The International Bill of Human Rights (IBHR) enjoys universal acclaim as the source of the best standards and definition of human rights. This paper argues that the IBHR is inspired by liberalism and harbours ambiguities that open the door to a neoliberal seizure of the rights agenda; and that this effectively destabilises the focus on the IBHR on socio-economic and community rights, and therefore its stated ideal of the equal value of all human rights. I argue that Kwame Gyekye's moderate (...) communitarian political philosophy affords a viable philosophical basis for justification of a more balanced conception of human rights than the theoretical basis of the IBHR does. (shrink)

In this text, the authors examine the relationship between political and feminist theory, characterizing and criticizing liberalism and communitarianism from a feminist perspective.

The purpose of this paper is an interpretation of the social and political thought of the Solidarity movement in the light of the political philosophy of communitarianism. In the first part of the paper, the controversies between liberalism and communitarianism are characterized in order to outline the communitarian response toward the authoritarian/totalitarian challenge. In the second part, the programme of a self-governing republic created by Solidarity is interpreted in the spirit of communitarianism. I reconstruct the ideal vision of human (...) being expressed in of ficial trade union’s documents and essays of Solidarity’s advisers e.g., Stefan Kurowski and Jozef Tischner, and the efforts of the movement for telling the truth about history and its vision of Polish history. Also, I interpret the programme of Self-Governing Republic adopted during the First National Convention of Delegates of Solidarity. In these programmatic documents of Solidarity, one may find ideas characteristic both of the communitarian and liberal political philosophy. However, the liberal ones—including, primarily, the guarantee of human and citizens’ rights, and of individual liberties—were subordinated to the postulate of reconstructing the national and social community. In the course of transformation after 1989, these communitarian elements of Solidarity programme, incompatible with liberal ideological agenda, have been erased. (shrink)

My main aim here is to examine what the significance is of the communitarian critique of liberalism for Hermann Cohen's political philosophy. I will conclude that Cohen's socialist Kantianism can successfully meet this critique. Also, I will argue that his political philosophy can better deal with some of the problems that communitarians detect in our Western democracies than can communitarianism itself. One crucial reason for this is that Cohen completes the original Kantian liberal project by making all agents fully (...) autonomous in the economic sphere. (shrink)

The communitarian critique of liberal agency is reminiscent of two earlier critiques: C. B. Macpherson's theory of possessive individualism and Marx's theory of alienation. As with the communitarian critique, Macpherson and Marx saw the liberal individual as being in some way 'disembodied'. Where they differed from communitarians was in the attention they paid to the actual social relations that gave rise to such an image. The comparison is thus fruitful because the emphasis Macpherson and Marx give to the (...) concrete circumstances of disempowerment highlights the overly abstract nature of the communitarian critique, demonstrating how it, and other similarly abstract normative theories, might maintain a focus on actual social relations. Key Words: alienation • communitarism • disembodiment • labor • liberalism • Macpherson • Marx • self. (shrink)

In the last two centuries, our world would have been a safer place if philosophers such as Rousseau, Marx, and Nietzsche had not given intellectual encouragement to the radical ideologies of Jacobins, Stalinists, and fascists. Maybe the world would have been better off, from the standpoint of sound practice, if philosophers had engaged in only modest, decent theory, as did John Stuart Mill. Yet, as Ronald Beiner contends, the point of theory is not to think safe thoughts; the point is (...) to open intellectual horizons. In Philosophy in a Time of Lost Spirit, Beiner reflects on the dualism of theory and practice. The purpose of the theorist is not to offer sensible guidance on the conduct of social life but to test the boundaries of our vision of social order. Whereas the liberal citizen should embody the practical virtues of prudence and moderation, the theorist should be radical, probing, and immoderate. Looking back at the liberal-communitarian debate of the 1980s, Beiner recognizes that the antidote to our spiritless times lies neither in the embrace of community over individualism nor of individualism over community: both individual and community need to be submitted to radical questioning. It is by exposing ourselves to the challenge of fearless thinking encountered at the philosophical extremities that we are most likely to understand our own world at a deeper level. In this collection of essays and reviews, Ronald Beiner helps us to think critically about the thought-worlds of our foremost contemporary thinkers, including Hannah Arendt, Allan Bloom, Michel Foucault, Hans-Georg Gadamer, J¦rgen Habermas, Will Kymlicka, Christopher Lasch, Richard Rorty, Judith Shklar, Leo Strauss, Charles Taylor, and Michael Walzer. (shrink)

The book describes a new form of communitarian politics on the African continent, that is able to take seriously both individual entitlements and communitarian obligations. This is achieved by proposing a thin version of communitarianism that realizes the organic relationship between individuals and the community.

The author shows that conceptions of rationality in current theories of science and law can account for neither the legitimacy of paradigm shifts nor the communitarian integrity internal to paradigms generally. He proposes an alternative conception of rationality that does.

Government by unanimous consent, following discussion, seems an attractive vision because it renders coercion legitimate or avoids coercion entirely.

This thesis discusses the proper relationship between religion and politics, not as two kinds of institutions in a society but as two sets of beliefs within and among belief systems: people's religious ideas of the good human life and their political ideas of a right society, in a religiously plural context. ;It starts its discussion by critically examining two most important positions on this issue in contemporary public discourses: the liberal idea of priority of the right to the good (...) and the communitarian idea of priority of the good to the right . The problem with the liberal view is that its idea of a politics neutral to all religions is merely an illusion. The problem with the communitarian one is that it will lead to either political sectarianism or religious pluralism. ;The thesis therefore aims to develop an alternative position, which is centered around the idea of multiple reflective equilibria. According to this idea, instead of a dichotomy, religious goodness and political rightness, along with many other ideas people may have, are mutually enriching, critical, and transformative, both within an individual's belief system and among different individuals' belief systems. In a religiously plural society, it searches for a universal political idea of the right that is kept in a reflective equilibrium with plural religious ideas of the good. (shrink)

The recent debate between liberals and their communitarian critics has reached a false plateau, with liberals conceding more than they should. After explicating the central communitarian thesis, the four ways that thesis could be understood, and the corresponding four senses of "independence," I argue that communitarians are right that liberalism requires a view of the self as 'unencumbered,' but I defend that view as superior to the alternatives. This allows me to defend true moral impartiality and universality as (...) well as the full normative primacy of the individual. I also present three variable factors of the 'inner citadel' model of the self and argue that communitarianism paradoxically presupposes a variant of that model which causes it internal contradictions. My discussion of these issues leads to a brief list of mandates for acceptable conceptions of personhood. After listing these, I briefly indicate implications of my analysis for the broader political and ethical realm. (shrink)

Both communitarianism and casuistry have sought to restore ethics as a practical science—the former by incorporating various traditions into a shared definition of the common good, the latter by considering the circumstances of each situation through critical reasoning. Mark G. Kuczewski analyzes the origins and methods of these two approaches and forges from them a new unified approach. This approach takes the communitarian notion of the person as its starting point but also relies upon the narrative and analogical tools (...) of case-based reasoning. He separates out the rhetoric that is incongruent with the Aristotelian aspirations of each method to show that the two are complementary, and that consensus can emerge from fragmentation. He then applies his resulting method to three major problems in bioethics: the difficulties that the issue of personal identity poses for advance directives, the role of the family in medical decision making, and the refusal of treatment because of religious beliefs. He analyzes the need to assume a communitarian notion of the person as a starting point for the application of casuistic insights. Combining theoretical, practical, and scholarly insights, this book will be of interest to philosophers, political and social scientists, and bioethicists. (shrink)

Communitarian thinkers have argued that liberalism devalues community in modern societies. This essay assesses the three main strands of the contemporary debate betweeen communitarianism and liberalism: (1) the communitarian critique of the liberal universalism, (2) the communitarian critique of liberal individualism, and (3) the communitarian critique of liberal politics. In each case, it is argued that the debate has moved from fairly abstract philosophical controversies to more concrete engagement with political disputes in Western as well (...) as East Asian societies. (shrink)

The thirteen essays in this volume approach the liberal-communitarian debate from a variety of perspectives. Some discuss disagreements between liberals and communitarians over the nature of moral agency and the proper functions of government. Some examine alternative ways of conceiving liberalism or community, or challenge widely held beliefs about the harmful effects of capitalism on community, or about the value of traditional practices as guides to judicial reasoning. Other essays seek to determine whether it makes sense to think of (...) societies as having and pursuing a common good, or whether culturally diverse societies can ever hope to achieve social unity. Still others examine the role of states in promoting citizens' civic education and their participation in the voluntary associations and institutions of civil society. (shrink)

The principle of national self-determination has usually been justified by extending to national groups an entitlement that individuals are regarded as having, namely, to the conditions necessary for their self development. In order to extend the concept of self-determination to nations in this way, an argument that it is important for nations to exist within their own political communities must be given. In this essay, I describe and criticize one type of argument for such a principle of national self-determination – (...) what I will call the communitarian argument.Contemporary communitarians (such as Michael Walzer and David Miller) usually contend that determining who rightfully has membership in a political community must precede the allocation of rights and responsibilities between members. Community is understood to mean a national community; membership in communities therefore results from the ascription of national identities to individuals and to the consequent sorting out of loyalties that follows from this ascription. A right of self-determination for nations is required, on this view, in order to ensure that political communities are legitimately formed in accordance with national identities. (shrink)

Introduction: Beyond neoliberalism -- Friedrich A. Hayek : markets, planning, and the rule of law -- The politics of utopia and the liberal theory of totalitarianism : Karl Popper and Michael Foucault -- Pluralism and positive freedom : toward a critique of Isaiah Berlin -- From the Crick report to the Parekh report : multiculturalism, cultural difference and democracy -- Foucault, liberal education and the issue of autonomy -- Saving Martha Nussbaum from herself : help from friends she didn't (...) know she had -- Social democracy in the 21st century : Hobson, Keynes and complexity. (shrink)

Why do we have obligations to the community to which we happen to belong? For communitarians, membership does more than provide the context for asking this question. In fact, the simple fact of membership goes some way towards justifying our obligations. According to the strong version of the communitarian thesis, membership is the fundamental consideration justifying political obligation; but for the weaker version, membership is one consideration among others and at times may be the less weighty one. John Horton's (...) theory of associative obligations can be read as moving back and forth between strong and weak communitarianism. His communitarianism is strong when he rejects value pluralism, arguing that one consideration, membership, is fundamental. However, Horton also advances claims that are compatible with not only the weak version of the communitarian thesis but also value pluralism. They suggest that, if membership is one reason among others to justify obligations, it is not fundamental as it can be defeated by other considerations. (shrink)

All stakeholders agree publicly that innovation and governance of emerging technologies should be done responsibly. However, the international debate on who should do what to contribute to this lofty goal is nowhere near a solution. The starting point of this paper is the issue of how and for which reason to engage stakeholders in addition to governments in the international governance of nanotechnology. This article examines the mainly North-American communitarian criticism of political liberalism and the related concept of subsidiarity (...) in order to shed new light on this discussion. The central research question is: Can a communitarian-subsidiarity perspective on the roles of governments, companies and civil society actors that hold a stake in emerging technologies clarify the grounds on which each actor should be expected to contribute to responsible research and innovation at the international level? After selecting some relevant aspects of a communitarian-subsidiarity model for a dialogue society, an analytical framework is proposed. This framework is then applied to the recent international dialogue on responsible governance of nanotechnology. The outcomes of the analysis are compared to the OECD planning guide on public engagement and outreach in nanotechnology, and indicators for monitoring progress in responsible global innovation are suggested. The main contribution of the selected communitarian-subsidiarity perspective is that it offers philosophical grounds for a return of citizens to the driving seat in cooperative international responsible innovation. (shrink)

(1998). Speculative imagination and the problem of legitimation: On David Ingram's Reason, History, and Politics: The communitarian grounds of Legitimation in the modern age. Social Epistemology: Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 117-126.

This article formulates a progressive conception of communitarian democracy which rests upon the distinction between deliberative and dedicated conceptions of community. Deliberative communities seek fallibilistic change through a non-Enlightenment conception of practical reason. According to this pragmatist conception of practical reason, members of deliberative communities jointly attempt to formulate political truth independently of any a priori or non-deliberative standards of the right and the good. By contrast, dedicated communities seek what they regard as the truth about reality and insist (...) upon adhering to those cultural and social givens of their society which express this truth. The distinction between deliberative and dedicated communities is relevant to the debate between liberalism and communitarianism. Rather than viewing this debate as one between those who value community and those who do not, it is better understood as a controversy over the appropriate kind of community. Typically, liberals seek deliberative communities, while communitarians seek dedicated ones. However, a person committed to deliberativism as the method of social change can also regard deliberativism as defining a certain conception of community and the conception of the persons who are its members. Consequently, in this view, almost every serious person is a communitarian, but some people are deliberative communitarians while others are dedicated communitarians. Communitarian democracy is an attempt to describe a deliberative community. Communitarian democrats seek freedom, equality, and solidarity for the purpose of devising joint solutions to social problems. In order to achieve this, communitarian democrats devise a civic discourse shorn of dedicated features, which values each citizen equally as a member of the community. This has implication for at least three conflicts in political and constitutional affairs. Since no irreducibly dedicated premises are possible in this civic discourse, dedicated arguments are impossible without translation into deliberative terms. This implies a particular conclusion to the debate about religion in the public square, namely, that dedicated religious discourse must be translated into its deliberative counterpart, if it has one, before its proponents may use it in public justification. (The article pays close attention to Michael Perry?s work concerning the role of religion in the public square.) Similarly, concerning multicultural conceptions of the right and the good, communitarian democrats can accept only those multicultural conceptions translatable into deliberative discourse. And, finally, communitarian democrats must guard against constitutional atrophy, the process by which initially deliberative structures become dedicated through lack of vigilance, criticism, and challenge. In a communitarian democracy, atrophied deliberative structures may be just as inefficient and unfair as some decidedly dedicated structures and must be similarly avoided. (shrink)

This book traces the progress of the liberal/communitarian debate. Beginning with an account of John Rawls's A Theory of Justice, d it goes on to provide clear presentations of the work of the main communitarians - Michael Sandel, Alisdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor and Michael Walzer. Clear and accessible in style, with a guiding agenda of themes and issues, this book is an indispensable aid to students of contemporary political theory.

The author recommends the incorporation of communitarian theories and critics of dominant political theory as a foundation for an advanced political philosophy course. The course is structured for students who are already familiar with the Western political philosophical tradition. Structuring the course around the liberal-communitarian debate allows students to be introduced to dominant liberal political theory and contemporary critiques of liberalism around issues of gender, race and class. Students are exposed to a wide range of views in readings (...) that are accessible to undergraduates. The author provides recommendations of current literature and anthologies that accommodate the structure of the course. (shrink)

Theories regarding the nature and achievement of personhood in a communitarian context appear to differ in significant respects in the writings of several contemporary African philosophers. Ifeanyi Menkiti seems to regard ethnic differences as sufficient to warrant a national accommodation of multiculturalism with respect to moralities and attendant beliefs. Kwasi Wiredu argues that there is a substantive universal moral principle that undercuts such apparent and relatively superficial diversity. Communitarianism also seems to provide a better framework for explaining how a (...) human being becomes a person than classical liberal theory as enunciated by someone like John Rawls. (shrink)

This chapter demonstrates that the African philosophical tradition offers four interesting ways to broaden global thought about human rights, where all four involve an appeal to the value of community in some way. Firstly, some African philosophers are skeptical about the normative category of human, i.e., individual rights, with some appealing to communal considerations to deny they exist at all and others doing so to argue that they should not play a central role in moral-political thought. Secondly, there is the (...) view, enshrined in the African (“Banjul”) Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights for more than 40 years, that there are group rights and not merely rights of individuals. Thirdly, some thinkers in the African tradition have held that we have dignity because of relational features such as our ability to enter into community with others, contrasting with more globally familiar features such as our autonomy, rationality, or life. Fourthly, many African political philosophers hold that there is a human right to have a voice in any major political decision, a kind of democracy that would forge community among all by forbidding rule by a majority. The chapter argues that the grounds for skepticism about human rights are weak and instead that a communitarian foundation of human rights and its implications for group rights and democratic rights should be taken seriously by a global audience. (shrink)

Political obligation is concerned with the clash between the individual’s claim to self-governance and the right of the state to claim obedience. It is a central and ancient problem in political philosophy. In this authoritative introduction, Dudley Knowles frames the problem of obligation in terms of the duties citizens have to the state and each other. Drawing on a wide range of key works in political philosophy, from Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, David Hume and G. W. F. Hegel to John (...) Rawls, A. John Simmons, Joseph Raz and Ronald Dworkin, Political Obligation: A Critical Introduction is an ideal starting point for those coming to the topic for the first time, as well as being an original and distinctive contribution to the literature. Knowles distinguishes the philosophical problem of obligation - which types of argument may successfully ground the legitimacy of the state and the duties of citizens - from the political problem of obligation - whether successful arguments apply to the actual citizens of particular states. Against the anarchist and modern skeptics, Knowles claims that a plurality of arguments promise success when carefully formulated and defended, and discusses in turn ancient and modern theories of social contract and consent, fairness and gratitude, utilitarianism, justice and a Samaritan duty of care for others. Against modern communitarians, he defends a distinctive liberalism: ‘the state proposes, the citizen disposes’. (shrink)

Winner of the 1999 Best Book in Ecological and Transformational Politics presented by the American Political Science Association's Section on Ecological and Transformational Politics The discipline of political science has reached a crossroads. The frequency with which terms such as "post-liberal," "post-modern," "post-patriarchical," "post-materialist," and "post-structural" are used in contemporary political discourse testifies to the pervasive conviction that an era has ended. Similarly, phrases such as "new world order," "new paradigm," "new age," and "third wave" convey the widely-shared (...) expectation that what lies ahead politically will be qualitatively unlike what has gone before. Transformational Politics argues that traditional political science is failing to identify and address fundamental political phenomena of our time and proposes an alternative value-based political science that not only studies phenomena, but also uses knowledge to promote democracy, sustainability, and social conscience. Part I of the book defines transformational political theory as an emerging paradigm and draws on a wide array of theories—empowerment, feminist, democratic, communitarian, chaos, quantum, conflict resolution, self-actualization. Part II examines how a transformational perspective guides the study of politics in both research and teaching. Part III offers guidance about how to practice the theory and apply the study with a concern for creating a better world. (shrink)

This book is open access under a CC BY 4.0 license. This timely book addresses the conflict between globalism and nationalism. It provides a liberal communitarian response to the rise of populism occurring in many democracies. The book highlights the role of communities next to that of the state and the market. It spells out the policy implications of liberal communitarianism for privacy, freedom of the press, and much else. In a persuasive argument that speaks to politics today (...) from Europe to the United States to Australia, the author offers a compelling vision of hope. Above all, the book offers a framework for dealing with moral challenges people face as they seek happiness but also to live up to their responsibilities to others and the common good. At a time when even our most basic values are up for question in policy debates riddled with populist manipulation, Amitai Etzioni’s bold book creates a new frame which introduces morals and values back into applied policy questions. These questions span the challenges of jobless growth to the unanswered questions posed by the role of artificial intelligence in a wide range of daily life tasks and decisions. While not all readers will agree with the communitarian solutions that he proposes, many will welcome an approach that is, at its core, inclusive and accepting of the increasingly global nature of all societies at the same time. It is a must read for all readers concerned about the future of Western liberal democracy. Carol Graham, Leo Pasvolsky Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution and College Park Professor/University of Maryland In characteristically lively, engaging, and provocative style Etzioni tackles many of the great public policy dilemmas that afflict us today. Arguing that we are trapped into a spiral of slavish consumerism, he proposes a form of liberal communitarian that, he suggests, will allow human beings to flourish in changing circumstances. Jonathan Wolff, Blavatnik Chair of Public Policy, Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford. (shrink)

I argue in this chapter against a common Kantian-inspired misconception of human dignity that has prevailed in African philosophical discussions of the concept of late. This approach substitutes the normative ground of dignity in our inherent capacity for individual rational autonomy for our inherent capacity for communal relationality. Although this African communitarian correction to Kantian individualism rightly picks up on the relational character of human dignity in African ethics and political thought, it repeats the mistake of attributing dignity to (...) single, individual persons. This misses the value of the social ontology of human dignity, which may be attributed to a typically African relational approach. In contrast, I offer an interpretation that locates dignity in mutual recognition. (shrink)

Under the democratic auspices of our time, rights have tended to be distributed generously and widely—if not in deed, at least in word. The tendency has been to widen their legitimate applicability from humans to all sentient beings, to all living beings, and, as some would have it, to the environment as a whole. Fortunately, this penchant for cataloging virtually every human relation, ambition, and aspiration in terms of rights and duties has not gone unopposed. On the one hand, there (...) are those who, though essentially committed to rights and their place within political discourse, are nonetheless distressed by a seemingly endless and senseless proliferation. They are concerned that in becoming widely palatable, rights have become common fare, thin in substance and all too frequently misunderstood and misapplied. Theirs is a mission of separating the genuine article from the many pretenders. (shrink)

For most contemporary liberals, politics concerns distribution in social arrangements based on consent, guided not by unified notions of the good life, but by notions of justice or rights prior to and neutral towards conceptions of the good. ;This liberal demarcation between politics and ethics assumes an ideal of individual autonomy that has little meaning to Confucianism. However, Confucianism is authoritarian. Confucianism views individuals and societies differently, but nevertheless avoids subordinating either to the other. Via communitarian critiques (...) of liberal democracy and John Dewey's conception of democracy that bridges the liberal-communitarian divide, the author argues that a Confucian democracy is possible in which politics and ethics are inseparable without being oppressive. ;Chapter one sets the problem within recent debates over liberal democracy global norm, the liberal-communitarian debate, and John Dewey's philosophy. ;Chapter two discusses a conception of social individuals that offers an alternative to the liberal conception of the autonomous self. Comparing Dewey's views with constructed Confucian conceptions, the chapter shows that recognizing individuals as inherently social does not subordinate individuals to some collective entity totally separate from its individual members. ;Through an understanding of their conceptions of communities as nonexclusionary and requiring individual creativity, chapter three explores the resources in Dewey's, pragmatism and early Confucianism for guidance on building democratic communities in which individuals flourish together. The operative conceptions of the good life in such communities would be neither imposed completely from above, nor begin entirely from below. ;Chapter Four compares Confucian and Deweyan ethico-political orders in which ethics and politics are inseparable. It suggests that, while Confucianism for most of its history has not explicitly advocated "government by the people," its emphasis on "government for the people" provides a Confucian argument for democracy. ;Chapter five examines how Confucians balance freedom with authority, and draws from early Confucianism and Dewey's philosophy an alternative ideal of human freedom in contrast with the liberal ideal of individual autonomy. ;In conclusion, the dissertation considers some difficulties and strategies of bringing about a Confucian democracy. (shrink)

One source of tension within and between modern nation states derives from conflict between individual and cultural rights. Modern democracies have been built on ideas of individual liberty whose extensions to the rights of culturally distinctive groups to survival and acceptance can create normative and political conflict. Such tensions raise questions about the role of the state, the underlying theory legitimising liberal states, and the social aims of education. Philosophical aspects of such conflicts are explored in Kevin McDonough and Walter (...) Feinberg’s excellent volume, Citizenship and Education in Liberal-Democratic Societies: Teaching for Cosmopolitan Values and Collective Identities. The philosophical issues hinge on how individuals and groups are conceived, as well as how liberty and loyalty are understood. Most of the essays address these concepts in pragmatic rather than essentialist ways, suggesting that how these issues are conceived is itself an important part of the problem, or its resolution. I conclude by suggesting that all of these doctrines are faiths, the problem being to create conditions so that they, or their elements, can be accepted or rejected reasonably in the light of their social consequences. (shrink)

In Liberalism, Community and Culture, Will Kymlicka suggests that the cultural resources with which communitarians have been concerned, inasmuch as they are prerequisites for the individual choice of the good, are appropriate objects of liberal protection. But Kymlicka's liberalism fails to fully meet the concerns of those who see their communities as intrinsically valuable—not merely as necessary means for the clarification of their options. Ultimately Kymlicka's approach shares in the tendency of liberalism to reduce manifold values to the single standard (...) of equal concern for individuals—which results in a paternalistic disregard for those individuals’ actual motivations. (shrink)

The debate on the communitarian notion of personhood as initiated by Gyekye, in response to Menkiti, is both exhaustive and exhausted. Its exhaustiveness and exhaustion lies in the fact that, in all probability whatever can be said around it has been said, with truly nothing new likely ever being added. What is possibly left, is the potential for further additions to be more strident in their picking of sides or repeating that Gyekye and Menkiti are not sufficiently different or (...) insisting on the authenticity of either approach to African thought. What is needed is to transcend the constraints of this debate by opening up new vistas of interpreting communitarian thought in personhood. Whatever merit there is in showing whether radical or moderate communitarianism is real, or in showing which of these two is better than the other, this discussion can be furthered by looking at implications of communitarianism to other facets of philosophy. The most plausible avenue that could be implicated in communitarian considerations is the sphere of politics. Theorising about the communitarian notion of persons, I suggest, is partly to theorise about the political. If the commitments on which the doctrine of communitarianism is founded, are used to capture the sort of relations that exist between individuals, and between individuals and the community, then this relationship has an effect on how we conceive of the political theory we think appropriate. It is suggested here that contemplating on the communitarian polity will show the shortcomings of communitarianism as conceived by Gyekye and Menkiti. Keywords: Menkiti, Gyekye, Communitarianism, Limited Communitarianism, Personhood, Classical Communitarianism. (shrink)

John O'Neill argues in a recent article, ‘Should Communitarians be Nationalists?’, that communitarians are wrong to be committed to the defence of ties of nationhood, both because the nation‐state's rise is associated with the disappearance of the ties of community and because the nation is an illusory community. I argue that the evidence that communitarianism is committed as charged to the defence of nationality is unconvincing. Further, the familiar accusation that the nation is a false or unreal community is neither (...) perspicuous nor obviously true. It is important to evaluate the significance and worth of the nation as a community independently of the nationalist prescription that the nation and the state should coincide. The important question is not whether the political community should be a nation, but what sort of community the nation should be. (shrink)

It is often claimed that liberalism is falsely and perniciously universalist. I take this charge seriously, exploring three positions: the communitarians’, Rorty’s, and that of “comprehensive” liberalism. After explaining why universalism is thought impossible, I examine the communitarian view that value is determined within communities and argue that it results in a form of relativism that is unacceptable. I next discuss Richard Rorty’s liberal acceptance of “conventionalism” and explain how, despite his rejection of universalism, Rorty remains a liberal. I (...) then present a defense of universalism, based in part on arguments that parallel Thomas Nagel’s arguments in defense of a “view from nowhere” and Jean Hampton’s objectivist arguments against Rawls’s moves to a “merely political” theory. That defense requires that we can distance ourselves from our ends to make moral judgments shorn of all partialities. (shrink)

Machine generated contents note: -- Introduction to the OneThe Concept of One: From Philosophy to Politics -Artemy Magun Part I. Metaphysics of the One and the Multiple1. More than One -Jean Luc Nancy 2. Condivision, or Towards a Non- communitarian Concatenation of Singularities -Gerald Raunig 3. Unity and Solitude -Artemy Magun 4. The Fragility of the One -Maria Calvacante 5. The One: Construction or Event? For a Politics of Becoming -Boyan Mancher Part II. 20th-Century Thinkers of Unity (...) and Multiplicity 6. Truth and Infinity in Badiou and Heidegger -Alexey Chernyakov 7. Complicated Presence: The Unity of Being in Parmenides and Heidegger -Jussi Bachman 8. The Universal, the General, the Multiple in the Perspective of a Political Utopia: Deleuze and Badiou on the Event -Keti Chukhrov 9. Humanity, Unity and the One -Nina Power Part III. Unity and Multiplicity in Nature 10. Elemental Nature as the Ultimate Common Ground of the World Community -Susanna Lindberg 11. Vegetative Democracy, or the Post-metaphysics of Plants -Michael Marder Part IV. Unity in Action: Forms of Political Consolidation in the Case of Contemporary Russia12. Collectivity in Post-revolutionary Russia -Igor Tchubarov13. Street University: Production of Collective Time and Public Space -Pavel Arsenyev 14. Fighting Together: the Problem of Solidarity -Carine Cle;ment Part V. E Pluribus Unum: Res Publica and Community 5. How Does One Constitute the One? Theology of the Icon, Theory of Non-representative Art and of Non-representative Politics -Oleg Kharkhodin 12. Drawing Lots in Politics: Unity and Totality -Yves Sintomer. (shrink)

Charles Taylor identifies a close connection between morality and politics, noting that much confusion arises from poorly understood, and sometimes clearly mistaken, moral ontologies. Together with fellow communitarians and civic-republicans, Taylor argues that the rights-based judicial review of legislation rests upon a fundamentally mistaken Rawlsian/Kantian moral ontology. While accepting Taylor’s critique of Rawls’ moral ontology and its questionable ability to defend judicial review, I develop an alternative reading of judicial review relying on insightful new work by Wilfrid Waluchow. I (...) conclude that if we accept Waluchow’s common- law conception of the judicial review, there is good reason for Taylor to reject some of his deprecating comments about judicial review. I further suggest that a common-law conception of the judicial review may be amicable to the larger Communitarian and Civic-republican project. (shrink)

Is statecraft soulcraft? Should we look to our souls and selves in assessing the quality of our politics? Is it the business of politics to cultivate, shape, or structure our internal lives? Summarizing and answering the major theoretical positions on these issues, Peter Digeser formulates a qualified permission to protect or encourage particular forms of human identity. Public discourse on politics should not preclude talk about the role of reason in our souls or the importance of wholeness (...) and community to our selves or the significance of autonomy for individuals. However, those who seek to place only their own conception of the self or soul within the reach of politics are as mistaken as those who would completely preclude such matters from the political realm. In proposing this view, Digeser responds to communitarians, classical political rationalists, and genealogists who argue that liberal culture fragments, debases, or normalizes our selves. He also critically analyzes perfectionist liberals who justify liberalism by virtue of its ability to cultivate autonomy and authenticity, as well as liberal neutralists who wish to avoid altogether the problem of selfcraft. All these, he argues, fall short in some way in defining the extent to which politics should be concerned with the self. (shrink)