The problem of intentional identity, as originally offered by Peter Geach, says that there can be an anaphoric link between an indefinite term and a pronoun across a sentential boundary and across propositional attitude contexts, where the actual existence of an individual for the indefinite term is not presupposed. In this paper, a semantic resolution to this elusive puzzle is suggested, based on a new quantified intensional logic and game-theoretic semantics (GTS) of imperfect information. This constellation leads to an expressive (...) intensional language with a property of informational independence, argued to produce a purely semantic explication to intentional identity statements. One consequence is that various extra-logical and pragmatic factors become of secondary concern; it is possible to solve the puzzle by logico-semantic methods, albeit somewhat radically renewed ones. (shrink)

In 1969, John McCarthy and Pat Hayes uncovered a problem that has haunted the field of artificial intelligence ever since--the frame problem. The problem arises when logic is used to describe the effects of actions and events. Put simply, it is the problem of representing what remains unchanged as a result of an action or event. Many researchers in artificial intelligence believe that its solution is vital to the realization of the field's goals. Solving the Frame Problem presents the various (...) approaches to the frame problem that have been proposed over the years. The author presents the material chronologically--as an unfolding story rather than as a body of theory to be learned by rote. There are lessons to be learned even from the dead ends researchers have pursued, for they deepen our understanding of the issues surrounding the frame problem. In the book's concluding chapters, the author offers his own work on event calculus, which he claims comes very close to a complete solution to the frame problem. Artificial Intelligence series. (shrink)

Different researchers from psychology and neuroscience state that navigation involves the manipulation of cognitive maps and graphs. In this paper, I will argue that navigating – specifically, journey planning – can be conceived as a process of practical reasoning. First, I will argue that journey planning constitutes a case of means-end reasoning involving inferences with cartographic representations. Then, I will argue that the output of journey planning functions as an instrumental belief in means-end reasoning. More specifically, journey planning can deliver (...) an instrumental rule that plays a normative role in spatial cognition. This approach motivates a pluralist conception of practical reasoning, stating that inferences might run through different representational formats and processes. (shrink)

In order to maximize human performance, defence forces continue to explore, develop, and apply human performance enhancement (HPE) methods, ranging from pharmaceuticals to (bio)technological enhancement. This raises ethical, legal, and societal concerns and requires organizing a careful reflection and deliberation process, with relevant stakeholders. We discuss a range of ethical, legal, and societal aspects (ELSA), which people involved in the development and deployment of HPE can use for such reflection and deliberation. A realistic military scenario with proposed HPE application can (...) serve as a starting point for such an iterative and participatory process. Stakeholders can discuss this application, modify its features, and design appropriate processes around it – for instance, procedures for informed consent. We propose that organizing aspects into these three categories – ethical, legal, and societal – can help involve appropriate interlocutors at different moments: legal aspects with people in strategy or management roles, from the start of a project; ethical aspects with people in operations and medical roles, during development; and societal aspects with people in communication and personnel roles, during deployment. Notably, we developed and discussed this framework and the three aspects in close collaboration with personnel from the military. (shrink)

Vādanyāya is one of the representative works of Dharmakīrti. It is concerned with debate logic and deals with win-or-lose reasoning rules in the broad sense of logic. In this paper, we will concentrate our discussion on Dharmakīrti’s theory of nigrahasthāna (fault) in his debate logic, a key issue in Vādanyāya. First, we point out that the justification of three logical reasons as proof conditions of debate constitutes the rational point of departure for Dharmakīrti’s debate logic. Second, we analyze the differences (...) between Dharmakīrti’s and the Naiyāyika’s notion of debate and point out that Dharmakīrti’s ‘debate’ involves two parties (the disputant and the opponent) attempting to rationally refute the other’s opinion to persuade the other to change their wrong ideas. Last, based on the discussion of Dharmakīrti’s concept of debate logic, we identify seven types of nigrahasthāna in Vādanyāya with regard to the two parties of a debate (the disputant and the opponent). (shrink)

In Cognitive Integration: Attacking The Bounds of Cognition Richard Menary argues that the real pay-off from extended-mind-style arguments is not a new form of externalism in the philosophy of mind, but a view in which the 'internal' and 'external' aspects of cognition are integrated into a whole. Menary argues that the manipulation of external vehicles constitutes cognitive processes and that cognition is hybrid: internal and external processes and vehicles complement one another in the completion of cognitive tasks. (...) However, we cannot make good on these claims without understanding the cognitive norms by which we manipulate bodily external vehicles of cognition. -/- Shaun Gallagher: “Menary sets out some extremely welcome clarifications that help to integrate the models of embodied and extended cognition. He not only provides convincing responses to all of the main objections that have been made against these approaches, he also puts flesh on the integrated model by incorporating concepts such as epistemic action, by expanding the discussion to include a Peircean view of representation, by demonstrating its evolutionary roots, and by exploring its implications for language and cognition. This is one of those books that takes us forward a number of giant steps. Menary makes it comprehensive and comprehensible.” . (shrink)

Effective teachers use mnemonic tools or mnemonic triggers to improve the students’ retention of the study material. This article discusses mnemonic triggers from a theoretical viewpoint based on Jerome S. Bruner’s writings. Fifty small linguistic–cognitive, constructive-, rhetorical-, and phonological mnemonic triggers are detected. These triggers may be the elements our brain use when “constructing the realities” in a Brunerian sense when ordering, differentiating, comparing, and handling information, stories and experiences in our brain. Many of these are small, hidden linguistic elements (...) in speech. This article discusses their usage in the educational talk and textbooks. (shrink)

The hypothesis that everyday cognitive failures are associated over individuals with levels of focused-attention performance was examined in a series of experiments. Everyday cognitive failure was assessed by the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire, and focused-attention performance was assessed using the Stroop, reverse Stroop, and dichotic-listening paradigms, together with the Embedded Figures Test. No reliable association between the two types of measure was observed. In addition, questionnaire results indicated a significant relation between reported cognitive failure and memory performance (using the Short Inventory (...) of Memory Experiences and the Everyday Memory Questionnaire) but not attentional performance (using the Everyday Attention Questionnaire). (shrink)

The capacity to control emotion is important for human adaptation. Questions about the neural bases of emotion regulation have recently taken on new importance, as functional imaging studies in humans have permitted direct investigation of control strategies that draw upon higher cognitive processes difficult to study in nonhumans. Such studies have examined (1) controlling attention to, and (2) cognitively changing the meaning of, emotionally evocative stimuli. These two forms of emotion regulation depend upon interactions between prefrontal and cingulate control systems (...) and cortical and subcortical emotion-generative systems. Taken together, the results suggest a functional architecture for the cognitive control of emotion that dovetails with findings from other human and nonhuman research on emotion. (shrink)

Naturalistic thinking and knowing, the tacit, experiential, and intuitive reasoning of everyday interaction, have long been regarded as inferior to formal reason and labeled primitive, fallible, subjective, superstitious, and in some cases ineffable. But, naturalistic thinking is more rational and definable than it appears. It is also relevant to design. Inquiry into the mechanisms of naturalistic thinking and knowledge can bring its resources into focus and enable designers to create better, human-centered designs for use in real-world settings. This article makes (...) a case for the explicit, formal study of implicit, naturalistic thinking within the fields of design. It develops a framework for defining and studying naturalistic thinking and knowledge, for integrating them into design research and practice, and for developing a more integrated, consistent theory of knowledge in design. It will (a) outline historical definitions of knowledge, attitudes toward formal and naturalistic thinking, and the difficulties presented by the co-presence of formal and naturalistic thinking in design, (b) define and contrast formal and naturalistic thinking as two distinct human cognitive systems, (c) demonstrate the importance of naturalistic cognition in formal thinking and real-world judgment, (d) demonstrate methods for researching naturalistic thinking that can be of use in design, and (e) briefly discuss the impact on design theory of admitting naturalistic thinking as valid, systematic, and knowable. (shrink)

De nombreuses études sur l'apprentissage des langues étrangères montrent que l'apprenant est incapable d'atteindre le niveau d'un locuteur natif. Des phénomènes de fossilisation et de nativisation demeurent, même à un niveau très avancé (Selinker & Lamendella, 1980 ; Selinker & Lakshamanan, 1992 ; Andersen, 1983 ; Narcy-Combes, 2005). Cet article met en évidence le rôle limitatif des représentations cognitives chez l'apprenant dans un contexte où il est possible d'isoler chronologiquement la construction des représentations cognitives et celle d'une première langue. Ce (...) contexte est celui de la surdité profonde prélinguistique, et plus spécifiquement celui de l'oralisme : l’acquisition de la langue y est différée de quelques mois ou années sans qu'il n'y ait de système linguistique préalable puisque les oralistes sont tenus à l'écart des langues signées. Les jeunes sourds développent des représentations cognitives dans leurs premières années de vie, préalablement à l'accès à une première langue. Or, des études expérimentales (ex. Vinter, 2000) montrent que les sujets sourds ont une approche inhabituelle du spatial et du temporel, approche pouvant être mise en rapport avec l'absence de perception auditive. Du fait des liens entre perception sensorielle et conception (ex. Talmy, 1988 & 2000), les représentations cognitives des sujets sourds relativement à l'espace et au temps seraient donc spécifiques. La langue orale produite par ces sujets à l'adolescence présente quant à elle des caractéristiques inhabituelles dans les domaines de la langue qui sont liés à l'espace et au temps, et ce, aussi bien chez les anglophones que chez les francophones dont les productions orales ont été analysées (ex. Vincent-Durroux, 2009 & 2008). Les représentations cognitives influent donc sur l'appropriation de la langue par les sourds. La discussion porte sur le fait que, dans le contexte de l'apprentissage de langues étrangères par des entendants, les représentations cognitives sous-jacentes à la langue maternelle pourraient avoir un rôle limitatif et ainsi expliquer la persistance des phénomènes de fossilisation et de nativisation. (shrink)

Unlike birds and mammals, reptiles are commonly thought to possess only the most rudimentary means of interacting with their environments, reflexively responding to sensory information to the near exclusion of higher cognitive function. However, reptilian brains, though structurally somewhat different from those of mammals and birds, use many of the same cellular and molecular processes to support complex behaviors in homologous brain regions. Here, the neurological mechanisms supporting reptilian cognition are reviewed, focusing specifically on spatial cognition and the (...) hippocampus. These processes are compared to those seen in mammals and birds within an ecologically and evolutionarily relevant context. By viewing reptilian cognition through an integrative framework, a more robust understanding of reptile cognition is gleaned. Doing so yields a broader view of the evolutionarily conserved molecular and cellular mechanisms that underlie cognitive function and a better understanding of the factors that led to the evolution of complex cognition. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Individuating Process Types in Science Individuating Processes in Cognitive Psychology A Broader Category of Cognition Conclusion.

The interdisciplinary research area Cognitive Interaction Technology (CIT) aims to understand and support interactions between human users and other elements of socio-technical systems. Important reasons for the new interest in understanding CIT in sport psychology are the impressive development of cognitive robotics and advanced technologies such as virtual or augmented reality systems, cognitive glasses or neurotechnology settings. The present article outlines this area of research, addresses ethical issues, and presents an empirical study in the context of a new measurement and (...) assessment system for training in karate. Recent advances in the field of cognitive assistance systems enabled largely automatized assessments of individual mental representation structures for action sequences, such as choreographed movement patterns in dance or martial arts. Empirical investigations with karate practitioners of different skill levels demonstrate that advanced software-based survey and algorithmic analysis procedures based on cognitive models generate individualized performance predictions for a movement sequence from theKanku-dai kata(a pre-defined karate movement sequence), which correlated significantly not only with formal expertise (kyu/danrank) but also with the actual likelihood of mistakes in action execution. This information could prospectively be used to define individual training goals for deliberate practice and incorporated into cognitive interaction technology to provide appropriate feedback. We argue that the development of cognitive interaction systems for sport should explicitly take ethical issues into consideration and present a particular developed engineering approach. The potential benefits of such an assistance system for intermediate and advanced practitioners include more effective and flexible practice, as well as supportive effects, and more flexible training schedules. Furthermore, we argue that researchers from the field of sport psychology can benefit from advances in technological systems that enhance the understanding of mental and motor control in skilled voluntary action. (shrink)

Renewed interest in human space exploration has highlighted the gaps in knowledge needed for successful long-duration missions outside low-Earth orbit. Although the technical challenges of such missions are being systematically overcome, many of the unknowns in predicting mission success depend on human behavior and performance, knowledge of which must be either obtained through space research or extrapolated from human experience on Earth. Particularly in human neuroscience, laboratory-based research efforts are not closely connected to real environments such as human space exploration. (...) As caves share several of the physical and psychological challenges of spaceflight, underground expeditions have recently been developed as a spaceflight analog for astronaut training purposes, suggesting that they might also be suitable for studying aspects of behavior and cognition that cannot be fully examined under laboratory conditions. Our objective is to foster a bi-directional exchange between cognitive neuroscientists and expedition experts by (1) describing the cave environment as a worthy space analog for human research, (2) reviewing work conducted on human neuroscience and cognition within caves, (3) exploring the range of topics for which the unique environment may prove valuable as well as obstacles and limitations, (4) outlining technologies and methods appropriate for cave use, and (5) suggesting how researchers might establish contact with potential expedition collaborators. We believe that cave expeditions, as well as other sorts of expeditions, offer unique possibilities for cognitive neuroscience that will complement laboratory work and help to improve human performance and safety in operational environments, both on Earth and in space. (shrink)

In Cognition and Work, Max Scheler offers an early critique of American pragmatism and demonstrates the dynamic relation that not only the human being but all living beings have to the environment they inhabit.

Cognitive and affective penetration of perception refers to the influence that higher mental states such as beliefs and emotions have on perceptual systems. Psychological and neuroscientific studies appear to show that these states modulate the visual system at the visuomotor, attentional, and late levels of processing. However, empirical evidence showing that similar consequences occur in early stages of visual processing seems to be scarce. In this paper, I argue that psychological evidence does not seem to be either sufficient or necessary (...) to argue in favour of or against the cognitive penetration of perception in either late or early vision. In order to do that we need to have recourse to brain imaging techniques. Thus, I introduce a neuroscientific study and argue that it seems to provide well-grounded evidence for the cognitive penetration of early vision in face perception. I also examine and reject alternative explanations to my conclusion. (shrink)

Cognitive ecology is the study of cognitive phenomena in context. In particular, it points to the web of mutual dependence among the elements of a cognitive ecosystem. At least three fields were taking a deeply ecological approach to cognition 30 years ago: Gibson’s ecological psychology, Bateson’s ecology of mind, and Soviet cultural-historical activity theory. The ideas developed in those projects have now found a place in modern views of embodied, situated, distributed cognition. As cognitive theory continues to shift (...) from units of analysis defined by inherent properties of the elements to units defined in terms of dynamic patterns of correlation across elements, the study of cognitive ecosystems will become an increasingly important part of cognitive science. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to show that externalist accounts of cognition such as Clark and Chalmers' (1998) “active externalism” lead to an explosion of knowledge that is caused by online resources such as Wikipedia and Google. I argue that externalist accounts of cognition imply that subjects who integrate mobile Internet access in their cognitive routines have millions of standing beliefs on unexpected issues such as the birth dates of Moroccan politicians or the geographical coordinates of villages (...) in southern Indonesia. Although many externalists propose criteria for the bounds of cognition that are designed to avoid this explosion of knowledge, I argue that these criteria are flawed and that active externalism has to accept that information resources such as Wikipedia and Google constitute extended cognitive processes. (shrink)

AbtractTechnologies both new and old provide us with a wide range of cognitive artifacts that change the structure of our cognitive tasks. After a brief analysis of past classifications of these artifacts, I shall elaborate a new way of classifying them developed by focusing on an aspect that has been previously overlooked, namely the possible relationships between these objects and the cognitive processes they involve. Cognitive artifacts are often considered as objects that simply complement our cognitive capabilities, but this “complementary (...) view” seems to be an oversimplification. Assuming an “interaction-centered approach”, this article identifies three essential ways in which cognitive artifacts carry out their function: complementing, constituting and substituting our cognitive processes, and builds a taxonomy of these objects that is grounded on these relations. In so doing, it also addresses the chaotic set of different micro-functions carried out by cognitive artifacts, which have not thus far been dealt with, sorting these functions into three corresponding categories. The second part of the article analyzes in greater detail how cognitive artifacts work in our cognitive life, identifying a new kind of functions, called semi-proper functions, and providing a new definition of cognitive artifact based on the previous analysis of these objects. (shrink)

This chapter discusses Peter John Olivi’s conception of the role of dispositions in sensory cognition from metaphysical and psychological perspectives. It shows that Olivi makes a distinction between two general types of disposition. Some of them account for the ease, or difficulty, with which different persons use their cognitive powers, while others explain why people react differently to things that they perceive or think. This distinction is then applied to Olivi’s analysis of three different psychological operations, where the notion (...) of disposition figures prominently; estimative perception, perceptual clarity, and the perception of pain and pleasure. The chapter argues that Olivi uses cognitive dispositions in an interesting way to explain individual differences between persons, and that they reveal the dynamic nature of his conception of human psychology. (shrink)

Changing and often class-dependent non-stationarities of signals are a big challenge in the transfer of common findings in cognitive workload estimation using Electroencephalography (EEG) from laboratory experiments to realistic scenarios or other experiments. Additionally, it often remains an open question whether actual cognitive workload reflected by brain signals was the main contribution to the estimation or discriminative and class-dependent muscle and eye activity, which can be secondary effects of changing workload levels. Within this study, we investigated a novel approach to (...) spatial filtering based on beamforming adapted to changing settings. We compare it to no spatial filtering and Common Spatial Patterns (CSP). We used a realistic maneuvering task, as well as an auditoryn-backsecondary task on a tugboat simulator as two different conditions to induce workload changes on professional tugboat captains. Apart from the typical within condition classification, we investigated the ability of the different classification methods to transfer between then-backcondition and the maneuvering task. The results show a clear advantage of the proposed approach over the others in the challenging transfer setting. While no filtering leads to lowest within-condition normalized classification loss on average in two scenarios (22 and 10%), our approach using adaptive beamforming (30 and 18%) performs comparably to CSP (33 and 15%). Importantly, in the transfer from one to another setting, no filtering and CSP lead to performance around chance level (45 to 53%), while our approach in contrast is the only one capable of classifying in all other scenarios (34 and 35%) with a significant difference from chance level. The changing signal composition over the scenarios leads to a need to adapt the spatial filtering in order to be transferable. With our approach, the transfer is successful due to filtering being optimized for the extraction of neural components and additional investigation of their scalp patterns revealed mainly neural origin. Interesting findings are that rather the patterns slightly change between conditions. We conclude that the approaches with low normalized loss depend on eye and muscle activity which is successful for classification within conditions, but fail in the classifier transfer since eye and muscle contributions are highly condition-specific. (shrink)

Prelinguistic cognitive reference comprehension is foundational to language acquisition and higher cognitive functions. However, its ontogenetic origins in the first year of life are currently not well understood. The current study pitted cognitivist against social interactionist views. We worked with infants monthly from 10 to 13 months of age and observed their behavioral search during a reference comprehension task. Our goal was to first establish the age at which infants begin to cognitively expect an occluded object in one of two (...) locations following a communicative pointing cue. We then tested whether infants' cognitive referential expectations would prospectively predict social interaction skills and experiences (as assessed by spontaneous infant and parent pointing) or, conversely, be predicted by social interaction skills and experiences. Results revealed a linear increase in cognitive reference comprehension, with clear above chance performance, individual stability in month‐to‐month correlations, and a synchronous correlation to referential pointing all emerging at 12 months but not earlier. Regarding developmental predictions, infants' cognitive referential expectations were not predictive of social interaction skills and experiences; on the contrary, they were predicted by social interaction skills and experiences. Findings suggest that a nonverbal cognitive understanding of reference to occluded entities is neither early emerging, hard wired, nor causal to infants' or caregivers' referential pointing. Instead, this foundational skill is predicted by earlier social interaction. Findings are consistent with the view that cognitive reference comprehension develops via a social construction process in the first year of life. (shrink)

This is a review of the book Mozg - kultura - socium. Kantianskaya programma v cognitivnykh issledovaniyakh by Bazhanov V.A. The author`s main aim is a reconsideration of some fundamental principles of epistemology and philosophy of science in the light of state-of-the-art advancements of neurosciences. According to the author of the book, social and cultural revolution in neurosciences has been crucially modifying the initial Kantian program of consciousness research and the modes of linguistic representation of its results. In particular, in (...) epistemology the universal concept of transcendental subject has been altered with regard to neurobiological and social data, which concern some preconditions of cognitive activity. In philosophy of science such a shift of research perspective allows to implement a naturalistic interpretation of natural sciences, clarifies the problem of empirical foundations of mathematics and sheds a new light on the problem of apriori elements of mathematical thought. The analysis of evolutionary and neurobiological preconditions of logical thought leads to the sort of revival of psychologism program in logic, which enables author to put forward an original interpretation of the problem of plurality of logical systems. Finally, some topics of social sciences as well as problems of genesis of art, ethical and religious systems, can acquire new interpretation with respect to modern investigations in cognitive science. (shrink)

_Abstract_: For many psychologists, “cognition” is an obvious object for study. A natural kind. What I want to do in this article is problematise “cognition”. Psychologists lived happily without “cognition” until the 1960’s and even then, its entry into psychological discourse was hardly smooth. Furthermore, the new cognitive psychology retained much of the behaviourism it wrongly claimed to have displaced. There are now some radical developments going on in “cognitive science” but those involved still retain the term (...) “cognition”. But isn’t it like modern physicists claiming that they are coming up with new theories of phlogiston? “Cognition” – forget it? _Keywords_: Psychology; Cognition; Behaviourism; Cognitive Behaviourism; S-R Theory; Unconscious Mind _“Cognizione”: dobbiamo lasciarla perdere?_ _Riassunto_: Per molti psicologi la “cognizione” è un oggetto di studio che rasenta l’ovvietà. Un genere naturale. Ciò che mi propongo di fare in questo articolo è problematizzare la “cognizione”. Gli psicologi hanno vissuto felicemente senza la “cognizione” fino agli Anni ’60 e anche allora la comparsa di questa nozione all’interno del lessico psicologico non è stata cosa semplice. Inoltre, la nuova psicologia cognitiva ha conservato molto di quel comportamentismo che ha affermato, sbagliando, di aver scalzato. Ci sono oggi alcuni sviluppi, anche radicali, che si affacciano nella “scienza cognitiva”, ma tutti quelli che sono coinvolti usano ancora il termine “cognizione”. Ma non è come se i fisici di oggi sostenessero di avere nuove teorie del flogisto? La “cognizione”: dobbiamo lasciarla perdere? _Parole chiave_: Cognizione; Comportamentismo; Comportamentismo cognitivo; Teoria stimolo-risposta; Mente inconscia. (shrink)

As we know, a cognitive architecture is a domain-generic computational cognitive model that may be used for a broad analysis of cognition and behavior. Cognitive architectures embody theories of cognition in computer algorithms and programs. Social simulation with multi-agent systems can benefit from incorporating cognitive architectures, as they provide a realistic basis for modeling individual agents (as argued in Sun 2001). In this survey, an example cognitive architecture will be given, and its application to social simulation will be (...) sketched. (shrink)

Reveals the diverse ways that cognition was seen as spread over brain, body and world in the 9–17th centuries - The second book in an ambitious 4-volume set looking at distributed cognition in the history of thought - Includes essays on literature, philosophy, law, art, music, medicine, science and material culture - For students and scholars in medieval and Renaissance studies, cognitive humanities and philosophy of mind - Draws out what was distinctive about medieval and Renaissance insights into (...) (and superstitions about) the cognitive roles of the body and environment - Examines how humanities topics are affected by new insights from the cognitive sciences This collection explores how medieval and Renaissance practices and ideas reveal the expression (and suppression) of cognition as distributed across brain, body and world. As many of the texts and practices have influenced later Western European societies and cultures, this book reveals vital stages in the historical development of our attempts to comprehend and optimise the distributed nature of cognition. (shrink)

Many individual difference variables predict Bayesian reasoning performance, including cognitive reflection (thoughtful engagement with a problem rather than intuitive responding). The cognitive reflection test (CRT), though, is interdependent with numerical literacy. Two non-mathematics versions of this test (CRTverbal) are integrated and evaluated here, concurrent with other individual difference measures, as predictors of Bayesian reasoning performance. Two studies found CRTverbal appears to measure a fairly unitary underlying construct that is correlated with Bayesian reasoning performance. However, all other measures were also correlated (...) with Bayesian reasoning, as well as generally with each other (including numerical literacy correlating with CRTverbal). Stepwise regressions found that Bayesian reasoning was best predicted by visuospatial ability and sets reasoning ability, excluding numeracy, working memory (Experiment 1), and pattern extrapolation abilities (Experiment 2). Although cognitive reflection remains a predictor of some utility, these positive manifold patterns of results suggest a broader cognitive ability may be generating these results. (shrink)

Cognitive science is a child of the 1950s, the product of a time when psychology, anthropology and linguistics were redefining themselves and computer science and neuroscience as disciplines were coming into existence. Psychology could not participate in the cognitive revolution until it had freed itself from behaviorism, thus restoring cognition to scientific respectability. By then, it was becoming clear in several disciplines that the solution to some of their problems depended crucially on solving problems traditionally allocated to other disciplines. (...) Collaboration was called for: this is a personal account of how it came about. (shrink)

Kazimierz Twardowski attributed high cognitive value to introspection because he believed it plays a fundamental role in psychology, the primary philosophical discipline. He believed that basing philosophy on inner experience would allow it to obtain universal and justified results. Internal experience consists of perceiving one’s own mental facts; it is non-sensual and selfevident. Twardowski referred to introspection in his investigations in various ways, which is presented in the article.

Perception is typically distinguished from cognition. For example, seeing is importantly different from believing. And while what one sees clearly influences what one thinks, it is debatable whether what one believes and otherwise thinks can influence, in some direct and non-trivial way, what one sees. The latter possible relation is the cognitive penetration of perception. Cognitive penetration, if it occurs, has implications for philosophy of science, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science. This paper offers an analysis of the (...) phenomenon, its theoretical consequences, and a variety of experimental results and possible interpretations of them. The paper concludes by proposing some constraints for analyses and definitions of cognitive penetrability. (shrink)

This paper explores the ramifications of the extended cognition thesis in the philosophy of mind for contemporary epistemology. In particular, it argues that all theories of knowledge need to accommodate the ability intuition that knowledge involves cognitive ability, but that once this requirement is understood correctly there is no reason why one could not have a conception of cognitive ability that was consistent with the extended cognition thesis. There is thus, surprisingly, a straightforward way of developing our current (...) thinking about knowledge such that it incorporates the extended cognition thesis. (shrink)

Modern cognitive and clinical psychology offer insight into how people deal with natural disasters. In my methodological paper, I make a strong case for incorporating experimental findings and theoretical concepts of modern psychology into environmental historical disaster research. I show how psychological factors may influence the production and interpretation of historical sources with respect to perceptions of and responses to disasters. While previous psychological approaches to history mostly involve psychoanalysis, I focus on empirical psychology. Specifically, I review a number of (...) well documented heuristics, biases, and memory modulations as described by cognitive psychology. Moreover, I argue that including investigations on disaster related mental disorders would complement the environmental historical research of natural disasters. My approach highlights a strong potential for interdisciplinary collaborations among environmental historians and psychologists. (shrink)

Many cognitive activities are irreducibly social, involving interaction between several different agents. We look at some examples of this in linguistic communication and games, and show how logical methods provide exact models for the relevant information flow and world change. Finally, we discuss possible connections in this arena between logico-computational approaches and experimental cognitive science.

This paper provides an overview over the debate about so-called “situated approaches to cognition” that depart from the intracranialism associated with traditional cognitivism insofar as they stress the importance of body, world, and interaction for cognitive processing. It sketches the outlines of an overarching framework that reveals the differences, commonalities, and interdependencies between the various claims and positions of second-generation cognitive science, and identifies a number of apparently unresolved conceptual and ontological issues.

Robotic and Autonomous Agricultural Technologies (RAAT) are increasingly available yet may fail to be adopted. This paper focusses specifically on cognitive factors that affect adoption including: inability to generate trust, loss of farming knowledge and reduced social cognition. It is recommended that agriculture develops its own framework for the performance and safety of RAAT drawing on human factors research in aerospace engineering including human inputs (individual variance in knowledge, skills, abilities, preferences, needs and traits), trust, situational awareness and cognitive (...) load. The kinds of cognitive impacts depend on the RAATs level of autonomy, ie whether it has automatic, partial autonomy and autonomous functionality and stage of adoption, ie adoption, initial use or post-adoptive use. The more autonomous a system is, the less a human needs to know to operate it and the less the cognitive load, but it also means farmers have less situational awareness about on farm activities that in turn may affect strategic decision-making about their enterprise. Some cognitive factors may be hidden when RAAT is first adopted but play a greater role during prolonged or intense post-adoptive use. Systems with partial autonomy need intuitive user interfaces, engaging system information, and clear signaling to be trusted with low level tasks; and to compliment and augment high order decision-making on farm. (shrink)

Cognition is embodied when it is deeply dependent upon features of the physical body of an agent, that is, when aspects of the agent's body beyond the brain play a significant causal or physically constitutive role in cognitive processing. In general, dominant views in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science have considered the body as peripheral to understanding the nature of mind and cognition. Proponents of embodied cognitive science view this as a serious mistake. Sometimes the nature (...) of the dependence of cognition on the body is quite unexpected, and suggests new ways of conceptualizing and exploring the mechanics of cognitive processing. Embodied cognitive science encompasses a loose-knit family of research programs in the cognitive sciences that often share a commitment to critiquing and even replacing traditional approaches to cognition and cognitive processing. Empirical research on embodied cognition has exploded in the past 10 years. As the bibliography for this article attests, the various bodies of work that will be discussed represent a serious alternative to the investigation of cognitive phenomena. Relatively recent work on the embodiment of cognition provides much food for thought for empirically-informed philosophers of mind. This is in part because of the rich range of phenomena that embodied cognitive science has studied. But it is also in part because those phenomena are often thought to challenge dominant views of the mind, such as the computational and representational theories of mind, at the heart of traditional cognitive science. And they have sometimes been taken to undermine standard positions in the philosophy of mind, such as the idea that the mind is identical to, or even realized in, the brain. (shrink)

As the cognitive revolution was slow to come to the study of animal behavior, the vast majority of what we know about primate cognition has been discovered in the last 30 years. Building on the recognition that the physical and social worlds of humans and their living primate relatives pose many of the same evolutionary challenges, programs of research have established that the most basic cognitive skills and mental representations that humans use to navigate those worlds are already possessed (...) by other primates. There may be differences between humans and other primates, however, in more complex cognitive skills, such as reasoning about relations, causality, time, and other minds. Of special importance, the human primate seems to possess a species-unique set of adaptations for “cultural intelligence,” which are broad reaching in their effects on human cognition. (shrink)

Cognitive phenomenology starts from something that has been obscured in much recent analytic philosophy: the fact that lived conscious experience isn’t just a matter of sensation or feeling, but is also cognitive in character, through and through. This is obviously true of ordinary human perceptual experience, and cognitive phenomenology is also concerned with something more exclusively cognitive, which we may call propositional meaning-experience: occurrent experience of linguistic representations as meaning something, for example, as this occurs in thinking or reading or (...) hearing others speak. One source of resistance to accepting this view has been a failure to distinguish sharply between cognitive content and cognitive-phenomenological content. (shrink)

Cognitive Models of Science resulted from a workshop on the implications of the cognitive sciences for the philosophy of science held in October 1989 under the ...