The central problem for normative ethics is the conflict between a consequentialist view--that morality requires promoting the good of all--and a belief that the rights of the individual place significant constraints on what may be done to help others. Standard interpretations see Kant as rejecting all forms of consequentialism, and defending a theory which is fundamentally duty-based and agent-centered. Certain actions, like sacrificing the innocent, are categorically forbidden. In this original and controversial work, Cummiskey argues that there is no defensible (...) basis for this view, that Kant's own arguments actually entail a consequentialist conclusion. But this new form of consequentialism which follows from Kant's theories has a distinctly Kantian tone. The capacity of rational action is prior to the value of happiness; thus providing justification for the view that rational nature is more important than mere pleasures and pains. (shrink)

This book attempts to derive a strong consequentialist moral theory from Kantian foundations. It thus challenges the prevailing view that Kant's moral theory is hostile to consequentialism, and brings together the two main opposing tendencies in modern moral theory.

Pure causal theories of reference cannot account for cases of theoretical term reference failure and do not capture the scientific point of introducing new theoretical terminology. In order to account for paradigm cases of reference failure and the point of new theoretical terminology, a descriptive element must play a role in fixing the reference of theoretical terms. Richard Boyd's concept of theory constituitive metaphors provides the necessary descriptive element in reference fixing. In addition to providing a plausible account of reference (...) failure and success, a metaphor approach to reference fixing provides the basis for a plausible realist account of the progress of science. Indeed, the metaphor approach undermines the sceptical force of the meta-induction and Laudan's objections to scientific realism. (shrink)

My critical focus in this article is on Rick Repetti's compatibilist conception of free will, and his apparent commitment to a Kantian conception of autonomy, which I argue is in direct conflict with the Buddhist doctrine of no‐self. As an alternative, I defend a conception of ego‐less agency that I believe better coheres with core Buddhist teachings. In the course of the argument, I discuss the competing conceptions of free agency and autonomy defended by Harry Frankfurt, John Martin Fischer, Christine (...) Korsgaard, and David Velleman. (shrink)

Kantian respect for persons is based on the special status and dignity of humanity. There are, however, at least three distinct kinds of interpretation of the principle of respect for the dignity of persons: the contractualist conception, the substantive conception and the direct conception. Contractualist theories are the most common and familiar interpretation. The contractualist assumes that some form of consent or agreement is the crucial factor that is required by respect for persons. The substantive conceptions of dignity, on the (...) other hand, treat the concept of dignity as a substantive value that justifies a deontological conception of respect for persons. A third conception of respect for the dignity of persons, the conception that I favor, focuses directly on the special value of our rational nature. According to this consequentialist conception, we respect the dignity of persons by promoting the flourishing of rational nature. (shrink)

As one of the most important ethicists to emerge since the Second World War, Alan Gewirth continues to influence philosophical debates concerning morality. In this ground-breaking book, Gewirth's neo-Kantianism, and the communitarian problems discussed, form a dialogue on the foundation of moral theory. Themes of agent-centered constraints, the formal structure of theories, and the relationship between freedom and duty are examined along with such new perspectives as feminism, the Stoics, and Sartre. Gewirth offers a picture of the philosopher's theory and (...) its applications, providing a richer, more complete critical assessement than any which has occurred to date. (shrink)

Abstract: In her recent book Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity, Christine Korsgaard does a wonderful job developing her Kantian account of normativity and the rational necessity of morality. Korsgaard's account of normativity, however, has received its fair share of attention. In this discussion, the focus is on the resulting moral theory and, in particular, on Korsgaard's reason for rejecting consequentialist moral theories. The article suggests that we assume that Korsgaard's vindication of Kantian rationalism is successful and ask whether, nonetheless, her (...) account is consistent with consequentialism. It suggests further that we grant that moral reasons are not based on substantive principles, and that they must instead emerge from the purely formal principles of practical reason. Can consequentialist principles nonetheless emerge from the formal constraints of practical reason? Why can't a consequentialist embrace Korsgaard's account of self-constitution and normativity? (shrink)

Kant maintains that “rational nature exists as end‐in‐itself” and thus you must “act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means.” As Korsgaard has emphasized, Kant presents a transcendental argument for the unconditional value of rational nature. According to Kant, happiness is indeed also valued as an end, but its value is nonetheless conditioned by the (...) value‐conferring power of rational nature. In this chapter, Kant's conceptions of intrinsic value, the goodness of ends and means, and the idea of an end‐in‐itself are explained. Problems for the argument for the priority of rationality are also explored. (shrink)

Historically and philosophically, there are two primary paradigms that capture much of Buddhist political thought. The author calls these as the Asokan model and the Shambhalan model. These two paradigms are not incompatible. The Shambhalan approach focuses on promoting justice by increasing enlightenment. The Asokan approach focuses on political legitimacy and a just basic structure for an unenlightened people. This chapter explores these two strands of Buddhist political thought and considers points of contrast and agreement with Western political philosophy, concentrating (...) on Hobbes, Hume, and Rousseau. Buddhism provides the basis for a compelling critique of Hobbes's moral psychology, his individualism, and his account of social conflict. The chapter concludes by sketching an alternative Buddhist theory of justice that is inspired by Rousseau's conception of the general will. (shrink)

This chapter argues that consequentialism provides a natural and straightforward interpretation of the formula of the end‐in‐itself. We treat rational nature as an end, and not a mere means, by promoting, first, the conditions necessary for the flourishing of rational nature and, second, the conditions necessary for the realization of the permissible ends of others. Although it is commonplace to assume that deontological constraints treat humanity as an end‐in‐itself, in fact, Kant provides no argument at all for agent‐centered or agent‐relative (...) constraints on the maximization of agent‐neutral value. Indeed, Kant's argument for the conclusion that rational nature is an end‐in‐itself just as easily implies that we should maximize the realization of morally objective ends. We must thus look elsewhere in Kant's theory for the promised refutation of consequentialism. (shrink)

Kantian consequentialism combines a Kantian conception of the justification of moral principles with a consequentialist principle of right action. Although the focus of this book is on defending the Kantian foundations of this new type of consequentialism, it is noteworthy that the resulting Kantian theory of value also leads to a more intuitively plausible form of consequentialism. The Kantian foundation of this new form of consequentialism does indeed entail significant constraints on the kinds of sacrifices that are morally permissible. Most (...) centrally, the maximization of happiness cannot override the basic interests related to our rational nature. For similar reasons, on issues of social justice, this type of consequentialism is more distribution‐sensitive than classical utilitarianism. Kantian consequentialism thus supports many of the deontological intuitions and basic rights concerns that have led Kantians like Rawls to reject utilitarianism. (shrink)

George Harris argues that human frailty, indeed vulnerability to utter and complete psychological breakdown in the form “a loss of the will to live, deep clinical depression, insanity, hysteria, debilitating shame, [and] pervasive self-deception,” is a source of our special dignity as persons. This type of fragility is a sign of a higher quality of character, he argues; a quality that is lacking in anyone who has the inner strength to survive the worst of life’s hardships without suffering “a form (...) of personal disintegration that renders the person dysfunctional as an agent”. This is a striking and extreme thesis. It is not the less controversial and more plausible thesis that virtue involves a capacity to experience, in the right way and at the right time, a broad range of feelings and emotions. An investigation of the psychological traits and vulnerabilities that are connected to virtue is a very interesting topic worthy of extensive discussion. Although this book contributes to this worthwhile discussion, the argument for the book’s controversial thesis is not convincing. (shrink)

After many years of reflection and debate, there is a clear international trend, indeed a near consensus, to endorse as a matter of ethics and law the modern biomedical conception of brain death as an alternative to the traditional conception of death. Alireza Bagheri has surveyed the current state of the law governing organ donation in eight Asian countries. His research shows that for the purpose of facilitating organ donation, the following countries have adopted the biomedical standard of brain death: (...) Turkey , Saudi Arabia , Singapore , Philippines , India , Japan , Korea , and Iran . In addition, there is an active and ongoing movement in China to also enact a brain death legal standard. On the other hand, the new definition of brain death always has been controversial. It is worthwhile to pause and survey the arguments for and the objections to the now popular conception of human death as brain-death. In light of the arguments over the definition of death and also of a survey of the different legal constraints on organ donation in different countries, the key elements of a model policy that incorporates the best of all of these different approaches will be defended. This model policy incorporates a pluralist standard of death, which allows individuals to choose a cardio-respiratory, whole brain, or higher brain conception of death. It also includes what I call a donor-recipient priority principle that gives priority to organ donors as recipient of organ transplants. Rather than requiring an organ donor card, a model policy should be based on a principle of presumed consent for organ transplant and a principle of surrogate consent. Finally, although a principle requiring family consent is too restrictive, family consultation in these important decisions should be encouraged by physicians and public policy. (shrink)

Kant argued at length against the idea that moral principles could be “material” principles, but consequentialist principles presuppose a theory of the good and thus seem to be material principles. After a careful explication of Kant's distinction between formal principles and material principles, especially as it is developed in The Critique of Practical Reason, we see that a consequentialist principle can indeed be a formal principle, and that they can even pass the universalizability test for moral principles. The formula of (...) universal law is compatible with consequentialism. (shrink)

There are four basic models for health care systems: the private market insurance model, the national single-payer model, the national health service model, and the social insurance model. The social justice debate over health care usually focuses on the comparative efficiency and quality of competitive private market insurance and the universal coverage and equity of national health care systems. It is a mistake, however, to think that a universal right to health care services requires a single-payer, government-run, national health care (...) system. The social insurance model of Germany, France, Japan, and many other countries, deserves more attention, as it incorporates the strengths of both market models and national health care models. (shrink)

Kant's moral theory is focused primarily on the justification of normative principles and the nature of moral motivation, reasons, and principles. Kant's own normative ethics, of course, is not consequentialist, and indeed Kant argues at length against empiricist, utilitarian approaches to ethics. The question, however, is whether he actually provides a nonconsequentialist justification of deontological intuitions or individual rights. I argue that, contrary to widespread philosophical opinion, Kant simply does not consider, and thus does not reject, a consequentialist interpretation of (...) the moral law or categorical imperative. Furthermore, once we distinguish the justification of normative principle from the principle itself, Kant's rationalist, internalist approach to justification seems to be compatible with normative consequentialism. In addition, we see that the key to the rejection of consequentialism is the justification of basic agent‐centered constraints. The introductory chapter also provides a comment on rational reconstruction as a form of textual interpretation and an overview and summary of the book's argument. (shrink)

There are many versions of Kantian ethics and even more supposedly Kantian objections to Consequentialism. By considering three of the more sweeping and influential objections, we shall see that there are general conceptual difficulties with Kantian responses to consequentialism, and Kantian consequentialism in particular. We consider, first, the significance of the Kantian deontologist emphasis on the principle of respect for persons. Second, we explore the relevance of Kant's distinction between price and dignity, his conception of the dignity of humanity, and (...) Hill's interpretation of the dignity principle. Third, and last, we focus on Kant's related formula of the kingdom of ends, and consider Rawls’ development of Kant's idea in his hypothetical social contract theory and more general Kantian constructivist conception of moral reasoning. (shrink)

In From Rationality to Equality, James Sterba argues that the non-moral, and non-controversial, principle of logic, the principle that good arguments do not beg-the-question, provides a rationally conclusive response to egoism. He calls this “the principle of non-question-beggingness” and it is supposed to justify a conception of “Morality as Compromise.” Sterba’s basic idea is that principles of morality provide a non-question-begging compromise between self-interested reasons and other-regarding reasons. I will focus, first, on Sterba’s rejection of the alternative Kantian rationalist justification (...) of morality, and second, I discuss the logical principle of non-question-beggingness and I argue that Sterba is wrong to assume that there is a formal, logical requirement that a rational egoist must provide a non-question-begging defense of egoism. I argue that, like the Kantian, Sterba needs a more substantial conception of practical reason to derive his conclusion. My third focus is the problem of reasonable pluralism and public reason . The Rawlsian principle of public reason is analogous to Sterba’s principle of non-question-beggingness. Sterba recognizes that public policies should respect competing perspectives and that a public conception of justice must be justifiable to all reasonable people. The problem is that that reasonable people disagree about fundamental moral questions. Rawls calls this the fact of reasonable pluralism. I argue that an intercultural conception of justice is necessary to provide a response to reasonable pluralism and a shared basis for public reason. (shrink)

Kant's own application of the categorical imperative reflects his strong deontological intuitions. Unfortunately, Kant's own interpretation of the limits on the duty of beneficence, and his various distinctions – between perfect and imperfect duties, narrow and wide duties, duties of virtue and duties of justice, maxims of actions and maxims of ends – simply reflect but do not support his intuitions. Contemporary Kantians follow Kant in this regard but replace their own intuitions about what is right with Kant's more extreme (...) and unpalatable views. Yet, they too assume what needs to be shown. This chapter focuses on Thomas Hill, Jr.'s influential account of Kant's account of imperfect duties and supererogation, and argues that Kant's theory supports a robust principle of beneficence but that Kant does not, in fact, provide any deontological constraints on the principle of beneficence. (shrink)

This chapter starts with Kant's basic rationalist, internalist approach to justification, and then considers its connection to his famous principle of universalizability, his account of the absolute value of the goodwill, and his analysis of the motive duty as the determining ground of goodwill. Kant's argument, if it succeeds, rules out externalist theories of justification and also mere natural inclination, even mere sympathy, as a determining ground of goodwill. It does not, however, rule out a consequentialist account of the normative (...) content of morality. (shrink)

It is a basic structural feature of consequentialism that it may sometimes require the sacrifice of the innocent. Chs. 5 and 6 argued that respect for persons involves both positive and negative duties. The problem at issue is thus the competing demands of the conflicting duties, or grounds of obligation, that confront us when the only way to save some involves sacrificing others. In these types of tragic cases, a commitment to the equal unconditional value of all persons should lead (...) moral agents to recognize the legitimacy of their own sacrifice to save others. If a sacrifice is rationally defensible to the sacrificed, then it also respects human dignity and treats rational nature as an end‐in‐itself. This chapter also discusses the limits of beneficence, self‐sacrifice, and the nature of justified coercion. (shrink)