Naïve realism is the view according to which perception is a non-representational relation of conscious awareness to mind-independent objects and properties. According to this approach, the phenomenal character of experience is constituted by just the objects, properties, or facts presented to the senses. In this article, I argue that such a conception of the phenomenology of experience faces a clear counter-example, i.e., the experience of seeing aspects. The discussion suggests that, to accommodating such a kind of experience, it must be (...) acknowledged that perception is, at least in part, representational. (shrink)

Irish philosopher George Bishop Berkeley was one of the greatest philosophers of the early modern period. Along with David Hume and John Locke he is considered one of the fathers of British Empiricism. Berkeley is a clear, concise, and sympathetic introduction to George Berkeley’s philosophy, and a thorough review of his most important texts. Daniel E. Flage explores his works on vision, metaphysics, morality, and economics in an attempt to develop a philosophically plausible interpretation of Berkeley’s oeuvre as whole. (...) Many scholars blur the rejection of material substance with the claim that only minds and things dependent upon minds exist. However Flage shows how, by distinguishing idealism from immaterialism and arguing that Berkeley’s account of what there is is dependent upon what is known, a careful and plausible philosophy emerges. The author sets out the implications of this valuable insight for Berkeley’s moral and economic works, showing how they are a natural outgrowth of his metaphysics, casting new light on the appreciation of these and other lesser-known areas of Berkeley’s thought. Daniel E. Flage’s Berkeley presents the student and general reader with a clear and eminently readable introduction to Berkeley’s works which also challenges standard interpretations of Berkeley’s philosophy. (shrink)

We present two studies that examine the effects of guanxi on multiple social groups from the perspective of Chinese business people. Study 1 (N = 203) tests the difference in perceived effects of six guanxi contextualizations. Study 2 (N = 195) examines the duality of guanxi as either helpful or harmful to social groups, depending on the contextualization. Findings suggest guanxi may result in positive as well as negative outcomes for focal actors and the aggregate.

While e-commerce has grown rapidly in recent years, some of the practices associated with certain aspects of marketing on the Internet, such as pop-ups, cookies, and spam, have raised concerns on the part of Internet users. In this paper I examine the nature of these practices and what I take to be the underlying source of this concern. I argue that the ethical issues surrounding these Internet marketing techniques move us beyond the traditional treatment of the ethics of marketing and (...) advertising found in discussions of business ethics previously. Rather, I show that the questions they raise ultimately turn upon questions of technique and the ways in which technologies can transform the fundamental means by which relationships are established and maintained within a social environment. I then argue that the techniques of e-commerce are indeed transforming the means by which businesses relate to consumers, and that this transformation is affecting the applicability of our previous ways of demarcating the imperatives determining the limits of accessibility between consumers and businesses. Properly addressing the ethical status of the techniques of e-marketing as such necessarily moves us to consider the changes that Internet commerce are having upon the norms that govern individuals in their relations with others. (shrink)

Recent corporate social initiatives (CSIs) have garnered criticisms from a wide range of audiences due to perceived inconsistencies. Some critics use the label “woke” when CSIs are perceived as inconsistent with the firm’s purpose. Other critics use the label “woke washing” when CSIs are perceived as inconsistent with the firm’s practices or values. I will argue that this derogatory use of woke is stigmatizing, leads to claims of hypocrisy, and can cause stakeholder backlash. I connect this process to our own (...) field by considering inconsistencies in our organizations and in our teaching that could garner similar criticisms. After describing the stigmatization process, I consider the moral implications of inconsistencies for CSIs and draw parallels to our field. I end by suggesting next steps for our field in response to the stigmatization of CSIs and to guard against the stigmatization of our own work. (shrink)

In the Third Meditation, Descartes suggests that God, and only God, is self-caused. This claim results in objections, first from Caterus and then from Arnauld, that an efficient cause must be distinct from its effect, and therefore the notion of self-causation is unintelligible. In the course of his reply to Arnauld, Descartes distinguishes between a formal cause and an efficient cause, contends that God's essence is properly the formal cause of God's existence, and attempts to find a cause midway between (...) a formal cause and an efficient cause. (shrink)

Berkeley’s Principles is a curious work. The nominal topic is epistemic. The actual topic is ontological. And it is not uncommon to suggest that ‘Berkeley’s system presents us with unique puzzles, particularly at its foundation.’.

ABSTRACT:While tone at the top is widely regarded as an important predictor of ethical behavior in organizations, we argue that recent research overlooks the various conflicting ethical tones present in many multi-organizational work settings. Further, we propose that the resolution processes promulgated in many firms and professional associations to reconcile this conflict reinforce the tone at the bottom or a tone at the top of the employee’s organization, and that both of these approaches can conflict with the tone at the (...) top of other important organizations such as professional and regulatory organizations. Here we adapt Integrative Social Contract Theory’s priority rules to propose a multi-tone reconciliation process which prioritizes conflicting ethical tones based upon features of the organization and the effects on society. Using three contextualizations, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the multi-tone reconciliation process over current processes. We conclude with recommendations for future research and implications for practice. (shrink)

If there is a normative moral theory embedded in Hume's works and if the recent critics of the utilitarian interpretation of Hume are correct in claiming that he was not a utilitarian, then what is the nature of Hume's moral theory? In this paper I hope to provide a plausible answer to that question by examining Hume's contention that the moral sentiment is analogous to a secondary quality. I shall show that his discussions of the moral sentiment provide one with (...) a method for evaluating the moral value of an agent's motive. Turning to Hume's discussions of obligation, I shall show that, for Hume, questions regarding one's obligations are resolved on the basis of societal conventions. Hume's social relativism, however, does not commit him to moral relativism, for questions of moral obligation are to be resolved by considering both whether one is socially obligated to perform a certain kind of action and whether or performing that kind of action in a certain set of circumstances in virtuous or vicious. Granting that there are utilitarian strains in Hume's moral theory, I shall conclude by discussing the role of the principle of utility in Hume's moral theory. (shrink)

In Freedom vs. Intervention, Daniel E. Lee addresses questions around such controversial issues as abortion, legalization of physician-assisted suicide and recreational use of marijuana, and the right to refuse medical treatment, taking an innovative approach by applying traditional just war criteria to questions of intervention.

There is much discourse and focus on the social determinants of health, but undergirding these multiple intersecting and interacting determinants are legal and political determinants that have operated at every level and impact the entire life continuum. The United States has long grappled with advancing health equity via public law and policy. Seventy years after the country was founded, lawmakers finally succeeded in passing the first comprehensive and inclusive law aimed at tackling the social determinants of health, but that effort (...) was short-lived. Today the United States is faced with another fork in the road relative to the advancement of health equity. This article draws on lessons from history and law to argue that researchers, providers, payers, lawmakers and the legal community have a moral, economic and national security imperative to address not only the negative outcomes of health disparities, but also the imbalance of inputs resulting from laws and policies which fail to employ an equity lens. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.2 (2003) 308-311 [Access article in PDF] Joseph Hamburger. John Stuart Mill on Liberty and Control. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999. Pp. xx + 239. Cloth, $35.00. C. L. Ten, editor. Mill's Moral, Political and Legal Philosophy. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1999. Pp. xxiii + 498. Cloth, $180.00. John Stuart Mill's On Liberty is commonly viewed as the classic defense of individual liberty, (...) and Mill himself as the grandfather of modern liberalism. In John Stuart Mill on Liberty and Control Joseph Hamburger seeks to dislodge this orthodox interpretation [End Page 308] of Mill. As the title of the work suggests, Hamburger, who died shortly before this work came to press, seeks to convince the reader that a proper understanding of Mill's account of individual liberty needs to be nuanced by an appreciation of those substantial controls that Mill was willing to place upon individuals.Hamburger suggests that the association of Mill with modern liberalism results from viewing the arguments presented in On Liberty in isolation from the context in which they were written. Hamburger argues that Mill's real purpose in writing On Liberty is neither self-evident nor is it one that is easily assimilated to modern libertarian ideals. Hamburger interprets "Mill as making an esoteric argument in On Liberty" (xvii). There are two additional pieces that Hamburger claims one needs in order to properly decipher the puzzle, and thus grasp the true import of Mill's claims concerning liberty. First, Hamburger argues that Mill's desire to bring about cultural reform was dependent upon his rejection of Christianity. Mill's unpublished writings reveal that he was far more antagonistic to the influence of Christian religion than is often recognized. Hamburger argues that for Mill initiating true moral reform depended upon overcoming the old social order of which Christianity was a primary constituent. In order for this to occur, one needed "to establish liberty for those who would implement his plan for moral reformation" (86). Second, Hamburger argues that we must also grasp Mill's view of history if we are to properly understand his project of moral reform and the place of On Liberty within this project. Hamburger claims that Mill's vision of history was strongly influenced by thinkers such as Comte and St. Simon. From them, Mill adopted the view that societies alternate between transitional and natural states, and that the values that are applicable in these states are quite different. Hamburger claims that "Mill easily recognized his own age as being transitional," and that this influences all of his arguments in On Liberty (111).Putting the above together, Hamburger concludes that Mill's arguments are specifically directed toward securing the liberty of those who would combat the influence of Christianity and the old moral order, and that "the liberty recommended in On Liberty was especially valued because it would hasten the undermining of old doctrines and institutions which occurred in transitional periods" (212). Hamburger argues that the liberty that Mill meant to secure in this work was not intended to apply equally to all persons or in all periods. Thus, Hamburger argues that Mill was quite willing to advocate strong forms of social control in other contexts.The latter claim, which Hamburger argues provides a more coherent interpretation of On Liberty, does not necessarily follow from Mill's view of religion and history. Here, I think there is room for two distinct judgments regarding Hamburger's achievement in this book. Hamburger has undoubtedly provided a great service in examining the often neglected areas of Mill's corpus and their relevance to his more prominent works. Philosophers who view On Liberty as an isolated piece of argument, or at best only consider it in relation to Mill's Utilitarianism, thus would profit much from reading this work. I am less convinced, however, of Hamburger's claim that heeding these aspects of Mill's thought will lead one to form a radically different understanding of Mill's claims concerning... (shrink)

The distinctions drawn by Vaesen are plausible when we are comparing chimpanzees and human beings somewhere between the middle Paleolithic and the Neolithic. But since then new kinds of organization have vastly outstripped these neurological differences to account for the enormous advancement of human technology leaving our remarkable evolutionary cousins far behind.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume's Hobbism and His Anti-Hobbism Daniel E. Flage Thomas Hobbes posed a crise morale to which British philosophers attempted to reply for over a century.1 Hobbes maintained that the terms 'good' and 'evil' have no import beyond individual self-interest and the fulfilment or failure to fulfil one's desires.2 While alluding to lawsofnature knownbyreason,3whetherone deems suchlaws dictates ofprudence4 or laws of some moral import,5 Hobbes held: (1) that the (...) notion ofjustice arises only after the institution of a commonwealth, and (2) that the dictates of justice are merely the dictates of the sovereign.6 Hence, justice is strictly a matter ofconvention. In this paper I argue that the Hume ofthe Treatise was a mitigated Hobbist.7 Like Hobbes, Hume held that the notions of justice and obligation reston a setofconventional social rules. Hume distinguished himselffrom Hobbes primarily with respecttoquestions ofmoral value, and though he provided an account of moral obligation, this was secondary to his considerations of moral value. To establish this, I briefly examine the 'is'-'ought' paragraph before turning to Hume's discussions of obligation and value. 1. 'Is' and Ought' To understand the 'is'-'ought' paragraph, one must consider it in the context of Treatise 3.1.1. There Hume examines the source of one's knowledge ofmoral value, namely, "Whether 'tis by means ofour ideas or impressions we distinguish betwixt vice and virtue, and pronounce an action blameable or praise-worthy?"s Hume's discussion, however, moves rather freely between considerations ofmoral value ('good' and 'evil', 'virtue' and Vice') and considerations of moral obligation Cright' and'wrong"). Evenin the 'is'-'ought'paragraph, a paragraph that seems to be concerned with purported relations between questions offact and questions ofmoral obligation, Hume explicitly alludes to value claims at the end of the paragraph (T 470). Since a moral philosopher might make any one of three claims regarding the relations between value and obligation, namely, (a) value claims are primary and obligation claims are dependent on them;9 (b) obligation claims are primary and value claims are dependent upon them;10 or (c) there are independent grounds for claims of value and obligation, I argue that Hume was attempting to dispel position (b). If this is correct, then Hume's Volume XVIII Number 2 369 DANIEL E. FLAGE arguments both pave the way for a conventionalist theory ofobligation and undercut Hobbes's rationalistic account ofnatural law.11 Hume's discussion in Treatise 1.1.1 is a critique of moral rationalism. It consists of two types of arguments. First, there is an argument from motivation that since moral qualities influence the passions, but whatis known by reason does notinfluence the passions, moral qualities are not known by reason (T 458-63). Second, there is a series of arguments to show that moral qualities cannot be known by reason. In examining some ofthe latter discussions, we shall see how in rejecting a rationalistic ground for moral obligation, Hume also undercuts any rationalistic ground for claims ofmoral value.12 Remember, Hume's question was "Whether 'tis by means of our ideas or impressions we distinguish betwixt vice and virtue, and pronounce an action blameable or praise-worthy?" (T 456). The rationalists answered this question in terms ofideas, claiming, that there are eternal fitnesses and unfitnesses of things, which are the same to every rational being that considers them; thattheimmutable measures ofrightand wrongimpose an obligation, not only on human creatures, but also on the Deity himself: All these systems concur in the opinion, that moraUty, like truth, is discern'd merely by ideas, and by their juxta-position and comparison. (T 456-57) In this, his initial account ofthe rationalists' position, Hume seems to focus on moral obligation, rather than moral value: the alleged eternal fitnesses seem to be moral rules such as, "All cases ofwilful murder are wrong," rather than rules such as, "All cases of wilful murder are vicious (evil)." If it were possible to establish that a rule of moral obUgation is true, a moralist might accept an additional putatively self-evident bridge-principle that, "Any action that is right (wrong) is virtuous (vicious)," and thereby deduce a claim of moral value... (shrink)

The paper provides an account of necessary truths in Berkeley based upon his divine language model. If the thesis of the paper is correct, not all Berkeleian necessary truths can be known a priori.

Rankings of countries by perceived corruption have emerged over the past decade as leading indicators of governance and development. Designed to highlight countries that are known to be corrupt, their objective is to encourage transparency and good governance. High rankings on corruption, it is argued, will serve as a strong incentive for reform. The practice of ranking and labeling countries "corrupt," however, may have a perverse effect. Consistent with Social Labeling Theory, we argue that perceptual indices can encourage the loss (...) of needed investment and, thus, contribute to higher rates of corruption within unfavorably ranked countries. In effect, corruption indices may inhibit foreign direct investment, the effect of which is to encourage the status quo in terms of corruption ranking. Using an experimental study design, we test the effects of country corruption rankings on the assessment of country investment desirability and find ranking exposure causes shifts in country investment desirability for 10 of 12 countries studied. These findings suggest that corruption rankings, which are based on perceptions of corruption, may cause country isolation and a reduction in legitimate means of investment. (shrink)

The attempt to find usable diagrams fornterms of the sort devised by John Venn seems to have originated with Venn himself, who published diagrams for up to five classes (the fifth class, however, was shaped like a doughnut, and contained an area outside itself — like the hole in the doughnut). Venn then suggested that “if we wanted to use a diagram forsixterms (x, y, z, w, v, u) the best plan would probably be to taketwofive-term figures, one for theupart (...) and one for the non-upart of all the other combinations …” Such a method would, as Venn admits, be somewhat confusing to the eye, and thus fail to fulfil one of the major purposes of the diagram; nevertheless, it is a method which could be extended to covernclasses.Venn also suggests (but without illustration) another method for drawing diagrams fornterms: “… the rule of formation would be very simple. We should merely have to begin by drawing any closed figure, and then proceed to draw others subject to the one condition that each intersect once, and once only, all the existing subdivisions produced by those which had gone before.” Then, in a rather surprising footnote, he adds: “It will be found that when we adhere to continuous figures, instead of the discontinuous five-term figure given above, there is a tendency for the resultant outlines thus successively drawn to assume a comb-like shape after the first four or five. If we begin by circles or other rounded figures the teeth are curved, if by parallelograms then they are straight. (shrink)

Francisco Pereira, Ver no es creer, Gedisa, México, 2021, 272 pp.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:173. PERCHANCE TO DREAM: A REPLY TO TRAIGER1 In "Hume on Memory and Causation" I argued that Hume took ideas of the memory to be relative ideas corresponding to definite descriptions of the general form "the complex impression that is the (original) cause of a particular positive idea m and which exactly (or closely) resembles m, " where 'm' is a variable ranging over positive ideas (mental images). My (...) argument was based primarily upon what I called Hume's formal criterion, i.e., Hume's contention that, unlike the imagination, memory preserves "the same order and form with the original impressions" (T9), it preserves "the original order and position of its ideas" (T85). Saul Traiger has recently taken exception to my interpretation of Hume, suggesting that my interpretation suffers from at least four defects. First, Traiger maintains that there is evidence that Hume took some ideas of the memory to be simple, while my account requires that they are all complex. Secondly, he maintains that my interpretation will not allow Hume to remember dreams or the contents of his imaginings, and Traiger contends that this provides at least prima facie evidence against my interpretation. Thirdly, he maintains that my account of the formal criterion is not sufficient to distinguish ideas of the memory from ideas of the imagination. Finally, he raises several questions regarding the temporal reference of ideas of the memory. I do not believe that any of Traiger's points require a significant modification of my account. I shall begin by discussing his third and fourth points and then focus 2 on his first and second points. 1. Memories and fictions. Traiger suggests that if my account of the formal criterion is correct, the formal criterion is not sufficient to distinguish 174, ideas of the memory from ideas of the imagination, "because there are complex ideas which are caused by resembling complex impressions but which are not memories" (FHAM, p. 170). He illustrates this by appealing to a writer of fiction who might appeal to some of his memories in constructing his fictitious world. Why, then, would not the resulting ideas of fiction count as ideas of the memory, since they meet both the causal conditions and the order and position requirements? The answer is that in the case of an idea of fiction one does not conceive of one's positive idea as a representative of some other perception. It is only because one conceives of the positive idea of which one is aware in memory as a representative of some other particular perception or perceptions that questions of form and order come into play. 2. Temporal reference. At several places in his paper, Traiger raises questions concerning the temporal reference of ideas of the memory. He suggests, first, that Hume's concern with "order" was with temporal order, rather than the order and arrangement of simple ideas in the complex positive component of an idea of the memory (FHAM, p. 168), and, secondly, that "when we remember, we place an impression in its temporal context, its place among a temporal sequence of perceptions" and this "temporal reference is generally not secured by the causal and resemblance relations an idea bears to an antecedent impression" (FHAM, p. 171). Regarding the first of these claims, it is clear that an idea of the memory can be "true" only if it represents a past impression or event, and since Hume construed representation in terms of resemblance (T233), this indicates that at least part of his concern with "order" must be with the arrangement of simple ideas in the complex positive component of an idea of the memory. Were it not for 175. such a correspondence between the "order" of simple ideas in the positive component of one's relative idea of the memory and the "order" of the simple impressions in the original impression, one's idea of the memory could not represent the original impression. Resemblance, however, plays no role in determining what the temporal position of the original impression was, and this brings us to Traiger's second point. Since Hume's account of time would seem to require that one locate a past impression within a series... (shrink)

ABSTRACT:U.S. Organizational Sentencing Guidelines provide firms with incentives to develop formal ethics programs to promote ethical organizational cultures and thereby decrease corporate offenses. Yet critics argue such programs are cosmetic. Here we studied bank employees before and after the introduction of formal ethics training—an important component of formal ethics programs—to examine the effects of training on ethical organizational culture. Two years after a single training session, we find sustained, positive effects on indicators of an ethical organizational culture (observed unethical behavior, (...) intentions to behave ethically, perceptions of organizational efficacy in managing ethics, and the firm’s normative structure). While espoused organizational values also rose in importance post-training, the boost dissipated after the second year which suggests perceptions of values are not driving sustained behavioral improvements. This finding conflicts with past theory which asserts that enduring behavioral improvements arise from the inculcation of organizational values. Implications for future research are discussed. (shrink)

In the section called “Observation of Nature” in the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel considers and criticizes a particular form of methodology which seeks final purposes by analogy. Through this methodology what is essential for thought is the recognition and demarcation of differentiae, which are imputed to natural objects as qualities by which things maintain their distinct and separate character - what Hegel calls their “being-for-self.” By these differentiae, then, the objects are categorized into types, or “natural kinds,” which, in turn, (...) are interpreted by natural philosophers according to a projected teleological system. Hegel’s critique is not aimed primarily at the categorization of objects, but at the method of interpretation used to characterize these categories as purposeful. In particular, Hegel is not criticizing the use of analogy as discussed in the biological writings of Aristotle, but the use of analogy by the transcendental idealists, especially Kant, who employs this method in the Critique of Judgment. (shrink)

A crisis of values underlies the economic uncertainty and anxiety about the future of the United States. The author of this book observes the shift of emphasis from productivity to consumption, from contribution to entitlement, and from long-term investment to short-term gain.

In Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit argues for a Reductionist View of personal identity. According to a Reductionist, persons are nothing over and above the existence of certain mental and/or physical states and their various relations. Given this, Parfit believes that facts about personal identity just consist in more particular facts concerning psychological continuity and/or connectedness, and thus that personal identity can be reduced to this continuity and/or connectedness. Parfit is aware that his view of personal identity is contrary to (...) what many people ordinarily think about persons, and thus if his view is correct, many of us have false beliefs about personal identity. Further, since many of our views about morality are based upon our views about personal identity, it follows that we may also have to change our beliefs about morality as well. Parfit, however, thinks that in many cases such changes represent an improvement over our former beliefs and better fit with our considered moral judgments. But instead, I argue that Parfit’s account poses a serious threat to considered moral judgments, and, in particular, that it seriously undermines any substantial notion of moral commitment. As such, even if Parfit is metaphysically correct, I suggest we may have practical reasons, based on our moral concerns, for holding to a more weighty view of the nature of persons. (shrink)