Social interaction is both ubiquitous and central to understanding human behavior. Such interactions depend, we argue, on shared intentionality: the parties must form a common understanding of an ambiguous interaction (e.g., one person giving a present to another requires that both parties appreciate that a voluntary transfer of ownership is intended). Yet how can shared intentionality arise? Many well-known accounts of social cognition, including those involving “mind-reading,” typically fall into circularity and/or regress. For example, A’s beliefs and behavior may depend (...) on her prediction of B’s beliefs and behavior, but B’s beliefs and behavior depend in turn on her prediction of A’s beliefs and behavior. One possibility is to embrace circularity and take shared intentionality as imposing consistency conditions on beliefs and behavior, but typically there are many possible solutions and no clear criteria for choosing between them. We argue that addressing these challenges requires some form of we-reasoning, but that this raises the puzzle of how the collective agent (the “we”) arises from the individual agents. This puzzle can be solved by proposing that the will of the collective agent arises from a simulated process of bargaining: agents must infer what they would agree, were they able to communicate. This model explains how, and which, shared intentions are formed. We also propose that such “virtual bargaining” may be fundamental to understanding social interactions. (shrink)

In general it is found that the corporate managers and stockholders possess totally different view about good governance of a company. Managers strongly believe that governance of their companies is quite well but stockholders view that it is very poor. The study found that the groups differ in perception especially in terms of turnover, production, capital, leverage, debt service, credit policy, solvency, human resource, recruitment, technology, customer satisfaction, internal control, strength, opportunity, competition, industry position, collective bargaining agent (...) (CBA) issues, and economic remedies; whereas, they have similar view in terms of adequacy of research fund, company weaknesses and threats, contingency plans, presence of political influence. The managers think that the companies do not have enough retained earnings and these should not be distributed among stockholders, but the stockholders thinkotherwise. Managers always perceive that they are underpaid whereas stockholders express the opposite view. Each group believes that it is the other group that dominates the decision-making. Both the group wants to have mutual interaction but stockholders want to interact more than the mangers. The study noted that corporate managers’ tenure is more with the company than a stockholder’s holding of stock. The study also found that the managers are better educated than the stockholders. The study observed serious gender biasness both in management position and stockholding of the corporations. Though both the groups belong to same age level but their distribution shows stockholders enter into the share market at an early age. (shrink)

The constitution of Pakistan contains wide range of provisions for the protection of labour rights. Pakistan has been bestowed with 70 labour laws along with 90 rules and regulations thereunder. In spite of these labour laws along with rules and regulations, labour force is facing multifarious challenges that posit direct threat to their legal recognised rights. In this regard this study was carried out to study the main hurdles that labour rights encountered in historical perspective. Moreover, in the wake of (...) devolution plan through 18th amendment to the constitution of Pakistan, what problems in respect of enforceability and legality have arisen? Labour laws promulgated in various Pakistani regimes have been discussed to figure out what really prevented successive governments to ensure minimum protection to labour strata of the nations. The article concludes with some recommendation that are sin-qua-non in current globalization where rights have emerged as the most sacred instruments in the hands of weaker portion of a society. (shrink)

This essay examines the role of the University of Bridgeport's Faculty Council in relation to the faculty union. The Faculty Council is a governing body composed of elected faculty representatives from different schools and departments within the university. Faculty Council leaders facilitated the certification of AAUP as the faculty's bargaining agent in 1973 and, under the author's leadership, the faculty petitioned the National Labor Relations Board to decertify the union in 1991. The author participated on the picket line (...) during the 1975, 1978 and 1987 faculty strikes, but crossed the picket line during the 1990 strike. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that there are a number of ethical issues facing college and professional athletes that admit of a unified treatment: viewing athletes as workers. By worker, I mean an agent who sells their labor for compensation. With this notion of worker in place, I present and discuss arguments for four claims: not paying college athletes is morally wrong; that the N.C.A.A. infringes on the right of college athletes to collectively bargain; that it is prima facie (...) wrong to draft and trade professional athletes; and that fans fail to respect athletes’ right to strike when they complain about labor stoppages in professional leagues. I argue that sports fans and members of sports media should explicitly conceive of athletes as workers to recognize and prevent these wrongs. I conclude by suggesting that all with an interest in the welfare of labor have an interest in conceiving of athletes as workers, as it puts what is owed to all workers into stark relief. (shrink)

This essay tells the story of the development of two of the most significant and controversial entitlement programs in twentieth-century U.S. history—collective bargaining and affirmative action. It focuses on the nexus between them—how New Deal empowerment of labor unions contributed to racial discrimination, and thus fed the Great Society race-based programs of affirmative action. The evolving relationship between the courts and the bureaucracies is emphasized, particularly how the judiciary went from an obstacle to an enabler of the entitlement (...) state. (shrink)

이 논문은 우리 사회의 경제적 현실에서 아주 중대한 문제로 떠오른 노사협상에 관한 문제, 특히 고용인들이 선출한 대표자 집단과 고용주가 임명한 경영자 집단 사이에 이루어지는 단체교섭에 관한 문제를 조명하고 있다. 이에 따라 먼저 이 논문은 현행 단체교섭 형태의 윤리적 심각성을 파악하고 있다. 노사 양 측 사이의 뿌리 깊은 불신으로 인해 서로를 무너뜨리기 위한 온갖 술수와 모략으로 점철되는 단체교섭의 문제점을 파악하고 있다. 그리고 이 논문은 이러한 현행 단체교섭을 서로에 대한 힘만 과시하면서 대부분 합의에 실패하고 마는, 그래서 극단적으로 감정의 골만 깊어지는 ‘적대적 단체교섭’으로 (...) 규정하고 있다. 이런 까닭에 이 논문은 이런 문제들의 근본적인 이유가 서로에 대한 뿌리 깊은 불신이라고 보고, 이를 해소시키기 위한 윤리적 방안으로서 상호 신뢰 수립의 원칙을 제시하고 있다. 그리고 이러한 신뢰 수립의 원칙을 통해 현행 단체교섭의 결정적 난점들을 수정할 수 있는 ‘협력적 단체교섭’으로의 전환이 이루어져야 한다는 점을 역설하고 있다. 협력적 단체교섭으로의 전환에 대한 윤리적 당위를 요청하면서, 이를 위해 이 논문은 노사가 서로 협력하는 단체교섭의 실제 형태를 다섯 단계로 묘사하고 있다. 다섯 단계의 주요 과정들은 현행의 적대적 단체교섭과 달리, 정직성, 공평성, 공개성 등을 기초로 한 합리적인 협상 모델임이 드러나도록 했다. 그리고 그에 따라 예상해볼 수 있는 협력적인 단체교섭 모델의 윤리적 장점들도 드러나도록 했다. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the poker analogy is unsuitable as a model for collective bargaining negotiations. Using the poker game analogy is imprudent, its use undermines trust and ignores the cooperative features of business, and its use fails to take into account the values of dignity and fairness which should characterize labor-management negotiations. I propose and defend a model of ideal family decision-making as a superior model to the poker game.

In this paper, I argue that there are a number of ethical issues facing college and professional athletes that admit of a unified treatment: viewing athletes as workers. By worker, I mean an agent who sells their labor for compensation. With this notion of worker in place, I present and discuss arguments for four claims: not paying college athletes is morally wrong; that the N.C.A.A. infringes on the right of college athletes to collectively bargain; that it is prima facie (...) wrong to draft and trade professional athletes; and that fans fail to respect athletes’ right to strike when they complain about labor stoppages in professional leagues. I argue that sports fans and members of sports media should explicitly conceive of athletes as workers to recognize and prevent these wrongs. I conclude by suggesting that all with an interest in the welfare of labor have an interest in conceiving of athletes as workers, as it puts what is owed to all workers into stark relief. (shrink)

In this paper I explain the present adversarial collective bargaining process (ACB) and then critique it on legal and ethical grounds. A new methodology, that I describe as the collaborative collective bargaining process (CCB), will then be explained and similarly critiqued. I argue that replacing the present ACB model with the CCB model will result in better long-term results for all parties concerned. This is because the ACB model is comparable, in many respects, to the adversarial (...) process used in court litigation. It is a combat model based on power. ACB makes the battle lines clear, and it grants victory to the more convincing display of power, but it leaves casualties. Indeed it cannot operate except upon the casualties of the opposing party, and those casualties are the basis for ever-renewed combat. Tactics employed in ACB to achieve victory include deception, lying and the abandonment of truth as a moral value. I argue that, in sharp contrast, CCB can foster an environment which encourages candor and truthfulness. By following the CCB model, the parties can avoid the negative and self-defeating elements of ACB and can work together toward mutually beneficial goals by the use of an ethically defensible approach to labor negotiations. (shrink)

The article reveals the existence of a greater sensitivity than in the past towards equality. Nevertheless, equality policies have failed to rise above the limits imposed by a culture that sees the male prevail in industrial relations. Both domestic law and European legislation have in uenced collective bargaining in Italy as regards equal opportunities. The presence of women in bargaining, in equal opportunities committees and in study groups has led to success regarding a core of issues such (...) as sexual harassment, positive action, working hours and parental leave and has favoured a positive praxis both for equality and bargaining between which there is positive synergy. The article discusses the problems which hinder a general acceptance of equality bargaining and a bargaining model that places the female worker among the subjects to be represented. (shrink)

When Leland Miles arrived as the University of Bridgeport's new president in 1974, the institution had substantial financial problems, declining enrollments, and a newly unionized faculty. This essay is a first-person account of his efforts to work with an immature union and his attempt to save the Liberal Arts at a time of growing student demand for professional degrees.

In this short piece, I attempt to respond to some of the challenges raised by Jessica Nihlén Fahlquist and Karen Meagher in their commentaries on my paper, ‘Public Health Virtue Ethics’. While these authors have made many insightful and challenging remarks, I mostly focus on two questions here: first, about the nature of collectives as moral agents, in response to Nihlén Fahlquist, and second, about the concept of a collective-level virtue, in response to Meagher.

My commentary calls attention to what makes Mr. Bowie's paper well worth intensive consideration. In my brief evaluation, however, I only lay out three incoherent elements of his proposed family model of labor-management relations.I argue that complete job security is not compatible with complete freedom to change firms; that, in practice, such security for all employees is not compatible with the shifting demand of our economic system, and that the model includes two kinds of spouse relationships — one affectional and (...) another competitive — that are incoherent with one another. My point is not that Mr. Bowie's model is fatally flawed, but that it needs to be improved. (shrink)

This paper contends that a Kantian universalizability constraint on theories of practical reason in conjunction with the possibility of collective rational agents entails the surprisingly strong conclusion that no fully agent‐relative theory of practical reason can be sound. The basic point is that a Kantian universalizability constraint, the thesis that all reasons for action are agent‐relative and the possibility of collective rational agents gives rise to a contradiction. This contradiction can be avoided by either rejecting Kantian (...) universalizability, the possibility of collective rational agents, or the tenability of a fully agent‐relative theory of practical reason; we cannot have all three. (shrink)

The article examines gender equality in collective bargaining and looks at the extent to which gender and equal opportunities issues have been mainstreamed in industrial relations systems in Italy where, despite the existence of old and new legislation on gender equality, there are persistently low levels of female employment and the precarious workforce is made up predominantly of women. The central question addressed in the article is whether the injection of a gender mainstreaming approach in the Italian (...) class='Hi'>collective bargaining system, combined with legislative measures, may improve the situation of women in the context of both public and private spheres. In particular, the article looks at whether gender mainstreaming has the potential to pave the way towards an ethos of substantive equality at the workplace, whereby women enter the workforce on equal terms and men are in a position to share the dual responsibilities of paid and unpaid work. The article maintains that gender mainstreaming may fulfil its transformative potential as a catalyst for changing both the conceptual and analytical tools which the law deploys, provided it is envisaged as a three-fold strategy involving simultaneous processes of deconstruction, replacement and inclusive measures, together with deliberative forms of democracy and the imposition of a statutory positive duty on public authorities to mainstream equality. (shrink)

(2012). Resistance! Do Teachers Dare to Strike and Insist Upon Collective Bargaining in this Neoliberal Age? Educational Studies: Vol. 48, No. 6, pp. 499-500.

Departing from Bourdieu's collective habitus, this essay develops a theory of the subjectivity of habitus, meaning the social-psychological processes comprising the agent and fueling deliberation. By incorporating George Ainslie's theory of the will and deliberation as the intertemporal bargaining of a population of interests, I theorize the “saturated agent” composed of an economy of interests, analogous to Bourdieu's “economy of practices” invested and saturated with cultural capital. Here culturally saturated interests negotiate strategically within the agent, (...) with the ending balance constituting the habitus. Additionally, reflexivity becomes amenable to habitus as “desaturation” or suspending the commitment to a set of culturally saturated interests as a result of a crisis, followed by “resaturation”, the restructuring of the economy of interests. (shrink)

Despite experiencing an early and protracted neoliberal transformation, France has exhibited an acutely ambiguous stance towards neoliberal practice. This is illustrated by, for example, regular nationwide protests opposed to policies with an overtly neoliberal flavour, or the coexistence of heavy taxation and a profound financialisation of its economy. This article seeks to explain why neoliberalism successfully developed in France, despite such an ambiguity. The focus will be placed on the transformation of labour relations, which will reveal the important role played (...) by both the technocratic elite and firm-level negotiations in legitimating neoliberal practice. It will be argued that while several relevant sociological explanations offer some valuable insights for making sense of neoliberalism’s successful development in France, Antonio Gramsci’s concept of ‘passive revolution’ provides a very fruitful basis upon which to capture the singularity of the French case. (shrink)

A necessary condition for a group being taken as a rational agent is that its choices and judgements are ‘logically contestable’, but this can lead to problems of aggregation, as Arrow impossibility theorem or the discursive dilemma. This paper proposes a contractarian or constitutional approach: the relevant thing is what aggregation mechanisms would be preferred by the members of the group. Two distinctions need to be made: first, judgement aggregation is not aggregation of decisions, and judgement aggregation needs be (...) distinguished from the aggregation of information: we assume that every member of the group has already taken into account the opinions of the other members, by means of a process of public deliberation, but they may end having different opinions; we also assume that the members are rational, so that they have no reasons to accept further changes in their individual opinions. So, from the epistemic point of view, the collective judgment is not a 'better' opinion than those of the individual members. The collective judgement is better seen as a kind of compromise, the outcome of a ‘bargain’, so to say. Basically, we assume that individuals will have an interest in choosing a specific aggregation function by taking into account how are they affected by the collective actions carried out by the group, and grounded on the chosen collective judgement. (shrink)

It is commonplace to attribute obligations to φ or blameworthiness for φ-ing to groups even when no member has an obligation to φ or is individually blameworthy for not φ-ing. Such non-distributive attributions can seem problematic in cases where the group is not a moral agent in its own right. In response, it has been argued both that non-agential groups can have the capabilities requisite to have obligations of their own, and that group obligations can be understood in terms (...) of moral demands on individual group members. It has also been suggested that members of groups can share responsibility for an outcome in virtue of being causally or socially connected to that outcome. This paper discusses the agency problem and argues that the most promising attempts at solutions understand group obligations and blameworthiness as grounded in demands on individual agents. (shrink)

Is capitalism inherently predatory? Must there be winners and losers? Is public interest outdated and free-riding rational? Is consumer choice the same as self-determination? Must bargainers abandon the no-harm principle? Prisoners of Reason recalls that classical liberal capitalism exalted the no-harm principle. Although imperfect and exclusionary, modern liberalism recognized individual human dignity alongside individuals' responsibility to respect others. Neoliberalism, by contrast, views life as ceaseless struggle. Agents vie for scarce resources in antagonistic competition in which every individual seeks dominance. This (...) political theory is codified in non-cooperative game theory; the neoliberal citizen and consumer is the strategic rational actor. Rational choice justifies ends irrespective of means. Money becomes the medium of all value. Solidarity and good will are invalidated. Relationships are conducted on a quid pro quo basis. However, agents can freely opt out of this cynical race to the bottom by embracing a more expansive range of coherent action. (shrink)

In this paper I will discuss a certain philosophical and conceptual program -- that I have called philosophy of social action writ large -- and also show in detail how parts of the program have been, and is currently being carried out. In current philosophical research the philosophy of social action can be understood in a broad sense to encompass such central research topics as action occurring in a social context (this includes multi-agent action); shared we-attitudes (such as we-intention, (...) mutual belief) and other social attitudes expressing collective intentionality and needed for the explication and explanation of social action; social macro-notions, such as actions performed by social groups and properties of social groups such as their goals and beliefs; social practices, and institutions (see e.g. Tuomela, 1995, 2000a, 2001). The theory of social action understood analogously in a broad sense would then involve not only philosophical but all other relevant theorizing about social action. Thus, in this sense, such fields of Artificial Intelligence (AI) as Distributed AI (DAI) and the theory of Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) fall within the scope of the theory of social action. DAI studies the social side of computer systems and includes various well-known areas ranging from human-computer interaction, computer-supported cooperative work, organizational processing, and distributed problem solving to the simulation of social systems. (shrink)

In this paper we analyze the notion of collective trust within a multi-modal setting. We argue that collective trust is a scalable concept and therefore definable in qualitatively distinct levels or strengths. We show possible connections between different forms of group trust and the emergence of obligations within groups of agents. In particular, the notion of collective trust appears to be strong enough to entail forms of delegation that may have a deontic connotation: the trust a group (...) puts in an agent’s performance of an action yields to the result that it becomes obligatory in the interest of the group that the agent performs this action. (shrink)

In the article, there proposed an original idea of the collective agent of cognition (CAC) that overcomes the controversy of individualism and collectivism. In the history of philosophy a clear conceptualization of has been offered by I. Kant (the notion of transcendental agent and scheme of imagination). This was interpretedby, among others, G.W.F. Hegel ("Zeitgeist") and K. Marx (the concept of the total and joint labor). A critical analysis of analytic social epistemology (A. Goldman, J. Lackey) helps (...) clarify the tacit presuppositions of the "individual-collective" dualism. In reducing the CAC to the cognizing individual, Lackey fails to interpret adequately the phenomenon of distributed knowledge widely spread in modern science and social practice (F. Hayek, H. Collins). As an alternative to reductionism, the article proposes a typological approach to CAC. It aims to understand its structure as consisting of four main levels (transcendental, imbedded, contract and distributed agent of cognition), each of which being illustrated by a paradigm example. In conclusion, the duality of collective and individual agents of cognition is unmasked as based on the mixture of everyday and philosophical discourses. (shrink)

Together we can achieve things that we could never do on our own. In fact, there are sheer endless opportunities for producing morally desirable outcomes together with others. Unsurprisingly, scholars have been finding the idea of collective moral obligations intriguing. Yet, there is little agreement among scholars on the nature of such obligations and on the extent to which their existence might force us to adjust existing theories of moral obligation. What interests me in this paper is the perspective (...) of the moral deliberating agent who faces a collective action problem, i.e. the type of reasoning she employs when deciding how to act. I hope to show that agents have collective obligations precisely when they are required to employ ‘we-reasoning’, a type of reasoning that differs from I-mode, best response reasoning, as I shall explain below. More precisely, two (or more) individual agents have a collective moral obligation to do x if x is an option for action that is only collectively available (more on that later) and each has sufficient reason to rank x highest out of the options available to them. (shrink)

How should we make sense of praise and blame and other such reactions towards collective agents like governments, universities, or corporations? My argument is that collective agents do not have to qualify as moral agents for us to make sense of their responsibility. Collective agents can be appropriate targets for our moral feelings and judgements because they can maintain and express moral positions of their own. Moral agency requires being capable of recognizing moral considerations and reasons. It (...) also necessitates the ability to react reflexively to moral matters, i.e., to take into account new moral concerns when they arise. While members of a collective agent are capable of this, the collective frames the thinking of the individual moral agents within it and affects their options in myriad ways. The moral positions thus formed and expressed belong to the collective. Crucially, unlike marginal moral agents, collective agents as moral actors can be held fully responsible for their acts and omissions. (shrink)

The focus of the following paper is the phenomenon of the collective agent; what constitutes the appearance of a collective agent? I begin by investigating one simple argument for the existence of collective agents. Two critical issues emerge: does it make sense to hold a collective agent blameworthy, and, what is the motivation for doing so, one way or the other? I then dissolve these issues with a distinction, that between blameworthiness and responsibility. (...) In light of this distinction, there appears to be no use for the introduction of collectives as agents in their own right, outside of expedience of reference and deference of blame. (shrink)

Could it be true that even though we as a group ought to do something, you as an individual ought not to do your part? And under what conditions, in particular, could this happen? In this article, I discuss how a certain kind of case, introduced by David Copp, illustrates the possibility that you ought not to do your part even when you would be playing a crucial causal role in the group action. This is because you may have special (...) agent-relative reasons against participating that are not shared by the group as a whole. I defend the claim that these are indeed cases in which you ought not to do your part in what the group ought to do. I then argue that we can expect these cases to produce a troubling kind of rational conflict. (shrink)

Andrew Forcehimes and Luke Semrau argue that agent-relative consequentialism is implausible because in some circumstances it classes an act as impermissible yet holds that the outcome of all agents performing that impermissible act is preferable. I argue that their problem is closely related to Derek Parfit's problem of ‘direct collective self-defeat’ and show how Parfit's plausible solution to his problem can be adapted to solve their problem.

This volume presents a systematic philosophical theory related to the collectivism-versus-individualism debate in the social sciences. A weak version of collectivism (the "we-mode" approach) that depends on group-based collective intentionality is developed in the book. The we-mode approach is used to account for collective intention and action, cooperation, group attitudes, social practices and institutions as well as group solidarity.

The article presents the nature of shared intentions and collective responsibility in simultaneous discussion of individualism, which views that collective agents and shared intentions are to be analyzed in relation between individual agents who are members of the collectives. It discusses as well the agent meaning theory that states that an agent moves against the interpretive background of action evaluation shared by the agent and the moral community.

Could groups ever be an understanding subject (an epistemic agent ascribed with understanding) or should we keep our focus exclusively on the individuals that make up the group? The way this paper will shape an answer to this question is by starting from a case we are most willing to accept as group understanding, then mark out the crucial differences with an unconvincing case, and, ultimately, explain why these differences matter. In order to concoct the cases, however, we need (...) to elucidate what it means to be attributed with understanding and what makes up an epistemic agent. I shall argue that it is abilities, above all, that guide our attributions of understanding. While it is true that understanding must go beyond single acts, this is not going beyond as in going behind them (to private occurrences which are impossible to discern and don’t themselves contribute anything of value), but beyond as in considering what people could and would do: their discernable and valuable abilities. To conceptualize whom the abilities belong to, I will specify what it means to be an epistemic agent. I shall argue that it is being a successful target of the epistemic stance. The epistemic stance (heavily inspired by Dennett’s intentional stance) forms an instrumental abstraction by attributing epistemic properties (i.e., beliefs, epistemic aims, problem-solving tactics) to an entity to explain or predict its behavior. Macro-systematicity (a higher-level pattern which a theory can exploit) is what makes the epistemic stance’s abstraction an explanatory powerful one (regardless of how that macro-systematicity is realized) and emergence (the lack of a straightforward mapping-relation between the micro and the macro) is what makes its power unique to a particular level of explanation. To end, I suggest two kinds of mapping-relations and walk through the shift from reducibility to emergence. (shrink)