In the years following the end of the Second World War Carol Reed directed three films, Odd Man Out, The Third Man, and The Man Between, that all dealt with individuals somehow cast alone into post-war urban environments that shared certain characteristics of division and violence. This article argues that they can be usefully analysed through the lens of Walter Benjamin's notion of the creaturely, especially through Eric Santner's explication of the concept. It considers the films from three aspects (...) of Santner's creaturely life: natural history, the state of exception, and undeadness. These qualities of the creaturely as an analysis of the human condition help to encompass some of the strangeness of Reed's apparently conventional film narratives. The films' characters can be seen as overtly modelling a kind of Benjaminian natural history, the history of the brutal twentieth century, in which the vulnerable, mortal, dying human beings at the centre of these tales stumble around in rea... (shrink)

In his _Duino Elegies,_ Rainer Maria Rilke suggests that animals enjoy direct access to a realm of being—the open—concealed from humans by the workings of consciousness and self-consciousness. In his own reading of Rilke, Martin Heidegger reclaims the open as the proper domain of human existence but suggests that human life remains haunted by vestiges of an animal-like relation to its surroundings. Walter Benjamin, in turn, was to show that such vestiges—what Eric Santner calls the _creaturely_—have a biopolitical aspect: (...) they are linked to the processes that inscribe life in the realm of power and authority. Santner traces this theme of creaturely life from its poetic and philosophical beginnings in the first half of the twentieth century to the writings of the enigmatic German novelist W. G. Sebald. Sebald’s entire oeuvre, Santner argues, can be seen as an archive of creaturely life. For Sebald, the work on such an archive was inseparable from his understanding of what it means to engage ethically with another person’s history and pain, an engagement that transforms us from indifferent individuals into neighbors. An indispensable book for students of Sebald, _On Creaturely Life_ is also a significant contribution to critical theory. (shrink)

In his _Duino Elegies,_ Rainer Maria Rilke suggests that animals enjoy direct access to a realm of being—the open—concealed from humans by the workings of consciousness and self-consciousness. In his own reading of Rilke, Martin Heidegger reclaims the open as the proper domain of human existence but suggests that human life remains haunted by vestiges of an animal-like relation to its surroundings. Walter Benjamin, in turn, was to show that such vestiges—what Eric Santner calls the _creaturely_—have a biopolitical aspect: (...) they are linked to the processes that inscribe life in the realm of power and authority. Santner traces this theme of creaturely life from its poetic and philosophical beginnings in the first half of the twentieth century to the writings of the enigmatic German novelist W. G. Sebald. Sebald’s entire oeuvre, Santner argues, can be seen as an archive of creaturely life. For Sebald, the work on such an archive was inseparable from his understanding of what it means to engage ethically with another person’s history and pain, an engagement that transforms us from indifferent individuals into neighbors. An indispensable book for students of Sebald, _On Creaturely Life_ is also a significant contribution to critical theory. (shrink)

The idea of creaturely life has, in recent years, emerged as an important and illuminating category of literary and philosophical critique. In this paper I seek to contribute to this contemporary discourse by examining the references to the creaturely found in the writings of T.W. Adorno. Whilst much attention has been paid to Walter Benjamin’s reflections on creatureliness, Adorno, a thinker with whom Benjamin is often associated, has received comparatively little in this regard. I begin to redress (...) this lacuna by developing a reading of key passages of Dialectic of Enlightenment which orients itself towards Adorno’s remarks concerning the ‘inverse theology’ which he sees as grounding both his own, and Benjamin’s, thought. In placing theological core of Adorno’s philosophy in the foreground of my analysis, I argue that the notion of the creature, which I claim signifies a redemptive perspective on human existence, can be read as an important, if somewhat overlooked, concept in the normative framework of the Dialectic of Enlightenment. (shrink)

A new collection of essays highlighting the wide range of Buber's thought, career, and activism. Best known for I and Thou, which laid out his distinction between dialogic and monologic relations, Martin Buber (1878-1965) was also an anthologist, translator, and author of some seven hundred books and papers. Martin Buber: Creaturely Life and Social Form, edited by Sarah Scott, is a collection of nine essays that explore his thought and career. Martin Buber: Creaturely Life and Social (...) Form shakes up the legend of Buber by decentering the importance of the I-Thou dialogue in order to highlight Buber as a thinker preoccupied by the image of relationship as a geode to spiritual, social, and political change. The result is a different Buber than has hitherto been portrayed, one that is characterized primarily by aesthetics and politics rather than by epistemology or theology. Martin Buber: Creaturely Life and Social Form will serve as a guide to the entirety of Buber's thinking, career, and activism, placing his work in context and showing both the evolution of his thought and the extent to which he remained driven by a persistent set of concerns. (shrink)

In _Biocultural Creatures_, Samantha Frost brings feminist and political theory together with findings in the life sciences to recuperate the category of the human for politics. Challenging the idea of human exceptionalism as well as other theories of subjectivity that rest on a distinction between biology and culture, Frost proposes that humans are biocultural creatures who quite literally are cultured within the material, social, and symbolic worlds they inhabit. Through discussions about carbon, the functions of cell membranes, the activity (...) of genes and proteins, the work of oxygen, and the passage of time, Frost recasts questions about the nature of matter, identity, and embodiment. In doing so, she elucidates the imbrication of the biological and cultural within the corporeal self. In remapping the relation of humans to their habitats and arriving at the idea that humans are biocultural creatures, Frost provides new theoretical resources for responding to political and environmental crises and for thinking about how to transform the ways we live. (shrink)

This piece takes its cue from Malcolm Bowie's ‘speech creatures’, at once Aristotelian and psychoanalytic, to compare two forceful male characters in English novels who each make speeches proclaiming their own emotional reformation. Different as they are in other respects — an ex-libertine and a man of morals — Samuel Richardson's ‘Mr B.’ and Jane Austen's Mr Darcy both denounce their early parental education in relation to the humbler selfhood their wives-to-be have taught them. Such a development is both like (...) and unlike the later model of psychoanalytic re-education. It takes early emotional malformation as given, and it postulates the possibility of a beneficial re-education in later life; but it does not differentiate between the sexes, and it makes overall for a much more complete transformation and ‘cure by love’ than Freud's theories imagined. (shrink)

��………………………………………………………... 3 Acorn Barnacle ………………………………………………………. 4 Spiny Pink Sea Star ………………………………………………….. 8 Decorator Crab ………………………………………………………. 9 Orange Sea Pen ……………………………………………………… 11 California Sea Cucumber ……………………………………………. 13 Dungeness Crab …………………………………………………….. 15 Boring Sulfur Sponge ………………………………………………. 19 Moon Snail …………………………………………………………. 22 Opalescent Nudibranch …………………………………………….. 24 Moon Jellyfish ……………………………………………………... 27 Bay Pipefish ……………………………………………………….. 31 Green Surf Anemone ………………………………………………. 34 Spot Prawn …………………………………………………………. 35 Sea Urchin …………………………………………………………. 37 Shiner Perch ……………………………………………………….. 39 Sunflower Sea Star ………………………………………………… 41 Squat Lobster ………………………………………………………. 43 Plumose Anemone …………………………………………………. 45 (...) Ochre Sea Star ……………………………………………………… 47 Wolf Eel ……………………………………………………………. 49 Sand Dollar ………………………………………………………… 51 2 Introduction.. (shrink)

The human enhancement debate is fundamentally based on divergent ideals of human flourishing. Using the complementary, though often contrasting, foci of creaturehood and deification as fundamental to the good life, we examine these visions of human flourishing inherent in transhumanist, secular humanist and critical posthumanist positions on human enhancement. We argue that the theological anthropologies that respond to human enhancement and these other ideologies tend to emphasise either creaturehood or deification to the neglect or detriment of the other. We (...) propose in response that understanding humans as creatures bound for glory integrates both dimensions of the human being into the one grand vision of flourishing God has for humanity. (shrink)

The notion of Dignity of Creatures has been voted into the Swiss Federal Constitution by a plebiscite. Philipp Balzer, Klaus-Peter Rippe, and Peter Schaber have given an expert opinion for the Swiss government to clarify the notion of Dignity of Creatures. According to them, by voting this notion into the Swiss constitution, the Swiss have chosen for a limited biocentric approach towards biotechnology. In such an approach genetic engineering of non-human beings is only allowed insofar that their own good is (...) not impaired. It is, however, not clear when the good of a non-human being is impaired. I defend the position that – even if we confine ourselves to animals – their good goes beyond their well being. (shrink)

Touching Creatures, Touching Spirit illustrates with true stories that we live in an interactive, aware world in which the creatures around us in our neighborhoods know us and sometimes reach across to us, empathically and helpfully. Implications are that all beings live in a possible "common mind" from which our mass culture has disconnected, but which is only a heartbeat and some concentrated attention away. This mind encompasses microbial life and insects as well as creatures and extends to nonmaterial (...) intelligence as well-that is to say, spirit. Creatures as varied as a collaborating dragonfly, ants rescuing each other, a sympathetic lizard, an empathic coyote, gift-giving squirrels, crazed birds, and lots of very mysteriously smart cats inhabit the stories. Precognition, dreams, paranormal experiences with birds, psychic communications with cats, visitations from ghosts with messages, rolling earth spirits-not supernatural, they seem natural enough but not visible to everyone. The intention of this book is to help people catch interactions they themselves experience with nonhuman and even disembodied beings, and who could use some support for recalling since these interactions make clear we live in a sentient world. (shrink)

What motivates behavior? What are the qualities of experience which make life worth living? Taking a new interdisciplinary approach, Morillo advances the theory that pleasure—interpreted as a distinct, separable, noncognitive quality of experience—is essential for all positive motivation and is the only intrinsic, nonmoral good in the lives of human beings and many other sentient creatures. Morillo supports her arguments with recent neuropsychological evidence concerning the role of reward centers in the brain and philosophical arguments for a naturalistic theory (...) of value and the good life. "Contingent Creatures" will interest philosophers, psychologists, and neurobiologists. (shrink)

As a child brought up among animals, Lynne Sharpe never doubted they were essentially ‘creatures like us’. It came as a shock to learn that others did not agree. Here she exposes the bizarre way in which many philosophers — including even some great and humane ones — have repeatedly talked and written about animals. They have discussed the topic in terms of non-existent abstract ‘animals’, conceived as defective humans, entirely neglecting the experience of people who have wide practical knowledge (...) of companion animals — such as horses and dogs — through working with them. She testifies to the interesting nature of these creatures’ lives, noting that the usual narrow approach to animals carries with it also a distorted notion of human life as essentially cerebral and language-centred. (shrink)

Arguing that the importance of painting and other visual art for Benjamin's epistemology has yet to be appreciated, Weigel undertakes the first systematic analysis of their significance to his thought. She does so by exploring Benjamin's dialectics of secularization, an approach that allows Benjamin to explore the simultaneous distance from and orientation towards revelation and to deal with the difference and tensions between religious and profane ideas. In the process, Weigel identifies the double reference of 'life' to both nature (...) and to a 'supernatural' sphere as a guiding concept of Benjamin's writings. Sensitive to the notorious difficulty of translating his language, she underscores just how much is lost in translation, particularly with regard to religious connotations. The book thus positions Benjamin with respect to the other European thinkers at the heart of current discussions of sovereignty and martyrdom, of holy and creaturely life. It corrects misreadings, including Agamben's staging of an affinity between Benjamin and Schmitt, and argues for the closeness of Benjamin's work to that of Aby Warburg, with whom Benjamin unsuccessfully attempted an intellectual exchange. (shrink)

An award-wining biologist takes us on the dramatic expeditions that unearthed the history of life on our planet. Just 150 years ago,most of our world was an unexplored wilderness.Our sense of how old it was? Vague and vastly off the mark. And our sense of our own species’ history? A set of fantastic myths and fairy tales. Fossils had been known for millennia, but they were seen as the bones of dragons and other imagined creatures. In the tradition of (...) The Microbe Hunters and Gods, Graves, and Scholars, Sean Carroll’s Remarkable Creatures celebrates the pioneers who replaced our fancies with the even more amazing true story of how our world evolved. Carroll recounts the most important discoveries in two centuries of national history — from Darwin’s trip around the world to CharlesWalcott’s discovery of pre-Cambrian life in the Grand Canyon; from Louis and Mary Leakey’s investigation of our deepest past in East Africa to the trailblazers in modern laboratories who have located a time clock in our DNA. Join him in a rousing voyage of discovery, from the epic journeys of pioneering naturalists to the breakthroughs making headlines today. (shrink)

Arguing that the importance of painting and other visual art for Benjamin's epistemology has yet to be appreciated, Weigel undertakes the first systematic analysis of their significance to his thought. She does so by exploring Benjamin's dialectics of secularization, an approach that allows Benjamin to explore the simultaneous distance from and orientation towards revelation and to deal with the difference and tensions between religious and profane ideas. In the process, Weigel identifies the double reference of 'life' to both nature (...) and to a 'supernatural' sphere as a guiding concept of Benjamin's writings. Sensitive to the notorious difficulty of translating his language, she underscores just how much is lost in translation, particularly with regard to religious connotations. The book thus positions Benjamin with respect to the other European thinkers at the heart of current discussions of sovereignty and martyrdom, of holy and creaturely life. It corrects misreadings, including Agamben's staging of an affinity between Benjamin and Schmitt, and argues for the closeness of Benjamin's work to that of Aby Warburg, with whom Benjamin unsuccessfully attempted an intellectual exchange. (shrink)

JONATHAN EDWARDS NAMES HIS CHRISTOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF THE VIRtue of humility as an "excellency proper to creatures" rather than of God's divine nature, which differentiates it from "true virtue" or benevolence. He presents the incarnate Christ as the moral archetype for humility. This has two implications for contemporary ethics. First, it suggests that we would have needed God's revelation in Christ to understand and pursue the virtues, even if the Fall had not occurred. Second, it indicates that there is a (...) necessary relation between love and humility in the Christian life. (shrink)

This paper offers a nexus of terms – mortality, limits, contingency and vulnerability – painting a picture of human life as marked by limitation and finitude. I suggest that limitations of possibility, capacity, and resource are deep features of human life, but not only restrict it. Limits are also the conditions of possibility for human life and as such have productive, normative, and creative powers that not only delimit life but also scaffold growth and transformation within (...) it. The paper takes a less known interpretation of the term ‘ephēmeros', to mean ‘of the day', rather than ‘short-lived' and suggests that as ephemeral, human life is contingent and mutable, subject to events beyond our control. However, virtue can still be exercised – indeed, can be exuberantly displayed – when we respond to contingent events marked by adversity. (shrink)

This article offers an extensive study of the idea of an animal afterlife in seventeenth-century England. While some have argued that the idea of an animal afterlife became prevalent at the time due to increased awareness of animals’ mental abilities, others have suggested it was due to greater sensitivity to animal suffering and the perceived need to square this suffering with divine justice. I show that both views are incorrect, and that seventeenth-century thinking about an animal afterlife was first and (...) foremost grounded in, and shaped by, speculations about end times and the restored creation based on a literal reading of a key passage in Paul’s letter to the Romans (8:19–22), which thus served as the sedes doctrinae throughout the seventeenth century. Lastly, I show that those who entertained a future life for beasts also supposed that animals would have a functional role therein, considering animals as being present in the restored creation to serve some spiritual end rather than as being true beneficiaries in their own right. (shrink)

: The suffering of creatures experienced throughout evolutionary history provides some conceptual difficulties for theists who maintain that God is an all-good loving creator who chose to employ the processes associated with evolution to bring about life on this planet. Some theists vexed by this and other problems posed by the interface between religion and science have turned to process theology which provides a picture of a God who is dependent upon creation and unable to unilaterally intervene in the (...) affairs of the world and avert suffering. In the present paper I seek to critique process theism, focusing on divine action and the aforementioned problem posed by evolutionary suffering. I show that the promise of a more compelling account of a loving God who suffers with creation advanced by the process theist is illusory. Rather, the process God is less dynamic than promised. And on such an account the freedom of both God and the world are significantly more circumscribed than one may find in other forms of theism. (shrink)

This paper defends “moral individualism” against various arguments that have been intended to show that membership in the human species or participation in our distinctively human form of life is a sufficient basis for a moral status higher than that of any animal. Among the arguments criticized are the “nature-of-the-kind argument,” which claims that it is the nature of all human beings to have certain higher psychological capacities, even if, contingently, some human beings lack them, and various versions of (...) the idea that there is a special form of life that all human beings share but of which no animal can be a full participant. The paper concludes that none of these arguments succeeds in demonstrating that there are moral reasons to permit animals to be treated less well than members of our own species whose psychological capacities and potential are no higher than those of the animals. (shrink)

"Of all creatures women be best, / Cuius contrarium verum est": Gendered Power in Selected Late Medieval and Early Modern Texts The aim of this paper is to examine images of the relationship between men and women in selected late medieval and early modern English texts. I will identify prevalent ideology of representation of women as well as typical imagery associated with them. I will in particular argue that men whose homosocial laughter performs a solidifying function of their community seek (...) to reiterate their superiority over women through seemingly playful and inclusive humour. I will attempt to show that what appears to be good-natured entertainment is actually a weapon used against women who, often accused of no sense of humour, are ridiculed and commanded to succumb to male authority. I will also discuss the triumphant tone of both poems and dramatic writings whose cheerful tone functions to marginalize women and to reinforce the misogynistic foundations of public life. (shrink)

This article argues that Christians have strong faith-based reasons to avoid consuming animal products derived from animals that have not been allowed to flourish as fellow creatures of God, and that Christians should avoid participating in systems that disallow such flourishing. It considers and refutes objections to addressing this as an issue of Christian ethics, before drawing on a developed theological understanding of animal life in order to argue that the flourishing of fellow animal creatures is of ethical concern (...) for Christians. Since the vast majority of animal products currently available for purchase are derived from farmed animals reared in modern intensive modes that fail to allow for their flourishing, and this practice is harmful for humans and the environment as well as farmed animals, the article argues that Christians should avoid consuming these products. (shrink)

Hans G. Ulrich's book, Wie Geschöpfe leben, engages eclectically but vigorously with moral and theological aspects of the Bible's teaching on ethics. This article employs three questions as an entrée to understanding his encounter with Scripture: it asks about his implicit biblical canon, his approach and presuppositions in hermeneutics, and finally about his major critical conversation partners. Supplementing Ulrich's strong sense of the Bible's importance for theological ethics, a strongly Lutheran reading of notions like `law' and `commandment' here goes hand (...) in hand with a concentration on Matthew, Romans and the Psalms; this in turn is matched by a characteristically unstated (but implicitly Protestant) Rule of Faith. There is a broad engagement with contemporary philosophers and theologians, but little attention is paid either to patristic and medieval voices or for that matter to biblical scholars, even those who have in recent years attempted to recover the connection between Scripture and Theology. (shrink)

Christian teaching about creation out of nothing appears to evacuate creatures of intrinsic worth. A theological‐spiritual response to this anxiety outlines the elements of the doctrine: understanding creation requires the direction of intelligence by divine instruction; God alone is cause of being to other beings, by his power, will and goodness; the act of creation is ineffable, instantaneous, without movement, supereminent, and without material cause; created things have being by divine gift; the relation of creator and creatures is mixed, the (...) creator not being constituted by creatures. Does this entail a metaphysics of creaturely privation in which creatures are permanently indigent? The creator is benevolent and, with no self‐interest, gives life, and so moves creatures to activity that the non‐reciprocal character of the creator‐creature relation is not malign but the principle of creaturely perfection. (shrink)

This article argues that organisms, defined by a semi-permeable membrane or skin separating organism from environment, are (must be) semiotically alert responders to environments (both Innenwelt and Umwelt). As organisms and environments complexify over time, so, necessarily, does semiotic responsiveness, or ‘semiotic freedom’. In complex environments, semiotic responsiveness necessitates increasing plasticity of discernment, or discrimination. Such judgements, in other words, involve interpretations. The latter, in effect, consist of translations of a range of sign relations which, like metaphor, are based on (...) transfers (carryings over) of meanings or expressions from one semiotic ‘site’ to another. The article argues that what humans describe as ‘metaphor’ (and believe is something which only pertains to human speech and mind and, in essence, is ‘not real’) is, in fact, fundamental to all semiotic and biosemiotic sign processes in all living things. The article first argues that metaphor and mind are immanent in all life, and are evolutionary, and, thus, that animals certainly do have minds. Following Heidegger and then Agamben, the article continues by asking about the place of animal mind in humans, and concludes that, as a kind of ‘night science’, ‘humananimal’ mind is central to the semiotics of Peircean abduction. (shrink)

A biographical sketch of the Hologenome Theory.

Winner of the Moonbeam Children's Animals/Pets Non-Fiction Gold Medal! A story about the fundamental connection between animals and people and how we can treat all of Earth's creatures with compassion and empathy. Furry polar bears, playful sea otters, slow sloths, prickly porcupines, and slimy snakes are just a few of the many animals we share our world with. And even though we might not look the same or have the same needs as our animal neighbors, we have more in common (...) with them than we might think. Our Animal Neighbors introduces children to the importance of treating all animals with the care and compassion they deserve. We all want to experience love, safety, and respect and this book is the first step to instilling those values at an early age. This planet is our home, and we should all be free to live a prosperous life regardless of whether we have hands, hooves, scales, or fur. “A serious message delivered with humor, simplicity, and charm makes this book an excellent purchase for families that value open-ended discussions. Also a good resource for classrooms and libraries that welcome diverse opinions and points of view.”—School Library Journal. (shrink)

Drawing on ancient writers, from Aesop to Ovid, classicist and working farmer, Mark Usher compiles in this book an anthology of Greco-Roman passages illustrating how they thought about animals and illuminating they might help us to rethink our relationships with them. Not many contemporary readers will know, for example, the compelling arguments the second century AD Greek philosopher Porphyry makes for vegetarianism, long before a plant-based diet began to garner headlines. Plutarch's serio-comic exposition of the rationality and inherent dignity of (...) non-human creatures-put on the lips of one of Circe's pigs-is so fresh that it sounds like it was formulated just yesterday. The knowledge the poet Theognis derived from Greek sponge divers about the behavior of octopods rivals our contemporary fascination with the octopus. Aristotle's introduction to the scientific study of animal morphology and behavior remains unparalleled for its elegance and insight, and it represents one of the first forays into natural history writing. Seneca, employing an ingenious etymological pun on the word animal, endeavors to show that we humans are morally inferior to our animal cousins, who instinctively know and are satisfied with their place in Nature. The Greeks and Romans, amidst all their magnificent cultural achievements and reckless, destructive behavior, lived closer than most of us to the perils and prospects of their environments. This afforded them a sensitivity to their environments and, in particular, to their fellow creatures that can perhaps help to disabuse us of our disconnectedness from animal life. This small volume demonstrates how astoundingly relevant the ancients still are in this regard. (shrink)

Are the emotions elicited by real-life occurrences in analogous with those which occur in fictions? The position that Jonathan Gilmore stakes in Apt Imaginings: Feelings for Fictions and Other Creatures of the Mind is that our emotions are not governed by the same standards of appropriateness or rationality across life and art—there is a kind of separation, barrier or “quarantine” (to borrow Gilmore’s parlance). For instance, we may admire or root for Tony Soprano when watching The Sopranos but (...) would abhor such a person in real life; similarly, we may take great pleasure in the wanton destruction in a film such as Lars von Trier’s Melancholia but would be horrified by this were it to occur. Gilmore queries us to examine this discrepancy and departure, drawing attention to the consideration that, if fictions are simply extensions of our imagination why often times when we imagination something do we respond to what we imagine as if it were to really occur? When we imagine missing a train, for instance, we feel a nervousness analogous to what we would feel were we to really miss the train. On the one side is the pull of continuity, a commitment to invariance, in which our engagements with the contents of fictions and other imagined creations are said to be modeled on our engagements with ordinary real-world states of affairs. On the other is the pull of discontinuity, in which such representations are posed as offering potentially sui generis sorts of experiences that resist assimilation or reduction to those we encounter in the everyday. Thus, questions concerning art and fictive imagining’s autonomy and belief are inherently imbricated within this discourse. (shrink)

How do our engagements with fictions and other products of the imagination compare to our experiences of the real world? Are the feelings we have about a novel's characters modelled on our thoughts about actual people? If it is wrong to feel pleasure over certain situations in real life, can it nonetheless be right to take pleasure in analogous scenarios represented in a fantasy or film? Should the desires we have for what goes on in a make-believe story cohere (...) with what we want to happen in the actual world? In Apt Imaginings, Jonathan Gilmore develops a new framework to pursue these questions, marshalling a wide range of research in aesthetics, the science of the emotions, moral philosophy, neuroscience, cognitive psychology, and film and literary theory. Gilmore argues that, while there is a substantial empirical continuity in our feelings across art and life, the norms that govern the appropriateness of those responses across the divide are discontinuous. In this view, the evaluative criteria that determine the fit, correctness, or rationality of our emotions and desires for what is internal to a fiction can be contrary to those that govern our affective attitudes toward analogous things in the real world. In short, it can be right to embrace within a story what one would condemn in real life. The theory Gilmore defends in this volume helps to explain our complex and sometimes conflicted attitudes toward works of the imagination; challenges the popular view that fictions serve to refine our moral sensibilities; and exposes a kind of autonomy of the imagination that can render our responses to art immune to standard real-world epistemic, practical, and affective kinds of criticism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:For the Love of All Creatures: The Story of Grace in Genesis by William GreenwayRyan JuskusFor the Love of All Creatures: The Story of Grace in Genesis William Greenway GRAND RAPIDS, MI: EERDMANS, 2015. 178 PP. $18.00The morning I started reading William Greenway's For the Love of All Creatures, my toddler stumbled into my bedroom holding an injured cockroach. After my startled response caused him to drop it, (...) I trapped and threw the cockroach outside. Had no children been present, I probably would have killed it. Later, I read Greenway's injunction to "love the cockroach," for "we reflect the image of God when we are wholly and without qualification seized by love for the cockroach and for every creature" (102). Did I love that injured cockroach, I wondered; was I seized in a "transcendent moment," my love "absolute and unqualified" (102)? Unpreoccupied by such quotidian dilemmas, Greenway instead proposes a spirituality of grace, of awakening to having been seized by love for all creatures. The moral and spiritual genius of "the primeval history" of Genesis 1–11, he argues, is its holding together the "knowing, insightful idealism" of the seven-day Creation narrative with the "hyperrealism" of the Flood narrative (140). Together they proclaim the "decisive, life-affirming asymmetry" that gracious love is more primordial and ultimate than evil (144). Greenway's book joins a growing body of literature reclaiming biblical texts from overly anthropocentric readings. Asserting the priority of moral sensibility to ethical reasoning, Greenway does not help me know whether I loved that cockroach—beyond mourning that in a fallen world, we "choose the lesser of two evils" (103)—but his Creation spirituality contributes a distinctive approach to animal ethics.Greenway contrasts his creature-loving reading with both materialist and anthropocentric interpretations, against which he argues that the redactors skillfully wove together the Genesis 1–11 narratives to bear a "spiritual truth" that awakens readers to love for all creatures (4). Contrasting this spiritual wisdom to two other influential Creation narratives—the Babylonian Enuma Elish and Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan, the latter carried to completion by Charles Darwin—Greenway draws out the interconnections between politics, cosmology, anthropology, God, and evil that each narrative renders.A provocative but carefully developed reading of the Flood as the "birth of the God of grace" and an interpretation of the seven-day Creation through the lens of exiled, suffering Israel, follow (67). The latter, Greenway argues, cultivates a life-affirming spirituality with an "infinite sensitivity to every other [End Page 205] being" (105). The both/and character of the primeval history's spirituality is summed up in Greenway's oft-repeated phrases "seized by love for all creatures" (i.e., idealism) yet "with eyes wide open to injustice and suffering" (i.e., realism). For a criterion to evaluate Creation narratives, Greenway distinguishes between a "logic of domination" and a "logic of dominion." He concludes that whereas the Hobbesian-Darwinian narrative recognizes fallenness and the Enuma Elish promotes realism, both fail to testify to the asymmetry between good and evil that Greenway thinks essential to a creature-loving spirituality of dominion. Gracious love is the most primordial and ultimate reality. The ethic of daily life, lived along the continuum between domination and dominion, is to "maximize dominion" (121).Regardless of whether one accepts Greenway's premises regarding authority, epistemology, and biblical interpretation, his argument is insightful and thought provoking. Engaging the oppressed communities highlighted by feminist, womanist, and postcolonial thinkers would have complicated his story of "the modern West" and his assessments of sacrifice, hierarchy, sin, and imago Dei. Also, a number of ambiguities—such as claiming to value multiple religious traditions while arguing for the superiority of Genesis—beg for further clarity. However, Greenway's contribution to a life-affirming spirituality in harmony with biblical testimony is laudatory. He may not help me know how to love a cockroach, but he successfully accounts for why such an ethical dilemma coheres with a Genesis-cultivated spirituality. The book would have wide appeal in undergraduate, seminary, or ecclesial contexts. [End Page 206]Ryan JuskusDuke UniversityCopyright © 2017 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

Life and the living (on Aristotelian biohorror) -- Supernatural horror as the paradigm for life -- Aristotle's De anima and the problem of life -- The ontology of life -- The entelechy of the weird -- Superlative life -- Life with or without limits -- Life as time in Plotinus -- On the superlative -- Superlative life I: Pseudo-Dionysius -- Negative vs. affirmative theology -- Superlative negation -- Negation and preexistent life (...) -- Excess, evil, and non-being -- Superlative life II: Eriugena -- Negation in the periphyseon -- The quaestio de nihilo: on nothing -- The quaestio de nihilo: superlative nothing -- Dark intelligible abyss -- Apophasis -- The apophatic logic -- Negation in Frege and Ayer -- Negation vs. subtraction in Badiou -- Negation and contradiction in Priest -- The dialetheic vitalism of negative theology -- Ellipses: Suhraward and the luminous void -- Univocal creatures -- On spiritual creatures -- Life as form in Aristotle -- The concept of the creature -- Univocity I: Duns Scotus vs. Aquinas -- Univocity in Aquinas' Summa theologica -- Univocity in Duns Scotus' Opus oxoniense -- The common nature of the creature -- Univocity II: Duns Scotus vs. Henry of Ghent -- Univocity in Henry of Ghent -- Negative vs. privative indetermination -- Absolute indetermination -- Univocity III: Deleuze's scholasticism three variations -- Spinoza et le problème de l'expression -- Différence et répétition -- Cours de Vincennes -- Univocal creatures -- Ellipses: Dgen and uncreated univocity -- Dark pantheism -- Everything and nothing -- Life as spirit in Aquinas -- The concept of the divine nature -- Immanence I: Eriugena's periphyseon -- Natura and the unthought -- Universal life -- Four statements on pantheism -- Immanence II: Duns Scotus' reportatio Ia -- Univocal immanence -- Actual infinity -- The pathology of the triple primacy -- Immanence III: Nicholas of Cusa's De docta ignorantia -- The coincidence of opposites -- The folds of life -- Absolute vs. contracted pantheism -- Speculative pantheism (Deleuze's interlocutors) -- Pantheism and pure immanence -- The insubordination of immanence in Deleuze -- Scholia I: the isomorphism of univocity and immanence -- Scholia II: the vitalist logic of common notions -- Scholia III: the life of substance -- Dark pantheism -- Ellipses: Wang Yangming and idealist naturalism -- Logic and life (on Kantian teratology) -- The wandering line from Aristotle to Kant -- Critique of life -- Spectral life and speculative realism -- Ontotheology in Kant, atheology in Bataille -- The night land. (shrink)

In a time of climate change, environmental degradation, and social injustice, the question of the value and purpose of human life has become urgent. What are the grounds for hope in a wounded world? This Sacred Life gives a deep philosophical and religious articulation of humanity's identity and vocation by rooting people in a symbiotic, meshwork world that is saturated with sacred gifts. The benefits of artificial intelligence and genetic enhancement notwithstanding, Norman Wirzba shows how an account of (...) humans as interdependent and vulnerable creatures orients people to be a creative, healing presence in a world punctuated by wounds. He argues that the commodification of places and creatures needs to be resisted so that all life can be cherished and celebrated. Humanity's fundamental vocation is to bear witness to God's love for creaturely life, and to commit to the construction of a hospitable and beautiful world. (shrink)

A life of the mind can be lived only by creatures who know that they have minds. We call these creatures “persons,” and currently, all such persons THAT we know OF are “alive” in the biological sense. But are there, or could there be, either in the future or elsewhere in the universe, creatures with “a life of the mind” that are not “alive” in the sense that we humans usually understand this term today?

In this essay, I explore the philosophical resonance of the theological notion of Paradise in the works of Giorgio Agamben and Jacques Derrida through the question of the Paradisiacal belonging of animal life. What is the significance of Paradise for these authors? This essay undertakes the search for the meaning of Paradise by way of these thinkers’ assessment of animal or creaturely life. I argue that their differing attitudes towards the life of the animal or creature (...) expose a fundamental discord concerning exactly this issue: the significance of theology, and the myth of Paradise and the Fall. To be precise, it is argued that Derrida means to preclude the narrative of the Fall. Agamben, on the other hand, takes the animal as creature, and thus as a proper theological subject – which in this context means an Edenic exile – and accordingly as a proper subject of redemption. So, where Derrida intervenes in an encounter between human and animal prior to Paradise, Agamben joins the story after man was driven from it. In turn, this essay covers the issue of Derrida and Agamben’s messianic terminologies, the ontology of the animal as being-after, and ultimately, the conceptual understanding of Paradise. (shrink)

In Life Beyond the Gene, Steven Rose offers a theory of life which insists that we as humans -- and indeed all living creatures -- create our own futures, though in circumstances not of our own choosing. Placing the organism at the center of life, Rose confronts the ideology of reductionism and ultra-Darwinism, with its insistence that all aspects of human life from sexual preference to infanticide, political orientation to violence, male domination to alcoholism, are in (...) our genes and are the inevitable consequences of natural selection. These claims, Rose asserts, are not only socially naive, but fundamentally misunderstand the active and irreducible nature of living processes. Rose argues that life depends on the elaborate web of interactions that occur within cells, organisms, and ecosystems, in which DNA has one part to play. From early in their development, living organisms have to be capable of quasi-independent existence while growing to maturity. If we are to understand life, we must recapture an understanding of the entire living organism and its trajectory through time and space. Rose calls these trajectories lifelines. Provocative and incisive, Life Beyond the Gene provides a compelling response to those enthusiasts of the gene who would deny the complexity of life. (shrink)

The idea of a ?dialogue with the dead? strikes us by turns as both impossible and intriguing. Yet, what can be really meant by it is far from clear. This essay attempts to explore this idea in the work of novelist W. G. Sebald. It examines the scope and the meaning of such an interchange in his works and connects this theme to his wider explorations of ?creaturely life.? It also links this particular dimension of Sebald's notion of (...) ?creaturely? or ?bare? life with some of the other major treatments of the same theme in recent literature and philosophy. (shrink)

The human propensity to take an ethical stance toward oneself and others is found in every known society, yet we also know that values taken for granted in one society can contradict those in another. Does ethical life arise from human nature itself? Is it a universal human trait? Or is it a product of one's cultural and historical context? Webb Keane offers a new approach to the empirical study of ethical life that reconciles these questions, showing how (...) ethics arise at the intersection of human biology and social dynamics. Drawing on the latest findings in psychology, conversational interaction, ethnography, and history, Ethical Life takes readers from inner city America to Samoa and the Inuit Arctic to reveal how we are creatures of our biology as well as our history--and how our ethical lives are contingent on both. Keane looks at Melanesian theories of mind and the training of Buddhist monks, and discusses important social causes such as the British abolitionist movement and American feminism. He explores how styles of child rearing, notions of the person, and moral codes in different communities elaborate on certain basic human tendencies while suppressing or ignoring others."--Publisher's Web site. (shrink)

Annotation. "What is life? What does it means to be alive? Is the Earth a super-organism? Is God necessary? In Biology and the Riddle of Life Charles Birch confronts these fundamental questions at a time when such topics as genetic engineering, cloning and ecology have been prominent in the news. Birch confronts the impression that modern biology has answers to all that there is to be known about life. We need to move towards an understanding of living (...) creatures as subjects, and not only as objects, in order to probe life's hidden secrets - what it is to be alive, what it is to experience pain, and what it is to be in love. The answer must include the meaning of life for us as individuals. Birch proposes a new perspective to bring subject and object together. This is the black box he has opened."--BOOK JACKET. Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved. (shrink)

This article investigates artificial life image-making in relation to and as constituent of the moving image, specifically artificial life visualized in three-dimensional computer-generated space . Of particular interest in this examination is the view or `window', from the virtual camera, into the artificial life computational model or `world' , and how it organizes a dense field of expectations. Analogous to looking through a telescope or microscope, the view into the artificial life world is monocular and often (...) fixed in the world; in this regime we look `at' computer models, which are often referred to as agents, `creatures', `organisms' or `cyberbeasts'. This tactic of looking through the instrumentality of science, the arts of reality, is parallel to looking through André Bazin's `long take' in cinema and documentary film-making in which we look `at' an unmediated view of reality; in other words, in looking `at' an image of artificial life we look `through' a non-intrinsic regime of seeing. This investigation into the interpretative regime provides only a partial account of the intercultural traffic between artificial life and the moving image. I further this discussion by arguing that artificial life screen-based works are a contemporary extension and reworking of the nature film in that they provide accounts of the `natural' world that are familiar and similar to those of their filmic and cinematic predecessors. I contend that artificial life visualizations and the stories that often accompany the images are the latest manifestation of this photographic and filmic tradition. To illustrate my point I discuss the scientific project Daisyworld, the associated narrative that frames the research, and the researchers' attempt to mathematically model an `imaginary planet [with] a very simple biosphere'. This sets the scene to explore artificial life in relation to Disney wilderness and nature films. (shrink)

In Social Life and Moral Judgment, author and philosopher Antony Flew examines the social problems induced by the mature welfare state. Welfare states make ever-increasing financial demands on their citizenry, yet the evidence clearly supports that such demands are not sustainable. In this superlative collection of thematic essays, Flew investigates and explains why this is so, and calls for a return to individual responsibility. The first essay establishes the philosophical basis for his argument. "Is Human Sociobiology Possible?" answers its (...) titular question in the negative, asserting that we are all members of a peculiar type of creature that can, and therefore must, be responsible for whatever choices between various courses of action or inaction that are open to us as individuals. In other essays, Flew shows how state welfare systems inevitably corrupt and demoralize their citizens by encouraging ever-more people to apply for welfare entitlements and reducing the incentives to avoid or escape the conditions warranting those entitlements. He investigates the origins of this new kind of welfare entitlement, and shows how very different what politicians and public sector employees produce is from what these people claim to be producing. Flew shows that the drive for "social" justice appears to require that the justly acquired income and wealth of all citizens should be progressively taxed away or supplemented by the state so that the eventual result is more, though never perfect, equality. This objective, he asserts, must be radically distinguished from old-fashioned, without prefix or suffix, justice. It was this type of justice Adam Smith referred to when he famously said that it is a virtue "of which the observance is not left to the freedom of our wills" but "which may be extorted by force." Flew question the aims of those who would discredit wealth creators and wealth-creating investment, showing that these are the same people who promote the rising "progressive" taxation needed to finance expenditure in the growing welfare state. Social Life and Moral Judgment is a timely critique, one that will be appreciated at a point in history when governments on both sides of the Atlantic have begun to describe spending on state health, social, education, and welfare services as investments, instead of mechanisms to achieve social justice. (shrink)

"In the midst of the world, darkened with many sins and sorrows, in which the majority live, there abides another world, lighted up with shining virtues and unpolluted joy, in which the perfect ones live. This world can be found and entered, and the way to it is by self-control and moral excellence. It is the world of the perfect life, and it rightly belongs to man, who is not complete until crowned with perfection. The perfect life is (...) not the far-away, impossible thing that men who are in darkness imagine it to be; it is supremely possible, and very near and real. Man remains a craving, weeping, sinning, repenting creature just so long as he wills to do so by clinging to those weak conditions; but when he wills to shake off his dark dreams and to rise, he arises and achieves." - JAMES ALLEN - A Complete and Unabridged edition of James Allen's book "The Life Triumphant." Part of The Works of James Allen Series. Other Works by James Allen:- Above Life's Turmoil All These Things Added As a Man Thinketh Byways of Blessedness Entering the Kingdom (Part of- "All These Things Added") From Passion to Peace From Poverty to Power Foundation Stones to Happiness and Success James Allen's Book of Meditations for Every Day in the Year Light on Life's Difficulties Man: King of Mind, Body and Circumstance Men and Systems Morning and Evening Thoughts Out from the Heart (Sequel to "As a Man Thinketh") Poems of Peace The Divine Companion The Eight Pillars of Prosperity The Heavenly Life (Part of-"All These Things Added") The Mastery of Destiny The Path to Prosperity (Part of-"From Poverty to Power") The Shining Gateway The Way of Peace (Part of-"From Poverty to Power") Through the Gate of Good. (shrink)

Biocentrism maintains that all living creatures have moral standing, but need not claim that all have equal moral significance. This moral standing extends to organisms generated through human interventions, whether by conventional breeding, genetic engineering, or synthetic biology. Our responsibilities with regard to future generations seem relevant to non-human species as well as future human generations and their quality of life. Likewise the Precautionary Principle appears to raise objections to the generation of serious or irreversible changes to the quality (...) of life of non-human species. Objections to the application of all this to new life-forms produced by synthetic biology are considered and addressed from a biocentric perspective. The bearing of biocentrism on religions is also considered, together with contrasting views about science, religion and the creation of life. (shrink)

While I, as may be said, “groaned” and “puffed” over the last chapter of the third book of the second series of my writings, in the process of my “subconscious mentation,” that is to say, in my automatically flowing thoughts, the center of gravity of interest was concentrated by itself on the question: how should I begin the third series of books predetermined by me for writing, namely, that series of books which according to my conviction was destined to become (...) in a short time so to say “edifyingly instructive” for all the creatures of Our Common Father similar to myself; but here I must sincerely confess that soon after I had chosen for myself the profession of a writer, as the most corresponding to my unexpectedly arisen physical state, and when, parallel to the improvement in my physical state, I clearly understood that, thanks to my personal written explanations, a great benefit will arise for the majority of contemporary people as well as for future generations, I determined by this very series of books consciously to acquit myself with Great Nature for my arising and existence, chiefly for an existence not merely as an “ordinary life,” automatically fulfilling some purpose necessary for the general realizations of Great Nature, but rather as an existence determinate and conscious, impartially evaluating itself and, in addition, gifted with the capacity of all-round perfecting and independent unity. The outcome of these recent reflections, combined with my conscious thoughts of today upon finishing this last-mentioned book, brought me to the categorical decision to begin this “edifyingly instructive” series of books with the description of the events connected with my last two visits to some of the cities of North America, and to cite in concise form the talks delivered by me there to a certain group of the followers of my ideas which had already been organized ten years before during my first visit in New York. I wish to begin with this description chiefly because upon these talks, as I planned them in my thoughts, a corresponding foundation may be built for everything which I have decided to introduce into the conscious life of people by means of this third and last series of my writings; furthermore, because the publication of these lectures, combined with the description of the events and causes which provoked them, to which events and causes I reacted by means of these very talks of definite form and sequence, will, I have almost no doubt, create in their totality a so to say “automatically acting factor” for the possible saving from their total ruination of many thousand people of both sexes from various countries in Europe, Asia and America. In this introductory book of the third series, I shall expose the “quintessence” of five talks, four of which were delivered by me at the end of 1930 and the beginning of 1931, and one other at the end of 1931 or the beginning of 1932. For the readers of this series of my expositions, no matter in which degree of consciousness they may rank themselves, it would not in my opinion be superfluous to know, among other things, from which of my conceptions and instinctive suppositions was derived the phrase I used: “consciously to acquit myself with Great Nature.” This phrase burst forth from me almost involuntarily and took a shape which derived from the totality of my instinctive and conscious conviction that by this act of making known this last series of my writings, I could rely on fulfilling what is in my opinion the most important duty of a man who has reached responsible age, which consists in preparing without fail for the benefit of posterity, according to one’s own individuality, certain profitable instructions; furthermore, I could by this same act, albeit quite subjectively, justify the sense of all my past intentional labors and conscious renunciations of all kinds of benefits which are generally crystallized in the life of contemporary people, and which have always been very easy for me to obtain; and finally, I hope, in the moment of my last breathing, to experience with no possible mental, sensitive or instinctive doubt the impulse, sacred for a man, which was called by the ancient Essenes “impartial self-satisfaction.” In order that there should arise in the mentation of the readers of this book, for a better orientation and an easier logical confrontation with what will follow, a “something” which existed on Earth before the Babylonian civilization in a branch of science named “Theomathos” and was called “a vivifying factor for objective assuming”—I refer, of course, to the mentation of those readers who, as soon as they became acquainted with my expositions, were guided by and closely followed my advice—I wish first of all to try, for their inner sight, to depict by a verbal description various information, the totality of which might help them to represent in true perspective and clearly understand two situations which occurred in the process of my ordinary life during the time of my writing activity. 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An outline of "philosophy of life" as a philosophical discipline is discussed. In today’s academic philosophy, we have “philosophy of biology,” which deals with creatures’ biological phenomena, “philosophy of death,” which concentrates on the concept of human death, and “philosophy of meaning of life,” which investigates difficult problems concerning the meaning of life and living. However, we do not have “philosophy of life,” which deals with philosophical problems concerning human life and the life of (...) non-human creatures. Hence, I proposed to establish “philosophy of life” as an academic discipline. We define philosophy of life as an academic research field that encompasses the following activities: 1) Cross-cultural, comparative, or historical research on philosophies of life, death, and nature. 2) Philosophical and ethical analysis of contemporary issues concerning human and non-human life in the age of modern technology. 3) philosophical analysis of the concepts surrounding life, death, and nature. (shrink)