Author: Krasiński Andrzej Title: IAN HACKING’S THE CONCEPT OF LABORATORY SCIENCE (Nauki laboratoryjne w ujęciu Iana Hackinga) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.12, number: 2011/1, pages: 385-396 Keywords: LABORATORY SCIENCE, NEW EXPERIMENTALISM, PHILOSOPHY OF EXPERIMENT, STABILITY OF SCIENCE Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:In this text I focus attention on the concept of laboratory science created by Ian Hacking, According to Hacking’s theory, not all scientific experiments are laboratory experiments. Laboratory science (...) created phenomena that seldom or never occur in a pure state in nature. In the second part of the text I analyze Hacking’s division of elements of laboratory science. There are three groups of elements: intellectual components, material things and results of experiment, in short: ideas, things and marks. The elements of laboratory in Hacking’s theory are used directly in the course of the experiment. Laboratory sciences are stable. Each element can be modified in order to match to each other. The stability of laboratory science is result of fact that theory and the laboratory equipment evolve in that way, that they match each other and mutually self-vindicating. (shrink)

Learn about astronauts and space exploration.

Learning grammar requires practice and practicing grammar can be boring. We examined whether an instructional game with intrinsically integrated game mechanics promotes this practice: compared to rote learning through a quiz. We did so “in the field.” Tens of thousands children visited, in their leisure time, a public website with tens of attractive online games for children during a 6-week-long period. Of these children, 11,949 picked voluntarily our grammar training intervention. Thereafter, unbeknown to them, they were assigned either to the (...) game or the quiz condition. By means of learning analytics, we examined variables related to participants’ persistence and performance. The results showed large participant drop-out before completing the first level in both conditions, confirming the boringness of the topic. More children completed at least one level in the game compared to the quiz. However, more children completed the intervention with the quiz. In the game, children answered fewer questions correctly and made more errors compared to the quiz. These findings suggest that even if a game initially catches user attention, it may not hold it. Plus, even if it is a minimalistic game with intrinsic integration of learning and playing, it may be distractive. We conclude that persistence in practicing grammar may be driven by other means than by a game’s shooting mechanics; for instance, by a desire to learn the topic and a feeling of achievement or by quizzing mechanics. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the relationship between paradigms of explication and the practice of conceptual engineering. It defends three interrelated claims: First, the predominant functionalist attitude in the present debate on conceptual engineering is due to its roots in Carnapian explication, which identifies the explicandum with a precursor concept. Second, alternative metaphysical paradigms of explication locate the explicandum in a part of a concept-independent reality (‘field explication‘, as I will call it). Third, field explication may be a better paradigm (...) than Carnapian functionalism for certain instances of socio-political conceptual engineering. In these instances, we adjust our concepts to more adequately capture differences in our concept-independent (felt) reality. To demonstrate this, I will contrast the metaphysical to the functionalist paradigm concerning the example of Heimat. [in German]. (shrink)

Was ist Intuition? Gibt es intuitive Erkenntnis? Intuition beschäftigt Philosophie, Psychologie und Alltagsdenken. Einschätzungen reichen dabei von "höchste Erkenntnisart" bis "höchst unzuverlässig." Cyrill Mamin zeichnet zentrale Bestimmungen der Intuition in Philosophie und Psychologie nach. Wesentliche Fragen sind dabei: Wie ist es, eine Intuition zu haben? Wie kommt eine Intuition zustande? Auf dieser Grundlage bestimmt Mamin Intuition als massgeblich nicht-propositionale Erkenntnisart, welche unsere intuitiven Überzeugungen rechtfertigen kann. Im Zentrum steht ein neuartiges Modell der intuitiven Rechtfertigung, das psychologische mit erkenntnistheoretischen Elementen (...) verbindet. Dadurch lässt sich Intuition im Verhältnis zu anderen mentalen Akten (u.a. Wahrnehmung, Imagination, Delusion) näher bestimmen sowie ein kritischer Blick auf die philosophische Intuitionsdebatte werfen. (shrink)

This paper explores the extent to which behavioral public policies can be both efficient and democratic by reflecting on the conditions under which individuals could rationally consent to them. Consent refers to a moral requirement that a behavioral public policy should respect what I call a person’s value autonomy and conception of the good. Behavioral public policies can take many forms. Based on a social choice framework, I argue that fully paternalistic and prudential behavioral public policies are unlikely to trigger (...) a hypothetical form of rational consent. Non-fully paternalistic behavioral public policies with partially non-prudential motivations are less problematic in this perspective. In any case, a public deliberative stage preceding the implementation of policies seems to be the best democratic way to justify them. (shrink)

Schyns, Goldstone & Thibaut oppose the notion of fixed feature analysis, suggesting the possibility of flexible feature creation in object recognition and categorisation. Such proposals cannot be assessed until clear definitions of the objects in question and their decompositions are formulated. Flexibility may come from the decompositions of objects rather than from feature creation.

The title led me to expect a somewhat different kind of book. What we are offered is not so much a dossier on Iconoclasm, like André Grabar's, as a dossier on the Dark Age of Byzantium. It falls into two parts: the first and more original is devoted to material culture, while the second is a checklist of written sources, largely overlapping the Prolegomena volume of PmbZ. Aimed at university students, this is essentially a work of reference. A further volume (...) of synthesis is promised. (shrink)

The concept of ÒrÒ among the Yoruba people in Nigeria has a lot in common with the biblical concept of Λoγos. This paper explores Λoγos as derived from Greek Logos translated as Word into English, and its parallelisms with ÒrÒ a fêted concept among the Yoruba. The paper provides evidence that both conceptsare related to exoteric functions within their distinct cultural communities. Finally, the paper opens these issues to the possibilities of cross-cultural research and semiotics.

L’importance de l’astronomie dans l’œuvre d’Auguste Comte est à la mesure de la place fondatrice qu’il lui accorde dans sa propre classification des sciences que constitue le Cours de philosophie positive. Comte dispense même un cours populaire d’astronomie, dont l’objectif n’est pas de former à l’astronomie mais à la « saine philosophie » positive. D’où le regard philosophique qu’il porte sur elle comme l’indique son Traité philosophique d’astronomie populaire. Pour Comte, l’astronomie est donc tout à la fois, un modèle de (...) science positive et un faire-valoir de la philosophie positive et même de l’engagement positiviste, quitte à restreindre assez fortement son champ d’étude. (shrink)

S.J. Cyril Barrett; VI—Concepts and Concept Formation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 63, Issue 1, 1 June 1963, Pages 127–144, https://doi.org/.

J’analyse dans cet article la valeur explicative que peuvent avoir les simulations numériques. On rencontre en effet souvent l’affirmation selon laquelle les simulations permettent de prédire, de reproduire ou d’imiter des phénomènes, mais guère de les expliquer. Les simulations rendraient aussi possible l’étude du comportement d’un système par la force brute du calcul mais n’apporteraient pas une compréhension réelle de ce système et de son comportement. Dans tous les cas, il semble que, à tort ou à raison, les simulations posent, (...) du point de vue de leur valeur explicative, des problèmes spécifiques qu’il convient de démêler et de décrire précisément. J’essaie dans cet article d’analyser systématiquement ces problèmes en utilisant comme guide les théories existantes de l’explication. J’analyse d’abord le rapport des simulations à la vérité (section 2). J’examine ensuite en quoi les simulations satisfont ou non les exigences de déductivité et de nomicité, qui jouent un rôle central dans le modèle de l’explication de Hempel (section 3). J’étudie dans quelle mesure les simulations sont aptes à véhiculer l’information causale pertinente qu’on attend d’une bonne explication (section 4). Je poursuis en analysant en quoi l’abondance informationnelle et la lourdeur computationnelle des simulations peut sembler problématique par rapport au développement de nos connaissances explicatives et de notre compréhension des phénomènes (section 5). J’analyse enfin en quoi les simulations ont un rôle unificateur comme cela est attendu des bonnes explications (section 6). Au final, cette étude permet de comprendre plus précisément pourquoi les simulations, alors même qu’elles semblent pouvoir satisfaire les conditions que doivent remplir les bonnes explications, semblent spécifiquement problématiques au regard de l’activité explicative. Je suggère que les raisons sont notamment à chercher dans l’épistémologie de l’activité explicative, dans les attentes méthodologiques envers les bonnes explications et dans l’usage spécifique qu’on fait des simulations pour l’étude des cas difficiles – en plus du fait que les simulations constituent une activité qui n’est plus à taille humaine. (shrink)

Computers have transformed science and help to extend the boundaries of human knowledge. However, does the validation and diffusion of results of computational inquiries and computer simulations call for a novel epistemological analysis? I discuss how the notion of novelty should be cashed out to investigate this issue meaningfully and argue that a consequentialist framework similar to the one used by Goldman to develop social epistemologySocial epistemology can be helpful at this point. I highlight computational, mathematical, representational, and social stages (...) on which the validity of simulation-based belief-generating processes hinges, and emphasize that their epistemic impact depends on the scientific practices that scientists adopt at these different stages. I further argue that epistemologists cannot ignore these partially novel issues and conclude that the epistemology of computational inquiries needs to go beyond that of models and scientific representations and has cognitive, social, and in the present case computational, dimensions. (shrink)

Présentation de l'indice de la distance intertextuelle et de ses propriétés. Discussion des limites du calcul : influence des décimales et des différences de taille entre textes comparés. Examen de la contribution à la distance des vocables classés en fonction de leurs catégories grammaticales et de leurs fréquences. L'indice de la distance inter-textuelle fournit un outil intéressant pour la mesure des ressemblances et des dissemblances au sein des grandes bases de textes.

Résumé Prenant pour exemple la figure littéraire de l’employé de bureau, notre étude se propose de saisir les particularités synchroniques et le cheminement diachronique d’une esthétique de l’impotence qui aurait émergé avec la tentation flaubertienne du « livre sur rien », pour se développer ensuite dans une large part du roman français de la première moitié du xx e siècle et trouver, enfin, son aboutissement dans l’œuvre de Samuel Beckett.

For a quarter of a century the industrial Western world has been living in the euphoria of continuous improvements in welfare, based on economic programming, increasing integration and terms of trade which favor indus trial countries and discriminate against agricultural regions. It is true that recessions have periodically recurred during these years : time and again, however, government intervention succeeded in reducing them to mere "in ventory cycles". In contrast with the twenties and thirties, when economic policy in the West (...) focused on fighting unemployment and stimulating investment, the postwar period has been characterized by a permanent concern to curb inflationary pressure, which was partly due to full-employ ment. The present welfare economy has given rise to a growth of the pro pensity to consume such that public policy has often been constrained to limit consumption and stimulate saving. In this new framework it has perhaps been forgotten that today's welfare owes much to the lessons from the past. The bitter world crisis experience of the thirties in particular has exerted a fruitful and decisive influence upon the search for means to prevent, eliminate or soften the cyclical fluctuations which the process of economic growth involves. Forty years after the out break of the greatest economic crisis ever, it seems useful to draw up the balancesheet of the lessons learned from it. There exists a large literature about the depression of the thirties. (shrink)

:Most game-theoretic accounts of institutions reduce institutions to behavioural patterns the players are incentivized to implement. An alternative account linking institutions to rule-following behaviour in a game-theoretic framework is developed on the basis of David Lewis’s and Ludwig Wittgenstein's respective accounts of conventions and language games. Institutions are formalized as epistemic games where the players share some forms of practical reasoning. An institution is a rule-governed game satisfying three conditions: common understanding, minimal awareness and minimal practical rationality. Common understanding has (...) a strong similarity with Ludwig Wittgenstein's concept of lebensform while minimal awareness and minimal practical rationality capture the idea that rule-following is community-based. (shrink)

In this paper, I criticize Bedau's definition of `diachronically emergent properties', which says that a property is a DEP if it can only be predicted by a simulation and is nominally emergent. I argue at length that this definition is not complete because it fails to eliminate trivial cases. I discuss the features that an additional criterion should meet in order to complete the definition and I develop a notion, salience, which together with the simulation requirement can be used to (...) characterize DEPs. In the second part of the paper, I sketch this notion. Basically, a property is salient when one can find an indicator, namely a descriptive function, that is such that its fitting description shifts from one elementary mathematical object to another when the property appears. Finally, I discuss restrictions that must be brought to what can count as DFs and EMOs if the definition of salience is to work and be non trivial. I conclude that salience can complete the definition of DEPs. (shrink)