Phenomenology and analytic philosophy were born out of the same historical problem---the growing crisis about how to characterize the proper methods and role of philosophy, given the increasing success and separation of the natural sciences. A common 18th and 19th century solution that reached its height with John Stuart Mill’s psychologism was to hold that the while natural science was concerned with “external, physical phenomena”, philosophy was concerned with “internal, mental phenomena”, and thus proceeded by turning our observational gaze inward (...) at the mind, rather than outward towards the world. Both Husserlian phenomenology and early analytic philosophy grew from dissatisfaction with psychologism, and figures from both traditions developed relentless criticisms of psychologism, beginning with Brentano and G.E. Moore[i] and reaching its peak with Frege / and Husserl. (shrink)

Philosophical interest in the biological concept of function stems largely from concerns about its teleological associations. Assigning something a function seems akin to assigning it a purpose, and discussion of the purpose of items has long been off-limits to science. Analytic philosophers have attempted to defend ‘function’ by showing that claims about functions do not involve any reference to a problematic notion of purpose. To do this, philosophers offer short lists of necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of the (...) concept—where the conditions involve only acceptable physical or biological notions—and claim that the set of conditions captures the import of function statements. (shrink)

One strategy for blocking Chalmers's overall case against physicalism has been to deny his claim that showing that phenomenal properties are in some sense physical requires an a priori entailment of the phenomenal truths from the physical ones. Here I avoid this well-trodden ground and argue instead that an a priori entailment of the phenomenal truths from the physical ones does not require an analysis in the Jackson/Chalmers sense. This is to sever the dualist's link between conceptual (...) class='Hi'>analysis and a priori entailment by showing that the lack of the former does not imply the absence of the latter. Moreover, given the role of the argument from conceptual analysis in Chalmers's overall case for dualism, undermining that argument effectively undermines that case as a whole in a way that, I'll argue, undermining the conceivability arguments as stand-alone arguments does not. (shrink)

The application of the conceptual analysis (CA) method outlined in Part I is illustrated on the example of quantum mechanics. In Part II, we deduce the complete-lattice structure in quantum mechanics from postulates specifying the idealizations that are accepted in the theory. The idealized abstract concepts are introduced by means of a topological extension of the basic structure (obtained in Part I) in accord with the “approximation principle”; the relevant topologies are not arbitrarily chosen; they are fixed by (...) the choice of the idealizations. There is a typical topological asymmetry in the mathematical scheme. Convexity or linear structures do not play any role in the mathematical methods of this approach. The essential concept in Part II is the idealization of “perfect measurement” suggested by our conceptual analysis in Part I. The Hilbert-space representation will be deduced in Part III. In our papers, we keep to the tenet: The mathematical scheme of a physical theory must be rigorously formulated. However, for physics, mathematics is only a nice and useful tool; it is not purpose. (shrink)

This book offers substantial insight into students’ conceptualization of scientific terminology. The current book explores the commonalities and distinctions between Arabic and French physics terms, and the impact of the language disparities on students’ understanding of physics terms. This book adopts a novel approach to the problem of scientific terminology by exploring physics terms’ polysemy, prototypical meanings, and conceptual metaphor and metonymy, which motivates their extension of meaning. The book also investigates how the linguistic discrepancies and (...) other variables affect the learning of physics by Arab students (Moroccan students, in this book). Concepts in Physics: A Comparative Cognitive Analysis of Arabic and French Terminologies, whether you are a student of science, a science teacher or lecturer, a translator, or a linguist, is what you need. The book will help you comprehend the linguistic and cultural differences between western and non-western physics terminologies (in this book, French and Arabic physics terminologies) and the factors influencing the learning of physics concepts, and thus address the multiple challenges in learning scientific terms and concepts. (shrink)

One of Julian Barbour’s main aims is to solve the problem of time that appears in quantum geometrodynamics (QG). QG involves the application of canonical quantization procedure to the Hamiltonian formulation of General Relativity. The problem of time arises because the quantization of the Hamiltonian constraint results in an equation that has no explicit time parameter. Thus, it appears that the resulting equation, as apparently timeless, cannot describe evolution of quantum states. Barbour attempts to resolve the problem by allegedly eliminating (...) time from his interpretation of QG. In order to evaluate the efficacy of his solution, it is necessary to ascertain in what sense time has been eliminated from his theory. I proceed to do so by developing a form of conceptual analysis that is applicable to the concept of time in physical theories and applying this analysis to Barbour’s account. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss the claim that the successful reduction of qualitative to physical states requires some sort of intelligible connection between our qualitative and physical concepts, which in turn requires a conceptual analysis of our qualitative concepts in causal-functional terms. While I defend this claim against some of its recent critics, I ultimately dispute it, and propose a different way to get the requisite intelligible connection between qualitative and physical concepts.

The explanatory gap . Consciousness is a mystery. No one has ever given an account, even a highly speculative, hypothetical, and incomplete account of how a physical thing could have phenomenal states. Suppose that consciousness is identical to a property of the brain, say activity in the pyramidal cells of layer 5 of the cortex involving reverberatory circuits from cortical layer 6 to the thalamus and back to layers 4 and 6,as Crick and Koch have suggested for visual consciousness. .) (...) Still, that identity itself calls out for explanation! Proponents of an explanatory gap disagree about whether the gap is permanent. Some say that we are like the scientifically naive person who is told that matter = energy, but does not have the concepts required to make sense of the idea. If we can acquire these concepts, the gap is closable. Others say the gap is uncloseable because of our cognitive limitations. Still others say that the gap is a consequence of the fundamental nature of consciousness. (shrink)

We illustrate the application of the conceptual analysis (CA) method outlined in Part I by the example of quantum mechanics. In the present part the Hilbert space structure of conventional quantum mechanics is deduced as a consequence of postulates specifying further idealized concepts. A critical discussion of the idealizations of quantum mechanics is proposed. Quantum mechanics is characterized as a “statistically complete” theory and a simple and elegant formal recipe for the construction of the fundamental mathematical apparatus of (...) quantum mechanics is formulated. Our analysis may also lead to a criticism of quantum mechanics as a “strongly idealized” theory. A critical analysis of the fundamental structure of quantum mechanics seems an indispensable and natural starting point for the construction of new theories. A major technical problem in a more general application of the CA method is the lack of mathematical representation theorems for more general algebraic structures. (shrink)

A method is proposed that should facilitate the construction of theories of “submicroscopic particles” (denoted as “theories of microchannels”) in a way similar to the use of group-theoretical methods. The “conceptual analysis” (CA) method is based on the analysis of the basic concepts of a theory; it permits a determination of necessary conditions imposed on the mathematical apparatus (of the theory) which then appear as a mathematical representation of the structures obtained in a formal scheme of a (...) theory. A pertinent conceptual analysis leads to a new definition (“relativization”) of the concept “empirical implication.” The approach may be characterized as “realistic” and “operational.” The application of the CA method is illustrated on the example of quantum theory. In Part I the algebraic structure of a partially ordered, up-ward directed, bounded set is deduced from the rudimentary concepts. In Parts II and III, we shall deduce the Hilbert-space structure (well established in quantum mechanics) from postulates on some essential idealizations accepted in the theory. Whereas Part II is concerned with the idealizations of existing quantum theories based on the Hilbert-space formalism, Part I may be considered as a general basis for a wider class of theories. (shrink)

I present a formal language that imposes a structure on processes in macro-chemistry. Each symbol in the language invites a type of analysis that is carried out either by looking into the semantics if the language or by looking at the context. Every formal language has assumptions underlying it. The assumptions made in developing the formal language are meant to help with conceptual analysis by inviting certain types of question.

There is an influential, ongoing debate between traditionalists and experimentalists about how to carry out conceptual analysis by means of the method of possible cases. The debate concerns whose intuitions are evidentially relevant to philosophical theories, and which methods are most appropriate for collecting such evidence. The aim of this paper is not to take sides in this debate, but to question the monopoly that the method of possible cases has in contemporary discussions of philosophical methodology. Since early (...) analytic philosophy is replete with methods of conceptual analysis that make no essential use of intuitions, these discussions are inevitably myopic. In particular, it will be argued that Frege’s logical analysis of arithmetic, Hilbert’s axiomatic analysis of geometry, and Poincaré’s transcendental analysis of physics are non-psychologistic methods that yield profound philosophical conclusions. None of these methods are carried out from the philosopher’s armchair or the scientist’s laboratory; instead they properly belong to mathematics and physics. Thus, by ignoring these methods, both traditionalists and experimentalists have neglected the significant role that the exact sciences can play in conceptual analysis. (shrink)

This article examines the main lines of contemporary thinking about analysis in philosophy. It first considers G. E. Moore’s statement of the paradox of analysis. It then reviews a number of accounts of analysis that address the paradox of analysis, including the account offered by Ernest Sosa 1983 and others by Felicia Ackerman ; the latter gives an account of analysis on which properties are the objects of analysis. It also discusses Jeffrey C. King’s (...) accounts of philosophical analysis, before turning to views of analysis that are not aimed at addressing the paradox of analysis, including those associated with David Lewis, Frank Jackson, and David Chalmers. In particular, it comments on Lewis’s argument that conceptual analysis is simply a means for picking out the physical state that occupies a certain role, where formulating what that role is constitutes a conceptual analysis of the relevant notion. (shrink)

A short overview, written for a primarily scientific audience, of how conceptual analysis and philosophy of science can assist in nanoscience research.

It is a contested question in contemporary theories of religion whether the concept of religion can be defined in a sound way or not. Many theorists maintain that a universal but delimiting definition is impossible. In this study, by contrast, it is argued that a conceptual analysis of religion that holds universally is perfectly possible because the following thesis can be seen as a necessary and sufficient conceptual condition of what religion is: X is a religion if (...) and only if X is a collection of artifacts which has the proper function of representing a supraphysical world. On this thesis, it is argued that artifacts such as pictorial and verbal representations, rituals, symbols, and various tools constitute religion as a cultural object, which, as a collection of artifacts, has the proper function of representing a conceived world that is not entirely physical, and which, allegedly, is a prerequisite for existential welfare in relation to observance. It is here important to understand what is constitutive for these kinds of conceived worlds. Supraphysical world is defined as follows. Given that the actual world is a physical world, a conception S is a construction of a supraphysical world if and only if both of the following conditions apply to S: Metaphysical component: S is a duplicate of the actual world with the addition of an anti-physical substance. Existential-normative component: S is an alleged prerequisite for existential welfare in relation to observance. The core argument of the study is that holds a priori for the concept of religion and as an a posteriori necessity for every instance of a religion. Apart from discussing the methodological problems of defining religion, the study introduces a new theory of religion in terms of. It addresses issues in the theory of artifacts; in the theory of representations; and in the theory of conceptual analysis. (shrink)

The article highlights innovative technologies in the context of physical education as one of the main factors of postmodern society. The main features of innovative technologies as an effective way to develop personal competencies and the formation of value orientations are defined in the context of the study. Physical education contributes to the development of individual personality traits, as well as forming the health-saving foundations of the development of society in the perspective of evolution. Postmodern trends in the formation of (...) society are defined by new worldview manifestations, when people lose meaning in certain value aspects and realize that past achievements can be neutralized. The physical education of a person forms the idea of the value of health, both in the past and in the future. It is this principle that defined the research problem. It is determined that innovative technology is a sign of a postmodern society, because innovation is one of the characteristic features of the postmodern. Innovative technologies are most effective both in educational activities and in physical education. The theoretical and methodological foundations of the concept of postmodern society and innovative technologies were analyzed in the course of the study. Also identified the main aspects of physical education in the context of the modern dimension. The article explores the peculiarities of the use of innovative technologies in the aspect of physical education. In the course of the study we used methods of analysis and synthesis, descriptive method and method of content analysis. This study provided the basis for determining the conceptual basis for the effectiveness of innovative technologies as postmodern approaches in the process of physical education. (shrink)

It is commonly held that killing is morally wrong and that the killers need to be punished, and in marginal cases where killing seems justifiable, we are advised to resort to the ethics of killing for general guidance. It is also commonly held that the notion of killing per se is accountable in terms of ‘causing death’, which is a metaphysical (or even physical) issue, having nothing to do with ethics. However, this dichotomy – between the ethics of killing and (...) the metaphysic of killing – is questionable and we claim that the notion of killing itself presumes a social norm, which generally involves ethical considerations. This explains why there has been much debate concerning the distinction between killing and letting die. According to the account of killing that shall be proposed in this article, the distinction is based on a social norm rather than a metaphysical reality. Likewise, there is no metaphysical ground for an active-killing/passive-killing distinction. With the help of a value-time diagram that captures a key feature of a genuine act of killing, six classic scenarios in the ethics of killing are analyzed within the same framework. The prominent feature of this approach is that no physical action is an act of killing before the imposition of a social norm. (shrink)

Unlike Dickens’s novel, this is not a tale of light and darkness, order and chaos, good and evil… It is, though, a story worth to be told about two standpoints about games and sports, teaching and research, physical education simply put, that have pursued similar interests on parallel tracks for too long, despite their apparent closeness and expected shared cultural grounds. The objective of this conceptual analysis is to try and reconcile two perspectives, namely motor praxeology and teaching (...) games for understanding (TGfU), born in the last third of the XX century in France and England with the intention to rethink the foundations of physical education (PE) and sports teaching. Pierre Parlebas, from the French side of the English Channel, claimed in 1967 that sports make part of PE, that team sports must be considered from a specific, sociomotor point of view, and that motor conducts (i.e. the significative organization of motor behaviour), not sports techniques, are the corner-stone of PE and sports coaching. In the early 1980s, from the English side of La Manche, Almond, Thorpe, and Bunker made a plea for a shift in the way to teach games (sporting collective duels mostly), deeply concerned by the negative impact of the traditional technics-centred approach on motivation, competence and attained level of the least able in school situations. Our conclusion is that TGfU, or game-based approaches to sports coaching and teaching, can take great advantage of the motor-praxeological rationale for three reasons: firstly, because concepts like understanding, game sense and action principles are operatively, semiotically linked to the reality of the playing process; secondly, because the inner structures of the games that constrain players and guide their motor conducts, permit to integrate games in the general system of sporting games, no matter their level of institutionalisation; finally, because the intervention practice is better thought of and more systematically developed upon the operational concepts of internal logic and expected practical effects of game playing. This time, Paris could be the place to go to in search of solutions, not the city to run away from in hope of consolation. (shrink)

It is widely accepted that children enjoy some form of a right to bodily integrity. However, there is little agreement about the precise nature and scope of this right. This paper offers a conceptual analysis of the child's right to bodily integrity, in order to further elucidate the relationship between the child's right to bodily integrity and considerations of autonomy. Following a discussion of Leif Wenar's work on the structure and justification of rights, I first explain how the (...) adult's right to bodily integrity can be distilled into separate elements that may plausibly be justified by different moral considerations. In particular, I claim that this analysis suggests that whilst the adult's right to bodily integrity is not wholly reducible to bodily autonomy, autonomy nonetheless remains entwined with our understanding of this right in a number of ways. On the basis of this discussion, I go on to outline three important complexities that arise when we consider the child's right to bodily integrity, before particularly focusing on the question of how third parties should determine whether or not to perform a physical interference upon a child who lacks decision-making capacity. Here, I raise some objections to Earp and Mazor's recent attempts to answer this question, before briefly defending an ‘autonomy-based interests’ account of permissible interference, an account that shares in what I take to be the spirit, if not the precise letter, of these earlier views. (shrink)

When is there no fact of the matter about a metaphysical question? When multiple candidate meanings are equally eligible, in David Lewis's sense, and fit equally well with ordinary usage. Thus given certain ontological schemes, there is no fact of the matter whether the criterion of personal identity over time is physical or psychological. But given other ontological schemes there is a fact of the matter; and there is a fact of the matter about which ontological scheme is correct.

We present a conceptual analysis of the notions of actual physical property and potential physical property as used by theoretical physicists/mathematicians working in the domain of operational quantum logic. We investigate how these notions are being used today and what role they play in the specified field of research. In order to do so, we will give a brief introduction to this area of research and explain it as a part of the discipline known as “mathematical metascience”. An (...) in depth analysis of Aristotle’s use of the notions of “actuality” and “potentiality” is presented in order to point out exactly how much of the Aristotelian connotations are embedded in the contemporary use of the concepts under investigation. Although we will not focus in depth on all the drawbacks in the early historical development of physics due to the overwhelming influence of Aristotle’s writings, our analysis does touch upon some aspects of the Aristotelian theory of movement that are often overthrown nowadays. (shrink)

After the birth of thermodynamics’ second principle—outlined in Carnot's Réflexions sur la puissance motrice du feu —several studies provided new arguments in the field. Mainly, they concerned the thermodynamics’ first principle—including energy conceptualisation—, the analytical aspects of the heat propagation, the statistical aspects of the mechanical theory of heat. In other words, the second half of nineteenth century was marked by an intense interdisciplinary research activity between physics and chemistry: new disciplines applied to the heat developed in the form (...) of analytical, mechanical and statistical theories. Inside all these theories, entropy—the brand-new function that Clausius coined in his Mechanical theory of heat—started to play a central epistemic role. In the present paper, we analyse some steps of the historical process of conceptualisation of such function from 1850 to 1902. Particularly, we retrace the historical–foundational path that—starting from Clausius’ Second Law—lead Boltzmann and Gibbs to their distinguished formulations of statistical entropy. As usual, our research has been unrolled through the analyses of primary sources and by leaning on critical readings of the secondary literature. As for the methodological approach, text analysis of historical documents constituted our privileged modus operandi. This paper is the expression of a collaborative historical research program focused on the thermodynamic foundations of physics–chemistry relationship; early results have already been published by the same authors upon the concepts of reversibility––and––thermal equilibrium. (shrink)

Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) has been little used by archaeologists. A key barrier is that current metaphor analysis relies on linguistic evidence, a resource that archaeologists rarely have. Methods for interpreting entirely “material metaphors” have yet to develop. This article explores CMT in a domain of long-standing archaeological interest: settlement structure. Anthropologists have long recognized that hunter-gatherers place their dwellings close to those they are close to socially, usually their kin. Archaeologists have assumed the same holds true for (...) prehistory—although without direct evidence. This article explains why people consistently associate with their kin this way, and how the metaphor, “SOCIAL DISTANCE IS PHYSICAL DISTANCE,” structures hunter-gatherer campsites worldwide. Archaeologists can infer the existence of this metaphor in the archaeological record without linguistic support. Furthermore, they can assume it exists in all human societies for as long as human brains have been wired up as they currently are. (shrink)

We suggest a common ground for alternative proposals In different domains of cognitive science which have previously seemed to have little in common. The underlying common theme is associated with a redefinition of the basic unit of analysis in each domain of thought. Our framework suggests a definition of unity which is based not on inherent properties of the elements constituting the unit, but rather on dynamic patterns of correlation across the elements. We introduce a set of features that (...) characterize the new dynamic units, and distinguish them from traditional units of analysis. A conceptual connection is made with the identification of elementary units in modern physics theories, as well as with concepts and structures in the study of complex dynamical systems and connectionism. The paper analyses the evolution of the concept of unit in different domains of thought in cognitive science, and examines the proposed framework of “dynamic unity” with regard to various theoretical problems within each domain. The particular cognitive science issues discussed in the paper include: (1) the binding problem in the brain; (2) the mental unit of conceptual organization; (3) defining ‘wordhood’ in linguistics; and (4) identifying the unit of cognition in the natural environment. (shrink)

The conceptual problems raised by the discovery of quantum effects have not been fully resolved after half a century. Part of the reason for this is undoubtedly to be found in the mutual ignorance which prevails between physicists and philosophers. In his book Heisenberg brings together a philosophically inclined temperament with an unrivalled knowledge of physics. The result is a book of very great interest, however much one might disagree with his conclusions. The collection of essays of which (...) the other book is made up is intended to bring crucial conceptual problems in physics especially to the notice of philosophers. The design and intention of the collection is admirable for this is the proper way to overcome the departmentalization of interest that has left the deep conceptual problems still unresolved. Men like Heisenberg who combine philosophical temperament with scientic knowledge of great distinction are rare, and yet the difficulties can only be cleared up by the application of philosophical techniques of analysis to problems which are an intimate and difficult part of physics. (shrink)

Summary A sufficient condition for a revolution in physics is a change in the concept of cause. To demonstrate this, we examine three developments in physical theory. After informally characterizing a theory in terms of an heuristic and a set of equations, we show how tensions between these two dimensions lead to the development of alternative theoretical accounts. In each case the crucial move results in a refinement of our account of cause. All these refinements taken together result in (...) the emergence of a new conceptual framework in which ‘causation’ is evolving in a manner unrelated to the common sense understanding of the concept. (shrink)

It is a well-acknowledged fact in legal translation studies that when searching for terminological equivalents, translators should make use of comparative conceptual analysis. Thus, legal translation trainees should be equipped with the necessary tools to carry out such analysis, but the question remains: are they? This paper is a follow-up to a study published in 2017, where modified think aloud protocols were used to explore the following research question: to what degree are university students doing a course (...) in legal and economic translation able to apply the methods of comparative conceptual analysis to translation of terms not accounted for sufficiently in legal dictionaries or terms with no straightforward equivalents. The results showed that major issues involve non-linearity of the analysis carried out and insufficient use of the resources available. The present study involves a different group of 29 BA students of the same course two years later, who were assigned the same task. As the retrospective protocols fail to simulate real-life conditions, this study uses screen recording and keystroke logging to track the processes leading to the identification of the conceptual equivalent in a more detailed and less subject-dependent manner. The results suggest that the steps most challenging for students include identification of relevant features defining the source and target language concepts, comparison of these features and selection, or creation, of an equivalent term reflecting the results of the analysis. Students also frequently show Google-driven searching, which influences the order of the steps performed in their analyses and the sources used. To address these challenges, translation training should include a range of tailor-made exercises focusing on the critical steps of the analysis as well as on improving web searching skills. (shrink)

El presente texto muestra el desarrollo y la evaluación de un proceso educativo con profesores de matemáticas en formación, centrado en el uso de estrategias didácticas con características inductivas, en el marco de laasignatura Matemáticas y Física de la Licenciatura en Enseñanza de las Matemáticas de la Universidad de Colima,México. La experiencia incluye a 19 estudiantes que han tenido formación disciplinar en matemáticas y dominan el conocimiento procedimental y el lenguaje algebraico que implica la física en los niveles básicos, pero (...) con poco acercamiento al conocimiento conceptual, tanto de física clásica como de física moderna. Bajo este principio, el curso se centró en la reflexión y la resolución de problemas. Desde esta lógica, la propuesta incluyó buscar,tanto el dominio procedimental como conceptual, siendo este último el objetivo central de esta investigación.Los métodos inductivos incluyeron la utilización de materiales audiovisuales y lecturas que van en un sentido de divulgación. Los resultados de sus trabajos muestran que, sin omitir un proceso formativo de corte más tradicional, como la resolución de problemas o libros de texto de física clásicos, la incorporación de estrategias inductivas sobre las particularidades de conceptos como “movimiento” o “luz” permite una comprensión más profunda de principios fundamentales, siendo un complemento funcional para una formación más integral. (shrink)

I analyse the conceptual and mathematical foundations of Lagrangian quantum field theory (QFT) (that is, the ‘naive’ (QFT) used in mainstream physics, as opposed to algebraic quantum field theory). The objective is to see whether Lagrangian (QFT) has a sufficiently firm conceptual and mathematical basis to be a legitimate object of foundational study, or whether it is too ill-defined. The analysis covers renormalisation and infinities, inequivalent representations, and the concept of localised states; the conclusion is that (...) Lagrangian QFT (at least as described here) is a perfectly respectable physical theory, albeit somewhat different in certain respects from most of those studied in foundational work. (shrink)

The past decade has seen notable development of conceptual engineering – a field of analytical philosophy that focuses on the critical evaluation of concepts. Most authors engaged with this area identify Rudolf Carnap’s ideas as its methodological framework and theoretical origin, placing particular emphasis on the philosopher’s method of explication. This article highlights the unquestionable influence Carnap’s thought had on conceptual engineering whilst by no means reducing it to the utilisation and advancement of explication within this field of (...) analytical philosophy: indeed, conceptual engineering has incorporated – and brought to the forefront – much broader tenets of Carnap’s concept. This study draws on a series of the philosopher’s works, as well as his ‘Intellectual Autobiography’, to trace the evolution of his ideas about language and describe the fundamental elements revealing the ‘engineering perspective’ in his reflection. Most clearly, this perspective is evident in his interpretation of logic as a conceptual tool for acquiring and processing knowledge, ‘assembling’ it into a structure and refining the procedures of logic itself. It is shown that the origins of the engineering perspective trace back, on the one hand, to Carnap’s interest in the methodological framework of physics, particularly the measurement problem and its epistemological analysis, and, on the other, his fascination with interpretations of the nature of mathematical theory and the idea of unifying logicism and formalism by introducing the principle of tolerance, which adds a pragmatic dimension to methodology. The article examines in detail the idea of explication and its theoretical origins, which lie, in particular, in Carnap’s intention to exactify the notions expressing the degree of validity and probability. His idea of a link between the results of explication and its goal became the central principle of conceptual engineering, distinguishing it from mere conceptual analysis. It is concluded that, when considered together, Carnap’s two major ideas – explication and the principle of tolerance – can be placed in a broader context of a project seeking a rational reconstruction of the life of society and providing it with knowledge-based underpinnings. (shrink)

A critical survey of various positions on the nature, use, possession, and analysis of normative concepts. We frame our treatment around G.E. Moore’s Open Question Argument, and the ways metaethicists have responded by departing from a Classical Theory of concepts. In addition to the Classical Theory, we discuss synthetic naturalism, noncognitivism (expressivist and inferentialist), prototype theory, network theory, and empirical linguistic approaches. Although written for a general philosophical audience, we attempt to provide a new perspective and highlight some underappreciated (...) problems about normative concepts. (shrink)

Conceptual analysis as a method of inquiry has long enjoyed popularity in analytic philosophy, including the philosophy of science. In this article I offer a perspective on the ways in which the method of conceptual analysis has been used, and distinguish two broad kinds, namely philosophical and empirical conceptual analysis. In so doing I outline a historical trend in which non-naturalized approaches to conceptual analysis are being replaced by a variety of naturalized (...) approaches. I outline the basic characteristics of these approaches with illustrative examples, arguing that recent developments in the philosophy of science show that in order to achieve a more adequate understanding of scientific endeavour we need to prioritize the naturalized accounts of the method. (shrink)

In Physical Causation, Phil Dowe proposes a Conserved Quality account of causation and offers criticisms of several alternatives, including Humean, counter-factual, and mark transmission accounts. Dowe eschews “conceptual analysis” and instead offers his theory as an “empirical account of causation at it is in the actual world.” Dowe takes this as absolving him of the responsibility of giving an account of the essence of causation, threatening to turn his metaphysical account into a watered-down version of more-or-less contemporary physical (...) theory. Nonetheless, on the basis of the strength of many of the criticisms of alternatives, I can recommend this book to anyone interested in contemporary debate about causation. (shrink)

Newtonian mechanics is more than just an empirically successful theory of matter in motion: it is an account of what knowledge of the physical world should look like. But what is this account? What is distinctive about it? To answer these questions, I begin by introducing the laws of motion, the relations among them, and the spatio-temporal framework that is implicit in them. Then I turn to the question of their methodological character. This has been the locus of philosophical discussion (...) from Newton’s time to the present, and I survey the views of some of the major contributors. I show that while Newtonian mechanics motivates a number of philosophical ideas about force, mass, motion, and causality – and through this, ideas about space and time – the laws are themselves the outcome of a philosophical or critical conceptual analysis. (shrink)

Network Analysis is considered as a new method that challenges Latent Variable models in inferring psychological attributes. With Network Analysis, psychological attributes are derived from a complex system of components without the need to call on any latent variables. But the ontological status of psychological attributes is not adequately defined with Network Analysis, because a psychological attribute is both a complex system and a property emerging from this complex system. The aim of this article is to reappraise (...) the legitimacy of latent variable models by engaging in an ontological and epistemological discussion on psychological attributes. Psychological attributes relate to the mental equilibrium of individuals embedded in their social interactions, as robust attractors within complex dynamic processes with emergent properties, distinct from physical entities located in precise areas of the brain. Latent variables thus possess legitimacy, because the emergent properties can be conceptualized and analyzed on the sole basis of their manifestations, without exploring the upstream complex system. However, in opposition with the usual Latent Variable models, this article is in favor of the integration of a dynamic system of manifestations. Latent Variables models and Network Analysis thus appear as complementary approaches. New approaches combining Latent Network Models and Network Residuals are certainly a promising new way to infer psychological attributes, placing psychological attributes in an inter-subjective dynamic approach. Pragmatism-realism appears as the epistemological framework required if we are to use latent variables as representations of psychological attributes. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe emergence of dimensional analysis in the early nineteenth century involved a redefinition of the pre-existing concepts of homogeneity and dimensions, which entailed a shift from a qualitative to a quantitative conception of these notions. Prior to the nineteenth century, these concepts had been used as criteria to assess the soundness of operations and relations between geometrical quantities. Notably, the terms in such relations were required to be homogeneous, which meant that they needed to have the same geometrical dimensions. (...) The latter reflected the nature of the quantities in question, such as volume vs area. As natural philosophy came to encompass non-geometrical quantities, the need arose to generalize the concept of homogeneity. In 1822, Jean Baptiste Fourier consequently redefined it to be the condition an equation must satisfy in order to remain valid under a change of units, and the ‘dimension' correspondingly became the power of a conversion factor. When these innovations eventually found an echo in France and Great Britain, in the second half of the century, tensions arose between the former, qualitative understanding of dimensions as reflecting the nature of physical quantities, and the new, quantitative conception based on unit conversion and measurement. The emergence of dimensional analysis thus provides a case study of how existing rules and concepts can find themselves redefined in the context of wider conceptual changes; in the present case this redefinition involved a generalization, but also a shift in meaning which led to conceptual tensions. (shrink)

In recent years, researchers within science education have started to consider the impact of narrative upon teaching and learning in science. This article investigates the possibilities of interactive fiction as a means by which students can be provided with feedback on their understanding in science, and explores the mechanisms which might allow learning from this. Through a review of literature around the use of narrative in science education, we have produced a list of recommendations that might guide the development of (...) interactive fiction within science education. These recommendations are tested through a small-scale study in which an interactive fiction book was written around Newton’s laws, and then tested with 27, 16- and 17-year-old chemistry students, eight of whom also study post-compulsory physics. The interactive fiction developed is based upon the well-established Force Concept Inventory and this allowed the analysis of the progression of student understanding. We found that, upon reading the book, there was a significant positive effect size on the understanding of students who do not study advanced physics. The gains for those who do study post-compulsory physics were not statistically significant. The participants’ report of enjoyment is also discussed. (shrink)

This book is the first to offer a systematic account of the role of language in the development and interpretation of physics. An historical-conceptual analysis of the co-evolution of physics and mathematics leads to the classical/quantum interface. Bohr's interpretation is analyzed and extended to the interpretation of the standard model of particle physics.

This theoretical exploration is an attempt to conceptualize the link between gender and urban environmental health. The proposed ecofeminist framework enables an understanding of the link between the urban physical and social environments and health inequities mediated by gender and socioeconomic status. This framework is proposed as a theoretical magnifying glass to reveal the underlying logic that connects environmental exploitation on the one hand, and gendered health inequities on the other. Ecofeminism has the potential to reveal an inherent, normative (...) class='Hi'>conceptual analysis and argumentative justification of western society that permits the oppression of women and the exploitation of the environment. This insight will contribute to a better understanding of the mechanisms underlying gendered environmental health inequities and inform healthy public policy that is supportive of urban environmental health, particularly for low‐income mothers. (shrink)

Since the appearance of T. S. Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, scholars from various fields have sought to evaluate their disciplines in the light of Kuhnian criteria for scientific change. In this paper I argue that a new paradigm seems needed in high energy physics, and that there is no more reason to say that matter is made of elementary particles, than to say that it is not. My argument, that high energy physics is approaching a state (...) of crisis, and that a new paradigm is needed, is based on an examination of two events which, according to Kuhn, presage a conceptual revolution: (1) the "old" paradigm of normal science becomes unclear; and (2) this paradigm fails to support normal problem solving research, and scientists begin to use it as if it were merely definitional. After examining the elementary particles paradigm in the light of these two criteria, I conclude that high energy physics is moving from "normal science" to "extraordinary science." I argue neither that a new paradigm has been found, nor that a return to normal science is imminent; instead I attempt to briefly outline some of the conceptual problems in high energy physics to which Heisenberg, Feynman, and others have alluded, but which so far have not been spelled out in any great philosophical detail. No attempt is made to argue about what the specific consequences of these difficulties might be, but merely to begin to clarify the problems facing scientists dealing with elementary particles. (shrink)

The best that has been thought and said in the analytical tradition since 1950 is here enshrined in a monumental testament to an idea. The naked sense of the idea is that the deepest problems encountered by man in understanding himself and his world will yield more readily to rapier-sharp conceptual analysis than to bold, creative, oracular, synoptic Anschauungen [[sic]] which are hard to get a handle on empirically. Although this beguiling idea, this analytical imperative, is itself only (...) heuristic and not substantive, its application has led to the accumulation of a staggeringly rich and brilliant treasury of philosophical illumination. Sixty-eight selections by giants of contemporary thought, from Ayer to Ziff, are deployed here under eight captions: reference and descriptions; analyticity and necessity; truth and meaning; problems of knowledge; the mental and physical; induction, laws, and causation; logic and ontology; and free will. Included are five selections each by Chisholm and Quine; four by Carnap; three each by Feigl, Pap, Sellars, and Strawson; two each by Austin, Bergmann, Cornman, Firth, and Rescher; and one each by 32 others. Some of the most famous philosophical papers of our century are represented here, such as Strawson’s "On Referring," Quine’s "On What There Is," Carnap’s "Meaning and Necessity," and Austin’s "Ifs and Cans." An index of 209 names and a knowledgeably prepared subject index bring this truly regal work to a close. It is a more-than-worthy successor to the uncommonly valuable Readings in Philosophical Analysis, edited by Feigl and Sellars and published in 1949.—W. G. (shrink)

This collection of 17 articles offers an overview of the philosophical activities of a group of philosophers (who have been) working at the Groningen University. The meta-methodological assumption which unifies the research of this group, holds that there is a way to do philosophy which is a middle course between abstract normative philosophy of science and descriptive social studies of science. On the one hand it is argued with social studies of science that philosophy should take notice of what scientists (...) actually do. On the other hand, however, it is claimed that philosophy can and should aim to reveal cognitive patterns in the processes and products of scientific and common sense knowledge. Since it is thought that those patterns can function as guidelines in new research and/or in research in other disciplines, philosophy can nevertheless hold on to the normative aim which is characteristic of 'classical' philosophy of science. Compared to this common assumption, there is a diversity of subjects. Some papers deal with general problems of science, knowledge, cognition and argumentation, others with topics relating to foundational problems of particular sciences. Therefore this volume is of interest to philosophers of science, to philosophers of knowledge and argumentation in general, to philosophers of mind, as well as for scientists working in the physical and applied sciences, biology, psychology and economy who are interested in the foundations of their disciplines. After a foreword by Leszek Nowak and a general introduction by the editors, the book is divided into four parts, with special introductions. - I: Conceptual Analysis in Service of Various Research Programmes (Henk Zandvoort, Rein Vos, Rick Looijen, Gerben Stavenga, Renée Dalitz); - II: The Logic of the Evaluation of Arguments, Hypotheses, Default Rules, and Interesting Theorems (Erik Krabbe, Theo Kuipers, Alfons Keupink, Maarten Janssen/Yao-Hua Tan, Bert Hamminga); - III: Three Challenges to the Truth Approximation Programme (Sjoerd Zwart, Hinne Hettema/Theo Kuipers, Roberto Festa); - IV: Explicating Psychological Intuitions (Anne-Ruth Mackor, Jeanne Peijnenburg, Lex Guichard, Michel ter Hark). The Groningen research group was recently qualified, by an official international assessment committee, as one of the best philosophy research groups in the Netherlands. (shrink)

The nature of intuitions remains a contested issue in philosophy. Yet, intuitions are frequently cited in philosophical work, featuring most prominently in conceptual analysis, the philosophical method par excellence. In this paper, we approach the question about the nature of intuitions based on a pragmatist, namely, Wittgensteinian account of concepts. To Wittgenstein, intuitions are just immediate ‘reactions’ to certain cognitive tasks. His view provides a distinct alternative to identifying intuitions with either doxastic states or quasi-perceptual experiences. We discuss (...) its implications for intuitions’ role in conceptual analysis and show that a Wittgensteinian account of intuitions is compatible even with ambitious metaphysical projects traditionally associated with this method. (shrink)

Philosophy of physics is a small but thriving research field situated at the intersection between the natural sciences and the humanities. However, what exactly distinguishes philosophy of physics from physics is rarely made explicit in much depth. We provide a detailed analysis in the form of eleven theses, delineating both the nature of the questions asked in philosophy of physics and the methodology with which they are addressed.

In recent years a lot of metaphilosophical attention has been paid to the role of thought experiments in philosophical inquiry. According to the popular picture, thought experiments are among the most prominent methods for conceptual analysis. However, it is also often claimed that thought experiments in ethics differ from those that are used in other fields of philosophy as being of a different nature—they are not about the concepts, but rather about the things in the world (what those (...) things exactly are depends on the particular metaethical theory one subscribes to). In the paper I argue that this claim is wrong. Conceptual analysis is of a huge value to ethics for it substantially helps to clarify the concepts one uses while making a moral judgment. It is very often the case that the apparent moral disagreement between two subjects turns out to be superficial since it is rooted in the misunderstanding on the conceptual level, for example when one uses some concept equivocally. Moreover, through thought experiments conceptual analysis can help to bring out the tacit assumptions that relate to the concepts involved. (shrink)

The editor has assembled these essays to support the thesis that Bergson considered "conceptual revolutions in physics inevitable [and that he foresaw] certain of their most important theoretical consequences." He introduces the collection with an intellectual biography indicating that, far from being antiscientific, Bergson was a respectful and diligent student of science. Several themes illustrative of the thesis run through the selections. One: Bergson's dualisms should be thought of as complementary, for example, intellect and intuition should be regarded (...) as two forms of empiricism rather than as antithetical approaches to knowledge. Another: Bergson anticipated concepts of quantum physics, such as, the dynamic concept of matter and the complementarity of velocity and position. A third theme: Bergson's ideas are suggestive for future scientific investigation, for example, the speed of light may be thought of as a coefficient of equivalence between space and time, a first law of time analogous to the first law of thermodynamics; then Bergson's concepts are perhaps a challenge to develop a second law. Most of the essays, originally published at various times between 1922 and 1959, appear in English for the first time. They are presented in four groups: "Quantum Physics" in which L. de Broglie, S. Watanabe, O. Costa de Beauregard, and R. Blanché are concerned with concepts of motion, entropy, and time; "Relativity" in which appears material by Bergson, Einstein, and Metz on Bergson's criticism of relativity, and essays by G. Pflug, J. F. Busch, W. Berteval, and O. Costa de Beauregard on aspects of Bergson's attack on relativity; "Bergson's and Zeno's Paradoxes" in which D. A. Sipfle uses an analysis of The Arrow by V. C. Chappell to interpret Bergson's theory of time. Milic Capek sums up the volume in an essay arguing that Bergson's concept of psychologic existence, on which his theory of matter is based, suggests a transformation of the basic concepts of the physical sciences. This is a stimulating group of essays, imaginatively edited.--L. G. (shrink)

Starting from logical structures of classical and quantum mechanics we reconstruct the logic of so-called no-signaling theories, where the correlations among subsystems of a composite system are restricted only by a simplest form of causality forbidding an instantaneous communication. Although such theories are, as it seems, irrelevant for the description of physical reality, they are helpful in understanding the relevance of quantum mechanics. The logical structure of each theory has an epistemological flavor, as it is based on analysis of (...) possible results of experiments. In this note we emphasize that not only logical structures of classical, quantum and no-signaling theory may be treated on the same ground but it is also possible to give to all of them a common ontological basis by constructing a “phase space” in all cases. In non-classical cases the phase space is not a set, as in classical theory, but a more general object obtained by means of category theory, but conceptually it plays the same role as the phase space in classical physics. (shrink)

The unusual applicability of mathematics to the description of the physical reality still remains a major investigative task for philosophers, physicists, mathematicians and cognitive scientists. The presented article offers a critical analysis of the philosophical motivations and development of a major attempt to resolve this task put forward by two prominent Polish philosophers: Józef Życiński and Michał Heller. In order to explain this particular property of mathematics Życiński has first introduced the concept of the field of rationality together with (...) the field of potentiality to be followed by Heller’s formal field and the field of categories. It turns out that these concepts are fully intelligible once located within philosophical stances on the relations between mathematics and physical reality. It will be argued that in order to achieve more extended conceptual clarification of the precise meaning of the field of rationality, further advancements in the understanding of the nature of the human mind are required. (shrink)