisningen. Artikeln bygger framför allt på mina egna erfarenheter av att använda Sokratisk Dialog i undervisningen vid Filosofiska institutionen vid Lunds universitet, Lunds Tekniska Högskola, Sveriges Lantbruksuniversitet och i det privata näringslivet. Artikeln vänder sig till alla som undervisar i filosofi på universitetet eller gymnasiet eller i filosofiska metoder för studenter vid andra utbildningar, t.ex. värdeteori, vetenskapsteori eller tillämpad etik för ingenjörer eller medicinare – eller i vilket annat ämne som helst där det förekommer begrepp som saknar en enkel och knivskarp definition men som är viktiga för ämnet. (shrink)

Tra gli intellettuali italiani della seconda metà del Novecento, Norberto Bobbio ha giocato un ruolo di grande importanza. Girolamo Cotroneo è intervenuto, spesso in maniera polemica per discutere le posizioni assunte da Bobbio di fronte ai problemi più pressanti del dibattito politico. Ad ognuno degli interventi Bobbio ha replicato con una lettera privata all’autore. Quegli articoli e le lettere di Bobbio sono contenute ora in questo volume che costituisce un prezioso documento per una maggiore conoscenza di taluni aspetti del dibattito (...) politico italiano di un passato recente. (shrink)

Wandlung und Bestand, von H. Jonas.--Die Bedeutung von Martin Heideggers Denken für die Methode der Theologie, von H. Ott.--Das befreite Nichts, von K. Harries.--Bevestigter Gesang; Bemerkungen zu Heideggers Hölderlin-Auslegung, von R.E. Schulz-Seitz.--Heidegger und das Problem einer "philosophischen" Anthropologie, von H. Fahrenbach.--"Das Sein und das Nichts," von E. Tugendhat.--Der Logos-Gedanke des Heraklit, von K. Held.--Platon und das Problem der Wahrheit, von W. Hirsch.--Sein und Cogitationes, von Fr.-W. von Herrmann.--Die Zeitlichkeit der Repräsentation, von W. Janke.--Wandlungen in der Kant-Auffassung Heideggers, von H. (...) Hoppe.--Dialectique et difference. par J. Taminiaux.--Nietzsche im Denken Heideggers, von E. Heftrich.--Remarques sur le rapport de Sein und Zeit et de la phénoménologie husserlienne, par G. Granel.--chiasma (romanized); Merleau-Ponty und Heidegger, von R. Boehm.--Heidegger vom anderen Ufer, von H. Patočka.--Der Spruch des Heidegger, von G. Petrović. (shrink)

A partire dal commento ad una sentenza sul problema della discriminazione razziale in una scuola privata, Cover presenta una teoria del pluralismo normativo fondata sulla distinzione fra autorità e significato. A tale dicotomia è dovuta la “proliferazione” dei mondi normativi e delle interpretazioni costituzionali. L’autore descrive i processi di formazione dei significati giuridici – la cosiddetta “giusgenesi” – ed offre una teoria della giurisdizione adatta ad un universo giuridico connotato da un radicale pluralismo. Così facendo, Cover intende mettere in luce (...) il potenziale trasformativo del diritto e in particolare del costituzionalismo. (shrink)