The purpose of this article is first to enrich the exposition on the contribution of the magistri artium in Claude Panaccio’s Le Discours intérieur by an in-depth scrutiny of a quotation from the Latin al-Fārābī ending the presentation of logic in the Divisio scientiarum (ca. 1250) of the Parisian Arts Master Arnoul of Provence (Arnulfus Provincialis). Once accomplished this revision using the various Latin versions or adaptations of the Farabian Enumeration of the sciences (Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿulūm) by Gerard of Cremona (...) and Gundissalinus, it is clear that, despite a certain duality in its manuscript tradition, the relevant passage in Arnulfus Provincialis’s Divisio scientiarum does not merely distinguish inner logos and external logos, but also considers, like its source, a third logos, and that in a way susceptible to refine the characterization of al-Fārābī’s triadic logos as Le Discours intérieur reports this triade at the occasion of its judicious comparison with a parallel doctrine in John Damascene (Ekdosis akribès tès orthodoxou pisteôs alias De fide orthodoxa) interpreted differently by Thomas Aquinas following Albert the Great. (shrink)

Traducción y notas de Alexander Fidora y Jordi Pardo Pastor . Nuestra traducción sigue el texto latino de Alexander Fidora y Andreas Niederberger, Von Bagdad nach Toledo ? "Das Buch der Ursachen" und seine Rezeption fin Mittelalter. Mainz, Dieterich'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 2001, donde se ofrece una nueva edición del texto latino presentado en su día por Adriaan Pattin revisándolo teniendo en cuenta las importantes sugerencias del arabista Richard Taylor . Éstas, a su vez, resultan, en su mayoría. del cotejo del importante (...) manuscrito latino de Aosta, Seminario Maggiore. Ai° D 20.Como las dos recientes traducciones castellanas del Liber de cau sis tan sólo tienen en cuenta el texto de Pattin, y parecen desconocer las propuestas de Taylon hemos creído conveniente publicar esta tercera traducción, señalando los cambios más importantes respecto a la edición de Pattin siempre y cuando éstos afecten a la traducción. Además, hay que advertir que ambas traducciones dividen el texto del Liber en 219 sentencias; sin embargo. esta división es una ficción editora introducida por Celsao Pera en su edición de la Sancti Thomae de Aquino In Librum de causis expositio, Roma. 1955, que no tiene ningún fundamento en los manuscritos. A pesar de que esta división pueda parecer "pedagógica", como afirma Cruz Cruz en su traducción citada, p. 26, n. 29, prescindimos de ella, ya que sugiere que el texto sigue una lógica puramente axiomática. mientras que su argumentación es harto más compleja. Con todo, ambas traducciones siguen siendo muy útiles y de alta calidad. y también han sido consultadas con gran provecho para esta versión.El texto latino conduce a una aparente paradoja, ya que constata que la causa sigue su efecto . Se trata aquí de un problema de la traducción latina de Gerardo de Cremona quien vierte el término árabe waliya por sequitur, en vez de "estar junto" o "cerca de". Lo que el texto original quiere expresar, por consiguiente, es que la causa acompaña su efecto, no que ésta le siga. No hace falta, pues, cambiar el pronombre ipsum por ipsam? como ha hecho Pattin, refiriéndolo así a la primera causa. (shrink)

Mathematical correspondence offers a rich heritage for the history of mathematics and science, as well as cultural history and other areas. It naturally covers a vast range of topics, and not only of a scientific nature; it includes letters between mathematicians, but also between mathematicians and politicians, publishers, and men or women of culture. Wallis, Leibniz, the Bernoullis, D'Alembert, Condorcet, Lagrange, Gauss, Hermite, Betti, Cremona, Poincaré and van der Waerden are undoubtedly authors of great interest and their letters are (...) valuable documents, but the correspondence of less well-known authors, too, can often make an equally important contribution to our understanding of developments in the history of science. Mathematical correspondences also play an important role in the editions of collected works, contributing to the reconstruction of scientific biographies, as well as the genesis of scientific ideas, and in the correct dating and interpretation of scientific writings. This volume is based on the symposium “Mathematical Correspondences and Critical Editions,” held at the 6th International Conference of the ESHS in Lisbon, Portugal in 2014. In the context of the more than fifteen major and minor editions of mathematical correspondences and collected works presented in detail, the volume discusses issues such as • History and prospects of past and ongoing edition projects, • Critical aspects of past editions, • The complementary role of printed and digital editions, • Integral and partial editions of correspondence, • Reproduction techniques for manuscripts, images and formulae, and the editorial challenges and opportunities presented by digital technology. (shrink)

Fichte’s Doctrine of Science of 1811 offers a sound model for explaining the conditions of semantics in its connection with the idea of freedom. Following Wolfram Hogrebe’s suggestion that the principle of contradiction works as an archaeological semantic postulate, i.e., is the implicit condition for any sentence to be meaningful, we argue that in Fichte’s definition of the phenomenon we find such a semantic postulate at a higher genetic level than the principle of contradiction indicated by Hogrebe. Moreover, the Doctrine (...) of Science of 1811 offers an analysis of the steps through which this phenomenon displays itself – i.e. Vermögen, als, Soll – which can be understood as the conditions for establishing a meaningful sentence. Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre 1811 kann uns einen soliden Modell zur Erklärung der Entstheung von Semantik anbieten. Mein Beitrag fangt mit der Darstellung Wolfram Hogrebes Hypothese an, dass der Satz vom Widerspruch als archäologisches Bedeutungspostulat fungiert, d.h. als implizite Bedingung der Möglichkeit jeglicher bedeutenden Äußerung. Ausgehend dieser Idee Hogrebes, hier schlage ich vor, dass man im Fichtes Begriffe der Erscheinung ein genetisch höheres archäologisches Bedeutungspostulat als der Satz vom Widerspruch finden kann. Daraufhin bietet die Wissenschaftslehre 1811 einen Einsicht in alle Schritte, wodurch die Erscheinung sich entfaltet – Vermögen, Durch, Als, Soll – die wir als die entsprechende Bedingungen für die Herstellung eines bedeutungsvollen Satzes verstehen können. (shrink)

There is strong reason to doubt that the intuitions Chalmers' meta-problem focuses on are widespread or independent of proto-theoretical prompting. So it's unlikely that they result from factors connected to the nature of consciousness. In any case, it's only the accuracy of the problem intuitions that matters for evaluating theories of consciousness or revealing the nature of consciousness, not an explanation of how they arise. Unless we determine that they're accurate about consciousness, we mustn't assume that realism about consciousness incorporates (...) them, or that denying them means denying that consciousness exists. And we must assess whether they're accurate independently of how they arise. (shrink)

My making choices and acting on those choices in a way that might count as my being free would seem to require that those choices are truly my choices. Furthermore, for my choices to be truly mine, it would seem that these choices must reflect my true self. So it seems that choosing and acting freely depends in a robust sense on such choosing and acting being authentic. Yet the concept of authenticity seems problematic. What or where is that true (...) self which would be the basis for authentic choosing, acting and living? Perhaps there is no such true self. This problem is central to the philosophies of both Sartre and Foucault. For the philosophers freedom authenticity or self-hood were central. The paper aims to show that, in spite of Foucault’s criticism, Sartre does not fall back on the idea of a true or deep self that is given to us. Sartre can appeal to the idea of authenticity without holding on such a dubious construct as a given, true self. Therefore the exploration of bad faith, good faith and authenticity in Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, where the problem is posed but left unresolved, is necessary. Sartre’s Anti-Semite and Jew, where a more concrete problem – the problem of authentically identifying oneself with a group of human beings − actually opens up a way how to overcome the problem of authenticity. (shrink)

Professor Monro presents an original view of ethics based on empiricism, which leads him to a subjectivist position about moral values. He starts by examining the central problem in moral philosophy: are moral statements objectively true, or are they expressions of preference? The first view conflicts with the empiricist beliefs current in modern thought; the opposing naturalistic theory seems to lead to moral scepticism. After discussing both views, the author presents a detailed defence of the subjectivist position. In the course (...) of his argument he gives a detailed analysis and criticism of the 'universalisability thesis', the theory that moral aspirations differ from others in being applicable to all men, and that it is this that makes them moral. He then offers an alternative account of the nature of moral attitudes. The author illustrates his explanations with straightforward analogies and examples. His clear exposition of the fundamental concepts arising in his argument makes this a book for students as well as for professional moral philosophers. (shrink)

Building on Jean-Luc Marion's phenomenology of love this book takes up the "question of the Other" and argues that through the interpretive activities of the amorous imagination lovers come to experience one another as the Beloved.

The world is disenchanted. Rationalization, intellectualization, and scientism rule the day. We used to see the world as a magical place, but now it's just a material space. How did we get here? The shift comes in part from the rise of a certain kind of secularism, one that reduces human experiences to whatever is explainable through observation. Love? It's just a biological drive. Joy, a rush of adrenaline. Beauty, an influx of dopamine. If you can't test it, it isn't (...) true; or so the thinking goes. The Romantic Life draws upon eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Romanticism to provide five strategies to re-enchant the world, five ways to imbue the world with meaning, truth, and beauty. According to the Romantics, far from being useless, encounters with impractical things like the imagination, nature, symbolism, sincerity, and the sublime give our lives a richness and depth that cannot be attained on a purely material account of the world. By learning from their example, we can come to see into the life of things, as William Wordsworth called it. We can be re-enchanted" -- taken from back cover. (shrink)

L'A. étudie le récit d'Eunapius concernant le règne d'Arcadius à partir de la mort de Théodose en 395 jusqu'en 404. Eunapius de Sarde est un sophiste, un philosophe et un historien grec païen qui a vécu de 347 à environ 414 ; il est un exemple de la rédaction helléniste et son travail peut être classé dans la fiction historique. Il s'oppose aux changements politiques, sociaux, économiques et religieux du 4e siècle ainsi qu'aux régimes de Constantin et Théodose. Son héros (...) est Julien l'Apostat. (shrink)

Writing On the Sublime and Beautiful, Edmund Burke tells us the ideas most capable of making an impression are those related to self-preservation and society. Such ideas are bound to our passions. Passions belonging to self-preservation turn on pain or danger.1 Those belonging to society do as well, although in this work, Burke dwells exclusively on pain. Because he tells us the king of terrors is death, we might infer pain is inferior to danger, the latter more formidable. We experience (...) delight in both when they are remote and do not affect us. But this delight, or indeed pleasure of any kind, is less powerful in terms of passion. Possibly for this reason Burke declines to qualify delight or pleasure as a source... (shrink)

In his article , 97–105) R. Reneham rightly classes Sail. Cat.20.9 as a conscious imitation of Cic.Cat.1.1, but adopts the unsatisfactory explanation of parody. Such parody is, as he notes, without parallel in Sallust and ineptly distracts attention from the vigorous development of Catiline's rhetoric. Elsewhere mimesis is regularly a compliment to the author imitated, often closely functional by reinforcing a point from the parallel of a similar context . Similarly I suggest that here Sallust recalls Cicero's words to illustrate (...) that perversion of vocabulary which is the keynote of Catiline's speech: just as he misuses, for example, the terms virtus fidesque at the beginning of his speech, in stark contrast to Sallust's own definition, so he perverts the famous words of the attack which revealed his true villainy in similar savage indignatio. (shrink)