Iraq: The Moral Reckoning is an intensive application of the six classic just war theory criteria to the 2003 Iraq war decision, weighing information available at the time from a wide range of sources and concluding that the war met just one of the six, whereas a just war should meet all. It supplements the criteria with widely used ethical principles and thoroughly refutes neoconservative arguments that the war met the criteria.

The authors apply the issue life cycle model to analyze the 1999 through 2001 dispute between the Securities and Exchange Commission and the accounting profession concerning auditor independence. The analysis also brings additional insights that extend understanding of the issue life cycle and issues development. This analysis highlights the roles of a trigger event, the shift of an issue from a technical concern to a public debate, and likely recurrence. The reappearance of the auditor independence issue in 2002 with accounting (...) scandals is consistent with the article’s findings and highlights the use of the issue life cycle model and issue evolution. (shrink)

The inherent conflict in the taxation of married couples versus single individuals is examined. With competing social and economic outcomes, the taxation of married couples is tied to societal values and the political environment. The authors illustrate the issue by describing three methods of personal income taxation currently used across the globe. Factors such as stakeholder interests, workforce participation, and the political environment are important in determining acceptable trade-offs. Analyzing this issue in terms of the issue life cycle, the authors (...) conclude that in the United States the marriage tax penalty will be an enduring issue because of competing values and interests. (shrink)

This book argues that the moral quality of an act comes from the agent's inner states. By arguing for the indispensable relevance of intention in the moral evaluation of acts, the book moves against a mainstream, 'objective' approach in normative ethics. It is commonly held that the intentions, knowledge, and volition of agents are irrelevant to the moral permissibility of their acts. This book stresses that the capacities of agency, rather than simply the label 'agent', must be engaged during an (...) act if its moral evaluation is to be coherent. The author begins with an ontological argument that an act is a motion or a causing of change in something else. He argues that the source of an act's moral meaning is in the agent: specifically, what the agent, if aware of relevant facts around her, aims to accomplish. He then moves to a series of critical chapters that consider arguments for mainstream approaches to act evaluation, including Thomson's dismissal of the agent knowledge and volition requirements, Scanlon's arguments for a derivative relevance of intentions to permissibility, Frowe's "causal roles" of agents in the moral evaluation of acts, and Bennett's explicit defense of the objective approach. The book concludes by offering the author's preferred replacement for the objective approach, an Aristotelian-Thomist view of acts. Acts, Intentions, and Moral Evaluation will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in ethics, just war theory, the ethics of self-defense, and philosophy of action. (shrink)

The Aristotelian-Thomist claim is that external actions can be morally evaluated when they are voluntary (which includes being based on reasonably accurate knowledge of what an agent is doing), absent which, in effect, we evaluate outcomes, not acts. Also, in the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition the internal act of the will is paramount. These claims contrast with some current theorizing, e.g., by Judith Jarvis Thomson, that morally evaluates actions separately from agents, downplaying the internal act. Taking cases from current authors that revolve (...) around ignorance of key facts, I critique their theorizing on the basis of the nature of agency, the nature of abstraction, the moral language we use in describing acts, the need for reasonably complete descriptions of acts, and the tendency of act evaluations to “leak” into agent evaluations in objective theories. I then describe how Thomas Aquinas’s account of moral evaluation avoids these problems and provides a superior, multi-dimensional framework for moral evaluation. (shrink)