Jurgen Habermas's critical communications theory of society has excited widespread interest in recent years. The essays in this book explore the research implications of Habermas's theory for the analysis of modern problems of public life.

McCarthy begins this first systematic review of the development of Habermas's thought with general accounts of the relation of theory and practice and of the reduction of praxis to techne in positivist conceptions of reason. We learn how the communication structures presupposed by the community of natural scientists cannot be grasped within the framework of empirical-analytic science and the technological cognitive interests on which it is based. He then goes on to explain clearly the practical interest supposedly underlying the (...) historical-hermeneutic sciences and the emancipatory interests said to be the basis of critical theory. McCarthy shows how the perceived weaknesses in the initial attempt to elucidate this view by incorporating some of Freud's insights into a revised historical materialism set the program for most of Habermas's subsequent work. He examines in some detail the central points at issue between hermeneutics and critical theory and shows how the existence of systematically distorted communication structures and the tendency of the hermeneutical sciences to reduce inquiry to the interpretation of transmitted meanings force Habermas to a critique of ideology. Having shown the importance of psychoanalysis to this critique and to social theory as conceived by the Frankfurt School, McCarthy proceeds to outline Habermas's project for the general theory of communicative competence presupposed by a consistent theoretical development of psychoanalysis. Since critical theory regards the reflexive application of science to social structures as a process of enlightenment, Habermas must also take seriously the challenge laid down by functional analysis, which understands life processes of the human species not a quest for liberation, but as a drive for the self-maintenance of social systems. In concretizing the critique of systems theory, McCarthy shows how Habermas is driven to project a theory of social evolution, a reconstructed historical materialism which goes beyond explaining historical development through changes in the forces of production to include the learning processes that take place in the dimension of moral insight, practical knowledge, communicative action and the consensual regulation of conflicts. This brings us to Habermas's most recent work on communication theory, and one of the considerable merits of McCarthy's book is that it brings together the widely scattered publications which bear on this matter. He shows how Habermas's universal pragmatics, his theory of communicative competence, is an attempt to rework the normative-theoretical foundations of critical theory. Since speech is seen as the distinctive medium of human life, a theory of communication becomes the foundation for the human sciences by disclosing the universal infrastructure of socio-cultural life. Since Habermas is particularly concerned with a theory of social action, his work in universal pragmatics focuses on speech acts and the interpersonal relations which underlie them. McCarthy argues that the theory of communicative competence can be seen as an attempt to make good the claim Habermas made some thirteen years ago in his inaugural lecture at Frankfurt: that the human interest in autonomy and responsibility can be apprehended a priori since it lies at the root of language. Habermas attempts to reconstruct the normative basis of speech as a system of universal and necessary validity claims, and McCarthy provides a clear account of the "logics" of truth and morality, as well as Habermas's argument for their inseparability. McCarthy concludes by examining the crisis tendencies Habermas perceives in advanced capitalism and the correlative question of legitimizing the private appropriation of public wealth. No such legitimization can withstand discursive examination or rational consensus since it must suppress generalizable interests by treating them as particular. Thus, a repoliticization of the public sphere becomes the "new conflict zone" in organized capitalism.--G.E. (shrink)

Jürgen Habermas, représentant majeur de l'Ecole de Francfort, est devenu un auteur classique mais son oeuvre complexe et multiforme, composée d'une cinquantaine d'ouvrages et d'un millier d'articles, continue d'être mal identifiée. Comment saisir la diversité de ses intérêts, des théories de l'action et du langage à la morale et au droit? C'est aussi un acteur, qui intervient régulièrement dans la presse et les débats publics. Comment articuler ces prises de position avec ses travaux proprement théoriques? Dialogues avec Jürgen (...) class='Hi'>Habermas, issu d'un colloque international, offre un panorama complet du parcours intellectuel de Habermas, depuis ses premiers écrits jusqu'aux plus récents. L'espace public, l'agir communicationnel, la modernité, la démocratie, l'autonomie, les intérêts de connaissance, etc. sont ici discutés. Plus largement, c'est l'actualité même de sa pensée qui est soulignée et interrogée à propos de thèmes qui font débat : les effets du droit sur la société, la compréhension que l'on peut avoir des crises du capitalisme, ou encore le rapport complexe de la modernité aux religions. Cet ouvrage comprend deux textes inédits du philosophe, un texte d'ouverture sur l'Europe et un texte de clôture où il répond aux intervenants. (shrink)

Here, for the first time in English, is volume one of Jurgen Habermas's long-awaited magnum opus: The Theory of Communicative Action. This pathbreaking work is guided by three interrelated concerns: to develop a concept of communicative rationality that is no longer tied to the subjective and individualistic premises of modern social and political theory; to construct a two-level concept of society that integrates the 'lifeworld' and 'system' paradigms; and to sketch out a critical theory of modernity (...) that explains its sociopathologies in a new way. Habermas approaches these tasks through a combination of conceptual analyses, systematic reflections, and critical reconstructions of such predecessors as Marx and Weber, Durkheim and Mead, Horkheimer and Adorno, Schutz and Parsons. Reason and the Rationalization of Society develops a sociological theory of action that stresses not its means-ends or teleological aspect, but the need to coordinate action socially via communication. In the introductory chapter Habermas sets out a powerful series of arguments on such foundational issues as cultural and historical relativism, the methodology of Verstehen, the inseparabilty of interpretation from critique. In addition to clarifying the normative foundations of critical social inquiry, this sets the stage for a systematic appropriation of Weber's theory of rationalization and its Marxist reception by Lukacs, Horkheimer and Adorno. This is an important book for degree students of philosophy, sociology and related subjects. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 36.1 (2003) 1-21 [Access article in PDF] Did Habermas Cede Nature to the Positivists? Gordon R. Mitchell Jürgen Habermas's "colonization of the lifeworld" thesis (1987, 332-73) posits that many of society's pathologies are due to the tendency of institutions to convert social issues that ought to be sorted out by a debating citizenry into technical problems ripe for resolution by expert bureaucracies, thus pre-empting (...) important public discussion. Habermas has attempted to lay bare the pernicious effects of this colonization process in his analysis of public opinion polling, welfare policy, education, German reunification, immigration, and other social issues (see Habermas 1997, 1994, and 1970; Holub 1992). In each of these contexts, Habermas has publicly challenged the encroachment of scientistic modes of decision-making into spheres where joint communicative action by deliberating citizens would yield more appropriate and legitimate judgments. This critical impulse is also evident in Habermas's methodological reflections on the proper role of academic scholarship, where he has argued vigorously against attempts to graft "objectivating" methods of natural scientific inquiry onto research projects in the social sciences (1971, 304-17).From all of this, one might gather that Habermas's commitment to rolling back the influence of technical forms of reasoning is connected to some intrinsic quarrel he has with the natural sciences. Yet such a sweeping generalization is hard to sustain in light of the fact that Habermas does not oppose technical reasoning per se; he recognizes that the daunting complexity of social life in late capitalism requiresthat certain "steering" tasks be delegated to systems that utilize largely instrumental logics to co-ordinate action. Likewise, he acknowledges that the disciplines of the natural sciences necessarily play important supporting roles in such steering projects.One normative presupposition of Habermas's colonization thesis is that there exists some proper boundary demarcating where the sphere of technical reasoning ends and the realm of communicative rationality begins. [End Page 1] On one side of this boundary, Habermas has provided many details on what he sees as the essential qualities of a properly functioning "public sphere," where "new social movements" continuously reweave the threads of communicative fabric holding society together (1996, 359-87), and where "historico-hermeneutic" academic study reflects on public life, sluicing insight back into the capillaries of democratic deliberations (1987, 374-403).What lies on the other side of the boundary is murkier. The proper role of natural scientific investigation has received relatively scant attention in Habermas's critical theory of society, and this has led to some confusion regarding his account of the natural sciences, as well as debate over whether this account has political purchase. One would think that sympathetic commentators, such as Helen Longino (who bases much of her own coherence theory of scientific truth on Habermas), would have reassuring things to say on this point. Yet her lukewarm assessment that, "in trying to clear a space for an autonomous social and critical theory, [Habermas] has ceded nature to the positivists" (1990, 202), raises questions about the flexibility and scope of Habermas's theory of communicative action as a basis for critique of scientific practice.One way to test Habermas's account of the natural sciences on this count is to put his views in conversation with science studies commentators who share a similar commitment to the idea that dialogue and argumentation are constitutive elements of scientific practice. Such an approach recasts the "ceding to positivism" question into a moment of controversy over the role of dialogue, not only as an essential motor driving the scientific enterprise, but also as a vehicle for democratic decision-making on issues related to the purpose and direction of scientific inquiry in society.Part one of this essay locates discursive norms embedded pragmatically in the notion of scientific objectivity. By bringing a modified version of Habermas's theory of communicative action into conversation with other approaches to science studies that foreground intersubjective dialogue as the key motor driving the scientific enterprise, I develop a foundation for robust criticism of systematically distorted scientific communication. Specific strategies of... (shrink)

Jurgen Habermas is by far the most preeminent and influential philosopher in Germany today. The scope of his writings is remarkable. Their influence extends over a wide range of disciplines that include philosophy, social theory, hermeneutics, anthropology, linguistics, ethics, educational theory, and public policy. The impact of Habermas's writings on theology alone reaches from fundamental to political theology, from moral to practical theology. The significance of Habermas, Modernity, and Public Theology is twofold. First, it represents (...) a genuine dialogue, an actual conversation, between Habermas and theologians. While theologians have appealed to Habermas's work in innumerable articles and monographs, he himself until now has remained silent. This book, then, is unique insofar as it offers the true give and take of dialogue. Second, this book focuses on Habermas's most recent work, especially his interpretation of modernity, his theory of communicative action, and his development of a discourse ethics. In so doing, it corrects some of the prevalent misreadings of Habermas within the theological literature devoted to him. In examining the relation between critical theory and a public and practical theology, the contributors note both the promise and limitations of Habermas's basic arguments and insights. They challenge Habermas as much as they learn from him. Sharing the conviction that religious traditions contain sources for interpreting human nature and society, they argue that if Habermas would attend more to the role of religion within life and society, he would more fully realize his project for a communicative rationality under the conditions of modernity and would offer amore comprehensive understanding of rationality, society, and modernity. Taking his own turn at the end of the book, Habermas responds to each of the contributors, comments on the broader theological reception of his work, and offers his own fascinating views on the function and development of religion in modernity and on the status and claim to truth of theological discourse. The work concludes with an extremely useful annotated bibliography covering Habermas's own writings, general introductions to Habermas and to critical theory, and works devoted to specific aspects of Habermas's thought. (shrink)

Joseph Heath's Communicative Action and Rational Choice may be read as a critical commentary upon Habermas's critical social theory, but it may also be read as merely using the latter as “scaffolding” for the presentation of Heath's own version of critical theory. In what follows, I will focus on the second option and thus largely ignore the exegetical question to what extent Heath provides a fair reading of Habermas. This does not mean, however, that (...) I will not make comparative judgements. On the contrary, my overall claim will be that Heath's new critical theory is more functionalist, and. partly as a result, less critical than Habermas's. Since lack of space does not permit me to argue this in accordance with the standards of detail that Heath's own book generally observes, my procedure may be justified by the attempt to provoke a clarificatory response from Heath. (shrink)

This introduction discusses the contemporary relevance of Jürgen Habermas’ social theory following the publication of his recent work, Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie (2019). It deals with his key topics and interventionist style of thinking. The essence of Habermas’ critical theory is its unwavering commitment to the utopia of communicative reason.

This new edition of a well-regarded book provides a concise and exceptionally clear introduction to Habermas's work, from his early writings on the public sphere, through his work on law and the state, to his more recent discussion of science, religion and contemporary Europe. Outhwaite examines all of Habermas's major works and steers a steady course through the many debates to which they have given rise. A major feature of the book is that it provides a detailed (...) critical analysis of Habermas's most important work, The Theory of Communicative Action. As well as looking at Habermas's appraisal of figures such as Foucault and Derrida, the book also examines his resolute defence of the Enlightenment project, his work on law and democracy and its implications for the important topic of European integration. This book quickly became established as an authoritative guide to Habermas's work, and this updated new edition will be an invaluable critical introduction for students and scholars across the social sciences and humanities, especially sociology, politics, philosophy and social theory. (shrink)

Refiguring Critical Theory offers some thoughts about the nature of democracy and the possibilities of individual and collective self-determination. The text traces theories of the relationship between being and consciousness from Marx through Lukacs and the Frankfurt School to Habermas' recent work The Theory of Communicative Action.

The out?dated intentionalistic assumptions manifest in Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action undermine a solution to the problem of order in action theory beyond utilitarianism. An analysis of his intersubjectivistic conception, which is based on the theory of the speech?act, shows that the incompleteness of Habermas's linguistic turn is due to his attempt to revive the older Critical Theory's concept of critique. The claims for a scientifically well?founded revival of a universal concept of reason ? which are (...) asserted in this concept ? invalidate the intersubjectivistic paradigm in action theory and therefore obstruct the way to a de?individualized formulation of the theory of social contract that avoids the paradox of utilitarian models. (shrink)

Jürgen Habermas is one of the most important German philosophers and social theorists of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. His work has been compared in scope with Max Weber’s, and in philosophical breadth to that of Kant and Hegel. In this much-needed introduction Kenneth Baynes engages with the full range of Habermas’s philosophical work, addressing his early arguments concerning the emergence of the public sphere and his initial attempt to reconstruct a critical theory of (...) society in _Knowledge and Human Interests_. He then examines one of Habermas’s most influential works, _The Theory of Communicative Action, _including his controversial account of the rational interpretation of social action. Also covered is Habermas’s work on discourse ethics, political and legal theory, including his views on the relation between democracy and constitutionalism, and his arguments concerning human rights and cosmopolitanism. The final chapter assesses Habermas’s role as a polemical and prominent public intellectual and his criticism of postmodernism in _The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity_, in addition to his more recent writings on the relationship between religion and democracy. Habermas is an invaluable guide to this key figure in contemporary philosophy, and suitable for anyone coming to his work for the first time. (shrink)

The most important intellectual in the Federal Republic of Germany for the past three decades, Habermas has been a seminal contributor to fields ranging from sociology and political science to philosophy and cultural studies. Although he has stood at the centre of concern in his native land, he has been less readily accepted outside Germany, particularly in the humanities. His theoretical work postulates the centrality of communication and understanding, and as such his strategy of debate is marked by a (...) politically informed unity of theory and practice. Holub's book is the first detailed account of the major debates in which Habermas has engaged since the early sixties. It stems from the conviction that his critics have not understood the political strategy behind his various interventions, or the consistency that informs his intellectual activities. Habermas is viewed in dialogue with important philosophical, sociological and political currents in West Germany. Holub demonstrates how Habermas pursues a course that incorporates various aspects of his opponents' positions, while simultaneously defending perceived threats to democracy and open discussion. (shrink)

Re-working the Gramscian idea of the ‘organic’ intellectual from the cultural-political sphere to Higher Education (HE), suggests the need to develop critical and questioning ‘counter hegemonic’ ideas and behaviour in community education students. Connecting this reworking to the Habermasian theory of communicative action, suggests that these students also need to learn how to be constructive in developing such knowledge. Working towards critical and constructive capacities is particularly relevant for students who learn through acting in practice settings where (...) general principles and purposes acquired in the academy need to be interpreted in response to the unique demands of specific situations. From a Gramscian perspective, enabling students to develop the qualities of organic intellectuals means that lecturers have a duty to teach critical knowledges which the student will be unfamiliar with and unlikely to possess. If teaching is not to become simply didactic, however, there is also a need to acknowledge Habermas’s contention that all knowledge is contingent. This does not mean that knowledge is merely relative, subjective, or essentially interest serving, as some postmodernists would have it. In Habermasian terms, knowledge is developed through a rigorous process of contesting validity claims according to procedures appropriate to discipline areas. In these procedures, contestation occurs to the point where there is general agreement about the best current understanding, until such time as this is overtaken by ideas with a better claim. The danger is that over commitment to contestation in the classroom undermines subject knowledge and ultimately the authority of the educator. Speaking Habermas to Gramsci, and vice versa, helps socially and politically committed educators to construct a space in which didactic and discursive moments purposefully alternate. (shrink)

In this article I consider the relevance of Tomasello’s work on social cognition to the theory of communicative action. I argue that some revisions are needed to cope with Tomasello’s results, but they do not affect the core of the theory. Moreover, they arguably reinforce both its explanatory power and the plausibility of its normative claims. I proceed in three steps. First, I compare and contrast Tomasello’s views on the ontogeny of human social cognition with the main tenets of (...) Habermas’ theory of communicative action. Second, I suggest how to reframe the role of language in the theory of communicative rationality in order to integrate the two theories. Third, I show how this affects social ontology, supporting the view that the construction of social reality is normatively constrained by the bounds of reason. (shrink)

Jurgen Habermas' construction of a critical social theory of society grounded in communicative reason is one of the very few real philosophical inventions of recent times that demands and repays extended engagement. In this elaborate and sympathetic study which places Habermas' project in the context of critical theory as a whole past and future, J. M. Bernstein argues that despite its undoubted achievements, it contributes to the very problems of ethical dislocation and meaninglessness it aims (...) to diagnose and remedy. Bernstein further argues that the precise character of the failures of Habermas' program demonstrate the necessity for a return to the first generation critical theory of Adorno. Reading across nearly the whole range of Habermas' corpus, Recovering Ethical Life traces the development of the theory of communicative reason from its inception in Knowledge and Human Interests through its elaboration in The Theory of Communicative Action and into its defense against postmodernism in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity . In separate chapters Habermas' readings of Freud, Durkheim amd Mead, Adorno and Foucault, Castoriadis and Taylor are critically examined. The focus of Bernstein's analyses, however, is always problem centered and thematic rather than textual psychoanalytic theory as an account of self knowledge, the competing claims of ethical identity and moral reason, the place of judgment in practical reason, and the debate between philosophies of language based communities versus those oriented towards world-disclosure. Critical theory is unique among current philosophies in engaging with the problems of social injustice and nihilism by siding with an abstract moral reason that forfeits the processes of intersubjective recognition it intended to salvage. Even in the fine grain of Habermas' account of performative contradictions and the theory of discourses of application, Bernstein perceives a squandering of the resources of an ethical life in need of transfiguration. (shrink)

Jurgen Habermas is unquestionably one of the foremost philosophers writing today. His notions of communicative action and rationality have exerted a profound influence within philosophy and the social sciences. This volume examines the historical and intellectual contexts out of which Habermas' work emerged, and offers an overview of his main ideas, including those in his most recent publication. Amongst the topics discussed are his relationship to the Frankfurt School of critical theory and Marx, his unique contributions (...) to the philosophy of the social sciences, the concept of 'communicative ethics', and the critique of post-modernism. New readers and non-specialists will find this the most convenient, accessible guide to Habermas currently available. Advanced students will find a conspectus of recent developments in the interpretation of Habermas. (shrink)

Jurgen Habermas is unquestionably one of the foremost philosophers writing today. His notions of communicative action and rationality have exerted a profound influence within philosophy and the social sciences. This volume examines the historical and intellectual contexts out of which Habermas' work emerged, and offers an overview of his main ideas, including those in his most recent publication. Amongst the topics discussed are his relationship to the Frankfurt School of critical theory and Marx, his unique contributions (...) to the philosophy of the social sciences, the concept of 'communicative ethics', and the critique of post-modernism. New readers and non-specialists will find this the most convenient, accessible guide to Habermas currently available. Advanced students will find a conspectus of recent developments in the interpretation of Habermas. (shrink)

Jürgen Habermas’s two-volume Theory of Communicative Action is at once an attempt to develop a socially-based theory of action as an alternative to the subjectivist and individualist underpinnings of much of social theory, a “two-level concept of society that connects the ‘lifeworld’ and ‘system’ paradigms,” a critical theory of modernity which retains the enlightenment ideal of rationally-grounded societies, and a theory of meaning rooted in a developmental logic of world­historical rationality. Habermas seeks to find a via (...) media between totalitarian closure and relativism, to show why the modernist project of a universal reason is still viable, and to propose a “public” discourse of rationally-grounded argumentative speech, or communicative action, as his answer. Despite the widespread attention Habermas’s work has received, and despite my sympathy for issues Habermas has raised, I show why his project is fundamentally flawed because of its uncritical assumption that only critical rationality can provide a legitimate standard for communicative reason: reasonableness is far more than that constricted view. These flaws become particularly evident in examining his analyses of myth, action, lifeworld, George Herbert Mead, and the “three spheres” of modernity. (shrink)

Since seminal essays like Adorno’s ‘The Culture Industry’ and Benjamin’s ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,’ the mass media has been of central concern for Critical Theory. Yet Critical Theorists have produced relatively little in the way of systematic analysis of the concrete institutions of mass communication. Early on, Habermas seemed to be headed in this direction, especially with the publication of The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. However, in Habermas’s (...) later years, this concern is eclipsed, on the one hand by an ideal theory of communication which says relatively little about non-ideal institutions that “systematically distort” communication, and on the other hand by an increasing focus on properly “political” institutions and the formal structure of law, exemplified by his later work Between Facts and Norms. In this essay, I will show how the colonization of public space by private interests, via technological media, remains sorely under-theorized in Habermas’s work, and that this is not just a peripheral oversight but a central problem that Habermas fails to resolve. I will then give some preliminary suggestions as to how one might expand and develop the critique of systematically distorted communication in more fruitful directions by developing the idea of a politics of meaning. My argument is located within the extensive discussion generated by the relatively recent translation of The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere into English, which has produced many useful and important criticisms. (shrink)

The book examines how the contemporary Indian situation poses a strict theoretical challenge to Habermas's theorization of the public sphere and employs the method of samvāda to critically analyze and dissect its universalist claims. It invites the reader to consider the possibility of imagining a normative Indian public sphere that is embedded in the Indian context-in a native and not nativist sense-to get past the derivative language of philosophical and political discourses prevalent within Indian academia. The book (...) proposes that the dynamic cooperative space between Indian political theory and contemporary Indian philosophy is effectively suited to theorize the native idea of the Indian public sphere. It underlines the normative need for a natively theorized Indian public sphere to further the multilayered democratization of public spheres within diverse communities that constitute Indian society. The book will be a key read for contemporary studies in philosophy, political theory, sociology, postcolonial theory, history, and media and communication studies. (shrink)

In this article I challenge two arguments central to Hugh Baxter's critical interpretation of Habermas in his recent book, Habermas: The Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (2011). Both arguments focus on whether Habermas’ system -lifeworld model of society can successfully make space for democratic politics. Baxter highlights problems with both Habermas’ The Theory of Communicative Action [hereafter cited as TCA] and Habermas’ attempts to fix those problems in Between Facts and Norms (...) [hereafter cited as BFN]. Thus, engaging Baxter on these issues provides an opportunity to think about how to read two of Habermas’ most significant texts in relation to each other. Baxter stresses discontinuities but I draw attention to important continuities. The first discontinuity highlighted by Baxter is between TCA's functionalism and BFN's normative approach. By contrast, in section I my article stresses elements of TCA that have been under-appreciated in general and by Baxter in particular, challenging us to rethink aspects of the standard reading of functionalist versus normative moments in the trajectory of Habermas’ thought. More specifically, in the second discontinuity Baxter identifies in BFN a significant shift in Habermas’ understanding of the nature of a ‘system’. I challenge this interpretation in section II and provide what I think is a superior reconstruction of the model presented in BFN. (shrink)

Habermas has argued that many of the endemic socio- economic problems of Western society are either symptoms or prod ucts of a 'lopsided' process of cultural rationalization, one that has emphasized instrumental forms of rationality over communicative. But other than presenting a rather general typology of lifeworld pathologies, Habermas has not done much to specify what these problems might be, nor has he provided any 'middle-range' analysis of the mechanisms through which they might be generated. This paper (...) discusses some of the ways in which, consistent with Haber mas's general framework, rational choice theory can be used for pre cisely this task. In this analysis, rational choice theory is not presented as a comprehensive theory of action, but is employed as a critical- diagnostic tool that allows the theorist to identify undesirable social interaction patterns that arise from a broader instrumentalization of the lifeworld. Key Words: critical theory • Habermas • instrumental rationality • market failure • rational choice theory. (shrink)

The text examines the attempt by Jürgen Habermas to renew the tasks of critical theory. The systematic reconstruction of his writings reveals a system of typical functions: a) the rationalization of instrumental and strategic action in the material reproduction of social systems (social technology); b) the analysis of the pathologies in the symbolic reproduction of the world of life; c) the clarification of the cognitive, value and expressive models in the public sphere; d) the unveiling of false (...) representations that dominate the mainstream (critique of ideology); e) sketching out alternatives to the status quo, through the utopia of a non-reified communicative everyday practice. All these functions actualize the Enlightenment project to place the cultural tradition in the service of civil and social progress. This ambitious program, however, must recognize the limitations of critical theory, with respect to the need for consolation and hope of human existence. The dialogue between philosophy and religion, which marks the last decade of Habermas's reflection, should be understood in this light. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show how Habermas used the writings of George Herbert Mead. This subject has already been examined by the critical literature; however, the originality of this analysis with respect to previous studies lies in its philological approach. The result of the research proves that the interest of Habermas towards the American social psychologist originates well before the Theory of Communicative Action and accompanies the elaboration of Habermas’ research programme for (...) over two decades. It is interesting to observe that the references to Mead’s writings continued to be very selective and focused on the same three particular areas: on the methodological level, around the problem of the foundation of the social sciences; on the theoretical level, around ontogenetic and phylogenetic development; on the moral level, around the justification of the discourse ethic and, more generally, the idea of a post-metaphysical concept of reason. This paper also shows the remarkable coherence with which Habermas is developing a general theory of society and a philosophy of rational discourse. (shrink)

With the publication of Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (1981) and of his essays “A Reply to my Critics” (1982), “Diskursethik — Notizen zu einem Bugründungsprogramm” (1983), “Moralbewusstsein und kommunikatives Handeln” (1983), and “Über Moralität und Sitdichkeit — Was macht eine Lebensform ‘rational’?” (1984), Habermas has considerably developed and systematized his views on ethics. Up to Communication and the Evolution of Society (1979), ethics had been of interest to Habermas mainly insofar as certain concepts related to it — such (...) as the ideal speech situation, communicative action, presuppositions of argumentation, etc. — were crucial for the purpose of grounding a universalistic point of view in philosophy and in social theory. (shrink)

This paper aims to elucidate the negative understanding of politics (depoliticization) that results from the classic work of Jürgen Habermas about communicative action. The political potential of communicative action that results from political public sphere and the institutionalization of practical and political discourse constitute the leitmotiv of Habermas’s political philosophy. However, the understanding of politics that results from the communicative action presents the problem of limited capacity of realization of a discursive social practice in (...) institutional contexts. The social-integrative power (social integration) of communicative action and the communicative power (power of influence) do not refer directly to the democratic procedures into political-institutional level. The political public sphere, as it defends the lifeworld in relation to systemic imperatives of power and money, it is not directly linked to institutional complexes and, therefore, it can only “besiege them”. This deficit of institutionalization undermines the political public sphere model (the potential political discourse in a communicative public sphere) that results from the theoretical framework of Theorie. Consequently, the “defensive” vision of politics undermines Habermas’ emancipatory project, because it does not expand the areas submitted to social and communicative rationality and does not open communicative channels for inflows in the political-administrative system. From the perspective of the theory addressed to emancipation (as is Habermas’ theory) these defensive movements, although they are important, are not sufficient, because defending it only does not expand the social areas in which the communicative understanding predominates. This is the reason for critical discourses and posterior need of reformulations. (shrink)

Jürgen Habermas seeks to defend the Enlightenment and with it an "emphatical", "uncurtailed" conception of reason against the post-modern critique of reason on the one hand, and against so-called scientism (which would include critical rationalism and the greater part of analytical philosophy) on the other. His objection to the former is that it is self-contradictory and politically defeatist; his objection to the latter is that, thanks to a standard of rationality derived from the natural sciences or from Weber's (...) concept of purposive rationality, it leaves normative questions to irrational decisions. Habermas wants to offer an alternative, trying to develop a theory of communicative action that can clarify the normative foundations of a critical theory of society as well as provide a fruitful theoretical framework for empirical social research. This study is a comprehensive and detailed analysis and sustained critique of Habermas' philosophical system since his pragmatist turn in the seventies. It clearly and precisely depicts Habermas' long chain of arguments leading from an analysis of speech acts to a discourse theory of law and the democratic constitutional state. Along the way the study examines, among other things, Habermas' theory of communicative action, transcendental and universal pragmatics and the argument from "performative contradictions", discourse ethics, the consensus theory of truth, Habermas' ideas on developmental psychology, communicative pathologies and social evolution, his theory of social order, the analysis of the tensions between system and lifeworld, his theory of modernity, and his theory of deliberative democracy. For all Habermas students this study will prove indispensable. (shrink)

The situation of public functioning of philosophy today is being fundamentally changed in comparison with it that even was by the end of last century. The new opportunities of free appeal to philosophical concepts and meanings and their use by every participant of unlimited networks of open communication raise issues of preservation and protection of normative philosophical discourse. The author formulates the need in such normativity as an issue of difference between the context of reproduction and the innovation one (...) or as interdependence of reproduction and elaborating interpretation of normative meanings in philosophy. He takes attention to highlighting the issue of making and recognizing normativity in discourse/communicative practices that could be find out in works of Michel Foucault and Jurgen Habermas. It helps to clarify a role and place of validity claims in communication actions including their meaning in philosophical discourse. Following Habermas’ theory of both linguistic and contextual depending of discourse’s normative meanings the author pays particular attention to meaning creation role of lifeworld as a cultural context that determines communicators’s understanding. It gives an opportunity to point out a principle role of communicator’s position or his or her self-understanding the lifeworld context they embodied. It also makes it possible to demonstrate clear examples of inconsistency of philosophical discourses depending on the position taken by a philosopher as we can meet radical critical position of Roger Scruton in his assessment of many prominent European philosophers’ works. In conclusion the author stresses on dependence of capacity to get added interpretation value in philosophy not only from a level of theoretical knowledge, but from his or her personal appropriation of own horizon of cultural meanings. Following Habermas's theory of linguistic and contextual dependence of normative values of discourse on context, the author draws attention to the role in the creation of values of the lifeworld as a cultural context that determines the participant's understanding. It gives an opportunity to point out a principle role of communicator’s position or his or her understanding the lifeworld context they embodied. It also allows to demonstrate clear examples of inconsistency of philosophical discourses depending on the position taken by a philosopher as we can meet in radical critical position of Roger Scruton within his assessment of many prominent European philosophers’ works. In conclusion the author stresses capacity to get added interpretation value in philosophy depends not only on a level of theoretical knowledge a person owns, but from his or her personal appropriation of own horizon of cultural meanings. (shrink)

The arguments presented in this discussion point to some problems in the theory of communicative action considered as a starting point for a sociological theory with both normative and explanatory aspirations. It is argued that Habermas's notion of consensus is not sufficiently developed to constitute a foundation of the ethics of public debates; that both social action and communicative action are grounded in social actors' references to the same three worlds, which makes the coordination of actions (...) by means of understanding achieved in speech possible; that the criteria of rationality underlying use of language in the communicative action are ultimately those that are made explicit and consciously worked out in science; and that, finally, it is Parsons' solution to the Hobbesian problem and his concept of social action that provide a possible foundation for universalistic ethics. (shrink)

The argument is that Bildung has occupied Habermas from the earliest writings. In these writings he criticizes the idea of being educated as an expression of innate abilities and emphasizes instead the significance of the social conditions of the upbringing. This is the subject of the first section. The second section provides a presentation of the ideology-critical analysis of Bildung found in Habermas’s doctoral thesis on The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. The basic critique is (...) that the ideal of individual Bildung is too tightly connected to economic and political dominance, but still the ideal contains some truth. The third section maps his relatively sparse comments regarding Bildung in the subsequent decades. Significant here is Knowledge and Human Interest, where he works himself out of the philosophy of consciousness framework towards the Theory of communicative action. This becomes the communicative approach, which becomes the framework of Habermas’ discussion of Bildung, both in relation to philosophical ethics – discourse ethics – and in more specific discussions, such as what is the role of the university in modern society. Finally just a few words on the political philosophy and the philosophy of law, which Habermas presents in Between Facts and Norms, where he once again allows Bildung have a positive normative significance, but now in a collective communicative perspective. (shrink)

In The Future of Human Nature, Jürgen Habermas raises the question of whether the embryonic genetic diagnosis and genetic modification threatens the foundations of the species ethics that underlies current understandings of morality. While morality, in the normative sense, is based on moral interactions enabling communicative action, justification, and reciprocal respect, the reification involved in the new technologies may preclude individuals to uphold a sense of the undisposability of human life and the inviolability of human beings that is (...) necessary for their own identity as well as for reciprocal relations. Engaging with liberal bioethics and Catholic approaches to bioethics, the article clarifies how Habermas’ position offers a radical critique of liberal autonomy while maintaining its postmetaphysical stance. The essay argues that Habermas’ approach may guide the question of rights of future generations regarding germline gene editing. But it calls for a different turn in the conversation between philosophy and theology, namely one that emphasizes the necessary attention to rights violations and injustices as a common, postmetaphysical starting point for critical theory and critical theology alike. In 2001, Jürgen Habermas published a short book on questions of biomedicine that took many by surprise.[1] To some of his students, the turn to a substantive position invoking the need to comment on a species ethics rather than outlining a public moral framework was seen as the departure from the “path of deontological virtue,”[2] and at the same time a departure from postmetaphysical reason. Habermas’ motivation to address the developments in biomedicine had certainly been sparked by the intense debate in Germany, the European Union, and internationally on human cloning, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, embryonic stem cell research, and human enhancement. He turned to a strand of critical theory that had been pushed to the background by the younger Frankfurt School in favor of cultural theory and social critique, even though it had been an important element of its initial working programs. The relationship of instrumental reason and critical theory, examined, among others, by Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse and taken up in Habermas’ own Knowledge and Interest and Theory of Communicative Action became ever-more actual with the development of the life sciences, human genome analysis, and genetic engineering of human offspring. Today, some of the fictional scenarios discussed at the end of the last century as “science fiction” have become reality: in 2018, the first “germline gene-edited” children were born in China.[3] Furthermore, the UK’s permission to create so-called “three-parent” children may create a legal and political pathway to hereditary germline interventions summarized under the name of “gene editing.”In this article, I want to explore Habermas’ “substantial” argument in the hope that philosophy and theology become allies in their struggle against an ever-more reifying lifeworld, which may create a “moral void” that would, at least from today’s perspective, be “unbearable”, and for upholding the conditions of human dignity, freedom, and justice. I will contextualize Habermas’ concerns in the broader discourse of bioethics, because only by doing this, his concerns are rescued from some misinterpretations.[1] Jürgen Habermas, The Future of Human Nature.[2] Ibid., 125, fn. 58. 8[3] Up to the present, no scientific publication of the exact procedure exists, but it is known that the scientist, Jiankui He, circumvented the existing national regulatory framework and may have misled the prospective parents about existing alternatives and the unprecedented nature of his conduct. Yuanwu Ma, Lianfeng Zhang, and Chuan Qin, "The First Genetically Gene‐Edited Babies: It's “Irresponsible and Too Early”," Animal Models and Experimental Medicine ; Matthias Braun, Meacham, Darian, "The Trust Game: Crispr for Human Germline Editing Unsettles Scientists and Society," EMBO reports 20, no. 2. (shrink)

The relationship between being and consciousness has been characterised as one of alienation , reification , instrumentalization , and 'one dimensionalization' . More recently Jurgen Habermas has described the 'colonization of the lifeworld'. Each of these theorists argues that social and political philosophy has two primary tasks. First, a political philosophy should construct a model of how we might best structure our social and political situation so as to maximize freedom and self-determination. Second, a political philosophy should provide an (...) analysis of presently existing conditions. The gap between the model and the actually existing reality provides the space for social and political criticism, as well as social and political struggle. In his account of 'the colonization of the lifeworld', Habermas attempts to explain the relation between being and consciousness in terms of his theory of communicative action and to locate possible points of social and political crisis in advanced capitalist society. ;In this dissertation I trace theories of the relationship between being and consciousness from Marx through Lukacs and the Frankfurt School to Habermas' recent work The Theory of Communicative Action. I argue that in terms of his stated goal of providing a critical social theory with practical intent Habermas has been only partially successful. I present an account of Habermas' theory and claim it is potentially more politically efficacious than post-structuralist theories, though only if his theory is attentive to the concerns of those same post-structuralist theories. After arguing that at a certain level of abstraction Habermas is right in his account of our present situation, I conclude that he falls short of his goal in so far as his theory fails to take adequate account of many actually existing struggles for political self-determination, and many hypotheses for alternative social organization which do not agree with his assumptions about validity and consensus. (shrink)

From the perspective of a contemporary German reader, one consideration is particularly important from the start. Illumination of the political conduct of Martin Heidegger cannot and should not serve the purpose of a global depreciation of his thought. As a personality of recent history, Heidegger comes, like every other such personality, under the judgment of the historian. In Farias’ book as well, actions and courses of conduct are presented that suggest a detached evaluation of Heidegger’s character. But in general, as (...) members of a later generation who cannot know how we would have acted under conditions of a political dictatorship, we do well to refrain from moral judgments on actions and omissions from the Nazi era. Karl Jaspers, a friend and contemporary of Heidegger, was in a different position. In a report that the denazification committee of the University of Freiburg at the end of 1945, he passed judgment on Heidegger’s “mode of thinking”: it seemed to him “in its essence unfree, dictatorial, uncommunicative.”7 This judgment is itself no less informative about Jaspers than about Heidegger. In making evaluations of this sort Jaspers, as can be seen from his book on Friedrich Schelling, was guided by the strict maxim that whatever truth a philosophical doctrine contains must be mirrored in the mentality and lifestyle of the philosopher. This rigorous conception of the unity of work and person seems to me inadequate to the autonomy of thought and, indeed, to the general history of the reception and influence of philosophical thought. I do not mean by this to deny all internal connection between philosophical works and the biographical contexts from which they come—or to limit the responsibility attached to an author, who during his lifetime can always react to unintended consequences of his utterances. 7. Ott, “Martin Heidegger und der Nationalsozialismus,” p. 65. Jürgen Habermas is professor of philosophy at the University of Frankfurt. His most recent books include the two-volume work Theory of Communicative Action and The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures . John McCumber is an associate professor of philosophy at Northwestern University. He is the author of Poetic Interaction: Language, Freedom, Reason. (shrink)

Erling Skjei's criticisms (Inquiry 28, this issue) of my account of communicative action in The Theory of Communicative Action are based on a misunderstanding of the role of the analysis of speech acts in that work. I begin by restating the terms of my analysis, and after dealing with Skjei's objections to my claims for the explanatory power of illocutionary acts, draw attention to a problem with imperatives that I haven't yet done justice to.

Normal 0 21 false false false ES-CO X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 My aim in this paper is first to develop the question raised by Habermas concerning the possibilities of a history of philosophy oriented to praxis. This line of analysis will let see the internal connection between theory and praxis within the framework of a materialistic understanding of philosophy. Secondly, I will show how this question becomes a reconstruction of historical materialism in the context of an analysis of the processes (...) which characterise social transformations. With this background Habermas moves from the paradigm of production to that of language seeking a foundation Theory of Communicative Action. Reconstruction, historical materialism,systemic interaction, social interaction, production paradigm, language paradigm. (shrink)

Calhoun’s critical sociology relies not only on engagements with Habermas, Bourdieu and Taylor, but also on the middle range empirical traditions of American sociology. Through a review of his recent work on cosmopolitanism and globalization, community and solidarity, and public spaces and sociology, I propose that his search to explain different ways in which solidarity is developed offers a robust sociological foundation for the development of the most appropriate intellectual formation, and institutional sequel, to the emancipatory project (...) that undergirds critical theory’s hope and commitment. At the same time, we all need to rethink how both critical theory and more empirical sociologies can help us recognize the issues and agencies most vital for the address of contemporary cultural, social and biophysical needs. (shrink)

Although Jürgen Habermas has a strong argument to link reason and philosophy, he also thinks that religion has a legitimate place in the (rational) public sphere. The question, though, is: what does this legitimate place entail? Is the power of religious language due to the fact that modern culture is not sufficiently secularized, that is, not yet sufficiently philosophic? Or is the power of religious language due to the fact that it successfully articulates certain widely shared moral (and (...) substantive) intuitions? In addressing these questions, this contribution has four parts. In the first section the issue of Critical Theory and religion will be briefly examined. The point here is that where religion (like aesthetics) plays a more central role amongst the thinkers of the first movement of Critical Theory (theorists such as Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, and Benjamin), this is not the case with Habermas (the leading exponent of the second movement). In the second section, this aspect is further explored by reconstructing Habermas’s intellectual project (with its religious implications) in six steps. Finally (in the third and fourth sections) some critical remarks (inter-paradigmatic and extra-paradigmatic) will be made on Habermas’s view of religion. (shrink)

I focus on holism in philosophy of language, particularly in Donald Davidson's truth-conditional semantics and Jurgen Habermas's formal pragmatics. An adequate semantics must take account of three dimensions: the subjective, the social, and the objective. It must, in this sense, be holistic. All three aspects are mutually irreducible and interdependent. Yet holistic approaches lack a clear sense of how they are related. Both Habermas and Davidson recognise that language is spoken by individuals whose intentions it expresses, that it (...) is social , and that it makes claims about the objective world. Habermas places paramount importance on speakers' mutual recognition of norms, whereas Davidson maintains that conventions play no essential role in interpretation. I argue that Davidson's idiolectic conception of language overemphasises the achievements of individuals. Distinguishing between a public and a social theory of meaning, I argue that meaning is social and depends on communities of language users who share a lifeworld. Habermas, however, fails to recognise that if the background knowledge of the lifeworld is holistic, this holism extends to the theory of meaning. Davidson's principle of charity and Habermas's lifeworld are both transcendental notions: they refer to the conditions of possibility--the pragmatic presuppositions--of interpretation. Habermasian transcendentalism, correctly understood, is much closer to Davidson than might initially appear. An important complementarity between them concerns the relation between truth and justification. While Habermas aptly articulates the connection between meaning and justification, Davidson's conception of truth as a semantic primitive avoids problems associated with accounts of truth as idealised warranted assertibility. Nonetheless, it is compatible with taking truth to be a regulative idea. Finally, I argue in favour of an assertibilist semantics in order to accommodate the holistic relation of subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and objectivity. Considerations of meaning holism and the fact that both Davidson and Habermas acknowledge a contextual element in meaning, however, continue to fuel scepticism concerning such a theory. (shrink)

Continental philosophy over the past two decades has increasingly turned its attention to social and political matters. Two key figures involved in this move, Jean-Luc Nancy and Giorgio Agamben, have advanced a position centering on the idea of singular community . This article sets out the basic features of this idea and contrasts it with Habermas' theory of communicative or dialogical community . Habermas is open to the criticism that his theory of community is constructed according to (...) an unduly narrow construal of legitimate argumentation and democratic participation. The idea of community advanced by Nancy and Agamben, in contrast, appears to lack any credible criteria of community inclusion or identity. In conclusion, it is suggested that both theories of community fall short by neglecting the task of constructing and preserving actual sites of collective democratic action and resistance. (shrink)

The transformative university is a reflective and critical university that attempts to transform the world so as to live under democratic values of freedom, inclusion, equality and justice. It is a...

This article discusses Habermas’s project of reformulating Critical Theory through a pragmatic philosophy of communication, while defending post-metaphysical reason and commitment to grounded critique. Habermas’s use of pragmatics is contrasted with Rorty, who argues for a non-foundational pragmatism that eschews the idea of science as the only site of reason and social progress. The argument moves through three stages. First, it outlines Habermas’s project of recovering critical activity with particular attention to his debt to pragmatic (...) philosophy and the departures from earlier Critical Theory that this entailed. Second, it examines his theory of communicative action and identifies some key areas of contestation with sceptical approaches. Finally, it identifies some of the problems and limitations in Habermas’s pragmatic turn, suggesting that his quasi-transcendental critique is developed at the expense of a pragmatic commitment to grounding in embodied agency-in-the-world. It concludes that the spirit of pragmatism, rather than its detail, might help Critical Theory focus on political analysis and resistances to domination. (shrink)

Annual reports are an important element in the genre of corporate public discourse. The reporting practices mandated by the Securities and Exchange Commission for all publicly traded corporations are intended to render the annual reports a legitimate and trustworthy medium through which management communicates information related to the financial performance of the firm. The following discussion represents an inaugural attempt to investigate the ethical characteristics of the discourse found in corporate annual reports using Habermas' principles of communicative (...) action. In preparing the Management's Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) portion of the report, managers are charged with providing narrative information for investors and other interested third parties relevant to assessing the firm's financial condition. Previous rhetorical studies of the narrative portions of annual reports argue that they serve as means for both legitimate and distorted communication. We investigate this communication medium through the lens of Habermas' norms for communicative action, which require communicators to be comprehensible, truthful, sincere, and legitimate. The study represents an initial attempt to operationalization Habermas' principles of communicative action and to employ a methodology that facilitates their application to research within a business context. From one perspective, consistent with agency theory as specified by neoclassical economics, it would seem that firms anticipating worse-than-expected financial performance would be less likely to exhibit the Habermasian principles necessary for undistorted communication because they would attempt to strategically influence the message being communicated about the firm's financial position. Instead, employing rhetorical analysis software, Diction 5.0, we found that firms expecting both good and bad earnings surprises exhibited a higher level of communicative action than a composite average firm. Although preliminary in nature, our findings suggest that firms anticipating large earnings surprises, either high or low, use the narrative portion of the annual report as a vehicle through which to communicate information about managements' veracity and trustworthiness as well as the firm's financial position. (shrink)

Considering the German idea of Bildung, I argue that it is a central concern of Habermas. First, he criticized the idea of being educated as a sign of innate abilities, emphasizing instead the significance of the social conditions of the upbringing. Subsequently, inspired by Adorno, he performed an analysis of Bildung, based on critique of ideology, in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. The basic critique is that Bildung is too tightly connected to societal dominance, but still (...) the ideal holds some truth. His comments on Bildung over the subsequent years are sparse. However, in Knowledge and Human Interest he works his way out of the framework of philosophy of consciousness, which results in the Theory of Communicative Action, and with this approach he can discuss Bildung in relation to discourse ethics and the role of the university. In this new version, Bildung finally becomes crucial to Habermas' political philosophy in Between Facts and Norms. (shrink)

Refiguring Critical Theory offers some thoughts about the nature of democracy and the possibilities of individual and collective self-determination. The text traces theories of the relationship between being and consciousness from Marx through Lukacs and the Frankfurt School to Habermas' recent work The Theory of Communicative Action.

Questions whether the logic of language underlying Habermas's theory of communicative action is in fact the defining feature of conversational practice.

This essay explores Axel Honneth‘s 1980 essay ―Work and Instrumental Action‖ with a view to revitalising its argument about the value of a critical conception of work activity. In his early essay, Honneth sought to reconstruct this critical conception of work, inspired by the philosophy of Marx, in an effort to generate a critique of Habermas‘s communicative social theory. Honneth doubted whether Habermas‘s core epistemological category of instrumental rationality could capture the normative significance of individual (...) work activity. This generates uncertainty over whether a critical theory with a communicative framework can locate the contribution of individual work activity in the process of social emancipation. After the publication of ―Work and Instrumental Action‖, Honneth‘s philosophy itself retreated from the critical conception of work in favour of the recognition-theoretic social theory that culminated in his influential 1992 work The Struggle for Recognition. My essay draws on evidence of the benefits of individual worker autonomy to argue that Honneth‘s theory of recognition itself could be enhanced through a reassessment of the critical conception of work activity that he proposed in his early essay. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Education is in itself a project of Enlightenment. The critical theory of the Frankfurt School, whose origin and development bear the imprint of self-destructive social-cultural processes of modernity and of the Holocaust, can count as an attempt to continue the process of Enlightenment through radical self-criticism. The paper presents the approach of the first generation of critical theory and then Jurgen Habermas' critique of this approach and his reconstruction of critical theory in his theory of (...) communicative action. Special emphasis is laid on the discussion of the ethical implications of human communication. From this background the paper enquires what significance these reflections could have for a revised concept of education. (shrink)

Constructing Community examines community from the particular perspective of the shaping and control of urban space in contemporary liberal democracies. Following a consideration and critique of influential theories of community that have arisen within European philosophy over the last three decades, Brian Elliott investigates parallel approaches to community within urban theory and practice over the same period. Underlying the comparison of political theory and urban practice is a basic assumption that community and place are intimately connected such that the (...) one cannot be adequately understood without the other. The underlying intention of this book is to advocate a particular understanding of community, one that centers on collective, grassroots oppositional action. While it draws on certain current theories and practices, the model of community put forward is far from the orthodox position. This study is a provocative and original analysis of the question of urban politics in contemporary liberal democracies. It offers a strong case for reconsidering current debates on democratic politics in light of the connection between political power and the control of public space and the built environment. (shrink)