In this article I aim to clarify the nature of Kant’s transformation of rationalist metaphysics into a science by focusing on his conception of transcendental reflection. The aim of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, it is argued, consists primarily in liberating the productive strand of former general metaphysics - its reflection on the a priori elements of all knowledge - from the uncritical application of these elements to all things and to things that can only be thought. (...) After considering Kant’s conception of metaphysics and his various uses of the term ‘transcendental’ I closely examine his account of logical and transcendental reflection in the section entitled ‘On the Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection’. Whereas commentators generally attribute the activity called transcendental reflection to Kant alone, I contend, first, that Kant regarded philosophy as such to rely on a mode of transcendental reflection and, second, that the critical mode of transcendental reflection enacted in the Critique itself yields insight into the reason why our a priori knowledge is limited to the realm of possible objects. This is illustrated by outlining the difference between Kant’s and Leibniz’ employment of the concepts of reflection. (shrink)

In this article I aim to clarify the nature of Kant’s transformation of rationalist metaphysics into a science by focusing on his conception of transcendental reflection. The aim of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, it is argued, consists primarily in liberating the productive strand of former general metaphysics – its reflection on the a priori elements of all knowledge – from the uncritical application of these elements to all things (within general metaphysics itself) and to things that (...) can only be thought (in special metaphysics). After considering Kant’s conception of metaphysics and his various uses of the term ‘transcendental’ I closely examine his account of logical and transcendental reflection in the section entitled ‘On the Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection’. Whereas commentators generally attribute the activity called transcendental reflection to Kant alone, I contend, first, that Kant regarded philosophy as such to rely on a mode of transcendental reflection and, second, that the critical mode of transcendental reflection enacted in the Critique itself yields insight into the reason why our a priori knowledge is limited to the realm of possible objects. This is illustrated by outlining the difference between Kant’s and Leibniz’ employment of the concepts of reflection. (shrink)

Martial Gueroult introduit ainsi le cours qu'il donna au Collège de France en 1957-1958 : «)La richesse du sujet choisi : Kant, Critique de la raison pure, nous a conduits à le limiter à l'Esthétique transcendantale et à l'Analytique transcendantale et à lui consacrer nos deux conférences hebdomadaires. Notre propos a été double : donner du texte un exposé aussi clair et précis que possible, élucider non tous les problèmes - ils sont innombrables - mais les plus importants (...) d'entre eux, relatifs à la signification et à l'économie structurale du système.)» D'emblée, le cours s'adresse à deux lecteurs : l'étudiant y lit une présentation remarquable des concepts et arguments fondamentaux de la Critique); le chercheur y trouve une discussion technique de quelques points centraux, dans laquelle Gueroult se confronte à des commentaires magistraux, surtout allemands, et parfois oubliés de nos jours. Cet ouvrage est l'édition de la version finale de ce cours, retravaillé pendant plus de trente ans et resté inédit jusqu'à aujourd'hui. Sa valeur tant philosophique que pédagogique en fait un livre incontournable pour éclairer une lecture de la Critique de la raison pure. (shrink)

Cet article explicite le sens métaphysique de l'invention kantienne d'une raison pratique pure, dans une confrontation avec les analyses heideggériennes qui l'inscrivent dans l'histoire de la promotion moderne de la volonté, elle-même vérité de l'avènement métaphysique de la subjectivité. Il souligne la force d'une interprétation qui met l'accent sur le caractère décisif du concept de volonté pure, ainsi que sur la signification métaphysique du formalisme kantien. Il montre toutefois que cette interprétation, en isolant ces concepts de leur procès (...) critique d'invention, passe sous silence le fait que la volonté pure finie ne se profile qu'à l'horizon d'une expérience d'irréductible soumission, et que l'énonciation de la loi en première personne ne signifie jamais sa position volontaire: selon Kant, nulle volonté n'est absolue, précisément parce que seule la loi l'est. This article clarifies the metaphysical meaning of Kant's invention of pure practical reason, using and discussing the Heideggerian analyses, according to which it comes within the modern promotion of will, itself regarded as the true metaphysical advent of subjectivity. The article underlines the strength of an interpretation which highlights the major importance of the concept of pure will as well as the capital metaphysical meaning of Kantian formalism. It shows however that such an interpretation, by isolating these concepts from the critical process of their invention, overlooks the fact that finite pure will can only stem from an experience of irreductible submission, as well as the fact that legislation never means the creation of the law itself: according to Kant, no will is absolute, precisely because only the law is. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ : Afin de circonscrire lescepticisme qui lui paraît miner l'entreprise métaphysique des Lumières, il est apparu nécessaire au Kant de la période critique de répondre à trois formes de scepticisme : au scepticisme baylien, qui s'interroge sur la capacité de la raison à parvenir à définir une vérité en rapport avec les idées de cette même raison; au scepticisme humien, ce qui le conduit à distinguer la question soulevée par Hume de son scepticisme pour parvenir à dégager la (...) possibilité de jugements synthétiques a priori; et au scepticisme cartésien, qui met en jeu le lien entre concepts empiriques et choses du monde extérieur. L,'analyse du traitement qu'il en propose montre que le scepticisme joue un rôle fondamental au sein de l'entreprise critique si bien qu'il peut être considéré comme un allié possible afin de rabattre les prétentions du dogmatisme idéaliste.ABSTRACT: In his critical period, Kant thought that scepticism was a threat to the metaphysical enterprise of Enlightenment. He consequently tried to tackle three of its species: Baylean scepticism, which doubts that reason could establish any truth concerning its ideas; Humean scepticism, which must be distinguished from Hume's formulation of the problem if we want to show that synthetic a priori judgements are possible; and Cartesian scepticism, which puts in doubt the reference of empirical concepts to things in the external world. Kant's treatment reveals the fundamental role played by scepticism in his critical enterprise not only as a tripIe challenge to the critical project, but also as an ally against idealist dogmatism. (shrink)

E. O. Wilson argues that we must use scientifically based reason to solve the values dilemma created by the loss of a transcendent foundation for values. Peter Singer allows that sociobiology can help us understand the evolutionary origin of ethics, but denies the claim that sociobiology or any science can furnish us with ultimate ethical principles. We argue that Singer's critique of Wilson's attempt to bridge the gap between fact and value using empirical reason is unconvincing and (...) that Singer's own ethical principle of disinterestedness requires major support from empirical reason and is not sustainable by pure reason alone. (shrink)

Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is a philosophical classic that marks a turning-point in the history of philosophy. Kemp Smith's Commentary, written at the beginning of the 20th century, has become a classic in its own right. Both expository and critical, Kemp Smith seeks to subordinate the treatment of textual questions and of minor issues to the systematic discussion of the central problems posed by Kant's Critique. Kemp Smith's momentous work is therefore invaluable both to students (...) of the Critique itself and to those wanting to delve more deeply into systematic discussions of Kant's teachings. (shrink)

This article investigates the relation between freedom, the public use of reason, and sensus communis, as discussed throughout Kant’s political writings and critical works. Kant’s discussion of the public use of reason, as put forth in "What Is Enlightenment?" is closely tied to his views on autonomy, most notably in the political sphere. However, Kant’s distinction between the public and private uses of reason relies upon sensus communis as discussed in the Critique of Judgment. The communicability (...) achieved by sensus communis has a relevance not restricted only to Kant’s explicitly political writings; sensus communis is also what we might call “transcendentally significant.” In this article, I argue that the public use of reason—a use of reason achieved by sensus communis—is vital for reason itself to follow its own normative demands. I conclude that sensus communis itself grounds reason’s use for its own critique. (shrink)

Two currents of thought dominated Western philosophy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: Continental Rationalism and British Empiricism. Despite the gradual dissemination of British ideas on the Continent in the first decades of the eighteenth century, these fundamentally disparate philosophical outlooks seemed to be wholly irreconcilable. However, the publication of Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in 1781 presented an entirely new method of philosophical reasoning that promised to combine the virtues of Rationalism with the scientific rigour (...) of Empiricism. This book offers the first extended analysis of Kant's method of proof in philosophy. The author constructs a model based on Kant's own statements about his procedure and then examines his famous proofs in light of it. Great emphasis is placed on historical accuracy and the debunking of popular myths about Kant's aims and doctrines. The result is a compelling new picture of Kant that will challenge current assumptions. (shrink)

L'auteur étudie le cas des analogies de l'expérience à la lumière de la thèse selon laquelle la Critique de la Raison Pure fonctionne selon une double modalité (du moins en ce qui concerne l'Esthétique et l'Analytique) : d'tune part comme élaboration des conditions générales d'une ontologie de l'étant (problème de la compétence du discours rationnel); d' autre part comme discours fondateur des mathématiques (Esthétique) et de la physique (Analytique). L'auteur présente l'exposé transcendantal des analogies, en donne une interprétation (...) épistémologique et en formule la transcription scientifique. The author studies the case of the analogies of experience, basing himself upon the thesis according to which, the Critique of Pure Reason works refetring itself to a double modality (at least as far as transcendantal Aesthetic and Analytic are concerned) : on one hand, it works as an élaboration of the general conditions of an ontology of the being (under the form of a problem of the competence of the rational discourse), on the other hand as the fundamental and founding discourse of mathematics (Aesthetic) and physics (Analytic). The author presents the transcendantal argument of analogies, provides it with an epistemologica! interpretation and formulates its scientific transcription. (shrink)

Cette contribution propose une étude, à la fois historique et critique, des controverses autour de l'interprétation empiriste ou friesienne de la Critique de la Raison Pure dans la période de 1830 à 1870. Il s'agit de l'idée que les connaissances a priori existent, certes, mais que leur découverte, ou la conscience que nous en avons, est a posteriori, et par conséquent de nature psychologico-empirique. This paper proposes a study, at the same moment historical and critical, on the (...) controversies about the empiricist or friesian interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason for the period from 1830 till 1870. It is about the idea knowledge a priori exists, of course, but that its discovery, or the consciousness which we have of it, is a posteriori, and consequently of psychologico-empirical nature. (shrink)

Kant posits the schema as a hybrid bridging the generality of pure concepts and the particularity of sensible intuitions. However, I argue that countenancing such schemata leads to a third-man regress. Siding with those who think that the mid-way posit of the Critique of Pure Reason's schematism section is untenable, my diagnosis is that Kant's transcendental inquiry goes awry because it attempts to analyse a form/matter union that is primitive. I therefore sketch a nonrepresentational stance aimed (...) at respecting this primitivity. (shrink)

Both European and Anglo-American philosophical traditions of Kant scholarship draw a sharp distinction between Kant’s theoretical and practical philosophies. They cite KrV, A 14.23 –28; KrV, A 15.01– 09; KrV, B 28.22 – 28; KrV, B 29.01 –12 as evidence that the analyses of intuition, understanding and reason proffered in the first Critique apply to cognition only, and therefore do not significantly illuminate his analyses of inclination, desire, or respect for the moral law in the Groundwork, second (...) class='Hi'>Critique, Metaphysics of Morals, or Religion. This paper is part of a larger project that takes issue with this near-universal consensus, and with the canonical interpretation of KrV, A 14.23– 28; KrV, A 15.01 –09; KrV,B 28.22 –28; KrV, B 29.01 – 12. Many of the most important terms in Kant’s mature moral philosophy – such as “action,” “reason,” “freedom,” “will,” “categorical,” “imperative,” “ought,” “maxim,” “duty,” “inclination,” “end,” and “idea” – are introduced, and sometimes elaborated at length, in the first Critique; and often appear in the Groundwork with little or no further elaboration. This suggests that Kant intended the analysis of self and rationality in the first Critique to serve as a formal foundation for his subsequent analysis of practical deliberation and moral motivation in the Groundwork. Here I argue specifically that Kant’s use of the first-/third-person asymmetry in his analysis of action in the first Critique’s Resolution of the Third Antinomy is necessary to his account of moral motivation and moral intention in the Groundwork; and that the structure of pure apperception he offers in the Transcendental Deduction resolves this asymmetry. (shrink)

Le « Canon de la raison pure » développe, pour la première fois dans un cadre critique, les idées morales de Kant. Ce texte pose donc aux commentateurs la question du rapport de la Critique de la raison pure et de la Critique de la raison pratique. Un article célèbre de Martial Guéroult, datant de 1954, a proposé de ce chapitre de la Critique de la raison pure une interprétation qui insiste sur la (...) discontinuité et l’hétérogénéité des deux premières Critique. Notre propos est de tenter, à rebours de cette interprétation, une lecture du Canon qui mette en évidence le fait que ce texte ne conduit nullement à l’hétéronomie, et rend donc possible la conciliation de la première et de la seconde Critique. (shrink)

Thoreau’s Walden is often disregarded as a philosophical work in academic circles because of its literary form and paucity of formal argumentation. I demonstrate that Walden is a philosophical work by relating its method to Kant’s in the Critique of Pure Reason, and I show that Walden’s literary genre—autobiography as critique—is a function of the work’s philosophical intent: to produce a philosophical instrument of lifeworldly experience. I ascribe to Thoreau a modified Kantian transcendental method by which (...) he investigates the conditions of the possibility of life as such, making the transition from Kant’s “experience”(Erfahrung) as the spatiotemporal and causal ground of the sciences to Dilthey’s “experience”(Erlebnis) as including the category of life and autobiographical and historical consciousness. I highlight a number of passages where this philosophical substance of Walden becomes clear, and I appeal to …. (shrink)

Karl Ameriks here collects his most important essays to provide a uniquely detailed and up-to-date analysis of Kant's main arguments in all three major areas of his work: theoretical philosophy (Critique of Pure Reason), practical philosophy (Critique of Practical Reason), and aesthetics (Critique of Judgment). Guiding the volume is Ameriks's belief that one cannot properly understand any one of these Critiques except in the context of the other two. The essays can be read individually, (...) but read together they offer a comprehensive guide to the main themes of the most influential of all modern philosophical systems. (shrink)

A comprehensive study of the Critique of Pure Reason, viewed as a theory of knowledge. The author generally accepts Kant's formulation of epistemological problems, but is highly critical of the Kantian solutions. The discussion is largely kept to the text itself; references to other commentators are deliberately omitted.--R. H.

This book is not what the title purports. It is, rather, yet another collection of articles dealing with some issues that can be culled out of Kant’s First Critique. No rationale appears to justify just these particular articles rather than others, and the collection, as a whole, lacks any sense of coherent unity. With the exception of an excerpt from a 1947 book by W. H. Walsh, these papers were all published at the turn of the last decade—the end (...) of the 60’s and the beginning of the 70’s. None makes a serious attempt to relate its concern to the total work and only one seeks to understand what Kant was trying to do rather than to evaluate his critics. (shrink)

In this essay, I will outline a novel strategy for using constitutivist ideas from Kantian metaethics to critique social practices and institutions. In doing so, I do not mean to defend this model of critique as the only viable form of social and political critique, even within a Kantian framework – nor, indeed, as always the most appropriate. But I hope to show that it provides us with a form of critique that allows us to (i) (...) develop a robust critique of many social practices (ii) on both epistemic and practical grounds, while nonetheless (iii) beginning from a perspective that is, in some sense, internal – or better, immanent – to the practice in question. Thus, if we are looking for a form of social critique that is neither purely epistemic nor merely external – which, in other words, allows us to critique social practices on something like their own terms as practically irrational – this method should be attractive for philosophers with Kantian (or post-Kantian) sympathies. At the heart of this conception of critique lies in the idea that social practices may be thought of as attempts at (some form of) collective practical understanding. As I will explain more below, this way of thinking about the rationality of social practices may be seen as the product of applying a general (post-Kantian) model of rationality, which I have developed elsewhere, to the rationality of social collectives or practices. (shrink)

In this essay, I will outline a novel strategy for using constitutivist ideas from Kantian metaethics to critique social practices and institutions. In doing so, I do not mean to defend this model of critique as the only viable form of social and political critique, even within a Kantian framework – nor, indeed, as always the most appropriate. But I hope to show that it provides us with a form of critique that allows us to (i) (...) develop a robust critique of many social practices (ii) on both epistemic and practical grounds, while nonetheless (iii) beginning from a perspective that is, in some sense, internal – or better, immanent – to the practice in question. Thus, if we are looking for a form of social critique that is neither purely epistemic nor merely external – which, in other words, allows us to critique social practices on something like their own terms as practically irrational – this method should be attractive for philosophers with Kantian (or post-Kantian) sympathies. At the heart of this conception of critique lies in the idea that social practices may be thought of as attempts at (some form of) collective practical understanding. As I will explain more below, this way of thinking about the rationality of social practices may be seen as the product of applying a general (post-Kantian) model of rationality, which I have developed elsewhere, to the rationality of social collectives or practices. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the relationship between the general metaphysics of the Critique of Pure Reason and the special metaphysics of the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Kant claims that what distinguishes the latter from the former is that the latter presupposes an empirical concept, namely the concept of matter, whereas the former does not. It is argued that the concept of matter is empirical not in any ordinary sense, but in the sense that it requires actual (...) perceptible objects to be given. Only the system of contingently given, empirical objects of the solar system as described by Newtonian physics, satisfies this requirement. This interpretation suggests that “experience”, whose possibility Kant is exploring in the first Critique, is exclusively “scientific experience”, and that the task of theoretical philosophy thus lies primarily in understanding the conceptual presuppositions of scientific experience. (shrink)

This MA thesis engages in an interpretative debate over Kant’s general aims in the first Critique. I argue that a defense of the rational legitimacy of religious faith is at the very center of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Moreover, I argue that Kant’s defense of faith is inextricably bound up with his views on the legitimacy of science. On my account, Kant’s Critique not only demonstrates that science is fully consistent with religious faith, but (...) also that science, when properly understood, actually favors religious belief over non-belief. (shrink)

Immanuel Kants three critiques the Critique of Pure Reason, the Critique of Practical Reason and the Critique of Judgment are among the pinnacles of Western Philosophy. This accessible study grounds Kants philosophical position in the context of his intellectual influences, most notably against the background of the scepticism and empiricism of David Hume. It is an ideal critical introduction to Kants views in the key areas of knowledge and metaphysics; morality and freedom; and beauty (...) and design. By examining the Kantian system in the light of contemporary arguments, Ward brings the structure and force of Kants Copernican Revolution in Philosophy into sharp focus. Kant is often misrepresented as a somewhat dry thinker, yet the clarity of Wards exposition of his main themes, science, morality and aesthetics, through the three critiques brings his writings and theories to life. Lucidly and persuasively written, this book will be a valuable resource for students and scholars seeking to understand Kants immense influence. (shrink)

The claim that we have free will is so important to Kant that many of his commentators suggest that the entire structure and machinery of his Critique of Pure Reason is constructed solely for the purpose of sheltering free will from the devastating effects it suffers from empiricism. Indeed, Kant himself, in a famous line in the preface, tells us, “I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith” [Bxxx]. The (...) question of whether people are free willed or determined in their actions is the central issue of the Third Antinomy, and perhaps arguably, the main issue of the whole Critique. (shrink)

Normative political philosophy always refers to a standard against which a society's institutions are judged. In the first, analytical part of the article, the different possible forms of normative criticism are examined according to whether the standards it appeals to are external or internal to the society in question. In the tradition of Socrates and Hegel, it is argued that reconstructing the kind of norms that are implicit in practices enables a critique that does not force the critic's particular (...) views on the addressee and can also be motivationally effective. In the second part of the article, Axel Honneth's theory of recognition is examined as a form of such reconstructive internal critique . It is argued that while the implicit norms of recognition made explicit in Honneth's philosophical anthropology help explain progressive social struggles as moral ones, his theory faces two challenges in justifying internal critique. The Priority Challenge asks for the reasons why the implicit norms of recognition should be taken as the standard against which other implicit and explicit norms are to be judged. The Application Challenge asks why a social group should, by its own lights, extend equal recognition to all its members and even non-members. The kind of functional, prudential, conceptual, and moral considerations that could serve to answer these challenges are sketched. (shrink)

La critique cartésienne de la logique est souvent reconduite à celle du syllogisme et d’une dialectique dont l’Organon aristotélicien fournit l’exposé canonique. On veut montrer ici, en resituant le propos cartésien dans son cheminement initial , que cette critique vise aussi, sinon en premier lieu, une conception alternative d’inspiration lulliste qui tend à s’imposer dans la Schulmetaphysik allemande contemporaine, et par le biais de laquelle celle-ci, déjà, prétend pouvoir se constituer en système encyclopédique du savoir. Le point culminant (...) de cette critique ne se trouve nullement dans le rappel de l’humaine finitude, et la dénonciation d’une vaine prétention à l’omniscience, car l’universalité de la méthode cartésienne lui permet tout aussi bien de viser la connaissance de toutes choses, même les plus « cachées » et les plus « éloignées ». Il se trouve en revanche dans une théorie des « natures simples » , qu’on peut juger lacunaire et inachevée au vu de l’incapacité apparente de Descartes à en établir la nomenclature exacte. Mais le statut propre de la logique cartésienne est indissociablement lié à celui de ces « natures simples » et au refus motivé d’en établir une liste exhaustive.Descartes’ criticism of logic is often reduced to criticism of syllogism and to the dialectic which can be perfectly represented and illustrated in Aristotle’s Organon. Going back to the very roots of Descartes’ thought , this article tries to demonstrate that above all else, his criticism also includes an alternative representation of logic widely diffused in contemporary German Schulmetaphysik which asserts itself as an encyclopaedic knowledge system. The climax of this criticism does not consist in the idea of human finitude nor in the pretension of universal knowledge. In fact universality of Descartes’ method can be applied to everything, even the « deepest » and « most distant » ones. This climax lies in the theory of « simple natures » which can be judged as incomplete as regards Descartes’ apparent inability to establish an exact list and description. Nevertheless, the exact status of Descartes’ logic is precisely linked to the status of these simples natures and to Descartes’ conscious refusal to establish a list. (shrink)

What is the point of ideology critique? Prominent Anglo-American philosophers recently proposed novel arguments for the view that ideology critique is moral critique, and ideologies are flawed insofar as they contribute to injustice or oppression. We criticize that view and make the case for an alternative and more empirically-oriented approach, grounded in epistemic rather than moral commitments. We make two related claims: (i) ideology critique can debunk beliefs and practices by uncovering how, empirically, they are produced (...) by self-justifying power, and (ii) the self-justification of power should be understood as an epistemic rather than moral flaw. Drawing on the recent realist revival in political theory, we argue that this genealogical approach has more radical potential, despite being more parsimonious than morality-based approaches. We demonstrate the relative advantages of our view by discussing the results of empirical studies on the contemporary phenomenon of neopatriarchy in the Middle East and North Africa. (shrink)

IN THIS ESSAY I BEGIN BY NAMING A "TURN TO CULTURE" THAT MARKS A wide range of works in contemporary theology and ethics. I describe how the turn plays out in books by Stanley Hauerwas and Delores S. Williams and argue that their idealist versions of the turn uncritically replicate core features of the dominant cultures they try to criticize. I explain how their idealism in conceiving the oppositional cultures to which they turn constructs those cultures as "others" to the (...) culture being criticized, wholes unto themselves, and symbols that directly participate in some ultimate good or truth. I then gesture toward a more critical, self-conscious performance of the turn to culture. I argue that turns to culture should not obscure but rather thematize the role of the critic in making the turn. I use the work of Pierre Bourdieu and Walter Benjamin to argue that self-conscious critique will involve a set of resignations to reflexivity rather than otherness, to a hodgepodge of highly mobile practices rather than a single, unified tradition, and to regarding cultural artifacts as mixed allegories rather than pure symbols. (shrink)

In this paper, I take issue with the idea that Michel Foucault might be considered a theorist of epistemic injustice, and argue that his philosophical premises are incompatible with Miranda Fricker’s. Their main disagreement rests upon their divergent ways of conceiving the relationship between reason and power, giving rise to the contrasting forms of normativity that characterize their critical projects. This disagreement can be helpfully clarified by addressing the different use they make of the genealogical method. While Fricker’s genealogy (...) of Testimonial Justice aims to ground her claim that reason and power can be neatly pulled apart, thus avoiding the reductionist and relativist conclusions entailed by Foucault’s genealogies, I argue that Foucault’s mature, overlooked definition of genealogy is based on a sophisticated distinction between games and regimes of truth, and is thus not vulnerable to these criticisms. Consequently, Foucault’s genealogical inquiries prove helpful for understanding issues that normally fall under the umbrella of epistemic injustice in a new light, while also allowing us to avoid some of the main objections that threaten Fricker’s project. (shrink)

The figure of Johann Gottfried Herder looms increasingly important not only for his prescient contributions to many fields - biblical criticism, philosophy of language, literary criticism, philosophy of history - but also for his pivotal position between the impulses of the Enlightenment and Romanticism. Many of Herder's questions and concerns are more pressing at the end of the modern era than they were at its inception. Bunge's lucid and engaging translations of signal texts from Herder - most appearing here for (...) the first time in English - are arranged thematically: human nature, language, and history; myth and religion; God and nature; literature and the Bible; and Christianity and theology. Along with her extensive Introduction and Bibliography, they constitute an essential resource for coming to terms with the checkered legacy of the Enlightenment. -- Back cover. (shrink)

Realist ideology critique (RIC) is a strand of political realism recently developed in response to concerns that realism is biased toward the status quo. RIC aims to debunk an individual's belief that a social institution is legitimate by revealing that the belief is caused by that very same institution. Despite its growing prominence, RIC has received little critical attention. In this article, I buck this trend. First, I improve on contemporary accounts of RIC by clarifying its status and the (...) role of motivated reasoning. Second, I show that realist ideology critics face a dilemma: either their account makes deeply implausible epistemological assumptions, or they temper its epistemology at the expense of rendering it toothless. I argue for each horn in turn before revealing the dilemma to be a false one by making a novel distinction between varying strengths of RIC based on their underlying epistemological assumptions. I propose Moderate RIC as a solution: upon discovering that one reason for your belief that a social institution is legitimate is likely malignantly epistemically circular, the belief should undergo further epistemic testing. I respond to three potential objections and suggest that Moderate RIC would make a fruitful addition to political theorists' methodological toolkit. (shrink)

When we criticize social institutions and practices, what kinds of reasons can we offer for such criticism? Political philosophers often assume that we must rely on universal moral principles that are not necessarily connected to the particular social practices of our communities. Traditionally,continental critical theory has rejected this claim through its endorsement of the method of immanent critique. Immanent critique is a critique of social practices that draws on norms already present within these practices to demand social (...) change, rather than merely conservatively reproducing them. This book defends the claim that such a critique is not only possible, but also has politically powerful potential. Taking up recent developments in analytic collective intentionality theory and in the philosophy of language, the book argues that all social practices rest on structures of mutual recognition between persons that allow social theorists to reconstruct hidden norms present within these practices. Starting from a comprehensive critique of contemporary critical theory, the book also spells out the consequences of this line of thought for the practice of social critique, for the social sciences and for political philosophy. (shrink)

Before participants can be enrolled in a clinical trial, an institutional review board must determine that the risks that the research poses to participants are ‘reasonable.’ This paper examines the two dominant frameworks for assessing research risks and argues that each approach suffers from significant shortcomings. It then considers what issues must be addressed in order to construct a framework for risk assessment that is grounded in a compelling normative foundation and might provide more operationally precise guidance to the deliberations (...) of various stakeholders. The paper concludes by sketching the outlines of what is referred to as the ‘Integrative Approach’ to risk assessment and by highlighting some of the ways in which this approach may be more promising than current alternatives. (shrink)

A critical approach on tolerance can be done as an endeavor to asset its rational arguments brought in its support or/and as a justification of its moral value within the process of human being completion. The commitment to such critical task is more necessary as it is unyieldingness summon in contemporary debates in political religious and, especially moral contexts, it has been equally valorized and contested. The most remarkable analyses of this rather summary rubric for many and often contradictory connotations, (...) then concept, underline the idea that a limit-matter is at stake: can be tolerated the intolerable? Because these boundaries are hard to be distinguished the critical position intellectually reasonable seems to be that of examining if is not more socially profitable and morally justifiable to be tolerant rather than intolerant.Developing possible arguments for and against the universal value of tolerance, critical discourse imposes a very meaningful statement: to uphold our humanity, even the demand for our right to intolerance must be done within the framework and with the means of tolerance. (shrink)

Pierre Bayle réalise une triple opération sur le concept de critique : 1. il généralise la critique ; 2. il lui donne le caractère d'instance où est établie la vérité ; 3. il en fait ainsi un tribunal particulier qui a son droit propre et ses procédures. Cette triple opération repose elle-même sur deux gestes. Le premier concerne le rapprochement de deux sens de la critique : la critique philologique et la critique publique. Le second (...) geste concerne l'extension du champ de la vérité et de la certitude au domaine des faits, et plus seulement à celui de la raison. Pierre Bayle étend ainsi la méthode cartésienne à l'histoire. Cette extension hétérodoxe du cartésianisme joue un rôle notable, d'une part dans l'application des notions de vérité et de certitude au domaine des faits et, d'autre part, dans l'identification des notions de raison et de critique. Ces deux gestes de Bayle constituent un nouvel espace : l'espace intellectuel comme lieu de la critique, c'est-à-dire l'espace de la république des lettres. Pierre Bayle has accomplished a triple operation on the concept of criticism : 1. he has generalised criticism ; 2. he has given it the character of a trial which establishes the truth ; 3. he has thus made it into a special tribunal with its own law and procedures. This triple operation is itself based on two actions. The first is to do with the bringing together of two meanings of criticism : philological criticism and public criticism. The second concerns the extension of the field of truth and certainty to the realm of fact, and no longer simply that of reason. Pierre Bayle thus extends Cartesian method to apply it to history. This heterodox extension of Cartesianism plays a significant role, on the one hand in the application of notions of truth and certainty to the realm of fact, and on the other hand in the identification of notions of reason and criticism. Bayle's two actions constitute a new space : the intellectual space as the location of criticism, in other words, a space which is the republic of letters. (shrink)

This book negotiates and engages with the ideas and influence of one of the leading theoreticians in social science research-Gayatri Spivak. It discusses the impact of her arguments on postcolonialism, cultural studies, ethnography, feminist studies, and anthropology.

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 108 Heft: 1 Seiten: 134-145.

The grounds for critique offered by Roy Bhaskar have developed over the course of his work, but two claims have remained central: ethical naturalism and moral realism. I argue that neither of these is compatible with a scientific realist understanding of values: a scientific realist approach commits one to treating values as socially produced and historically contingent. This does not, however, prevent us from reasoning about values, nor from developing critiques by combining ethical reasoning with a theoretical understanding of (...) the social world and its possibilities. In particular, we can draw on a variety of Habermas's discourse ethics to offer provisional justifications for value-claims that support a critical stance. Thus we can develop grounds for critique that are both ontologically credible and anti-foundational, but also judgementally rational. (shrink)