This volume brings together 14 classic papers by interpersonal pioneers. Collectively, these papers not only demonstrate the coherence and explanatory richness of interpersonal psychoanalysis; they anticipate the emphasis on relational patterns and analyst-analysand interaction that typifies much recent theorizing. Each paper receives a substantial introduction from a leading contemporary interpersonalist. The pioneers of interpersonal psychoanalysis are: H. Sullivan, F. Fromm-Reichmann, J. Rioch, C. Thompson, R. Crowley, E. Schachtel, E. Tauber, E. Fromm, H. Bone, E. Singer, D. Schecter, J. Barnett, S. (...) Arieti, and J.Schimel. (shrink)

This introduction to the philosophy of science includes six chapters, each taking up a single problem—though the last four constitute something of a package: three attempts to establish Schlesinger’s criterion of confirmability, four applies it to non-confirmable sentences in such a way as to provide an alternative to the Wittgensteinian "received view" about the meaningless of self-referring sentences; in the process Schlesinger defends a version of neo-verificationism which, in five and six, he attempts to show is nontrivial by (...) applying it to the discussion of the nature of time and of determinism. To complete the list, chapter two discusses confirmation and parsimony ; and chapter one is introductory, discussing Niced’s criterion and Hempel’s paradox in terms of "the most simple type of generalization... ‘All ravens are black'... found mainly in elementary science or commonsense, prescientific reasoning". (shrink)

Nugayev critically analyzes current conceptions of scientific change. Then he constructs his own normative model and compares it with actual problematic situations. In particular, he analyzes critically the replacement of Lorentz’s theory with the special theory of relativity. Key words: Popper, Duhem, Schlesinger, Lakatos, Kuhn .

The science of man, by A. Schaff.--The humanistic meaning of natural science, by R. Mukerjee.--The role of social sciences in the struggle for progress, by R. Schlesinger.--Scientific research in developing countries, by J. D. Bernal.--Problems of science and technology in underdeveloped countries by, D. D. Kosambi.--Priorities in scientific research for economic development, by J. Bognar.--Science and technology in underdeveloped countries, by S. H. Zaheer.--Science and scientific workers, by E. Olszewski.--Medical research in developing countries, by C. G. Pandit & N. (...) P. Gupta.--Changing society and crisis of enterprise, by Z. Tanic.--The university and society, by E. G. Edwards.--The intellectual and society, by V. B. Singh.--Indo-Soviet relations in retrospect, by K. P. S. Menon.--Fifteen years of cooperation between Indian and Soviet paediatricians, by I. N. Ussov. (shrink)

The Philosophy of Time Society grew out of a National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Seminar on the Philosophy of Time offered by George Schlesinger in 1991. The members of that seminar wanted to promote interest in the philosophy of time and Jon N. Turgerson offered to become the first Director of the society with the initial costs underwritten by the Drake University Center for the Humanities. Thus, the Philosophy of Time Society (PTS) was formed in 1993. Its goal (...) is to promote the study of the philosophy of time from a broad analytic perspective, and to provide a forum as an affiliated group with the American Philosophical Association, to discuss the issues in and related to the philosophy of time. The society held its first meeting during the Eastern Division of the AP A in Atlanta, George, in December 1993. In 1997 I began my tenure as Executive Director of PTS and with my term ending in 2000, I decided to put together a volume of selected papers read at PTS meetings over the years. The result is the present volume. It contains some of the latest developments in the field, including discussions of recent books by Michael Tooley, Time, Tense, and Causation, and D. H. Mellor, Real Time II, and much more. The main issue in the philosophy of time is and remains the status of temporal becoming and the passage of time. (shrink)

Fichte’s Doctrine of Science of 1811 offers a sound model for explaining the conditions of semantics in its connection with the idea of freedom. Following Wolfram Hogrebe’s suggestion that the principle of contradiction works as an archaeological semantic postulate, i.e., is the implicit condition for any sentence to be meaningful, we argue that in Fichte’s definition of the phenomenon we find such a semantic postulate at a higher genetic level than the principle of contradiction indicated by Hogrebe. Moreover, the Doctrine (...) of Science of 1811 offers an analysis of the steps through which this phenomenon displays itself – i.e. Vermögen, als, Soll – which can be understood as the conditions for establishing a meaningful sentence. Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre 1811 kann uns einen soliden Modell zur Erklärung der Entstheung von Semantik anbieten. Mein Beitrag fangt mit der Darstellung Wolfram Hogrebes Hypothese an, dass der Satz vom Widerspruch als archäologisches Bedeutungspostulat fungiert, d.h. als implizite Bedingung der Möglichkeit jeglicher bedeutenden Äußerung. Ausgehend dieser Idee Hogrebes, hier schlage ich vor, dass man im Fichtes Begriffe der Erscheinung ein genetisch höheres archäologisches Bedeutungspostulat als der Satz vom Widerspruch finden kann. Daraufhin bietet die Wissenschaftslehre 1811 einen Einsicht in alle Schritte, wodurch die Erscheinung sich entfaltet – Vermögen, Durch, Als, Soll – die wir als die entsprechende Bedingungen für die Herstellung eines bedeutungsvollen Satzes verstehen können. (shrink)

My making choices and acting on those choices in a way that might count as my being free would seem to require that those choices are truly my choices. Furthermore, for my choices to be truly mine, it would seem that these choices must reflect my true self. So it seems that choosing and acting freely depends in a robust sense on such choosing and acting being authentic. Yet the concept of authenticity seems problematic. What or where is that true (...) self which would be the basis for authentic choosing, acting and living? Perhaps there is no such true self. This problem is central to the philosophies of both Sartre and Foucault. For the philosophers freedom authenticity or self-hood were central. The paper aims to show that, in spite of Foucault’s criticism, Sartre does not fall back on the idea of a true or deep self that is given to us. Sartre can appeal to the idea of authenticity without holding on such a dubious construct as a given, true self. Therefore the exploration of bad faith, good faith and authenticity in Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, where the problem is posed but left unresolved, is necessary. Sartre’s Anti-Semite and Jew, where a more concrete problem – the problem of authentically identifying oneself with a group of human beings − actually opens up a way how to overcome the problem of authenticity. (shrink)

Inasmuch as a good many of the Australian philosophers one would like to see included are not represented, and some of the contributors are no longer teaching in Australia, the title of this volume is somewhat misleading. It contains an introduction by Alan Donagan and the following original essays: J. Passmore, "Russell and Bradley"; L. Goddard, "The Existence of Universals"; B. Ellis, "An Epistemological Concept of Truth"; P. Herbst, "Fact, Form, and Intentionality"; M. Deutscher, "A Causal Account of Inferring"; D. (...) M. Armstrong, "Colour-Realism and the Argument from Microscopes"; K. Campbell, "Colours"; C. B. Martin, "People"; M. C. Bradley, "Two Arguments Against the Identity Thesis"; D. H. Monro, "Mill's Third Howler"; G. Schlesinger, "The Passage of Time." Though the essays are original and admirable, there does not seem to be anything distinctively Australian, rather than American or British, about their contents. Perhaps the most enlightening fact about them is that neither the Andersonian tradition of Sydney nor the Wittgensteinian tradition of Melbourne which dominated the Australian philosophical scene in the early 1950's is pre-eminent any longer, or even in evidence.--A. B. M. (shrink)

Building on Jean-Luc Marion's phenomenology of love this book takes up the "question of the Other" and argues that through the interpretive activities of the amorous imagination lovers come to experience one another as the Beloved.

The world is disenchanted. Rationalization, intellectualization, and scientism rule the day. We used to see the world as a magical place, but now it's just a material space. How did we get here? The shift comes in part from the rise of a certain kind of secularism, one that reduces human experiences to whatever is explainable through observation. Love? It's just a biological drive. Joy, a rush of adrenaline. Beauty, an influx of dopamine. If you can't test it, it isn't (...) true; or so the thinking goes. The Romantic Life draws upon eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Romanticism to provide five strategies to re-enchant the world, five ways to imbue the world with meaning, truth, and beauty. According to the Romantics, far from being useless, encounters with impractical things like the imagination, nature, symbolism, sincerity, and the sublime give our lives a richness and depth that cannot be attained on a purely material account of the world. By learning from their example, we can come to see into the life of things, as William Wordsworth called it. We can be re-enchanted" -- taken from back cover. (shrink)

L'A. étudie le récit d'Eunapius concernant le règne d'Arcadius à partir de la mort de Théodose en 395 jusqu'en 404. Eunapius de Sarde est un sophiste, un philosophe et un historien grec païen qui a vécu de 347 à environ 414 ; il est un exemple de la rédaction helléniste et son travail peut être classé dans la fiction historique. Il s'oppose aux changements politiques, sociaux, économiques et religieux du 4e siècle ainsi qu'aux régimes de Constantin et Théodose. Son héros (...) est Julien l'Apostat. (shrink)

Writing On the Sublime and Beautiful, Edmund Burke tells us the ideas most capable of making an impression are those related to self-preservation and society. Such ideas are bound to our passions. Passions belonging to self-preservation turn on pain or danger.1 Those belonging to society do as well, although in this work, Burke dwells exclusively on pain. Because he tells us the king of terrors is death, we might infer pain is inferior to danger, the latter more formidable. We experience (...) delight in both when they are remote and do not affect us. But this delight, or indeed pleasure of any kind, is less powerful in terms of passion. Possibly for this reason Burke declines to qualify delight or pleasure as a source... (shrink)

In his article , 97–105) R. Reneham rightly classes Sail. Cat.20.9 as a conscious imitation of Cic.Cat.1.1, but adopts the unsatisfactory explanation of parody. Such parody is, as he notes, without parallel in Sallust and ineptly distracts attention from the vigorous development of Catiline's rhetoric. Elsewhere mimesis is regularly a compliment to the author imitated, often closely functional by reinforcing a point from the parallel of a similar context . Similarly I suggest that here Sallust recalls Cicero's words to illustrate (...) that perversion of vocabulary which is the keynote of Catiline's speech: just as he misuses, for example, the terms virtus fidesque at the beginning of his speech, in stark contrast to Sallust's own definition, so he perverts the famous words of the attack which revealed his true villainy in similar savage indignatio. (shrink)