ABSTRACTThe legal market is changing. Whether individual consumer or corporate client, the choice of services available to help manage or solve legal problems appears increasingly wide. Business process outsourcing, technology and data companies, accountants and other professional advisors are offering corporate clients new options to manage their legal affairs. Law firms are responding to this increasing competitive pressure with new services of their own. The Solicitors Regulation Authority, as the largest legal regulator in the UK, is liberalising its approach to (...) regulation, removing prescriptions and inflexibilities, so that business and solicitors can compete and thrive in this changing market. The proposals will introduce greater flexibility for individual solicitors to offer services to the public from businesses outside of legal regulation. A simpler and shorter Code of Conduct, focused separately on individual s... (shrink)

In a recent broadcast talk it was said that philosophers commonly base arguments and theories on garbled versions of science. Professor Passmore's article in the April number of Philosophy seems to go some way to justifying this complaint. The article discusses the objectivity of history by a series of comparisons with science under various heads representing criteria of objectivity.

John Passmore was a renowned Australian empirical philosopher and historian of ideas. In this book, which was originally published in 1952, Passmore's intention was to disentangle certain main themes in Hume's philosophy and to show how they relate to Hume's main philosophic purpose. Rather than offering a detailed commentary, the text provides an account based on specificity and critical scholarship, seeking to complement the other more comprehensive works on Hume's philosophy that had become available around the same time. (...) This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in perspectives on Hume and Passmore's philosophical approach. (shrink)

Passmore argues that there is urgent need to change our attitude to the environment, and that humans cannot continue unconstrained exploitation of the biosphere.

We now know of a number of ways of developing real analysis on a basis of abstraction principles and second-order logic. One, outlined by Shapiro in his contribution to this volume, mimics Dedekind in identifying the reals with cuts in the series of rationals under their natural order. The result is an essentially structuralist conception of the reals. An earlier approach, developed by Hale in his "Reals byion" program differs by placing additional emphasis upon what I here term Frege's Constraint, (...) that a satisfactory foundation for any branch of mathematics should somehow so explain its basic concepts that their applications are immediate. This paper is concerned with the meaning of and motivation for this constraint. Structuralism has to represent the application of a mathematical theory as always posterior to the understanding of it, turning upon the appreciation of structural affinities between the structure it concerns and a domain to which it is to be applied. There is, therefore, a case that Frege's Constraint has bite whenever there is a standing body of informal mathematical knowledge grounded in direct reflection upon sample, or schematic, applications of the concepts of the theory in question. It is argued that this condition is satisfied by simple arithmetic and geometry, but that in view of the gap between its basic concepts (of continuity and of the nature of the distinctions among the individual reals) and their empirical applications, it is doubtful that Frege's Constraint should be imposed on a neo-Fregean construction of analysis. (shrink)

Across the world people in different societies structure their family relationships in many different ways. These relationships become encoded in their languages as kinship terminology, a word set that maps variably onto a vast genealogical grid of kinship categories, each of which could in principle vary independently. But the observed diversity of kinship terminology is considerably smaller than the enormous theoretical design space. For the past century anthropologists have captured this variation in typological schemes with only a small number of (...) model system types. Whether those types exhibit the internal co-selection of parts implicit in their use is an outstanding question, as is the sufficiency of typologies in capturing variation as a whole. We interrogate the coherence of classic kinship typologies using modern statistical approaches and systematic data from a new database, Kinbank. We first survey the canonical types and their assumed patterns of internal and external co-selection, then present two data-driven approaches to assess internal coherence. Our first analysis reveals that across parents’ and ego’s generation, typology has limited predictive value: knowing the system in one generation does not reliably predict the other. Though we detect limited co-selection between generations, “disharmonic” systems are equally common. Second, we represent structural diversity with a novel multidimensional approach we term kinship space. This approach reveals, for ego’s generation, some broad patterning consistent with the canonical typology, but diversity is considerably higher than classical typologies suggest. Our results strongly challenge the descriptive adequacy of the set of canonical kinship types. (shrink)

This is a multicultural philosophy of art applied to common American and European experience and discussed in relation to Taoist, Buddhist, Hindu, Native American, and African traditions.

Here, Bob Hale and Crispin Wright assemble the key writings that lead to their distinctive neo-Fregean approach to the philosophy of mathematics. In addition to fourteen previously published papers, the volume features a new paper on the Julius Caesar problem; a substantial new introduction mapping out the program and the contributions made to it by the various papers; a section explaining which issues most require further attention; and bibliographies of references and further useful sources. It will be recognized as (...) the most powerful presentation yet of a neo-Fregean program. (shrink)

Professor Karl Popper has had a great deal to endure: “expositions” of his ideas which were mere travesties, “refutations” which he had already answered, by anticipation, or which entirely missed the point at issue. One can easily understand why, when he came to publish an English translation of his Logik der Forschung, he decided to keep to the original text; it should at last be clear exactly what he had—and had not—said in 1934. Yet his thinking had by no means (...) stood still since that time; quite naturally, too, he wished to emphasize as much. (shrink)

Every human being is born into a world of stories. Western society has tended to differentiate types of stories, distinguishing, for example, between history and fiction. Recently, the major intellectual task undertaken by many influential thinkers has been that of destroying these distinctions, and insisting on resemblances rather than differences. According to this train of thought, history is as much "imaginative literature" as is fictional writing. Argument in favor of this view is often begun by reducing the description of an (...) historian's data to "scattered events." But, being born into a world of stories, an historian actually works with events only in story-form. It is misleading to compare the concept "event," which belongs to the ontological mode, to "narrative," which belongs to the linguistic mode. "Event" is further ambiguous because "events" can be distinguished ontologically or evaluatively. Historians deal with "event-descriptions," not events, and these descriptions can be correct or incorrect. (shrink)

The main objective of this 2-week RCT study was to test the efficacy of the previously developed Noticing Nature Intervention to boost wellbeing during winter months. The NNI consists of noticing the everyday nature encountered in one’s daily routine and making note of what emotions are evoked. Community adults were randomly assigned to engage in the NNI or were assigned to one of two control conditions. Paired t-tests revealed significant increases pre- to post-intervention in the NNI group for positive affect, (...) elevation, nature connectedness, and hope agency, and a marginally significant increase in transcendent connectedness. No significant pre-post difference emerged for any aspect of wellbeing in the control conditions. Analysis of qualitative findings revealed that negative emotion themes were 2.13 times more likely to be associated with built photos than with nature photos. Feelings of peace, awe, happiness, humbleness, and hope were more likely to be associated with nature photos, while feelings of annoyance, loneliness, curiosity, uncertainty, anger, yearning, and comfortableness were more likely to be associated with built photos. Overall, results indicated that engaging in the NNI can provide a wellbeing boost, even in the cold of winter. This study is the first to test any nature-based wellbeing intervention during colder, winter months, and to directly assess the impact of a nature-based wellbeing intervention on levels of hope. (shrink)

As a consequence of industrialization, we face unprecedented pressures on the carrying capacity of the earth. Desertification, pollution and global climate changes can only increase these pressures, and will cause vast increases in the number of refugees and widespread risks to human health. Increasing inequalities between rich and poor nations are potential causes of conflict. Since the industrial countries are mainly responsible for our economic problems, they must give a lead in global arrangements to alleviate them. A major change in (...) our habitual patterns of thought is essential, in which we reassess how we perceive values, and how we measure wealth and well-being. This must be accompanied by governmental action: on population numbers and the refugee problem; on the efficient use of energy; on new methods of land use, and on regulation of damaging industrial activities. To act in these ways, governments must reorganize their domestic policies and increase international co-operation. (shrink)

The paper reviews the leading attempts in the literature—contextualist, relativist, and interest-relative invariantist—to provide a satisfactory semantic theory of the ways in which the correctness conditions of ascriptions of knowledge seem to vary in tandem with variation in pragmatic factors—interests, stakes, and sentences—afflicting the parties concerned. It is argued that none of these attempts provides a satisfactory account of all the variability phenomena save at the cost of mis-predicting other aspects of what we count as acceptable uses of “knows” and (...) its cognates. The paper concludes with the suggestion that the correct reaction to this finding is not a reversion to the traditional kind of invariantism about knowledge, but rather a move to a kind of deflationism about “knows” broadly comparable to the familiar deflationist account of “true”. (shrink)

One of the most important “folk” anti-realist thoughts about certain areas of our thought and discourse—basic taste, for instance, or comedy—is that their lack of objectivity crystallises in the possibility of “faultless disagreements”: situations where one party accepts P, another rejects P, and neither is guilty of any kind of mistake of substance or shortcoming of cognitive process. On close inspection, however, it proves challenging to make coherent sense of this idea, and a majority of theorists have come to reject (...) it as incoherent. There are two significant exceptions in the contemporary literature: relativists often hold it up as something of a coup for their view that it can make straightforward sense of faultless disagreement; and the author of this paper has argued (Wright 2006) that making judicious intuitionistic revisions to classical logic can provide resources that suffice to stabilise the notion. The present paper argues that neither relativism nor intuitionism in fact provides a satisfactory account and indicates how an alethic pluralist framework enables us to do better. (shrink)

A reviewer of the original edition in 1970 of "The Perfectibility of Man" well summarizes the scope and significance of this renowned work by one of the leading philosophers of the twentieth century: "Beginning with an analytic discussion of the various ways in which perfectibility has been interpreted, Professor Passmore traces its long history from the Greeks to the present day, by way of Christianity, orthodox and heterodox, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, anarchism, utopias, communism, psychoanalysis, and evolutionary theories of (...) man and society. Both in its broad sweep and in countless supporting reflections, it is a journey through spiritual scenery of the most majestic and exhilarating kind." Thoroughly and elegantly, Passmore explores the history of the idea of perfectibility--manifest in the ideology of perfectibilism--and its consequences, which have invariably been catastrophic for individual liberty and responsibility in private, social, economic, and political life.John Passmore served for many years as a Professor of Philosophy at Australian National University. (shrink)

Recasting important questions about truth and objectivity in new and helpful terms, his book will become a focus in the contemporary debates over realism, and ...

The ambiguity of the word ‘nature’ is so remarkable that I need not remark upon it. Except perhaps to emphasise that this ambiguity — scarcely less apparent, as Aristotle long ago pointed out, in its Greek near-equivalent physis — is by no means a merely accidental product of etymological confusions or conflations: it faithfully reflects the hesitancies, the doubts and the uncertainties, with which men have confronted the world around them. For my special purposes, it is enough to say, I (...) shall be using the word ‘nature’ in one of its narrower senses — so as to include only that which, setting aside the supernatural, is human neither in itself nor in its origins. This is the sense in which neither Sir Christopher Wren nor St Paul's Cathedral forms part of ‘nature’ and it may be hard to decide whether an oddly shaped flint or a landscape where the trees are evenly spaced is or is not ‘natural’. The question I am raising, then, is what our attitudes have been, and ought to be, to nature in this narrow sense of the word, in which it excludes both the human and the artificial. And more narrowly still, I shall be devoting most of my attention to our attitudes towards that part of nature which it lies within man's power to modify and, in particular, towards what Karl Barth calls ‘the strange life of beasts and plants which lies around us’, a life we can by our actions destroy. (shrink)

This volume, published on the fiftieth anniversary of Wittgenstein's death, brings together thirteen of Crispin Wright's most influential essays on Wittgenstein ...

What should we make of the vagueness we find in our language and thought? This has been one of the most debated questions in philosophy in recent decades. Crispin Wright has been a key figure in this area since the 1970s, and now at last his highly influential work on the topic is drawn together in a book.

Kinship terminologies are basic cognitive semantic systems that all human societies use for organizing kin relations. Diversity in kinship systems and their categories is substantial, but constrained. Rácz, Passmore, and Jordan explore hypotheses about such constraints from learning theories and social pressures, testing the impact of a community‐size driven learning bottleneck against the social coordination demands of different kinds of marriage and resource systems.

This is a response to Paul Boghossian’s paper: What is inference?. The paper and the abstract originate from a symposium at the Pacific Division Meeting of the APA in San Diego in April 2011. John Broome was a co-commentator.

Crispin Wright; IV*—On Putnam's Proof that We are not Brains-in-a-Vat1, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 92, Issue 1, 1 June 1992, Pages 67–94, h.

A work using Wittgenstein's concept of philosophy to argue against the possibility of theories that seek to define art. It claims that the problems about identification and evaluation of works of art is that these problems are not theoretical, but grow out of our artistic traditions and practice.

ABSTRACT It is sometimes suggested that academics should subscribe to a special professional ethics. The question then arises under what circumstances a professional ethics is called for. The answer suggested is that this is when the members of a profession have peculiar moral privileges. In the academic's case, these relate to special forms of freedom which academics usually possess, in distinction from other workers. These generate special temptations which a professional ethics would particularly warn against.

“There's one thing certain,” said a historian of my acquaintance when he heard the title of this paper, “that's a problem which would never perturb a working-historian.” He was wrong: a working-historian first drew it to my attention; and in one form or another it raises its head whenever historians discuss the nature of their own inquiries. Yet in a way he was right. His mind had turned to the controversies of epistemologists, controversies about “the possibility of knowledge”; historians, he (...) rightly felt, do not trouble their-heads about such matters. (shrink)