The main purpose of the present paper is to demonstrate that as early as 1904 pre-eminent American mathematician Maxime Bôcher was an adherent to the presently relevant argument of reasonableness, or even necessity of parallel development of two philosophical methods of reflection on mathematics, so that its essence could be more fully comprehended. The goal of the research gives rise to the question: what two types of philosophical deliberation on mathematics were proposed by Bôcher?

This paper avers that most attempts at formulating viable theories in African philosophy are saddled with intrusions of ethnophilosophic and ethnocentric types: The author identifies this as the phenomenon of “unintended ethnocentric commitment”. He uses communalism, a socio-political theory in African philosophy, to illustrate his point. He further argues that overreliance on the method of synthetic deduction - as is widely practised in African philosophy - can impact adversely on the universal outreach of theories and limit our (...) knowledge of the world. The paper contends that any theory that aspires to give us a clearer picture of the world should be in a position to contain the distortions arising from the promptings of sense experience. Likewise, such a theory should show clear evidence ofanalytic insight into the mechanisms and phenomena on the basis of which our knowledge of the world can be broadened and our judgement thereof improved. By recourse to the method and principles of ibuanyidanda (complementary reflection) philosophy, a systematic methodological approach to theory formulation in African philosophy, the author shows how theories in African philosophy can be articulated more resourcefully with a view to upholding their systematic and universal relevance. (shrink)

Preface In his book, African Philosophy, Theophilius Okere, after arguing that the way to African philosophy is the path of hermeneutics of culture, ...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS 501 the practical problems of daily life by providing an explanation for misfortune and a source of guidance in times of uncertainty. There were also attempts to use it for divination and supernatural healing" (p. 151). Along these same lines, one should also cite a number of articles by Natalie Zemon Davis and, above all, the work of Robert Mandl 'ou. 17 To conclude these remarks, (...) I must stress once again that Cassirer's program, in its pure form, is not only impossible for any but the mystic to follow; it is fundamentally anti~ historical. Peter Gay himself, a great admirer of Cassker, and a historian who has a penchant for such neo--idealist hocus-pocus, has tended to follow Cassirer's dictum in his interpretation of the Enlightenment as a whole (to his grid, one is tempted to add).TM Earlier, in Voltaire's Politics (1959), Gay had made a most convincing case for a radically different approach, which he calls "the social history of ideas." Instead of "searching for a dynamic center of thought," "a single point of view," of which each pamphlet, poem or tale was but another facet, Gay presented Voltaire's works as responses to specific situatiom--a series of positions which, if not discrete, were at least sufficientlydiverse as to be incomprehensible without intimate knowledge of the peculiar circumstances of each. I am not suggestinghere that the historian of philosophy abandon his traditional m6tier in a mad search for more fashionable methods. There will always be a need for insightful, penetrating analyses of individual thinkers, and probing essays into internal consistencies or contradictions. Febvre readily conceded that the historian concerned only with "placing" Descartes in his century has not thereby come to grips with Cartesianism. But abstract analysis cannot safelybe divorced from its natural collateral disciplines. It is time to stop studying philosophical ideas as if they were statements propounded in a void. If we neglect the rhetorical situation of philosophy, if we forget the particular audience to which an idea was addressed, we run the risk of forgetting what it is we mean by an idea in the first place. ALeaev SOMA~ Par/~ COMPLEMENTARY METHODOLOGIES IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS Alfred Soman doses his article with the modest statement, "I am not suggesting here that the historian of philosophy abandon his traditional metier in a mad search for more fashionable methods. There will always be a need for insightful, penetrating analyses of 1T N. Z. Davis, "The Reasons of Misrule: Youth Groups and Charivaris in Sixteenth-Century France.,"Past and Present, No. 50 (February, 1971), 41-75; "The Rites of Violence: Religious Riot in Sixteenth-Century France," ibid., No. 59 (May, 1973), 51-91. Mandrou's recent Des humaniatea au.r hommea de science: XVI 9 et XVIIe si~cles (1973) is by far the most coherent and systematic synthesisof the new historiography of ideas for this period. Specialistswill of course findroom to quarrel over some of the details;but as an initial outline and as a program for future research, the virtues of Mandrou's book are, I think, indisputable. is E.g., P. Gay, The Enlightenment, an Interpretation, 2 vols. (New York, 1966-1969). Gay's s~lmmaryremarks on Charron (I, 303) are so typical of his verbal sleights of hand that I cannot resist the following quotation: "While Charron was not a philosophe before his time---he was a priest and a theologian---the values he celebrates, in open dcfcren~ to his Romans, are the v~u of tl~ Eallghtc~m~nt." 502 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY individual thinkers, and probing essays into internal consistencies or contradictions.''t Yet what else might his intent be when he tacks on to a critique of an article explicitly designed as a textual analysis of De la Sagesse a glowing!audation of the new trends in the social history of ideas. The second half of his article is in fact an attack on many of the textual studies that fill this journal. The new trends in historiography that have so greatly affected eighteenth-century studies do indeed look most promising,2 hut in our concern for the social milieu in which... (shrink)

In everyday life, situations in which we act adequately yet entirely without deliberation are ubiquitous. We use the term “situated normativity” for the normative aspect of embodied cognition in skillful action. Wittgenstein’s notion of “directed discontent” refers to a context-sensitive reaction of appreciation in skillful action. Extending this notion from the domain of expertise to that of adequate everyday action, we examine phenomenologically the question of what happens when skilled individuals act correctly with instinctive ease. This question invites exploratory contributions (...) from a variety of perspectives complementary to the philosophical/ phenomenological one, including cognitive neuroscience, neurodynamics and psychology. Along such lines we try to make the normative aspect of adequate immediate action better accessible to empirical research. After introducing the idea that “valence” is a forerunner of directed discontent, we propose to make progress on this by first pursuing a more restricted exploratory question, namely, ‘what happens in the first few hundred milliseconds of the development of directed discontent?’. (shrink)

In a series of lectures on German philosophy ‘since Kant’, the names of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel and their critical reference to Kant are, of course, a must. No less a must, though, would seem to be Wilhelm von Humboldt, a philosopher and linguist who, together with Herder and Hamann, formed the alliterating triumvirate of a romanticist critique of Kant. The response, within the discipline, to transcendental philosophy from this side was, in contrast to the idealistic mainstream, long (...) in the coming but, in the end, rich in consequences. (shrink)

AbtractTechnologies both new and old provide us with a wide range of cognitive artifacts that change the structure of our cognitive tasks. After a brief analysis of past classifications of these artifacts, I shall elaborate a new way of classifying them developed by focusing on an aspect that has been previously overlooked, namely the possible relationships between these objects and the cognitive processes they involve. Cognitive artifacts are often considered as objects that simply complement our cognitive capabilities, but this “ (...) class='Hi'>complementary view” seems to be an oversimplification. Assuming an “interaction-centered approach”, this article identifies three essential ways in which cognitive artifacts carry out their function: complementing, constituting and substituting our cognitive processes, and builds a taxonomy of these objects that is grounded on these relations. In so doing, it also addresses the chaotic set of different micro-functions carried out by cognitive artifacts, which have not thus far been dealt with, sorting these functions into three corresponding categories. The second part of the article analyzes in greater detail how cognitive artifacts work in our cognitive life, identifying a new kind of functions, called semi-proper functions, and providing a new definition of cognitive artifact based on the previous analysis of these objects. (shrink)

According to a widely held view, scientific modelling consists in entertaining a set of model descriptions that specify a model. Rather than studying the phenomenon of interest directly, scientists investigate the phenomenon indirectly via a model in the hope of learning about some of the phenomenon’s features. I call this view the description-driven modelling (DDM) account. I argue that although an accurate description of much of scientific research, the DDM account is found wanting as regards the mechanistic modelling found in (...) many branches of biology. By analysing research practices in cancer immunology concerning the development of mechanistic models of the process of cancer metastasis, this paper presents and argues for a complementary account of scientific modelling, herein called the experimentation-driven modelling (EDM) account. In EDM, scientists investigate a set of experimental systems and then integrate the results obtained from experiments into a mechanistic model. While EDM shares some key features with DDM, the two are epistemically very different approaches to research. (shrink)

We review the notion of complementarity of observables in quantum mechanics, as formulated and studied by Paul Busch and his colleagues over the years. In addition, we provide further clarification on the operational meaning of the concept, and present several characterisations of complementarity—some of which new—in a unified manner, as a consequence of a basic factorisation lemma for quantum effects. We work out several applications, including the canonical cases of position–momentum, position–energy, number–phase, as well as periodic observables relevant to spatial (...) interferometry. We close the paper with some considerations of complementarity in a noisy setting, focusing especially on the case of convolutions of position and momentum, which was a recurring topic in Paul’s work on operational formulation of quantum measurements and central to his philosophy of unsharp reality. (shrink)

The 20th century philosophy of science began on a positivistic note. Its focal point was scientific explanation and the hypothetico-deductive (HD) framework of explanation was proposed as the standard of what is meant by “science.” HD framework, its inductive and statistical variants, and other logic-based approaches to modeling scientific explanation were developed long before the dawn of the information age. Since that time, the volume of observational data and power of high performance computing have increased by several orders of (...) magnitude and reshaped the practice and concept of science, and indeed, the philosophy of science. A new observational-inductive (OI) framework for scientific research is emerging due to recent developments in sensors, data systems, computers, and knowledge discovery techniques. We examine the nature of these changes and their impact on the question of what is meant by “science” after discussing five examples of the OI framework, and conclude that the HD and OI frameworks are complementary and synergistic. (shrink)

Philosophy of Science: A Unified Approach combines a general introduction to philosophy of science with an integrated survey of all its important subfields. As the book’s subtitle suggests, this excellent overview is guided methodologically by "a unified approach" to philosophy of science: behind the diversity of scientific fields one can recognize a methodological unity of the sciences. This unity is worked out in this book, revealing all the while important differences between subject areas. Structurally, this comprehensive book (...) offers a two-part approach, which makes it an excellent introduction for students new to the field and a useful resource for more advanced students. Each chapter is divided into two sections. The first section assumes no foreknowledge of the subject introduced, and the second section builds upon the first by bringing into the conversation more advanced, complementary topics. Definitions, key propositions, examples and figures overview all of the core material. At the end of every chapter there are selected readings and exercises . The book also includes a comprehensive bibliography and an index. (shrink)

With the prevalence of complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) increasing in western societies, questions of the ethical justification of these alternative health care approaches and practices have to be addressed. In order to evaluate philosophical reasoning on this subject, it is of paramount importance to identify and analyse possible arguments for the ethical justification of CAM considering contemporary biomedical ethics as well as more fundamental philosophical aspects. Moreover, it is vital to provide adequate analytical instruments for this task, such (...) as separating ‘CAM as belief system’, and ‘CAM as practice’, Findings show that beneficence and non-maleficence are central issues for an ethical justification of CAM as practice, while freedom of thought and religion are central to CAM as belief system. Many justification strategies have limitations and qualifications that have to be taken into account. Singularly descriptive premises in an argument often prove to be more problematic than universal ethical principles. Thus, non-ethical issues related to a general philosophical underpinning - e.g. epistemology, semantics, and ontology - are highly relevant for determining a justification strategy, especially when strong metaphysical assumptions are involved. Even if some values are shared with traditional biomedicine, axiological differences have to be considered as well. Further research should be done about specific CAM positions. These could be combined with applied qualitative social research methods. (shrink)

This paper has two main objectives. The first, which could be said to be the ultimate objective, is to gradually introduce the research project of African philosophy to the philosophical scholars in Taiwan (as a case study) and by extension to Asia in general. The second is to expose the crucial role of contemporary African philosophy in the mental liberation and emancipation of the African peoples. And by the means of this role of contemporary African philosophy introduce (...) it to philosophical scholars and scholars in the humanities in Taiwan. It highlights the need and areas for a comparative or complementary research between African and Asia philosophies, with special focus on contemporary Taiwan philosophical scholarship. This work posits “mental liberation” as the end and motivation of African Philosophy. It maintains that, whereas the Western philosophical traditions, in most part, aim at mental liberation disinterestedly or strictly epistemologically, and the Eastern philosophical traditions, in most part, aim at mental liberation socio-ethically, the African philosophical traditions, in most part, aim at mental liberation socio-politically. (shrink)

The spin-j Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen–Bohm experiment is examined in the context of how the quantum theoretic probability distributions for the spin measurement outcomes are to be coarse-grained in order to yield classical behavior in the $$j \rightarrow \infty $$ limit. A coarse-graining protocol is found that can be viewed as imperfection either in the detection process or in state preparation process, and is in both viewpoints minimal in the sense that it is no more than what is needed to wash out the (...) execess quantum correlations. In the first point of view the coarse-grained distribution can be written in terms of a Bell-type factorizable hidden variable model wherein the conditional distributions for the spin measurement outcome of each particle is not just nonnegative but actually attains the value zero for some choice of measurement axis. In the second point of view the coarse-grained distribution arises from a spin state whose Wigner function is not just nonnegative but actually attains the value zero for some spin orientations. That such a remarkable dual interpretation should be possible suggests that this type of complementary coarse graining is an intrinsic aspect of how classicality is obtained in the large j limit, but this conclusion remains speculative. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to define the sources of crisis affecting civilization, and to define a solution by the development of a Universal-Complementary Civilization. The study’s conclusion is that neither Western nor Global Civilization can improve the order of civilization. Even worse, these civilizations threaten sustainability by depleting strategic resources at a fast pace, driven by the market forces only. World Civilization at this time is driven by two conflicting civilizations, Christianity and Islam, and is hurdling towards (...) a huge disaster. Neither Christianity nor Islam has the right to impose its own values upon the other. To avoid wars and conflicts among civilizations one must break the human history of permanent negations and integrate eight autonomous civilizations and a global one by a set of Common-Complementary Universal Values, selected by each autonomous civilization and accepted by all the others as common values. Theimplementation strategy of this new civilization may take several centuries, but to start this civilization one must create a group of pioneers and “show cases” as soon as possible. (shrink)

A path-breaking intervention in current debates on reading and literature, the two complementary essays—one on literature and the other on reading—focus largely on texts in English and French, but also refer to other literatures. The authors propose a way of reading literature that not only synthesizes some earlier tendencies and puts them in context, but also propounds a revolutionary understanding of the nature of literature and reading. The writers taken up for discussion include William Shakespeare, Joseph Conrad, Rudyard Kipling, (...) Marcel Proust, Charles Baudelaire, Franz Kafka, William Burroughs, Dylan Thomas, Attia Hosain, Albert Wendt, Zadie Smith, Philip Hensher, Mohsin Hamid and many others. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.1 (2002) 87-90 [Access article in PDF] Phenomenological and Biological Psychiatry:Complementary or Mutual? James Morley Keywords: phenomenology, psychiatry, psychoanalysis, ontology. We feel that even if all possible scientific questions be answered the problems of life have still not been touched at all. (Witgenstein, Tractatus, 6.52) IF ONE WAS TO PERFORM a thought experiment by imagining a scientifically explained universe, how would this explained (...) universe resolve my issues of value and meaning? Would it help me to live a better life? In one sentence, Witgenstein expressed exactly the issues dividing, and defining, the phenomenological and biophysical approaches to psychiatry. (Natural) scientific questions are concerned with relations of physical causality while phenomenology is aimed at the problems of life, i.e., the elucidation of lived personal meanings.Clarifying the relation between phenomenology and the general psychiatric literature is clearly a significant undertaking. At this juncture in the history of psychiatry where the biophysical model is so dominant, the authors' efforts are especially welcome, as I wholeheartedly appreciate, and thank the authors for this endeavor. I only wish to explicate a few issues latent within the article and perhaps add a few supportive points. Explicitly or implicitly, the need for phenomenology in psychiatry is long enduring and will always persist (Ellenberger 1981, 1993). The integration of phenomenology with general psychiatric practice would certainly serve the needs of patients and society generally. But, in the present state of affairs where the biological model is so preeminent, a full accounting of the dramatic divergences between the two approaches is necessary if there is to be authentic dialogue between them.Essentially, I want to stress that phenomenology and natural science medicine are genuinely distinct paradigms for construing reality and organizing knowledge. As distinct scientific paradigms, each one is holistically self-contained. Like soap bubbles, if pushed together too forcefully one or the other may burst. In this case, it is more likely that the smaller, less prevalent paradigm would burst by becoming absorbed into the more dominant paradigm. I believe that this is precisely the risk when phenomenology is introduced to conventional psychiatry as "complementary." Whereas one could hardly object to any application of empathy and understanding toward the experiences of patients, it would be tragic if the [End Page 87] full philosophical power of phenomenology were to be overlooked in favor of its mere utility as a preliminary stage of diagnosis and assessment, a framework for bedside manners, or worst of all, an appendage to neuroscience or pharmacology. This would not be phenomenology but the very symptomatology that the authors have has so clearly distinguished from true phenomenology.This equation of phenomenology with symptomatology is exactly the misunderstanding that the authors so effectively address. However, I would hesitate to join the authors' optimism in regard to phenomenology's potential complementary role to conventional psychiatric practice. Furthermore, in the process of paradigm mix, certain constituents of each paradigm may be taken out of context and the strength of each paradigm thus diluted. For example, the very power of the experimental method is its reduction of phenomena to measurable variables that can be altered in order to discern causality. Unmeasurable variables detract form the rigor of this entire approach. Then on the other hand, phenomenological empathy is only possible within a standpoint that is severed from the causal thinking of experimental science. This is the holistic perceptual shift that cannot be accomplished when one only appends phenomenological insights to an otherwise materialist approach to psychiatry. Thus, it is not at all clear how one can be both phenomenological and nonphenomenologically natural scientific. Instead of positioning phenomenology as a potential complimentary component of natural-science psychiatry, both world views need to be examined, on their own terms, in a framework of mutuality.Empathy or the understanding of other peoples subjective experience is indeed an essential component of the application of phenomenology to clinical assessment and especially therapeutic treatment. But, to limit phenomenology to this theme alone may not honor the profoundly radical character of this paradigm. As the authors point out, phenomenology asks the practitioner to... (shrink)

The generalization of Complementarity has been an ambition and a challenge to many a Bohrian scholar or quantum philosopher, and to Bohr himself above all others besides. A very recent attempt by Professor Gonzalo Munevar, proposing an extension of CTY to alternative conceptual schemes, re-opens this issue and seeks to place it within the context of modern day Relativism on the grounds that conceptual schemes belonging to different cultural groups or even different biological species are neither reducible to one another, (...) nor equivalent, nor however contradictory and therefore simply "complementary." Such being the case, neither conceptual scheme can overrule its rival scheme, nor however include or assimilate it, being to all intents and purposes as valid as its rival, albeit fundamentally divergent from it. This conclusion inevitably guides the steps of knowledge along the path of Relativism and Subjectivism, a route which Prof. Munevar makes it perfectly clear that he would eagerly follow. (shrink)

A biological explanation for the dependence of genome-wide mutation-rate variation on local base context is now becoming clearer. The proportions of G + C relative to A + T—expressed as GC%—is a species-specific DNA character. The frequencies of these single bases correlate with frequencies of corresponding oligonucleotides that are more-sensitive indicators of species specificity. Thus, when k = 3 there are 64 possible trinucleotide sequences and a GC%-rich species has a high frequency of GC-rich 3-mers. Closely related species have similar (...) k-mer patterns. For distantly related species, even if happening to have the same GC% values, k-mer patterns are widely discordant. Conventionally, a base substitution mutation is viewed as a chemical 1-mer phenomenon. However, the selective difference by which the corresponding mutation is scored usually relates to context. Thus, an A to U codon mutation in sickle cell anemia, rather than attracting an anticodon in a structural loop of glutamate tRNA, pairs with the more complementary anticodon loop of valine tRNA. Likewise, a recent statistical analysis of genome-wide mutation-rate variation supports the view that a failure of discordant DNA loops to pair at meiosis can initiate and/or sustain the speciation process. Such disharmony among base patterns may have unknowingly been hinted at by geneticist William Bateson who invoked a music metaphor when considering speciation mechanisms. (shrink)

Theodosius Dobzhansky has long been recognized by historians as a pioneer in the combining of the 'field natural history' and 'laboratory experimentalist' traditions in biology (Allen 1994). The following essay analyzes two papers in his wellknown Genetics of Natural Populations series, GNP IX and GNP XII, which demonstrate how Dobzhansky combined field and laboratory work in the pursuit of an evolutionary question. The analysis reveals the multiple and complementary roles field observations and experiments played in his investigations. But it (...) also identifies several interpretive problems associated with the use of intervention that limited the effectiveness of his approach. The essay argues that these problems reflect a fundamental tension between the amount of control Dobzhansky had over the circumstances of his experiments and the applicability of his results to natural populations. It concludes that this trade-off represents an important distinction between experiments in biology and most other sciences. (shrink)

“If, then, we are really to find out what is true and what is false, we must direct our attention to the role of any particular item in the whole of which it is a part.”—Wertheimer: On Truth.In these days of Gestalttheorie it seems not untimely to inquire whether psychology itself does not stand in need of being recognized as a configuration of complementary parts. The suggestion, it is true, tends at the first to be repudiated by the implacability (...) of the schools with their claims and counterclaims resounding on every side. On further analysis, however, such controversy seems to acquire the very different significance of having permitted certain partial aspects of the whole field to become well-articulated, even if in somewhat exaggerated form. In other words, if there is any underlying unity in psychology, then the very overstatements of the school zealots while unwittingly defeating their own purpose may have been doing the science a real service by throwing its basic pattern into bold relief. In broadest terms this seems to describe what has been happening in psychology in the recent past and to define the present stage of its development. (shrink)

Scientific explanations arc subject to the occurrence of inconsistencies. To rule them out in many cases demands the construction of new theories. As the examples of complementary explanations show, that may take a while. Furthermore, even if possible in principle, it is not always reasonable to eliminate inconsistencies immediately, e.g., by bringing in a more sophisticated formal language. After all, under some circumstances a provisional, not fully coherent explanation may be better than none. In any case, we need a (...) logically controlled approach to such inconsistencies. Modern logic provides the tools which are necessary to solve this task. We will mention two alternative approaches. (shrink)

In recent years so-called Complementary and Alternative Medicine practices have made significant political and professional advances particularly in the United Kingdom : osteopathy and chiropractic were granted statutory self-regulation in the 1990s effectively giving them more professional autonomy and independence than health care professions supplementary to medicine ; the practice of acupuncture is widespread within the National Health Service for pain control; and homoeopathy is offered to patients by a few General Practitioners alongside conventional treatments. These developments have had (...) a number of consequences: one is that both CAM and Conventional and Orthodox Medical professions have had to reappraise their professional identity. In manual therapy for example, questions have been asked about the differences between physiotherapy, osteopathy and chiropractic, and what the justification is for having separate professions. A wider question concerns the relationship between CAM and COM; are CAM distinct professions or should they, as has happened to a limited extent in the UK, be absorbed into the broader field of ‘ Medicine ’ or ‘Health Care’ as adjunctive therapies. CAM professions have also had to develop, implement and enforce codes of practice for practitioners and clarify the scope of practice within a profession. At the heart of these issues lies the need to identify and clarify professional values. A key claim of CAM professions is that their practice is distinct and the outcome of treatment at least as effective and in many cases more effective than with conventional therapies. In addition, what counts as effective outcome is often different from conventional medical understanding, involving more subtle humanitarian considerations, for example. Three values are identified as being commonly held across CAM professions. These are: offering ‘natural’ treatment; being patient rather than disease focussed; and being holistic. However, these may not be as distinctive of CAM as is claimed either because the meaning is unclear or because COM professions claim similar values. The paper argues that the values that inform ‘good practice’ and ‘effective outcome’ should be seen as distinct components of professional competence. This has implications for establishing professional identity and codes of practice. (shrink)

A Significant percentage of the people outside their country of citizenship or residence who are unable to meet their basic needs on their own, and need international protection, do not fall under the definition set out in the UN Refugee Convention. This has led many - both academic commentators and activists - to call for a new, expanded refugee definition, preferably backed up by a new, binding, international convention. In earlier work I have resisted this call, arguing that there is (...) good reason to pick out a sub-stet of those in need of international aid - a set that largely, if not completely, corresponds to those picked out by the Refugee Convention - for special benefit and protection. However, even if Convention refugees are in some ways special, we are left with the question of what, if anything, is owed to those in need of aid who are not Convention refugees. In this chapter, I set out philosophical foundations for so-called complementary protection, and show how this may and should apply to people in need of international aid who are not Convention refugees. (shrink)

In this paper it is argued that there are relevant similarities of Aristotle's account of definition and Carnap's account of explication. To show this, first, Aristotle's conditions of adequacy for definitions are provided and an outline of the main critique put forward against Aristotle's account of definition is given. Subsequently, Carnap's conditions of adequacy for explications are presented and discussed. It is shown that Aristotle's conditions of extensional correctness can be interpreted against the backdrop of Carnap's condition of similarity once (...) one skips Aristotelian essentialism and takes in a Carnapian and more pragmatic stance. Finally, it is argued that, in general, a complementary rational reconstruction of both approaches allows for resolving problems of interpretational underdetermination. (shrink)

Compared to the massive literature from other disciplinary perspectives on interdisciplinarity, philosophy of science is only slowly beginning to pay systematic attention to this powerful trend in contemporary science. The paper provides some metaphilosophical reflections on the emerging “Philosophy of Interdisciplinarity”. What? I propose a conception of PhID that has the qualities of being broad and neutral as well as stemming from within the agenda of philosophy of science. It will investigate features of science that reveal themselves (...) when scientific disciplines are viewed in comparison or in contact with one another. PhID will therefore generate two kinds of information: comparative and contactual. Comparative information is about the similarities and differences between disciplines, while contactual information is about what happens and why when disciplines get in contact with each other. Virtually all issues and resources within the philosophy of science can be mobilized to bear on the project, including philosophical accounts of models, explanations, justification, evidence, progress, values, demarcation, incommensurability, and so on. Given that scientific disciplines are institutional entities, resources available in social epistemology and social ontology will also have to be invoked. Why? Establishing PhID is presently an obvious step to take for several reasons, including the following two. First, ID is an increasingly powerful characteristic of contemporary science and its management, and so it would be inappropriate for an empirically informed philosophy of science to ignore it. Second, contemporary philosophy of science happens to be particularly well equipped for addressing issues of ID thanks to the recent massive work in the more specialized fields of philosophies of special disciplines. How? Given the breadth and heterogeneity of its domain and tasks, the practice of PhID must be heavily collective. It must mobilize multiple competences and it must keep elaborating a systematic agenda. While a lot of new conceptual work is needed, the approach is bound to be emphatically empirical, with a cumulative and mutually complementary series of case studies to be conducted. Among the methods to be employed, good old textual analysis of scientific publications will be supplemented with interviews, ‘experimental’ techniques, participant observation as well as various interventionist approaches. The published work in PhID will often be authored jointly by philosophers and other scholars in science studies as well as practitioners in various scientific disciplines. (shrink)

In this article, author expressed the meaning of “belief”, possible effective factors in human life, and how these factors can be effective on person and/or communities. With this respect, the meaning of religion, the possible interaction and relation between religion and science evaluated. 42 past/present theories of religion and evaluation of the past/present works of the 87 philosophers of religion are explained. Author considered new synthesis (R-Synthesis), and also new era philosophy, new and re-constructed branches of philosophy, and (...) some systems/constructions to express the new perspective for philosophy of religion. Author applied 27(+) possible definitive/certain result cases of the synthesis for R-Religion discipline specifically, and did the followings under new perspective: (i) eliminated some religious subjects, (ii) unified some religious subjects, (iii) modified some religious subjects, (iv) united some religious subjects in upper phase, (v) separated some religious subject, (vi) defined all religious subjects under one framework, (vii) integrated all religious subjects, (viii) defined new religious subjects, (ix) re-defined some religious subjects, (x) removed some religious subjects and put new religious subjects instead, (xi) added some religious subjects, (xii) kept/protected some religious subjects, (xiii) proposed progression for religious subjects, (xiv) changed the priority of some religious subjects, (xv) increased the importance of some religious subjects, (xvi) strengthened the ethics, (xvii) integrated philosophy branches under one framework, (xviii) others. Some of the purposes of this article are: (i) to define new synthesis method, (ii) to define good and/or correct new perspective and structure for philosophy of religion, science of religion, theories of religion, and related subjects, (iii) to extend the definition/limits of philosophy of religion with new perspective, (iv) others. As result of the synthesis, new perspective for philosophy of religion explained by considering the following concepts/sections: (a) theories of religion, (b) 17 upper constructional philosophies and philosophy of religion, (c) eight complementary branches of philosophy of religion, (d) 14 lower constructional philosophies and philosophy of religion, (e) science of religion, (f) new theory of religion and its relations with other disciplines. Author defined New Era Theory, New Era Religion, New Era Belief, Progressive Religion and their relations with other religions, beliefs, religious/non-religious movements, and the relation with other theories of religion. Also, power authorities and functional position levels in the New Era Belief, and Religion of God, Knowledge of God/gods, Nature of God/gods concepts are explained generally/specifically. (shrink)

The classical Western concept of place points in two directions: toward isolating things from one another and toward articulating their connections. Aristotle’s famous definition of a thing’s place as the limit of its surrounding body, which serves to isolate the thing from all but its immediate surroundings, sits side-by-side in the Physics with his theory of natural places, according to which things have places only in relation to each other.1 A thing’s natural place may be at the center—as the earth (...) is at the center of the cosmos in the classical theory—but the center exists only with respect to the periphery, and vice versa. Likewise, a thing can be below only in relation to something above it. The relationship... (shrink)

In 1971, Wolfgang Müller-Lauter introduced his study of Nietzsche as an investigation into the history of modern nihilism in which “contradiction” forms the central thread of the argument. For Müller-Lauter, the interpretive task is not to demonstrate the overall coherence or incoherence of Nietzsche’s philosophy, but to examine Nietzsche’s “philosophy of contradiction.” Against those such as Karl Jaspers, Karl Löwith and Martin Heidegger, Müller-Lauter argued that contradiction is the foundation of Nietzsche’s thought, and not a problem to be (...) corrected or cast aside for exegetical or political purposes. For Müller-Lauter, contradiction qua incompatibility (not just mere opposition) holds a key to Nietzsche’s affective vision of philosophy. Beginning with the relationship between will to power and eternal recurrence, in this paper I examine aspects of Müller-Lauter’s account of Nietzsche’s philosophy of contradiction specifically in relation to the counter-interpretations offered by two other German commentators of Nietzsche, Leo Strauss and Karl Löwith, in order to confirm Müller-Lauter’s suggestion that contradiction is indeed an operative engine of Nietzsche’s thought. Indeed contradiction is a key Nietzschean theme and an important dynamic of becoming which enables the subject to be revealed as a “multiplicity” ( BGE §12) and as a “fiction” (KSA 12:9[91]). Following Müller-Lauter’s assertion that for Nietzsche the problem of nihilism is fundamentally synonymous with the struggle of contradiction experienced by will to power, this paper interprets Nietzsche’s philosophy of contradiction in terms of subjective, bodily life (rather than in terms of logical incoherences or ontological inconsistencies). Against the backdrop of nihilism, the “self” (and its related place holder the “subject”), I will argue, becomes the psycho-physiological battlespace for the struggle and articulation of “contradiction” in Nietzsche’s thought. (shrink)

Subjective probabilities play a significant role in the assessment of evidence: in other words, our background knowledge, or pre-trial beliefs, cannot be set aside when new evidence is being evaluated. Focusing on homeopathy, this paper investigates the nature of pre-trial beliefs in clinical trials. It asks whether pre-trial beliefs of the sort normally held only by those who are sympathetic to homeopathy can legitimately be disregarded in those trials. The paper addresses several surprisingly unsuccessful attempts to provide a satisfactory justification (...) for ignoring the pre-trial beliefs of the homeopathic community. The ensuing diagnosis of the difficulties here emphasizes that the reason the arguments for choosing the pre-trial beliefs of the conventional community seem insufficient is not the arguments per se. It is rather that there is no cogent argument for choosing the conventional stance which would at the same time rationally persuade a member of the homeopathic community. The paper concludes that, once we understand that this is the predicament, there is no genuine reason to doubt the reasoning that leads us to reject the pre-trial beliefs of the homeopathic community. (shrink)

In previous work, I introduced a complete axiomatization of classical non-tautologies based essentially on Łukasiewicz’s rejection method. The present paper provides a new, Hilbert-type axiomatization (along with related systems to axiomatize classical contradictions, non-contradictions, contingencies and non-contingencies respectively). This new system is mathematically less elegant, but the format of the inferential rules and the structure of the completeness proof possess some intrinsic interest and suggests instructive comparisons with the logic of tautologies.

Philosophy and Science are subject to conflicting interpretations, such as the rules of positivism and analytic thought. Bernard Lonergan and Gilles Deleuze have both assessed such issues in complementary fashion. This book examines their arguments through the application of mathematical theories and Buddhist-Christian ethics in an attempt to bridge the religious-secularist divide exacerbated by postmodernism.

The more popular complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) has become, the more often it is demanded that the integration of CAM should be limited to those approaches that are scientifically proven to be effective. This paper argues that this demand is ethically and philosophically questionable. The clinical legitimacy being gained by CAM and its increasing informal integration should instead caution against upholding the biomedical framework and evidence-based medicine as conditions of acceptance. Patients’ positive experiences with CAM deserve a truly (...) scientific exploration of non-biomedical conceptualizations of health and illness. It is also problematic to request scientific evidence when there is proven resistance against CAM in research institutions, under-funding and a lack of suitable research methodologies. This is even more so, when much conventional medicine is not practiced with the same level of evidence as demanded from CAM. (shrink)

The market seems to have substituted politics as a coordination model in modern societies. While philosophy's complementarity to politics is well-acknowledged, its importance for economic markets can be questioned. Economics deals with optimization, but as markets are constituted by real persons with individual beliefs and normative values the economic tool box is not sufficient to describe market behavior. This is especially true whenever technologicalinnovations challenge established market rules. Philosophy supplies analytical instruments for a better, more complete description of (...) markets including theirnormative aspects. For this complementary function philosophy should be placed at the core of any theory of markets. (shrink)

The research programme of the philosophy of information (PI) proposed in 2002 made it an independent area or discipline in philosophical research. The scientific concept of ‘information’ is formally accepted in philosophical inquiry. Hence a new and tool-driven philosophical discipline of PI with its interdisciplinary nature has been established. Philosophy of information is an ‘orientative’ rather than ‘cognitive’ philosophy. When PI is under consideration in the history of Western philosophy, it can be regarded as a shift (...) of large tradition. There are three large traditions at large, known as Platonic, Kantian and Leibniz-Russellian. In the discussion of the position of the possible worlds, we have modal Platonism and modal realism, but both of the theories are made in the framework of Western philosophy. In this essay, it is argued that possible worlds could be seen as worlds in information, which is then an interpretation of modal information theory (MIT). Our interpretation is made on the basis of Leibniz’s lifelong connection with China, a fact often overlooked by the Western philosophers. Possible world theory was influenced by the Neo-Confucianism flourishing since the Song Dynasty of China, the foundation of which is Yijing. It could be argued that Leibniz’s possible world theory was formulated in respect to the impact of the thoughts reflected in Yijing, in that one of the prominent features is the model-theoretic construction of theories. There are two approaches to theory construction, i.e., axiom-theoretic and model-theoretic. The origin of the former is from ancient Greece and the latter from ancient China. And they determined the different features of theoretic structures between the oriental and occidental traditions of science and technology. The tendency of the future development of science and technology is changing from the axiom-theoretic to the model-theoretic orientation, at least the two approaches being complementary each other. To some extent, this means the retrospective of tradition in the turning point of history, and some of the China’s cultural traditions might become the starting points in formulating the future Chinese philosophy of science and technology. (shrink)

Science and philosophy study well-being with different but complementary methods. Marry these methods and a new picture emerges: To have well-being is to be "stuck" in a positive cycle of emotions, attitudes, traits and success. This book unites the scientific and philosophical worldviews into a powerful new theory of well-being.

Pippin, Pinkard and Brandom are rightly seen as representatives of a distinct approach in contemporary Hegel scholarship. Still, their interpretations diverge due to different definitions and uses of conceptions of discursive practice. We focus on three ways in which such definitions and uses bear on their interpretations. First, while Lumsden has recently criticized Pinkard and Brandom for ‘discursive bias’ in their accounts of the contestation and upheaval of normative authority in Hegel’s Phenomenology, we note that Pinkard distinguishes between various modes (...) of reason-giving, and we argue that a further qualification of interdependencies between these modes may support his interpretation against such criticism. Second, Pinkard and Pippin have recently criticized Brandom’s conception of discursive score-keeping practice, and Pippin in particular has argued that the latter rests on an individualistic reductionism about content foreign to Hegel. However, we find that the real issue is that the modes of methodological abstraction and idealization assumed for Brandom’s conception of discursive practice leave out of account the historical alteration as well as the institutional embodiment of normative authority as emphasized by Pippin and Pinkard. Third, while Pippin and Pinkard both make Hegel’s notion of modern ethical life bear on a conception of practical rationality, their uses of a conception of discursive practice in such an undertaking betray divergent conceptions of the sociality of rational agents. (shrink)

In The Philosophy of Change, the distinguished scholar of Chinese philosophy Chung-ying Cheng advances our understanding of the Yijing by analyzing its philosophy in comparison to Western philosophical traditions. Cheng focuses on critically comparing philosophies of science, religion, and metaphysics in Leibniz, Whitehead, Neville, and Cobb alongside classical Chinese views on reality, divinity, knowledge, and morality. The book begins and ends with questions related to the character of Chinese metaphysical traditions, which contrast with the mainline metaphysical traditions (...) found in Western Europe and North America. Cheng argues throughout the book that the philosophical underpinnings of basic concepts in Chinese culture are ultimately rooted in key claims found within the Yijing 易經 and one of its standard commentaries, the Yizhuan 易傳. The book serves as a complementary volume to the author's previous book, The Primary Way: Philosophy of the Yijing, which lays out a comprehensive and systematic philosophy based on the symbolism and text of the classical document and its traditional commentaries. (shrink)

Background Medical research in complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) has increased recently, raising ethical concerns about the moral status of CAM. Medical academic journals are responsible for conducting ethical review (ER) of manuscripts to protect the interests of human subjects and to make ethical results available before deciding to publish. However, there has been no systematic analysis of the ER in CAM journals. This study is aim to evaluate the current status of ethical requirements and compliance in CAM journals. (...) Methods This is a cross-sectional study. We reviewed instructions for authors (IFAs) of CAM journals included in the Journal Citation Reports (2021) (https://jcr.clarivate.com) for general information and requirements for ER. We also browsed the manuscripts regarding randomized controlled trials published by CAM journals in Q1 and Q2 section from January to June, 2023, to check the actual situation of ethical requirement. Descriptive statistics and Fisher’s exact test were used for statistical analysis. Results 27 journals and 68 manuscripts were ultimately included. 92.6% (25/27) IFAs included keywords of ER, indicating the presence of ethical considerations. However, no specific ER was required for CAM (n = 0). We categorized journals by Geographic origin, JCR section, Year of electronic JCR, Types of studies, % of OA Gold to explore the factors that could influence CAM journals to have certain ethical review policies. The results showed there was no statistical significance in certain ethical review policy in any classification of journals (p > 0.05). All RCT manuscripts included in the study generally met the requirements of the published journals for ethical review. Conclusions All IFAs discussed ER, but the content was scattered, unfocused, and there were no specific ER requirements regarding CAM. Although the manuscripts basically met the requirements of the journal, it was not possible to get closer to the process of ER in the manuscript. To ensure full implementation of these policies in the future, CAM journals should require authors to provide more details, or to form a list of items necessary for CAM ethical review. (shrink)