The present study combined magnetoencephalography recordings with fast periodic visual stimulation to investigate automatic neural responses to morphemes in developing and skilled readers. Native English-speaking children and adults were presented with rapid streams of base stimuli interleaved periodically with oddballs. In a manipulation-check condition, tapping into word recognition, oddballs featured familiar words embedded in a stream of consonant strings. In the experimental conditions, the contrast between oddball and base stimuli was manipulated in order to probe selective stem and suffix identification (...) in morphologically structured pseudowords. Neural responses at the oddball frequency and harmonics were analyzed at the sensor level using non-parametric cluster-based permutation tests. As expected, results in the manipulation-check condition revealed a word-selective response reflected by a predominantly left-lateralized cluster that emerged over temporal, parietal, and occipital sensors in both children and adults. However, across the experimental conditions, results yielded a differential pattern of oddball responses in developing and skilled readers. Children displayed a significant response that emerged in a mostly central occipital cluster for the condition tracking stem identification in the presence of suffixes. In contrast, adult participants showed a significant response that emerged in a cluster located in central and left occipital sensors for the condition tracking suffix identification in the presence of stems. The present results suggest that while the morpheme identification system in Grade 5–6 children is not yet adult-like, it is sufficiently mature to automatically analyze the morphemic structure of novel letter strings. These findings are discussed in the context of theoretical accounts of morphological processing across reading development. (shrink)

ABSTRACT A belief is correct if and only if the believed proposition is true. Some philosophers argued that from this standard of correctness it is possible to derive the statement of a norm, a claim about what a subject ought to do. Many formulations of the standard in terms of an ‘ought’-claim have been suggested, but all resulted affected by some problem. My aim in this article is to suggest a new formulation of the standard in ‘ought’-terms based on an (...) analysis of the relations occurring between the notions of correctness and ‘ought’. My suggested formulation is that, for any subject S and proposition p, according to the standard of correctness, given that S believes that p, it ought to be that p. (shrink)

Some philosophers have argued that a standard of correctness is constitutive of the concept or the essence of belief. By this claim they mean, roughly, that a mental state is a belief partially in virtue of being correct if and only if its content is true. In this paper I provide a new argument in support of the constitutivity of the correctness standard for belief. I first argue that the standard expresses a conceptual necessity. Then I argue that, since conceptual (...) necessities are such in virtue of some concept, the standard must also be necessary in virtue of some concept. Finally, I provide an argument by exclusion to the effect that the standard is necessary in virtue of the concept of belief. (shrink)

In this paper I defend mathematical nominalism by arguing that any reasonable account of scientific theories and scientific practice must make explicit the empirical non-mathematical grounds on which the application of mathematics is based. Once this is done, references to mathematical entities may be eliminated or explained away in terms of underlying empirical conditions. I provide evidence for this conclusion by presenting a detailed study of the applicability of mathematics to measurement. This study shows that mathematical nominalism may be regarded (...) as a methodological approach to applicability, illuminating the use of mathematics in science. (shrink)

This paper recognizes a specific correspondence between biological evolution and technological development and on this basis tries to set up a semioticapproach to the evolutionary phenomenon of exaptation. To do this, the existence of a historical-structural and pragmatic analogy between organs and tools is shown, which in turn implies on a communicative ground the dissolution of some of their traditional distinctive att ributes. Finally, a philosophical-analytical approach to natural and cultural functions is applied to define three types of exaptations.

Davide Panagia’s Impressions of Hume: Cinematic Thinking and the Politics of Discontinuity is volume fifteen of Modernity and Political Thought, the Rowman & Littlefield series in contemporary political theory.

Procreative obligations are often discussed by evaluating only the consequences of reproductive actions or omissions; less attention is paid to the moral role of intentions and attitudes. In this paper, I assess whether intentions and attitudes can contribute to defining our moral obligations with regard to assisted reproductive technologies already available, such as preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), and those that may be available in future, such as reproductive genome editing and ectogenesis, in a way compatible with person‐affecting constraints. I propose (...) the parent–child relationship argument, which is based on the moral distinction between creating and parenting a child. Hence, I first argue that intentions and attitudes can play a role in defining our moral obligations in reproductive decisions involving PGD. Second, I maintain that if we accept this and recognize reproductive genome editing and ectogenesis as person‐affecting procedures, we should be committed to arguing that prospective parents may have moral reasons to prefer reproduction via such techniques than via sexual intercourse. In both cases, I observe an extension of our procreative responsibility beyond what is proposed by the consequentialist person‐affecting morality. (shrink)

This essay asks how we might articulate a political theory of algorithms. To do so, I propose a political ontology of the algorithm dispositif that elaborates how algorithms arrange the movement of energies in space and time, and how they do so automatically. This force of arrangement is what I refer to as the dispositional power of algorithms that I identify as a political physics of vital processes. The essay is divided into three sections. The first provides readers of Political (...) Theory with a discussion of three notable works in the field of critical algorithm studies relevant to a political theory of algorithms. The subsequent sections of the essay elaborate an understanding of the political ontology of the algorithm dispositif by focusing (first) on the difference that a virtual ontology introduces to our political reflections and (second) on the cybernetic operation of negative feedback that I identify as foundational to understanding an algorithm’s political physics of vital processes. I conclude that any political theory engagement with technical media can’t simply rest on an epistemic analysis of the normative effects of media but must also pursue an investigation into a medium’s modes of existence in the world. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that mapping-based accounts of applications cannot be comprehensive and must be supplemented by analyses of other, qualitatively different, forms of application. I support these claims by providing a detailed discussion of the application of mathematics to a problem of election design that is prominent in social choice theory.

The main objective of this project lies in the presentation of the most relevant features of Romano Guardini’s concept of ‘person’, as characterised by the presence of the spiritual dimension, which determines the person and his freedom as irreducible to other entities, and which thus determines the inviolability of his human dignity. The aim of this reflection will be to put forward a model of anthropology, which, in contradistinction to modern orientations of an idealistic kind, the ‘spirit’ appears as disconnected (...) from its being levelled down to the ‘io’, understood in an immanentist sense, as pure subject, who orientates his activism as dominion over the world, and is bound to the idea of the interior centre of the person, as his point of balance, and as the source of the different and opposing vital tendencies, as the place in which man must enter into the full, free possession of his existence, reconnecting himself with his divine origin and re-appropriating his essence, as a ‘spirit’ truly involved in the complexity and multi-dimensional nature of the human person. (shrink)

I introduce and defend a view about knowledge that I call Moderate Skeptical Invariantism. According to this view, a subject knows p only if she is practically certain that p, where practical certainty is defined as the confidence a rational subject would have to have for her to believe that p and act on p no matter the stakes. I do not provide a definitive case for this view, but I argue that it has several explanatory advantages over alternative views (...) and I show how it can avoid two pressing problems commonly addressed to similar approaches. (shrink)

Prologue : narratocracy and the contours of political life -- From nomos to nomad : Kant, Deleuze, and Rancière on sensation -- The piazza, the edicola, and the noise of the utterance -- Machiavelli's theory of sensation and Florence's vita festiva -- The viewing subject : Caravaggio, Bacon, and the ring -- "You're eating too fast!" slow food's ethos of convivium -- Epilogue : "the photographs tell it all" : on an ethics of appearance.

Obligations can be affected by knowledge. Several approaches exist to formalize knowledge-based obligations, but no formalism has been developed yet to capture the dynamic interaction between knowledge and obligations. We introduce the dynamic extension of an existing logic for knowledge-based obligations here. We motivate the logic by analyzing several scenarios and by showing how it can capture in an original manner several fundamental deontic notions such as absolute, prima facie and all-things-considered obligations. Finally, in the dynamic epistemic logic tradition, we (...) provide reduction axioms for the dynamic operator of the new logic. (shrink)

In a recent paper (Okasha, Mind 120:83–115, 2011), Samir Okasha uses Arrow’s theorem to raise a challenge for the rationality of theory choice. He argues that, as soon as one accepts the plausibility of the assumptions leading to Arrow’s theorem, one is compelled to conclude that there are no adequate theory choice algorithms. Okasha offers a partial way out of this predicament by diagnosing the source of Arrow’s theorem and using his diagnosis to deploy an approach that circumvents it. In (...) this paper I explain why, although Okasha is right to emphasise that Arrow’s result is the effect of an informational problem, he is not right to locate this problem at the level of the informational input of a theory choice rule. Once the informational problem is correctly located, Arrow’s theorem may be dismissed as a problem. (shrink)

Microfinance institutions are alternative financial providers offering financial services to people typically excluded from the standard banking sector. While most MFIs are active in developing countries, there is also a young and developing microfinance sector in Europe; however, very little literature exists on this MFI segment. In this paper, we analyze the environmental performance of 58 European MFIs. Our results suggest that the size of the MFI, investor concern for environmental performance and, to a lesser extent, donor interest, are closely (...) related to the institution’s environmental performance. Moreover, providing loans larger than microcredits is linked to better environmental performance. This could suggest that the additional revenues generated from these loans, also called cross-subsidies, could help MFIs to strengthen their environmental bottom line. Finally, no evidence suggests that profit status explains environmental performance. (shrink)

Wie kann die italienische Philosophie dazu beitragen, die gegenwärtige Krise der modernen politischen Theorie zu lösen? Der vorliegende Text berücksichtigt die Werke einiger zeitgenössischer italienischer Hauptdenker und betont trotz der verschiedenen Standpunkte die unterschwelligen Verbindungen. Insbesondere lässt sich der Konflikt, oft im Sinne des griechischen Begriffs stasis, als Schlüssel zur Krise des modernen Staates bestimmen. Das Thema Konflikt durchquert alle besprochenen Werke und wirft ein Licht auf die Spannung zwischen der Fortdauer eines politisch-theologischen Rahmens und dem ständigen Verweis auf die (...) Biopolitik. Wie von Esposito vorgeschlagen, ist diese Anpassung von fremden Begriffen seitens einer Philosophie, die konstitutiv entterritorialisiert ist, die beste Möglichkeit, eine wirksame Herangehensweise zu erarbeiten, um aus der gegenwärtigen Lage herauszufinden. -/- Giorgio Agamben: Stasis. La guerra civile come paradigma politico. Torino 2015. Bollati Boringhieri. 84 S.; Massimo Cacciari: Il potere che frena. Mailand 2013. Adelphi. 217 S.; Paolo Virno: Saggio sulla negazione. Per una antropologia linguistica. Torino 2013. Bollati Boringhieri. 204 S.; Roberto Esposito: Da fuori. Una filosofia per l'Europa. Torino 2016. Einaudi. 256 S. (shrink)

Nel 1881, per i tipi dell’editore Brigola di Milano, vedeva la luce Macchiette parigine, un compendio di profili biografici che lo scrittore siciliano Emanuele Navarro della Miraglia (1838-1919) dedicava a eminenti personalità della cultura letteraria e artistica francese di metà Ottocento.Francesista, a lungo residente a Parigi (1864-1872), in contatto a Milano con gli ambienti della scapigliatura lombarda (1872-1882) e da ultimo professore di Lingua e letteratura francese presso l’Istituto superiore di magistero femminile di Roma (1883-1913), Navarro della Miraglia includeva fra (...) le sue “macchiette” anche due ritratti d’artisti dedicati rispettivamente a Gustave Courbet e a Jean-Baptiste Carpeaux.Questo contributo si propone di definire il contesto e le ricadute di una lettura non allineata alla tempestiva e più “ortodossa” discussione della lezione di Courbet promossa da Diego Martelli presso i macchiaioli toscani, a beneficio di una geografia culturale diversamente articolata fra le aperture cosmopolite del naturalismo meridionale e le frange più avanzate della scapigliatura lombarda. Allo stesso modo il resoconto dell’atelier di Carpeaux è riconsiderato alla luce del coevo dibattito sulla scultura monumentale e delle ricerche in corso a Milano su un modellato più mosso e nervoso. (shrink)

RiassuntoSulla base di nuove considerazioni, si propone la ricostruzione della battaglia di Pidna (168 a.C.) sotto l’aspetto topografico, tattico e strategico. Il luogo dello scontro individuato da N.G.L. Hammond viene confermato, ma vi sono dettagli delle fonti che fanno pensare a una diversa disposizione delle truppe. La battaglia sembra essere stata accuratamente preparata dai Romani.

In the debate about Michael Oakeshott’s philosophy there is very little agreement on the theoretical and historical meaning of his skepticism. Starting from the assumption that skepticism is not a fixed theory but a tradition of ideas, this article draws on both published texts and archival materials to contend that Oakeshott developed his thought by confronting himself with, and even merging, different strands of skepticism: the ancient, the modern, as represented by Hobbes and Montaigne, and the idealist, as conceived by (...) F. H. Bradley. The article firstly shows Oakeshott’s awareness of ancient skepticism, even though its impact on his thought is contested and controversial. With regard to modern skepticism, it looks at how Oakeshott defines Hobbes’s skepticism in his “Introduction to Leviathan.” It also examines the relevance of Montaigne to Oakeshott’s image of conversation, his idea of human agency and conception of politics. Finally, the article illustrates the influence of Bradley’s skepticism on Oakeshott’s conception of philosophy and reveals the consistency between Oakeshott’s skepticism and idealism. What emerges is a complex picture, in which Oakeshott’s skepticism is a constellation of elements taken from a variety of sources. (shrink)

When phylogenetic trees constructed from morphological and molecular evidence disagree (i.e. are incongruent) it has been suggested that the differences are spurious or that the molecular results should be preferred a priori. Comparing trees can increase confidence (congruence), or demonstrate that at least one tree is incorrect (incongruence). Statistical analyses of 181 molecular and 49 morphological trees shows that incongruence is greater between than within the morphological and molecular partitions, and this difference is significant for the molecular partition. Because the (...) level of incongruence between a pair of trees gives a minimum bound on how much error is present in the two trees, our results indicate that the level of error may be underestimated by congruence within partitions. Thus comparisons between morphological and molecular trees are particularly useful for detecting this incongruence (spurious or otherwise). Molecular trees have higher average congruence than morphological trees, but the difference is not significant, and both within- and between-partition incongruence is much lower than expected by chance alone. Our results suggest that both molecular and morphological trees are, in general, useful approximations of a common underlying phylogeny and thus, when molecules and morphology clash, molecular phylogenies should not be considered more reliable a priori. (shrink)

This paper focuses on social responsibilities of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The objective of the paper is to define propositions in order totest if and how the behavior of small companies depends on managerial tasks, and general environmental threats and opportunities. Broadly speaking, we try toanswer to the following questions. Is there a way to connect small companies’ attitudes towards social responsibility to the models of the businesses they run?Does socially responsible behavior depend on the specific industry or the (...) local economic environment, more than on firm size? (shrink)

John Dewey’s theory of education, despite having become a reference point for the pedagogical sciences, has been subjected to much criticism. One of the most significant attacks came from Jerome Bruner, who questioned Dewey’s principles as set forth in his “My Pedagogic Creed”.1 Bruner chose that book for criticism because it foreshadowed much of the later writing on education by the American philosopher, and he assessed the five articles of faith contained therein against the background of the deep changes that (...) had occurred in conceptions of society, social institutions, and man. Then, paralleling Bruner, Kieran Egan stressed more recently the necessity to reconsider some of Dewey’s.. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:diacritics 30.2 (2000) 113-126 [Access article in PDF] Dissenting Words:A Conversation with Jacques Rancière 1 Davide Panagia:In your writings you highlight the political efficacy of words. In The Names of History, for instance, this emphasis is discussed most vividly in terms of what you refer to as an "excess of words" that marks the rise of democratic movements in the seventeenth century. Similarly, in On The Shores of (...) Politics, you begin your discussion with an excursus on the end of politics as the end of the promise. Finally, in Dis-agreement you speak of "the part of those who have no-part" as voicing a "wrong" for the sake of equality.In each of these instances, however, your treatment of words (and language more generally) is very different from those thinkers of the "linguistic turn" in political philosophy who expound on an ethics of deliberation as the first virtue of modern democracies. For that matter, your approach is quite different from those thinkers who focus on the aporias of language as such.Could you discuss this thematic of the proliferation of words in your thinking about democratic politics?Would it be fair to characterize your research on and exposition of democratic thinking as a "poetics of politics"?Rancière's Reply:In order to address your question adequately, it would be wise to enlarge the sense of "linguistic turn" you invoke. In its most generally accepted sense, the linguistic turn in philosophy consists in ascribing to linguistic processes certain phenomena and specifiable modes of relating objects attributed, in a previous instance, either to factual processes or lines of thought. This approach is not limited to the two figures you invoke in your question. The linguistic turn also has two stages of development that, from my experience, have been more noticeable in France than in the United States. The first phase, then, emerged with Lévi-Strauss and his structural approach to social relations founded on a linguistic model of relationality, subsequently reprised in Lacan's psychoanalytic notion that "the unconscious is structured like a language" that, in its turn, conjoins the energetic mental processes Freud discusses to linguistic practices. The primacy of "the linguistic" thus granted language all the properties of the Freudian unconscious [End Page 113] along with those of a Marxist notion of infrastructure. The Saussurian opposition between langue and parole provided a privileged status to a linguistic model whose role was that of a general law that unconsciously structures the behavior of individuals and societies. It is on the basis of these parameters that the structuralist moment of the linguistic turn was constituted. At one and the same time, the analysis of speech acts became first and foremost a "symptomatic" analysis of those procedures of misrecognition that linguistically structured both the behavior of individuals and social relations. When we "read" Le Capital with Althusser, the interpretive and methodological schema for linguistic phenomena operated like a kind of "policing of the enunciated": that is, a search for those unsuccessful (i.e., inadequate) modes of expression that exemplify such symptomatic procedures of misrecognition.The second phase of the linguistic turn constituted itself more ambiguously. For those who shared intellectual experiences similar to my own, this version involved a critique of the langue/infrastructure model; that is, a further and more favorable consideration of the value of the political and the linguistic games therein that, according to the Althusserian/Marxist model (and, indeed, with structuralism more generally), were to be treated as ideological artifacts. In a very real sense, it all began with the May '68 assertion that "we are all German Jews"--an entirely ideological statement, the validity of which, if analyzed at the level of its content, one finds to rest entirely on the capacity to overturn the political relationship between the order of designations and that of events by emphasizing the gap that separates subject and predicate. From there, an entire field of understanding speech acts as political gestures opened up: a field that reconfigured the division between words and things while rearranging the distinction between legitimate... (shrink)

This research investigated whether perceived situational appropriateness (defined as the degree of fit between product and intended usage situations) is predictive of consumer choices for foods and beverages, on the theoretical premise that intended usage situation acts as a frame of reference in orienting choices. Extant research on the topic, though suggestive of a link, is very limited in scope and almost completely lacking with regards to choice behaviour (as opposed to other aspects such as food acceptability or intake). To (...) address the hypotheses, data collected in a series of 15 experiments ($N= 2731$ consumers in total) -- covering a wide range of product categories and usage situations -- are presented. In all studies, participants evaluated a set of stimuli varying with respect to perceived appropriateness (low to high), and evaluated each stimulus either monadically using a choice likelihood scale or by performing a discrete choice task. Regression analyses from all studies consistently indicated that perceived appropriateness significantly predicted choice response. The results were robust with respect to variation in product category and experimental protocol and, overall, strongly support the notion that appropriateness can provide a simple yet powerful (in some case accounting for over 50\% of variance) predictor of consumer choice. Effect sizes varied substantially: perceived appropriateness explained from a minimum of 3\% to over 65\% of variance in consumer choice, and this variation was linearly related to the degree of product heterogeneity in the product sets. This research also investigated possible moderators of the link between appropriateness and choice, by relating the results to consumers’ product familiarity and involvement. While both traits significantly (and positively) affected choice, they did not interact with appropriateness. Possible explanations for these results, as well as other possible candidate moderators to explore in future research, are highlighted. (shrink)

Ageing is one of the main risk factors for Covid-19. In this paper, we delineate four alternative conceptualisations of ageing, each of which determines different understandings of its causal role to the susceptibility to Covid-19 as well as to the severity of its symptoms and adverse health outcomes.

According to intentionalism, the phenomenal character of experience is one and the same as the intentional content of experience. This view has a problem with moods (anxiety, depression, elation, irritation, gloominess, grumpiness, etc.). Mood experiences certainly have phenomenal character, but do not exhibit directedness, i.e., do not appear intentional. Standardly, intentionalists have re-described moods’ undirectedness in terms of directedness towards everything or the whole world (e.g., Crane, 1998; Seager, 1999). This move offers the intentionalist a way out, but is quite (...) unsatisfying. More recently, Angela Mendelovici (2013a, b) has suggested something that looks more interesting and promising: instead of re-describing moods’ phenomenology, she accepts its undirectedness at face value and tries to explain it in intentionalist terms. In this paper, I focus on and criticize Mendelovici’s proposal. As I will show, despite its prima facie virtues, the view is poorly motivated. For, contrary to what Mendelovici argues, introspection does not support her proposal—arguably, it provides some evidence against it. So, the problem that intentionalism has with moods is not solved, but is still there. (shrink)