Some religiously devout individuals believe divine command can override an obligation to obey the law where the two are in conflict. At the extreme, some individuals believe that acts of violence that seek to change or punish a political community, or to prevent others from violating what they take to be God’s law, are morally justified. In the face of this apparent clash between religious and political commitments it might seem that modern versions of political morality—such as John Rawls’s political (...) liberalism—that refuse to take a stance on controversial religious matters, or eschew appeal to perfectionist doctrines, are beset by a particularly acute version of this problem of religious disobedience. Whilst political liberalism follows this path so as to generate wide and stable support, it raises the question of how political liberals should respond to religiously motivated non-compliance with the norms of that liberal conception of justice. This article evaluates what resources are available to political liberalism to respond to this challenge. It examines whether anti-perfectionism can be sustained in the face of those whose religious beliefs are in conflict with the law. We argue that, under certain circumstances, political liberalism requires direct engagement with the religious views of the unreasonable, including offering religious arguments to show that their particular interpretation of their faith is mistaken. This view takes political liberalism away from its usual ambitions, but it is a position that is both anticipated by Rawls and consistent with his view. It does, however, require that political liberals give up the claim that the view is a wholly non-sectarian, purely political view, and accept that, under certain circumstances it is a partially comprehensive version of liberal theory. (shrink)

In this paper we take issue with two central claims that John Tomasi makes in Free Market Fairness. The first claim is that Rawls’s difference principle can better be realized by free market institutions than it can be by state interventionist regimes such as property-owning democracy or liberal socialism. We argue that Tomasi’s narrow interpretation of the difference principle, which focuses largely on wealth and income, leaves other goods worryingly unsatisfied. The second claim is that a wide set of economic (...) liberties ought to be protected because they realize responsible ‘self-authorship.’ We argue that this claim also fails because, crucially, whether economic liberties serve individuals in pursuing their ambitions will depend on the nature of those ambitions and how the use of those liberties by others would affect their pursuit of them. If an expansion of liberty is good for us in some ways, but bad in others, we need to assess whether, all things considered, we would be better off with or without such expanded economic rights. We argue that the expansion Tomasi proposes is likely to fail this test. (shrink)

Aircraft with increasingly high performance were important to the war effort in World War II. Changes in technology allowed aircraft to reach faster speeds and to complete missions at higher altitudes. With these changes came new obstacles for pilots who had to tolerate these stresses. Of primary concern to the U.S. War Department was the loss of consciousness that often occurred with high-speed maneuvers and especially during pull-up after dive-bombing missions. In some cases, pilots would experience up to 9G of (...) force during rapid ascent, much more than the 6G threshold that typically leads to loss of consciousness. In 1941, a research team in Red Wing, MN, proposed experiments to elucidate the mechanism .. (shrink)

Methods to facilitate co-production in mental health are important for engaging end users. As part of the Technology for Healthy Aging and Wellbeing initiative we organized two interactive co-production workshops, to bring together older adults, health and social care professionals, non-governmental organizations, and researchers. In the first workshop, we used two activities: Technology Interaction and Scavenger Hunt, to explore the potential for different stakeholders to discuss late life mental health and existing technology. In the second workshop, we used Vignettes, Scavenger (...) Hunt, and Invention Test to examine how older adults and other stakeholders might co-produce solutions to support mental wellbeing in later life using new and emerging technologies. In this paper, we share the interactive materials and activities and consider their value for co-production. Overall, the interactive methods were successful in engaging stakeholders with a broad range of technologies to support mental health and wellbeing and in co-producing ideas for how they could be leveraged and incorporated into older people’s lives and support services. We offer this example of using interactive methods to facilitate co-production to encourage greater involvement of older adults and other under-represented groups in co-producing mental health technologies and services. (shrink)

In his book, The Grounds of Moral Judgment, Russell Grice argues for a thesis he calls "the contract ground thesis," which connects the interest of members of a group in making a contract to the existence of an obligation and reason to abide by that contract. This thesis has been challenged by Jesse Kalin and subsequently defended by Grice. We show that Grice's defense fails--the contract ground thesis is without justification.

Clayton Chin provides a helpful reconstruction of Rorty’s philosophy that aims to show its usefulness for political thought, while also shedding light on its relationships with Continental philosophy and on Rorty’s reading strategy employed in relation to some Continental thinkers. In relation to the first aim, Chin argues convincingly that Rorty’s primary contribution to political thought is located at the meta-theoretical level, by which he means the level at which questions may be asked about the nature and purpose of (...) political theorizing. I agree with much of Chin’s account of the nature and value of Rorty’s meta-theoretical approach. I am less convinced by Chin’s account of Rorty’s relations with Continental philosophy and the reading strategies employed in his discussions of those with whom he engaged. There are a number of reasons for this. First, he confines his discussion to a handful of figures that he groups under the heading of ontological approaches to politics and political theory: primarily Martin Heidegger and William Connolly, but also Foucault and Jürgen Habermas. Second, This is the asymmetry in the way in which Rorty is treated compared to the discussion of these interlocutors. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the psychological process of selectively attending to one source of information to the exclusion of others. In a meta-analysis, it reviews different tasks used to study selective attention, under the construct of conflict resolution, as assessed with functional imaging techniques. Both the anterior cingulate cortex and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex are involved in some aspect of conflict resolution, which is likely related to different mechanisms. The theme of heterogeneity of function is reflected in these results.

The specific heat of hydrogen gas at low temperatures was first measured in 1912 by Arnold Eucken in Walther Nernst’s laboratory in Berlin, and provided one of the earliest experimental supports for the new quantum theory. Even earlier, Nernst had developed a quantum theory of rotating diatomic gas molecules that figured in the discussions at the first Solvay conference in late 1911. Between 1913 and 1925, Albert Einstein, Paul Ehrenfest, Max Planck, Fritz Reiche, and Erwin Schrödinger, among many others, attempted (...) theoretical descriptions of the rotational specific heat of hydrogen, with only limited success. Quantum theory also was central to the study of molecular spectra, where initially it was more successful. Moreover, the two problems interacted in sometimes surprising ways. Not until 1927, following Werner Heisenberg’s discovery of the behavior of indistinguishable particles in modern quantum mechanics, did American theorist David Dennison find a successful theory of the specific heat of hydrogen. (shrink)

Recent reports of the discovery of a “God module” in the human brain derive from the fact that epileptic seizures in the left temporal lobe are associated with ecstatic feelings sometimes described as an experience of the presence of God. The brain area involved has been described as either (a) the seat of an innate human faculty for experiencing the divine or (b) the seat of religious delusions.In fact, religious experience is extremely various and involves many parts of the brain, (...) including some that are prehuman in their evolutionary history and some that are characteristically human. In the continuing integration of such experiences, spiritual formation takes place. Thus the entire human brain might be described as a “God module.”Such a process is only possible because of the brain's complexity. The human brain is the most complex entity for its size that we know of. As used here, complexity is a specialized term denoting the presence of a web of interlinked and significant connections—the more intricate the web, the more complex the entity. Complex systems develop only in a milieu that provides both lawfulness and freedom, and they tend to be self‐organizing, becoming more complex and more effective as a result of both inward and outward experience. The evidence suggests that both personal growth and spiritual growth are processes of complexification of character, and of the brain itself. This thesis is tested in light of the work of William James and James W. Fowler. (shrink)

Panentheism has often been put forward as a means for bringing theology and science into dialogue, perhaps even resolving some of the major tensions between them. A variety of “faces” of panentheism are distinguished, including conservative, metaphysical, apophatic, and naturalist panentheisms. This series of increasingly radical panentheisms is explored, each one bringing its own core commitments, and each describing very different relationships between religion and science. We consider, for example, the diverse ways that the radical panentheisms construe emergent phenomena in (...) the natural world. In the end, comparing the increasingly radical forms of panentheism yields a new understanding of the state of the religion/science dialogue today. (shrink)

In this article Clayton Pierce reviews three books representative of the recent neo-Marxist literature on education: David Blacker's The Falling Rate of Learning and the Neoliberal Endgame, John Marsh's Class Dismissed: Why We Cannot Teach or Learn Our Way out of Inequality, and Pauline Lipman's The New Political Economy of Urban Education: Neoliberalism, Race, and the Right to the City. His analysis of these books focuses on how each author remains consistent or advances traditional Marxist interpretations of the (...) role of education in capitalist society. In addition, he puts the arguments of each author into conversation with W. E. B. Du Bois's analysis of schooling in a racial capitalist society — what he called caste education — as a way to generate discussion around some of the inherent limitations of Marxist studies of education. Here, Pierce is particularly concerned with the ability of neo-Marxist analyses of the neoliberal restructuring of education to articulate how white supremacy is preserved even in revolutionary critiques of capitalist schooling. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 30.1 (2006) 299-309 [Access article in PDF] Conscious Fiction Mary Clayton Coleman Bard College Consciousness and the Novel: Connected Essays, by David Lodge; 320 pp. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002, $24.95 boards, $16.95 paper. Fictional Minds, by Alan Palmer; 275 pp. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2004, $45.00. Radiant Cool: A Novel Theory of Consciousness, by Dan Lloyd; 357 pp. Cambridge, (...) Mass.: The MIT Press, 2004, $24.95 boards, $14.95 paper. What contributions can fiction make to the representation and investigation of conscious experience? Might fiction help us to develop and advance new theories about the nature of consciousness? And might such theories, in turn, inform our understanding of the process of reading fiction? Three recent volumes—one by English critic and novelist, David Lodge; another by literary theorist, Alan Palmer; and a third by philosopher and (now) novelist, Dan Lloyd—raise these important, genre-bending questions, and they offer challenging if not always convincing answers to them. More generally, these volumes make valuable contributions to the fruitful cross-pollination that has developed between philosophers, scientists, literary theorists, and novelists who are interested in the nature of consciousness.Lodge's new collection of essays is called Consciousness and the Novel: Connected Essays, and like all of the criticism he has written since the late eighties, this volume is intended for a general audience, not for [End Page 299] literary theorists. The title essay, "Consciousness and the Novel," is a revised version of the Richard Ellman Lectures in Modern Literature that Lodge gave at Emory University in 2001, and the other nine essays, all previously published, cover such topics as Howards End; the novels of Evelyn Waugh; The Letters of Kingsley Amis; Martin Amis's memoir, Experience; and the relationship between literature and criticism. I will focus on "Consciousness and the Novel."Lodge's thesis in this essay is that novels play an essential role in our exploration of the nature of human consciousness. This thesis is certainly true, but it is also entirely banal. Much more interesting is what Lodge says in support of it. He argues that because of the unique representative possibilities of the novel, conscious experiences can be represented more effectively in novels than they can be in scientific writing. Taken literally, as an assertion about the relative representational power of novels and scientific discourse, this is extremely implausible. However, taken more loosely—as an invitation to those of us interested in consciousness to take a closer look at the ways conscious experiences are represented in novels—Lodge's claim is sensible and appealing. I will consider the literal reading of Lodge's claim first and then turn to the looser one.It is undoubtedly true that, as a whole, novelists devote more energy to representing conscious experiences than writers of scientific discourse do. However, science writers can use whatever techniques best serve their aims, including the aim of describing conscious experiences, so there is no reason to think that conscious experiences can, in principle, be represented more effectively in novels than in broadly scientific discourse. Given that Lodge discusses such creative science writers as Antonio Damasio, Daniel Dennett, and Steven Pinker in the course of his essay, it is surprising and disappointing to find him caricature scientific writing in the following way: "science... is a third-person discourse. The first-person pronoun is not used in scientific papers. If there were any hint of qualia in a scientific paper... it would be edited out" (p. 11). Qualia are the supposedly subjective qualitative aspects of conscious experiences. How the plucked string of a cello sounds to you; how the rotting fish in the garbage smells to you; and how it feels for you to inch down into the smooth, almost-too-hot water of a perfect bubble bath—these are all (supposedly) examples of qualia. Lodge is simply mistaken when he says that there is no hint of qualia in scientific writing. There is no consensus about whether qualia can be explained scientifically. In fact, there is no consensus about whether they exist. [End Page... (shrink)

Several authors, including Thomas Nagel and David Gauthier, have defended the view that reasons of self-interest (prudential reasons) are rationally binding. That is, there is always a reason, bearing on the rational advisability, based on one's self-interest and, as a result, a person may act irrationally by knowingly acting against such reasons regardless of the person's desires or values. Both Nagel and Gauthier argue from the rationally mandatory nature of prudential reasons to the conclusion that moral reasons can be (...) rationally mandatory, challenging the neo-Humean position that practical reasons that bear on an agent's rationality are essentially grounded on the agent's subjective, contingent, conative states. I argue, pace Nagel and Gauthier, that prudential reasons are not rationally mandatory--that the rational requirement to act in one's own interest, when it exists, is, as the neo-Humean insists, grounded on one's subjective, contingent, conative states. Prudential reasons are not reasons for every (conceivable) agent--not in the sense that bears on the rational advisability of action. (shrink)

Human life has special importance. Human decisions must be granted special respect. It is natural to see these claims as connected. It seems likely that human life has value because human beings possess a unique capacity for self-determination. David Velleman’s argument that the nature of autonomy provides us with a prima facie case against the morally permissibility of suicide, at least in most cases, rests on highly questionable premises. Nonetheless, it does point to the importance of a proper understanding (...) of seemingly arcane notions like the self and autonomy in giving principled and systematic answers to practical moral dilemmas. I will argue here that his case against suicide relies on a Kantian understanding of the nature of the self, and consequently of the nature of autonomy and how it should be respected. (shrink)

Conscious technology features in many Black Mirror episodes. For example, there are the cookies in White Christmas, the people uploaded into the San Junipero simulation, Robert Daly's digital copies of his coworkers in USS Callister, and the copy of Clayton Leigh that is exhibited in Black Museum. But would such pieces of technology really be conscious? Would they, for example, feel pain? And how could we tell? Is uploading or replicating someone's consciousness even possible? This chapter explores these questions (...) and discusses the ethical issues that are raised by consciousness technology. (shrink)

Selon une thèse populaire en épistémologie contemporaine, une croyance est justifiée si, et seulement si, elle est une connaissance. Les défenseurs de cette thèse soutiennent également que la connaissance est la norme fondamentale de la croyance et que la conformité à cette norme est à la fois nécessaire et suffisante pour la justification. Je conteste l’affirmation selon laquelle la simple conformité à une norme suffit à justifier une croyance. La justification exige la conformité pour des raisons suffisantes et «invaincues» (undefeated). (...) Une conséquence de ceci est le rejet de la thèse selon laquelle la conformité à la norme de la croyance est nécessaire et suffisante pour la justification épistémique. (shrink)

The interconnections between self and surroundings in Daoist thought have been explored in the past in a variety of contexts. This paper, however, explores the Daoist version of the relational self from the general perspective of chaos theory and, more specifically, examines the role of the self in creating emergent form and dynamism in nature and society. The fractal self and world merge through the disciplined effort of the sage until the effort becomes effortless. Both self and world are transformed (...) and become one through the emergent moment. This moment represents a new opportunity for subsequent patterns, or attractors, to emerge. We suggest that the self folds itself into the world, creating and being created by a new attractor, or pattern, in the organization of nature, which we argue is Dao. Our current investigation addresses the following aspects of chaos theory and its relation to Daoism: (1) the Daoist notion of wuwei as perfect congruence; (2) yin and yang at the edge of chaos; (3) the emergent nature of the myriad things; and (4) a Daoist warning against fractal disconnections in the world. Finally, we conclude that the self has the potential to become the world. To approach this amplified condition, the self must dedicate itself to and risk open engagement with events across the complexity of nature. Through openly engaging the world, the self is transformed, leaving the world forever changed. (shrink)

Algorithmic probability and friends: Proceedings of the Ray Solomonoff 85th memorial conference is a collection of original work and surveys. The Solomonoff 85th memorial conference was held at Monash University's Clayton campus in Melbourne, Australia as a tribute to pioneer, Ray Solomonoff, honouring his various pioneering works - most particularly, his revolutionary insight in the early 1960s that the universality of Universal Turing Machines could be used for universal Bayesian prediction and artificial intelligence. This work continues to increasingly influence (...) and under-pin statistics, econometrics, machine learning, data mining, inductive inference, search algorithms, data compression, theories of intelligence and philosophy of science - and applications of these areas. Ray not only envisioned this as the path to genuine artificial intelligence, but also, still in the 1960s, anticipated stages of progress in machine intelligence which would ultimately lead to machines surpassing human intelligence. Ray warned of the need to anticipate and discuss the potential consequences - and dangers - sooner rather than later. Possibly foremostly, Ray Solomonoff was a fine, happy, frugal and adventurous human being of gentle resolve who managed to fund himself while electing to conduct so much of his paradigm-changing research outside of the university system. The volume contains 35 papers pertaining to the abovementioned topics in tribute to Ray Solomonoff and his legacy. (shrink)

According to epistemological disjunctivism (ED), ordinary perceptual experience ensures an opportunity for perceptual knowledge. In recent years, two distinct models of this idea have been developed. For Duncan Pritchard (Epistemological disjunctivism, 2012, Oxford University Press; Epistemic angst: Radical skepticism and the groundlessness of our believing, 2012, Princeton University Press), perception provides distinctly powerful reasons for belief. By contrast, Clayton Littlejohn (Journal of Philosophical Research, 41, 201; Knowledge first, 2017, Oxford University Press; Normativity: Epistemic and practical, 2018, Oxford University Press) (...) and Alan Millar (The nature and value of knowledge: Three investigations, 2010, Oxford University Press; Philosophical Issues, 21, 332) argue for a version of ED in terms of a “knowledge first” program, on which perception directly provides knowledge, without relying on antecedent reasons or justification. Specifically, both Littlejohn and Millar argue that “reasons first” ED faces a problematic regress. In this article, I defend “reasons first” ED by arguing that experience provides a type of reason that escapes the regress. I also argue that reasons are a fundamental aspect of ED, especially in its anti-skeptical stance. (shrink)

Matthew Clayton, David Stevens and Laura D’Olimpio have advanced a series of objections to arguments I set out in my recent book A Theory of Moral Education – in particular to the problem-of-sociality justification for basic moral standards. Here I reply to their objections.

John Tillson concludes the symposium on his Children, Religion and the Ethics of Influence by replying to his five respondents. The reply focusses on Michael Hand’s defence of parental rights to raise their children in their faith; Ruth Wareham’s suggestion that the value of autonomy rules out a wider range of impermissible religious influences than Tillson’s account is able to; David Lewin’s alternative criteria for ethical influence and scepticism about rationality’s objectivity; Anca Gheaus’ proposal that initiation into multiple contradictory (...) religious faiths is permissible; and Matthew Clayton’s rejection of the book’s perfectionist political morality. (shrink)

This article examines the process theodicies of David Ray Griffin and Philip Clayton. It explains their differences on such issues as God’s primordial power and voluntary self-limitation, creativity as an independent metaphysical principle that limits God, creation out of nothing or out of chaos, and God’s voluntary causal naturalism. Difficulties with their positions are discussed. The Clayton-Knapp “no-not-once” principle is explained, and a more comprehensive process theodicy is outlined.

A provocative case for the inherently political nature of language In The Politics of Language, David Beaver and Jason Stanley present a radical new approach to the theory of meaning, offering an account of communication in which political and social identity, affect, and shared practices play as important a role as information. This new view of language, they argue, has dramatic consequences for free speech, democracy, and a range of other areas in which speech plays a central role. Drawing (...) on a wealth of disciplines, The Politics of Language argues that the function of speech—whether in dialogue, larger group interactions, or mass communication—is to attune people to something, be it a shared reality, emotion, or identity. Reconceptualizing the central ideas of pragmatics and semantics, Beaver and Stanley apply their account to a range of phenomena that defy standard frameworks in linguistics and philosophy of language—from dog whistles and covert persuasion to echo chambers and genocidal speech. The authors use their framework to show that speech is inevitably political because all communication is imbued with the resonances of particular ideologies and their normative perspectives on reality. At a time when democracy is under attack, authoritarianism is on the rise, and diversity and equality are being demanded, The Politics of Language offers a powerful new vision of the language of politics, ideology, and protest. (shrink)

It is morally impermissible for parents, educators, and others to initiate children into religious belief systems. That is the provocative conclusion of John Tillson’s Children, Religion and the Ethics of Influence—the book which is the focus of the present symposium. This introduction briefly summarizes the book’s arguments together with the criticisms levelled against them. The symposium includes critiques by Matthew Clayton, Anca Gheaus, Michael Hand, David Lewin, and Ruth Wareham. Clayton and Wareham propose alternative bases for prohibiting (...) religious initiation, whilst Hand, Lewin, and Gheaus propose conditions under which religious initiation may be permissible. The symposium concludes with a rejoinder by Tillson. (shrink)

Only few philosophers are fortunate enough to start single-handedly a new topic in philosophy. The Oxford philosopher J. O. Urmson is one of them. But at the time he wrote his seminal article, ‘Saints and Heroes’ (1958), he was certainly not aware of it.

The question of how people change artworks is important for the metaphysics of art. It’s relatively easy for anyone to change a painting or sculpture, but who may change a literary or musical work is restricted and varies with context. Authors of novels and composers of symphonies often have a special power to change their artworks. Mary Shelley revised Frankenstein, and Tchaikovsky revised his Second Symphony. I cannot change these artworks. In other cases, such as those involving jazz standards and (...) folk songs, performers and ordinary folks have more power to change artworks. My preferred explanation of these facts is the created-abstract-simples view, according to which literary and musical works, unlike paintings and sculptures, are created abstract objects that have no parts. On this view, the way to change a literary or musical work is for an individual, empowered by social practices, to change rules about how a literary work should be published or a musical work should be performed. A. R. J. Fisher and Caterina Moruzzi object that the created-abstract-simples view doesn’t allow for literary and musical works to genuinely change, and Nemesio Garcia-Carríl Puy objects that the view doesn’t allow for these artworks to be repeatable. This paper clarifies the created-abstract-simples view and defends the view against these objections. -/- . (shrink)

In this article, I argue that if tacit knowledge of grammar is analyzable in functional‐computational terms, then it cannot ground linguistic meaning, structure, or sound. If to know or cognize a grammar is to be in a certain computational state playing a certain functional role, there can be no unique grammar cognized. Satisfying the functional conditions for cognizing a grammar G entails satisfying those for cognizing many grammars disagreeing with G about expressions' semantic, phonetic, and syntactic values. This threatens the (...) Chomskyan view that expressions have such values for speakers because they cognize grammars assigning them those values. For if this is true, semantics, syntax, and phonology must be indeterminate, thanks to the indeterminacy of grammar‐cognizing (qua functional‐computational state). So, the fact that a speaker cognizes a grammar cannot explain the determinate character of their language. (shrink)

The dynamical hypothesis states that cognitive systems are dynamical systems. While dynamical systems play an important role in many cognitive phenomena, the dynamical hypothesis as stated applies to every system and so fails both to specify what makes cognitive systems distinct and to distinguish between proposals regarding the nature of cognitive systems. To avoid this problem, I distinguish several different types of dynamical systems, outlining four dimensions along which dynamical systems can vary: total-state versus partial-state, internal versus external, macroscopic versus (...) microscopic, and systemic versus componential, and illustrate these with examples. I conclude with two illustrations of partial-state, internal, microscopic, componential dynamicism. (shrink)

To provide a theoretical basis for the common view that moral status comes in degrees, many philosophers endorse ‘two-factor’ accounts of the foundations of moral status. These accounts postulate one or more properties which endow individuals with moral status, and one or more other properties which increase the moral status of those who possess them. Critical assessment of two-factor accounts has focused on their implications, especially for humans who lack the properties thought to increase individuals’ moral status. Unfortunately, this approach (...) has led to an impasse. To try to break it, the present manuscript instead assesses the assumption on which two-factor accounts are based, namely, possession of one or more properties, what I call ‘moral status enhancing’ properties, increases their possessors’ moral status. I argue that two challenges, the problem of relevance and the need for a threshold, reveal that there are no moral status enhancing properties, hence, no degrees of moral status among those who matter morally. (shrink)

Volume 30, Issue 1, March 2024, Page 80-83.

The aim of this essay is to seek out the prototype of the last man in Dawn, Thoughts on the Presumptions of Morality (1881) and to present them in the light of the critique of prejudices as it is carried out in this work. In the third book, in particular, one can find an exact representation of the last man. Under the features of modern humanity and its prejudices, it is first and foremost the aporia of a certain type of (...) man that Nietzsche highlights before appealing to the arrival of the superman a few years later. (shrink)

Like the discipline of economics, the philosophy of education and educational studies are offshoots of moral philosophy. They investigate how best to realize the good as part of human existence. In...

O presente trabalho expõe de que forma a educação pode ser utilizada como ferramenta emancipatória para a superação do capital, tendo como base teórica o pensamento de István Mészáros. O principal objetivo dos que lutam contra a sociedade mercantil, a alienação e a intolerância, é a emancipação humana. Objetivo este alcançado quando o ser humano finalmente compreende, seja teoricamente ou na prática, todas as características de funcionamento de sua sociedade e de seu gênero, de tal forma que a luz científica (...) não seja algo que o cegue, mas que o faça ver onde seus olhos não alcançam. Tendo em vista o objetivo de transformar qualitativamente as condições objetivas da reprodução social, István Mészáros entende que há a necessidade de reconquistar o controle do capital enquanto estrutura, e não enquanto instância personificada do sistema capitalista e também transformar progressivamente as consciências. Considera-se então que para trabalhar as consciências, de acordo com o autor, fica evidente a relação entre educação e trabalho: uma vez que, cabe à educação elaborar tantas estratégias apropriadas, elaboradas e adequadas para transformar as condições objetivas de reprodução, como para a automudança consciente dos indivíduos chamados a concretizar a criação de uma ordem social metabólica radicalmente diferente, esta seria o socialismo. (shrink)

Tarzian and ASBH Core Competencies Update Task Force (2013) say that making ethics consultation accountable means examining the abilities and qualifications of health care ethics consultants (HCECs...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Bibliography of Resources by and about André E. Hellegers*Compiled by Doris Mueller Goldstein (bio)This bibliography is derived from the holdings of the National Reference Center for Bioethics Literature and the BIOETHICSLINE© database (both of which are at the Kennedy Institute of Ethics and supported by the National Library of Medicine); the archives of Lauinger Library, Georgetown University; the Medline databases of the National Library of Medicine; the WorldCat database (...) of OCLC, Dublin, Ohio, and selected Internet sites.Primarily comprised of writings by Dr. Hellegers, the list also includes interviews and media programs in which he participated, as well as writings about him that were written following his death. The arrangement within each section is by date. The 231 authored pieces reflect the transition from Dr. Hellegers’s early career as a researcher in fetal physiology at Johns Hopkins Medical School, where he published his first research report at the age of 29, to the early years of the Kennedy Institute, where he produced so many provocative columns on bioethical issues that influenced the growth of the field.Due to the diversity of sources and the 40-year time span covered, there are some variations in bibliographic style. Time and availability constraints precluded verifying all of the citations with the original documents. Any additions or corrections should be submitted to the compiler.Works Authored by André E. HellegersNo Date Ethical Issues in Sterilization of the Retarded. Unpublished paper.1956Vitamin B12 Serum Level and Pregnancy. American Journal of Clinical Nutrition 4: 440+, 1956. [With Bacon F. Chow and Kunio Okuda] [End Page 89]1957Vitamin B12 Absorption in Pregnancy and in the Newborn. American Journal of Clinical Nutrition 5: 327+, 1957. [With Bacon F. Chow, Robert E. L. Nesbitt, Kunio Okuda, and David W. Smith]1958The Effects of Acute Hypoxia on the Osmotic Pressure of the Plasma. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Physiology 43: 197+, 1958. [With Donald H. Barron, Frederick C. Battaglia, and Giacomo Meschia]Studies on the Absorption of Vitamin B12 in Human Pregnancy with Especial Reference to the Effect of D-Sorbitol. American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology 76: 91+, 1958. [With Bacon F. Chow, Harry Prystowsky, and Vernon Wong]1959The Alveolar PCO2 and PO2 in Pregnant and Nonpregnant Women at Altitude. Proceedings of the Society for Clinical Investigation 38: 1010+, 1959. [With Donald Barron, William Huckabee, Giacomo Meschia, James Metcalfe, and Harry Prystowsky]A Comparison of the Oxygen Dissociation Curves of the Bloods of Maternal and Fetal Goats at Various pHs. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Physiology 44: 215–21, July 1959. [With Donald Barron, Giacomo Meschia, Harry Prystowsky, and A. Stark Wolkoff]Fetal Blood Studies. XII. On the Relationship Between the Position of the Oxygen Dissociation Curve of Human Fetal Blood and Adult Fetal Hemoglobin. American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology 77: 585+, 1959. [With Paul D. Bruns, Julian Cotter, and Harry Prystowsky]Fetal Blood Studies. XIV. A Comparative Study of the Oxygen Dissociation Curve of Nonpregnant, Pregnant and Fetal Human Blood. American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology 78: 489–93, September 1959. [With Paul D. Bruns and Harry Prystowsky]Fetal Blood Studies. XVI. On the Changes in Total Osmotic Pressure and Sodium and Potassium Concentration of Amniotic Fluid During the Course of Human Gestation. Surgery, Gynecology and Obstetrics 109: 509–12, October 1959. [With Frederick Battaglia, Paul D. Bruns, Harry Prystowsky, and Clayton Smisson]Further Observations on the Metabolism of Vitamin B12 in Human Pregnancy. American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology 77: 1+, 1959. [With Bacon F. Chow, Harry Prystowsky, Bruno Ranke, and Elma Ranke]The Oxygen Dissociation Curves of the Bloods of Adult and Fetal Llamas. Federation Proceedings 18, 1959. [With Donald Barron, William Huckabee, Giacomo Meschia, James Metcalfe, and Harry Prystowsky] [End Page 90]Transfer of Oxygen Across the Sheep Placenta at High Altitude. Federation Proceedings 18, 1959. [With Donald Barron, William Huckabee, Giacomo Meschia, and Harry Prystowsky]Uterine Blood Flow and Metabolism in Pregnant Sheep at High Altitude. Federation Proceedings 18, 1959. [With Donald Barron, William Huckabee, Giacomo Meschia, James Metcalfe, and Harry Prystowsky]Uterine Blood Flow and Metabolism in Unanesthetized Pregnant Sheep. Federation Proceedings 18, 1959. [With Donald Barron, William Huckabee, Giacomo... (shrink)

In this article I take up a central question posed by the article jointly authored with Bill Winslade in this issue of JCE: What should be the role of clinical ethics consultants (CECs) in (what we call) an unsettled case: that is, a situation in which the range of allowable choices, among which the parties to a bioethical disagreement must select, cannot be clearly or completely specified? I argue here that CECs should, in such cases, guide the parties by presenting (...) their own reasoned conclusions about what the scope of allowable choices should be taken to include. Since this position challenges the received view that CECs must not express their own moral positions or conclusions in their role as ethicists, I try to defend my view of the CEC’s role in unsettled cases against several objections. (shrink)