David Wiggins; II*—Deliberation and Practical Reason, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 76, Issue 1, 1 June 1976, Pages 29–52, https://doi.org/10.

David Wiggins; IV*—Moral Cognitivism, Moral Relativism and Motivating Moral Beliefs, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 91, Issue 1, 1 June 1991, P.

David Wiggins; XV*—Weakness of Will Commensurability, and the Objects of Deliberation and Desire, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 79, Issue 1, 1.

Emptiness is a strange phenomenon that haunts us in many ways. Most of us have felt empty at one time or another, though we don’t often talk about it. We have a sense that something is missing in life. This absence extends beyond human experience to the physical world. As contemporary science has revealed to us on both a macroscopic and subatomic level, curiously, the vast majority of the universe is composed mostly of nothing but empty space. Emptiness is “abundant” (...) and beckons for our attention. Drawing on the Judeo-Christian wisdom of the Bible, in conversation with Eastern and Celtic thought, David Arthur Auten offers us an eye-opening and profoundly practical examination of the much neglected gift of absence. Nothing, ironically, turns out to be endlessly fascinating and significant. (shrink)

The nature of masculinity is a popular subject for contemporary authors, either treated critically from a sociological standpoint, or analysed from a psychological and spiritual perspective. In _Remaking Men_, David Tacey argues that we must strive to bridge the gap between these separate traditions - masculinity should neither be hijacked by the spiritual, Jung-influenced men's movement, nor discussed merely as a product of socio-political forces. Examining his own and other men's experience in a critical and lively discourse he evades (...) the simplistic optimism of the 'inner journey' approach and the chronic pessimism of contemporary academic arguments. This is a fascinating and very accessible look at masculinity for those who want to explore self and society with intelligence and soul. (shrink)

How do we know when what is happening between two people should be called psychoanalysis? What is a psychoanalytic process and how do we know when one is taking place? _Psychoanalysis Comparable and Incomparable_ describes the rationale and ongoing development of a six year programme of highly original meetings conducted by the European Psychoanalytic Federation Working Party on Comparative Clinical Methods. The project comprises over seventy cases discussed by more than five hundred experienced psychoanalysts over the course of sixty workshops. (...) Authored by a group of leading European psychoanalysts, this book explores ways for psychoanalysts using different approaches to learn from each other when they present their work to fellow psychoanalysts, and provides tools for the individual practitioner to examine and improve his or her own approach. As described in detail in its pages, sticking to the task led to some surprising experiences, raising fundamental questions about the way clinical discussion and supervision are conducted in psychoanalysis. Well known by many in the psychoanalytic community and the object of much interest and debate, this project is described by those who have had the closest contact with it and will satisfy a widely held curiosity in psychoanalysts and psychotherapists throughout the world. David Tuckett is winner of the 2007 Sigourney Award. (shrink)

Humboldtian science Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9480-6 Authors David Oldroyd, School of History and Philosophy, The University of New South Wales, Sydney, 2052 Australia Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.

This book deserves far more attention from philosophers and from the general public than it has so far received. Perhaps it is too much to hope that the hoary old myths about Philosophy having no practical relevance will ever be completely exploded. But if a sizeable number of thinking adults were to read this succinct and readable work, it might go a long way towards their demolition.

In_ Dispositional Properties_, David Weissman attacks a problem central to the philosophy of mind and, by implication, to the theory of being: Are there potentialities, capabilities, which dispose the mind to think in one way rather than another? The volume is arranged in the form of four arguments that converge upon a single point. First, there is an intricate discussion of the shortcomings of Hume's account of mind as ideas and impressions. Next comes a brief treatment of the arguments (...) of some of Weissman's contemporaries, including Carnap and Braithwaite. Third, Weissman discusses Wittgenstein's theories of learning and knowledge. Finally, there is a full discussion of Aristotle and his doctrine of potentialities. The question this book ultimately raises is how to steer between a doctrine of mind as no more than a series of acts, on the one hand, and a doctrine of mind as a kind of unitary object, on the other. The solution is to show first of all that there must be a potentiality in the universe, and then to show clearly and in detail that the mind is shot through with that potentiality. __. (shrink)

This first contribution to the special issue “Understanding Chinese Culture in the World” represents a philosophical proem regarding the format and general aim of the Young Experts Symposium 2022 (YES 2022), which was held online at Beijing Normal University, Zhuhai (China) and provided a platform for topics related to classical, modern, futuristic, and comparative perspectives on Chinese culture—across generations, cultures, and disciplines. Furthermore, it outlines the basic content of the six papers in this special issue that resulted from this event, (...) including some basic information about the contributors. (shrink)

« Cet article se propose de revenir, en s’appuyant sur des documents d’archives inédits, même en Allemagne, sur le chapitre que Günther Anders consacre au jazz dans le tome 1 de L’Obsolescence de l’homme. Voyant dans le jazz l’ analogon d’une machine destinée à dresser les corps, il ne le confie ni à une philosophie de la musique ni à une sociologie de la musique, mais à une critique de la technique. Si ce texte de 1956 repose sur une analyse (...) de la machine-jazz du swing qui peut parfois sembler injuste, les notes inédites révèlent en revanche un véritable intérêt pour le be-bop.». (shrink)

Channeled entities, like Seth and Michael, maintain that your inner consciousness utilizes expectations to create your life.

A defense of P.F. Strawson's view of asymmetrical dependency between objects and events. (Events are dependent on objects, not the other way around) put forth in his _Individuals_. I defend Strawson's view against a critique in "Strawson on Ontological Priority" by J.M.E. Moravscik. In doing so I critique Moravscik by drawing a distinction between ontological and conceptual dependencies. This was a chapter of my senior thesis published in an undergraduate journal and should probably only be read if you need a (...) good laugh. Published in an undergraduate conference journal Aporia. (shrink)

It is in the formal procedures and their rigorous logic, not in any contingent eventuality in Beckett’s life or acts, humanly fascinating as they may be, that we must look for the political, ethical, and even aesthetic implications of his oeuvre. Politics is above all the domain of expression and of representation, undergirded alike by the notion of an integral voice that gives utterance (outerance) to an inward essence, whether conceived as interest or identity. Neither what he experienced nor what (...) he expresses gives us a way into the political and ethical implications of Beckett’s forms. Beckett takes the famous “formality” of bourgeois freedoms at their word, evacuating both freedom and duty of any content and reducing progress and development to the single, recurring word “on.” Likewise, the bodiless voice that imprints Beckett’s plays from Krapp on is not the guarantor of the fullness of the subject in its Mundigkeit, finding authentic expression of its inner essence in its utterance, but the manifestation of the lacuna inscribed by the “suffering of being” in the state-oriented formation of an ethical-political subject through aesthetic culture. The little syllable “on” that echoes though his work from Godot to Worstward Ho, which could be mistaken for a categorical imperative, nonetheless does not interpellate its auditor as ethical Subject; rather, it insists on bringing the subject face to face with its own thingliness, a thing for the thing that is this unowned voice buzzing in the ear. (shrink)

The paper, written for a research handbook, critically surveys some fundamental philosophical, historical, and doctrinal issues in the crime of aggression. The two introductory sections set the theoretical issues in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and explain the origins of criminalizing aggression under the heading of “crimes against peace.” Section 3 explores an ambiguity between aggression as first use of force and aggression as unprovoked use of force, while section 4 discusses the doctrinal distinction between acts of aggression (...) and wars of aggression. Sections 5 and 6 turn to the theory of aggression. Section 5 examines modern versus early modern just war theorists’ views of just cause. Section 6 explores various theories of what exactly makes aggressive war so evil that it belongs in the pantheon of core crimes, side by side with genocide, crimes against humanity, and other war crimes. The basic question is whether aggression is fundamentally a crime against states, a crime against human rights, or a crime against peace itself. I reject the first, statist, version, and endorse the human rights version. I examine three versions of the view that aggressive war is fundamentally about its human costs: that aggressive wars lead to atrocities (Trainin); that aggressive wars lead more generally to unjustified killings (Dannenbaum); and that aggressive wars lead to both unjustified killings by the aggressor, and to unnecessary killings that include the justified killings of aggressors’ troops by defenders (Mégret). As for crimes against peace, I argue that this theory of aggression’s evils comes in two “flavors,” one of which has justly been criticized by postcolonial writers, and one of which I think is legitimate. The former originates in Judge Pal’s famous dissenting opinion in the IMTFE, and argues that criminalizing aggression is a move by colonial powers to freeze the oppressive status quo. The more legitimate version is that in an age of catastrophically destructive weapons, the risks of escalation in armed conflict –the threat that conflicts will spiral into world wars–are simply too great in human terms. Thus, the legitimate version of “crimes against peace” is part and parcel of the human rights analysis. The final sections break new ground. Section 7 considers whether aggression is solely a leadership crime. Everyone agrees that it would be wrong to punish ordinary soldiers for the crime of aggression launched by their leaders. The questions is why, and it is not easy to answer. Examining it brings us to a contemporary dispute over which leaders can be prosecuted: only those who control or direct the aggressive policies (as per the ICC’s Rome Statute), or others as well, who “shape or influence” the policy without necessarily directing it (as the customary rule used to be formulated). I argue against any narrowing of the leadership clause. Section 8 explores the “paradox of immunity”: Under the legal principle of sovereign immunity, apex leaders are immune from prosecution in the courts of another state. But under the narrow leadership clause, only apex leaders can be prosecuted. Here I argue for a surprising conclusion: that in fact there never was a customary rule of immunity for the crime of aggression. If so, the paradox of immunity disappears. This resolution also helps cut the Gordian knot of a current debate about whether a relatively small subset of states (the EU, perhaps) can form an aggression tribunal and call it “international.”. (shrink)

Teases out from assumptions underlying Polybius's constitutional theory an otherwise unknown subjectivist, agent-relative utilitarian theory of well-being. In contrast to other ancient theories, other-concern is assumed to be rooted in nonrational human nature and without moral value. Moral concepts arise within a social community from rational reflection on personal experience and lead to socially constructed moral values and political institutions that promote cooperative over competitive behaviors. The assumptions meet Arcesilaus's skeptical objections to dogmatic ethics. Polybius, some of whose political associates (...) studied under Arcesilaus, may have derived his theory from current antiskeptical justifications of normative ethics and politics. (shrink)

History shows convincingly that major transformations coincide with periods of crisis or wars. Many aspects of the contemporary world and US economy point to a possible crisis, in particular financial instability, and domestic and external imbalances. Neither hyperinflation nor deflation appear as likely issues. The consolidation of neoconservative authoritarism appears as a potential answer. Fortunately, there is a substantial opposition which can be mobilized against such trends. There are to ways of addressing the problem of alternatives. One is suggested by (...) the directions taken by oppositional movement, now on the rise. The second is critical analysis. But analysis also points up exploitable contradictions within the neoliberal and neoconservative agenda. (shrink)

Contemporary accounts of what it is for an agent to be justified in holding a given belief commonly carry substantive commitments concerning what cognitive processes can and should be like. In this paper, we argue that concern for the plausiblity of such psychological commitments leads to significant epistemological results. In particular, it leads to a multi-faceted epistemology in which elements of traditionally conflicting epistemologies are vindicated within a single epistemological account. We suggest thinking of the epistemologically relevant cognitive processes in (...) terms of the metaphor of an iceberg--the accessible and articulable states that have been the exclusive focus of much epistemology must, for reasons that we explain, comprise only a proper subset of epistemologically relevant processing, even as only a part of an iceburg is exposed to view. When one focuses on the interaction of accessible states and articulable information, the structure of epistemic justification looks rather like what has been called structural contextualism (Timmons 1993, Henderson 1994b). It might also be called quasi-foundationalist. Yet, given the sort of creatures we are, in attending to our epistemological tasks we must rely on processing that is sensitive to information that we could not articulate, that is not accessible in the standard internalist sense. When one focuses on the full range of epistemologically important processes, the structure of what makes for justification may be rather more like that envisioned by some coherentists. (shrink)

A prominent objection against epiphenomenalism—the doctrine that mental phenomena are causally inefficacious—is that it is incompatible with the phenomenon of human agency. It is essential for our being agents, so the argument goes, that our mental states contribute to the causation of our actions. In this paper, I wish to refute that objection and argue that epiphenomenalism, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, is fully compatible with human agency.