En el presente trabajo nos proponemos trazar la distinción entre la subjetividad preteórica y el sujeto cognoscente en las lecciones tempranas de Friburgo de Martin Heidegger desde el punto de vista de la función metodológica y el carácter ontológico de la reflexión, en vistas a pensar si se puede hablar de una noción de subjetividad no egológica en el planteo heideggeriano. Entendemos por «subjetividad no egológica», el dominio subjetivo originario de la existencia humana, previo a la constitución del ego. Para (...) nuestro propósito abordamos, en una primera instancia, las nociones de discurso originario y discurso derivado para, en un segundo momento, distinguir la subjetividad preteórica de la subjetividad originaria y analizar, finalmente, si se puede hablar de la presencia de una subjetividad no egológica en Heidegger a partir del análisis del estatus metodológico y ontológico de la reflexión. (shrink)

El propósito de este artículo es presentar una interpretación de la subjetividad en L’Être et le Néant de Jean-Paul Sartre centrada en su carácter prerreflexivo y no egológico. En vistas a ello, me propongo elucidar la concepción de “subjetivi-dad no egológica” que opera en la ontofenomenología existencial de Sartre, mediante un análisis minucioso de las nociones de autoconciencia prerreflexiva, presencia a sí, proyecto fundamental y circuito de la ipseidad. A partir de este análisis, argumento que Sartre logra dar cuenta de (...) la subjetividad como una experiencia fenoménica individualizada sin necesidad de recurrir al “Yo”.In this paper I try to articulate an interpretation of subjectivity in Sartre's L’Être et le Néant focusing on its pre-reflective and non egological features. In order to do this, I suggest to elucidate the notion of "non-egological subjectivity" that takes place in Sartre's existential ontological phenomenology, through a meticulous analysis of the notions of pre-reflective self-consciousness, presence to self, fundamental project and circuit of selfness. I argue that in L’Être et le Néant Sartre manages to deliver an account of subjectivity as a singularized phenomenal experience whithout having to resort to the notion of "Self". (shrink)

Ofrecemos un análisis de los aspectos ontoepistemológicos de los debates actuales sobre el cuerpo sexogenerizado en Argentina. Con herramientas teóricas de la fenomenología feminista, la epistemología feminista y los nuevos materialismos feministas analizamos, por un lado, la manera en que el Estado argentino comprende el cuerpo sexogenerizado y, por el otro, una serie de afirmaciones en los discursos transexcluyentes que conflictúan estas discusiones. Buscamos despejar el terreno conceptual del debate feminista para determinar qué posturas nos permiten avanzar y cuáles nos (...) hacen retroceder. Concluimos que, mientras que las nociones en la ley de identidad de género están amparadas por el conocimiento feminista actual, los discursos transexcluyentes que cuestionan su contenido representan un marco de comprensión ontoepistemológico patriarcal. (shrink)

El artículo ofrece un análisis, desde la epistemología feminista, del Juicio a la Justicia Patriarcal, proceso feminista y latinoamericano llevado adelante por la organización Feministas de Abya Yala. La hipótesis es que esta experiencia constituyó un foco de resistencia epistémica al conjunto de injusticias epistémicas que padecen las mujeres, lesbianas, travestis y trans de América Latina, y que actúan como barreras de acceso a la justicia.

El propósito del presente trabajo consiste en analizar la conexión existente entre feminismo, fenomenología y marxismo, por medio de la exploración de las prácticas de autoconciencia y la teoría del punto de vista feminista. Sostenemos que las prácticas de autoconciencia feminista y su sucedánea teoría del punto de vista feminista se apartaron de sus raíces fenomenológicas y marxistas. Esto contribuyó a la reapropiación de cierta retórica perteneciente a estas prácticas por parte de la ideología capitalista dominante, con un contenido y (...) un propósito sustantivamente diferentes. Afirmamos que para producir teoría situada desde Latinoamérica es necesario partir de la materialidad de la propia experiencia. Para esto, reivindicamos las raíces fenomenológicas y marxistas de las prácticas de autoconciencia y las teorías del punto de vista feminista. Finalmente, argumentamos que es posible recuperar la impronta revolucionaria de estas prácticas, en el marco del paradigma del feminismo post-identitario e interseccional actual, en especial, en su expresión latinoamericana. (shrink)

El artículo presenta una reconstrucción del método del psicoanálisis existencial sartriano especificando su finalidad, campo de aplicación, y provee un análisis interpretativo de su necesidad dentro del desarrollo de la ontología sartriana. Se defenderá que la meta del psicoanálisis existencial es el acaecimiento de la reflexión pura, la cual abre la posibilidad del reconocimiento del proyecto fundamental y la conversión existencial. El análisis se basa en una lectura de El ser y la nada que toma como concepto central a la (...) noción de “deseo”. (shrink)

En este breve comentario discuto algunos aspectos de la interpretación de la epistemología de Davidson que sugiere Willian Duica en su reciente libro. Luego de una presentación somera del libro me centro en tres asuntos centrales de la interpretación de Duica. En primer lugar, argumento que su lectura de la crítica de Davidson al dualismo esquema/contenido es muy restrictiva y deja abierta la posibilidad de un realismo directo empirista. En segundo lugar, argumento que en su lectura el propio Duica se (...) compromete inadvertidamente con un empirismo de este tipo y, de este modo, su interpretación entra en tensión con el coherentismo de Davidson. Finalmente, discuto algunos aspectos de la interpretación que hace Duica de la tesis davidsoniana de la triangulación. In this short comment I discuss some aspects of William Duica's interpretation of Davidson's epistemology in a recent book. After a brief review of the book, I focus on three central issues of Duica's interpretation. First, I argue that his reading of Davidson's criticism of the scheme/content dualism is too restrictive and leaves open the possibility of an empiricist direct realism. Second, I argue in his reading Duica inadvertently commits himself to an empiricism of this sort and, as a result, his interpretation is in tension with Davidson's own coherentism. Finally, I discuss some aspects of Duica's interpretation of Davidsonian triangulation. (shrink)

La celebración del quincuagésimo aniversario de la Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico se dio en el marco, como es usual en estos casos especiales, de la realización de una edición extraordinaria del tradicional Coloquio Anual de la institución. Para tales fines, la Comisión Directiva conformó un Comité Organizador, del cual tuve el honor de formar parte junto con Leandro Giri, Nicolás Lo Guercio, Andrea Melamed, Danila Suárez Tomé, Damián Szmuc y Paula Teijeiro. Desde el inicio pensamos que el coloquio (...) debía tener un cariz diferente, que fuera la ocasión para que la Sociedad hiciera una revisión de su historia y proyectara su continuidad. En función de tales objetivos se decidió que el Coloquio estuviera conformado por tres instancias. La primera sería una serie de paneles en los que representantes de los diversos grupos de investigación activos de la sociedad dieran cuenta de su visión acerca del pasado, el presente y el futuro en SADAF del área de la filosofía en la que se han especializado. La segunda instancia se desplegaría a través de diversas mesas redondas donde se reflexionaría sobre la historia de diversos aspectos institucionales de la sociedad. Por último, habría una convocatoria abierta que tenía una particularidad: los trabajos a presentar debían ser comentarios críticos de artículos originalmente publicados en la revista de la institución: Análisis Filosófico. De esta manera se pretendía generar las condiciones para una autorreflexión colectiva del significado de SADAF en sus 50 años de existencia como punto de partida para pensar los desafíos filosóficos, metafilosóficos e institucionales por venir. (shrink)

Ensayo -- Palabras finales -- Selección de textos.

O objectivo principal deste artigo consiste em chamar a atenção para os problemas levantados pela ausência de quaestiones anexas a Metafísica XII. Partindo de uma série de remissões explícitas para temas a desenvolver no contexto daquele escrito aristotélico, feitas por Fonseca em vários passos que ocorrem nos tomos I, II e III dos seus Comentários à Metafísica de Aristóteles, constata-se que era intenção sua desenvolver, naquele lugar, temas ligados ao discurso filosófico sobre Deus, seus atributos, omnipotência e librerdade divinas, contingência (...) bem como tudo o que se refere às "substâncias separadas". Insto indica claramente que a metafísica de Fonseca se encontra inacabada no sentido em que não chegou a ser publicado o texto sobreum núcleo doutrinal importante, projectado desde o início da redacçã dos CMA para ser publicado no quarto tomo. Este facto deve ser tido em consideração em qualquer tentativa de interpretação global do pensamento de Fonseca e, sobretudo, na comparação com outras ontologias efectivamente acabadas, no sentido indicado. Suárez é o caso mais óbvio mas não o único. /// L'objectif principal de cet article consiste à attirer l'attention sur les problèmes posés par l'absence de quaestiones annexes à la Métaphysique XII. En partant d'une série de renvois explicites vers des thèmes à développer dans le contexte de cet écrit aristotélicien, renvois faits par Fonseca à plusieurs endroits des tomes 1, 2 et 3 de ses Commentaires à la Métaphysique d'Aristote, on constate que son intention était de développer, à cet endroit, des thèmes liés au discours philosophique sur Dieu, sur ses attributs, toute-puissance et liberté divines, à la contingence ainsi qu'à tout ce qui se rapporte aux "substances séparées". Cela signifie clairement que la Métaphysique de Fonseca se trouve inachevée au sens où n'a pas réussi à être publié le texte sur un point doctrinal important projeté dès le début de la rédaction des C.M.A. pour être publié dans le quatrième tome. Ce fait doit été tenu en ligne de compte dans toute tentative d'interprétation globale de la pensée de Fonseca et, surtout, dans comparaison avec d'autres ontologies effectivement achevées, au sens indiqué. Suarez est le cas le plus net, mais non le seul. /// This paper starts from the fact that the 4th volume of Fonseca's Commentariorum in Meiaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae libros (CMA) contains no quaestiones to Met. XII. An analysis of several explicit remissions to topics and questions to be developed in the context of that Aristotelian script (Met. XII), made by Fonseca in several places in volumes I, II and HI of his CMA, reveals that his project was, from the beginning, to develop in the IV volume the subjects related to the philosophical discourse about God, divine attributes, omnipotence and freedom, contingency as well as to the 'separate substances'. This indicates clearly that the metaphysics of Fonseca remained unfinished given the fact that the text on an important thematic cluster was not published not withstanding the inclusion of such text in the original project of Fonseca. It is sustained that this fact should be taken in due consideration in any global interpretation of Fonseca's thought as well as in any comparison with other (finished) ontologies. Suárez is the most obvious case but not the only one. (shrink)

Abstract: It is often assumed without argument that fictionalism in the philosophy of science contradicts scientific realism. This paper is a critical analysis of this assumption. The kind of fictionalism that is at present discussed in philosophy of science is characterised, and distinguished from fictionalism in other areas. A distinction is then drawn between forms of fictional representation, and two competing accounts of fiction in science are discussed. I then outline explicitly what I take to be the argument for the (...) incompatibility of scientific realism with fictionalism. I argue that some of its premises are unwarranted, and are moreover questionable from a fictionalist perspective. The conclusion is that fictionalism is neutral in the realism-antirealism debate, pulling neither in favour nor against scientific realism. (shrink)

In a cultural setting in which the imitation of nature continues to be regulated by the ambitious project to cancel the dividing line between the natural and the artificial, man continues to find space for his replicative fantasies, even at the cost of breaking cultural boundaries and taboos. On the other hand, as shown in the historical analogy, this ambition, aimed not only at a partial reproduction but a true replication, seems to exhibit developmental contours that lead to the same (...) final results in terms of disillusionment and subsequent abandonment. (shrink)

Although robots are largely designed with industrial, scientific or military aims in mind, many designers seek to endow them with anthropomorphic forms, even at the risk of compromising their functionality. Why do they not content themselves with constructing useful machines, rather than also incorporating human-like features? What drives them to cover their machines with a latex coating to simulate human skin? The utopia of the creation of a double appears also in the world of art, the history of which shows, (...) above all, an outcome that coincides with the abandonment of the naturalistic imperative, and the inauguration of various periods of exploration and innovation. That is why a possible roboaesthetics—i.e. robotics and aesthetics combined could give rise to a new scenario. This view would acknowledges the radical novelty of these ‘species’ and induce the adoption of a new observation level, constructed on the basis of a common project. (shrink)

The role of cultural models in the process of adaptation to the new technologies is very different according to different civilizations. Some basic cultural items seem to be particularly crucial, such as, for example, the levels of pragmatism or rationalism which characterize a civilization or some periods of its history. This paper presents a sketch aimed at setting up a comparison between Western and Eastern cultures facing the problem of adapting to new technologies. The concept ofcold utilitarianism is introduced. It (...) allows a way of defining adaptation which is only partial and contradictory in Western culture, while it completely describes, though perhaps provisionally, the Eastern way of making and using technology. (shrink)

It is shown that the before-before (or Suarez-Scarani) experiment refutes hidden variable models with a deterministic (“realistic”) nonlocal part, whereas experiments violating Leggett-type inequalities refute models with biased random local part. Therefore the claim that Gröblacher et al. (Nature 446:871–875, 2007) present “an experimental test of nonlocal realism” is misleading, and Marek Żukowski’s (Found. Phys. 38:1070, 2008) comment misses the point. A new experiment is suggested.

On a purely epistemic understanding of experimental realism, manipulation affords a particularly robust kind of causal warrant, which is – like any other warrant – defeasible. I defend a version of Nancy Cartwright’s inference to the most likely cause, and I conclude that this minimally epistemic version of experimental realism is a coherent, adequate and plausible epistemology for science.

L'index detaille de la Metaphysique d'Aristote publie en 1597 par Suarez, constitue une introduction aux Disputes metaphysiques. Il a pour objectif de produire les conditions d'un renouvellement de l'heritage de la Metaphysique d'Aristote en redefinissant le contenu et les limites d'une science de l'etant.Le projet de refondation de la metaphysique comme ontologie s'effectue dans cet ouvrage de presentation en quatre moments:1) L'exposition du probleme de la nature de la connaissance qui implique le depassement de l'equivocite de la notion de sagesse.2) (...) La determination de l'objet, des proprietes et des principes veritables de la metaphysique en tant que science de l'universel, c'est a dire de l'etantite de l'etant selon son abstraction la plus extreme.3) La redefinition du statut de la realite a partir d'une theorie de la representation de l'objet qui fasse abstraction de l'objet, c'est a dire qui procede a l'indifferenciation des etants afin d'en donner une representation universelle et abstraite; ainsi est affirme le primat d'une ontologie de l'essence sur toute ontotheologie.4) Enfin, la mise en place d'un systeme de reference transcendantal rendant possible une fondation universelle de la comprehension de l'etant par la mediation d'une theorie du concept.L'index prefigure ainsi, par son ambition et sa demarche, ce que Heidegger nommera, en evoquant la philosophie de Suarez, l'avenement du "caractere fondamental de la metaphysique moderne". (shrink)

This paper defends an inferential conception of scientific representation. It approaches the notion of representation in a deflationary spirit, and minimally characterizes the concept as it appears in science by means of two necessary conditions: its essential directionality and its capacity to allow surrogate reasoning and inference. The conception is defended by showing that it successfully meets the objections that make its competitors, such as isomorphism and similarity, untenable. In addition the inferential conception captures the objectivity of the cognitive representations (...) used by science, it sheds light on their truth and completeness, and it explains the source of the analogy between scientific and artistic modes of representation. (shrink)

This Element has two main aims. The first one is an historically informed review of the philosophy of probability. It describes recent historiography, lays out the distinction between subjective and objective notions, and concludes by applying the historical lessons to the main interpretations of probability. The second aim focuses entirely on objective probability, and advances a number of novel theses regarding its role in scientific practice. A distinction is drawn between traditional attempts to interpret chance, and a novel methodological study (...) of its application. A radical form of pluralism is then introduced, advocating a tripartite distinction between propensities, probabilities and frequencies. Finally, a distinction is drawn between two different applications of chance in statistical modelling which, it is argued, vindicates the overall methodological approach. The ensuing conception of objective probability in practice is the 'complex nexus of chance'. (shrink)

This paper critically reviews Philip Kitcher's most recent epistemology of science, real realism . I argue that this view is unstable under different understandings of the term 'representation', and that the arguments offered for the position are either unsound or invalid depending on the understanding employed. Suitably modified those arguments are however convincing in favor of a deflationary version of real realism, which I refer to as the bare view . The bare view accepts Kitcher's Galilean strategy, and the ensuing (...) commitment to the existence of unobservables; but it does not trade on a correspondence or copy theory of representation. So the bare view, unlike real realism, does not entail that our representations match reality even approximately. (shrink)

In this special issue we explore practices of scientific inquiry into human populations in Latin America in order to generate new insights into the complex historical and sociopolitical dynamics that have made certain human groups integral to the production of scientific knowledge in and about the region. In important contributions, other scholars have shown that the science of human difference is racist and all too often has been a mediator of development ideologies. To further unpack these arguments we focus attention (...) on the complex interaction between scientists and the populations they study. We explore cases from across the fields of evolutionary biology, demography, epidemiology... (shrink)

Kant and Heidegger argue that our subjectivity escapes scientific explanation, while also providing the conditions that enable it. This understanding of the relationship between subjectivity and science places limits on the explanatory scope of the sciences. But what makes transcendental reflection on the structure of subjectivity possible in the first place? Fink argues that transcendental philosophy encounters its own limits in attempting to characterize its own conditions of possibility. I argue that the limits of science and transcendental philosophy entail that (...) nature cannot be conceived as a specific object, or as a totality of objects in the world, but only as the ontological ground of phenomenal manifestation in general. Nature is not identical with anything discoverable in either science or phenomenology; it is, rather, the origin from which discovery of phenomena proceeds. (shrink)

1Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, 9 Woodland Road, Bristol BS8 1TB, UKScience Without Laws Ronald Giere Chicago, IL University of Chicago Press 1999 x + 285 Hardback£17.50.

Johannes Kepler dedicated much of his work to discover a law for the refraction of light. Unfortunately, he formulated an incorrect law. Nevertheless, it was useful for anticipating the behavior of light in some specific conditions. Some believe that Kepler did not have the elements to formulate the law that was later accepted by the scientific community, that is, the Snell–Descartes law. However, in this paper, we propose a model that agrees with Kepler’s heuristics and that is also successful in (...) anticipating the behavior of light when it passes through a surface that separates two media with different optical densities. This model adopts strategies that were recommended by Kepler in two types of analogies. The obstacles that led to the failure of the two types of analogies are presented in the article, and we argue that the model proposed here could overcome these specific obstacles. Finally, we show how the proposed model could be articulated with Kepler’s metaphysics of light. (shrink)

There has been an intense discussion, albeit largely an implicit one, concerning the inference of causal hypotheses from statistical correlations in quantum mechanics ever since John Bell’s first statement of his notorious theorem in 1966. As is well known, its focus has mainly been the so-called Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (“EPR”) thought experiment, and the ensuing observed correlations in real EPR like experiments. But although implicitly the discussion goes as far back as Bell’s work, it is only in the last two decades that (...) it has become recognizably and explicitly a debate about causal inference in the quantum realm. The bulk of this paper is devoted to a review of three influential arguments in the philosophical literature that aim to show that causal models for the EPR correlations are impossible, due to Bas Van Fraassen, Daniel Hausman and Huw Price. I contend that all these arguments are inconclusive since they contain premises or presuppositions that are false, unwarranted, or at least controversial. Five different common cause models are outlined that seem perfectly viable for the EPR correlations. These models are then employed to illustrate various difficulties with the premises and presuppositions underlying Van Fraassen’s, Hausman’s and Price’s arguments. In all these cases it is argued that the difficulties cut deep against these authors’ own theories of causation and causal inference. My conclusions are that causal models for the EPR correlations remain viable, that philosophical work is still required to assess their relative virtues, and that in any case the mere theoretical conceivability and empirical possibility of these models sheds doubts over Van Fraassen’s, Hausman’s and (important elements in) Price’s theories of causation and causal inference. (shrink)

: This paper outlines a genuinely pragmatist conception of propensity, and defends it against common objections to the propensity interpretation of probability, prominently Humphreys’ paradox. The paper reviews the paradox and identifies one of its key assumptions, the identity thesis, according to which propensities are probabilities. The identity thesis is also involved in empiricist propensity interpretations deriving from Popper’s influential original proposal, and makes such interpretations untenable. As an alternative, I urge a return to Charles Peirce’s original insights on probabilistic (...) dispositions, and offer a reconstructed version of his pragmatist conception, which rejects the identity thesis. – Correspondence to: [email protected]. (shrink)

En el artículo se ofrece un análisis crítico de la misión como inculturación del Evangelio, desde una perspectiva filosófico-teológica. Para comenzar, se exponen las deficiencias de la evangelización colonizadora en América. Posteriormente, se proponen dos posibles sentidos de la plantatio ecclesiae como meta de la misión. En tercer lugar, se esclarece la manera en la que se entiende la relación entre Evangelio y cultura en la Nueva Evangelización. La tesis por demostrar es que el principal problema al que está expuesta (...) la inculturación del Evangelio es la idolatría. (shrink)

In this paper we claim that the notion of cognitive representation (and scientific representation in particular) is irreducibly plural. By means of an analogy with the minimalist conception of truth, we show thatthis pluralism is compatible with a generally deflationary attitude towards representation. We then explore the extent and nature of representational pluralism by discussing the positive and negative analogies between the inferential conception of representation advocated by one of us and the minimalist conception of truth.

Los medios digitales se caracterizan por ofrecer multitud de herramientas interactivas a la audiencia. Sin embargo, es el usuario quien decide cuál es su grado de participación y qué uso hace de ellas. En este artículo analizamos el caso de la Fórmula 1 en los cibermedios valencianos y observamos dos tipos de usuarios: usuario activo y usuario pasivo. El usuario activo prefiere participar en las noticias más polémicas y escribe comentarios, mayoritariamente, cuando no está de acuerdo con el punto de (...) vista de la información. Es decir, mantiene una actitud combativa. Por su parte, el usuario pasivo consume noticias que aborden temas más ligeros y cuando lee noticias politizadas, escoge el encuadre que le refuerza ideológicamente. (shrink)