Philip McShane explores the implications of Bernard Lonergan’s compacted account of ‘what questions’ and ‘what-to-do questions’ for understanding deliberation. The essay provides a fascinating and instructive glimpse into McShane’s own long-continued struggle and dialogue with Lonergan’s achievement.

Bernard Lonergan is a Jesuit philosopher-theologian whose work is having an increasing influence, particularly on those concerned with identifying the nature of theological reflection and its relation to other areas of human inquiry. The purpose of this volume is to introduce a broader philosophical and theological audience to the world of Lonergan's thought. This world is principally characterized by Lonergan's notion of horizon-analysis. Perhaps the best way to explain what this means is to link it (...) to Lonergan's view that man is a being who can ask questions. Questions that he can raise and answer constitute the known. Questions that he can raise but cannot answer as yet constitute the known unknown, the docta ignorantia. There are still other questions, meaningful in themselves. that man, because of his historical situation, cannot even raise simply because they are not meaningful for him, and these constitute the unknown unknown, the indocta ignorantia. An horizon marks the boundary between the known unknown and the unknown unknown, that is, it provides the maximum field of knowledge available within the range of questions possible within a given methodological structure. A new horizon, that is, a new field of knowledge, emerges when a new kind of consciousness with an implicit new kind of method which makes it possible for a man to ask questions that previously were meaningless for him. Lonergan's work has been a careful attempt, based on horizon-analysis, to investigate the possibilities for metaphysical and theological understanding. Tracy, in setting forth as comprehensively as possible the full range of Lonergan's work, shows how his early studies of Thomas Aquinas focused on the centrality in the Thomistic noetic of the dynamic character of the act of knowing, an act that is not one of confrontation with an object but one of identity-in-being, of a deepening interiority making it possible for new questions to become meaningful. In his major epistemological study, Insight, Lonergan sought to show how the scientific method and the critical movement in philosophy were of crucial significance in providing new horizons for the question-asking being, man, whose dynamic interiority grounds a metaphysics and whose dynamism prolonged into doing grounds an ethics. The later Lonergan, the Lonergan of the post-Insight period, is the Lonergan who is seeking to discover how a new historical consciousness, a consciousness distinct from that of "classical" man, provides a new horizon for asking questions of philosophical and theological import. Thus Lonergan's major concern today is with method, that is, with a normative pattern of recurrent operations resulting in cumulative and progressive results. Through horizon-analysis Lonergan is currently seeking "to move fully and coherently from... a notion of theology as 'reason illuminated by faith' to 'method illuminated by faith'." Because Lonergan has significant things to say about human knowledge and because his highly original approach has affinities to developments in phenomenology and linguistic analysis, this patient and painstaking introduction to his thought should be of value to many contemporary philosophers.--W. E. M. (shrink)

ALTHOUGH THERE is no direct dependence of Bernard Lonergan upon Edmund HusserI in the manner, say, of Husserl himself upon Franz Brentano, there are nonetheless points of similarity and contrast between them. It would be possible to list these matching points singly on their own, such as Epoche and self-appropriation, Erlebnis and consciousness, monad and subject, Anschauung and affirmation. However, besides and beneath these individual points of similarity and contrast, lying as their basis, there is similarity and contrast (...) at the level of the fundamental conceptions of the two philosophers. Husserl and Lonergan share a common problematic: the structure of intentionality. If intentionality is the common problematic where Husserl and Lonergan meet, one might ask if and how various notions of theirs viewed in relation to intentionality are common or divergent. For the sake of comparison-confrontation, one might take the two central notions, Anschauung (intuition) in Husserl and affirmation in Lonergan, and inspect some of the implications they have for the two philosophers. Husserl calls intuition the "principle of all principles for his phenomenology." For his part, Lonergan conceives of affirmation as the culmination of the knowing process. Intuition and affirmation have analogous roles. For Husserl it is through intuition that cognition attains what is real, whereas for Lonergan it is through affirmation. The comparison-confrontation between Husserl and Lonergan can be summed up in terms of the three questions that Lonergan sets up to mark off the range of human knowing. First, what happens when one knows? Secondly, why is doing that knowing? Thirdly, what does one know when he does it? Husserl and Lonergan would seem closest in their approach to answering question one. However, they would part company in their answers to questions two and three, for here intuition and affirmation essentially determine what kind of an answer can be given. This paper will work within the brackets of these three questions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:484 BOOK REVIEWS faith. Yet faith-knowledge alone is insufficient to account for Jesus' extraordinary gifts as a teacher: for this we must appeal to a special charism along the lines of an infused knowledge. According to Torrell this knowledge is best understood by reference to Aquinas's mature teaching on prophecy: God equipped the prophets with an infused light (but not infused ideas) enabling them to communicate divine truths to (...) others. Likewise, God conferred on Jesus an infused light akin to that of the prophets, but with this qualitative difference: in him the lumen is a permanent feature of his cognitive life (a habitus), while it is given to the prophets only intermittently (per modum actus). The foregoing i;ummary will have served its purpose if it has conveyed to the reader some sense of the very rich historical, philosophical, and theological reflections that comprise this volume. The editorial team of the Revue thomiste is to be commended for the high caliber of this and the other special publications it has produced in recent years: the 1992 commemorative volume on the theological achievement of M.-M. Labourdette; th~ 1993 centenary index ("tables generales 1893-1992"); the Gilson issue of 1994; and most recently an issue devoted to Thomas Aquinas and the onto-theo-logy debate (1995). This reviewer eagerly waits for more. Fordham University Bronx, New York GREGORY M. REICHBERG The Divine Initiative: Grace, World-Order, and Human Freedom in the Early Writings of Bernard Lonergan. By J. MICHAEL STEBBINS. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995. Pp. xxii + 399. $65.00 (cloth). Aquinas insists that the creator's primary intent is the "order of the universe," and Bernard Lonergan's dissertation on "operating grace" in Aquinas's writings managed to move beyond the stalemated discussion of "sufficient" and "efficacious" grace precisely because he displayed how any discourse about grace had to be connected with larger theorems of the creator's operation in creation. What speaking of the divine action called "grace" requires is a set of metaphysical skills adequate to speaking of the "order of the universe" as created. A tall order, whose scope the published edition of his dissertation-Grace and Freedom-so understated that its implications have been missed by many philosophers and theologians fascinated with such questions. Stebbins's careful reconstruction of that text reminds us of its daunting scope. And part of the reason it can do so is that he illustrates both the method and conclusions of Grace and Freedom through a later text which Lonergan had composed (in Latin) for a course on grace offered from 1947 to 1960: De ente supernaturali (which will appear in volume 16 [Early Latin Theology] of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, published by BOOK REVIEWS 485 University of Toronto Press). The significance of this collateral source is that it can profit from and respond to Henri de Lubac's epochal Surnaturel (1946). For those not familiar with Grace and Freedom, as well as some who thought they were, a list of Stebbins's chapters manages to convey the scope of Lonergan's achievement: 1. The Role of Understanding in Theological Speculation; 2. The Principal Instance of Supernatural Being: The Created Communication of the Divine Nature; 3. Thirteenth-Century Breakthrough (The "Theorem" of the Supernatural); 4. Supernatural Transformation of Human Activity; 5. Obediential Potency and the Natural Desire to See God; 6. Molinist and Bannezian Systems; 7. Theoretical Perspective on Divine Concourse; 8. Contingence, Sin and Divine Efficacy. As always, Lonergan must actively reflect on method while executing a theological inquiry, so Stebbins rightly begins with his insistence that such inquiry must be more than "just a networks of concepts; it is primarily an act of understanding" (xix)-Chapter 1. Then, following the expository order of De ente supematurali, he shows how Lonergan roots the supernatural in the theorems developed to speak of the natural: of creation itself. ("Theorem," as we shall see, is a favorite word of Lonergan's, intimating what it takes to move beyond our imaginations to a set of propositions able to articulate the metaphysical issues at stake.) Following the analogy of nature, we can see how the "two operations by which creatures... (shrink)

Raymund Schwager SJ suggested a dramatic way of looking at the Christ event, as recorded in the New Testament, in order to clarify the meaning of it and provide a coherent picture. Bernard Lonergan SJ developed a theological methodology for our day. In this article, the author tries to determine how Schwager's approach relates to Lonergan's methodology. He wants to investigate the question: what functional specialty is Schwager engaged in in his main work? The answer shall (...) be that this is foundations. The author of the article proceeds by (1) introducing the most important elements of Schwager's dramatic understanding of the Christ event and (2) of Lonergan's methodology, and then by linking them with one another; (3) he will try to show how Schwager's subdivision of the Christ event into five acts brings out the contours of Jesus' struggle with his opponents as an instance of dialectic in Lonergan's sense; (4) that the Easter experience will be construed as a new, foundational, act that objectifies conversion to human authenticity; and that (5) by discerning all this in the Christ event dramatic theology defines soteriology as the horizon within which Christian doctrines and systematics have to stand and elucidates the way soteriology should be construed; that way dramatic theology determines itself as a foundational enterprise. For the author of the article, this constitutes an exemplary case of the genesis of special theological categories. /// Segundo o artigo, Raymund Schwager SJ propôs um modo dramático de encarar o acontecimento crístico, tal como o mesmo nos é relatado nos textos do Novo Testamento, em ordem a clarificar o seu sentido e a oferecer-nos uma imagem coerente do mesmo. Por seu lado, Bernard Lonergan SJ desenvolveu uma metodologia teológica adequada às exigências do nosso tempo. Assim, o autor do artigo propõe-se determinar de que modo a abordagem de Schwager está relacionada com a metodologia de Lonergan. O seu objectivo é investigar a seguinte questão: qual é a especialidade funcional com que Schwager se compromete na sua principal obra? A resposta será que se trata das fundações. Com isso, o artigo desenvolve-se da seguinte maneira: (1) introdução dos elementos mais importantes na compreensão dramática de Schwager acerca do acontecimento crístico; (2) introdução dos elementos mais importantes da metodologia lonerganiana, para depois os relacionar um ao outro; (3) mostrar de que modo a subdivisão de Schwager do acontecimento crístico em cinco actos é capaz de trazer ao de cima os contornos da luta de Jesus com os seus opositores como uma instância dialéctica no sentido de Lonergan; (4) mostrar de que modo a experiência pascal pode ser construída como um novo, e fundacional, acto que objectiva a conversão à autenticidade humana; (5) mostrar até que ponto mediante o discernimento de tudo isto no acontecimento crístico, a teologia dramática define a soteriologia como o horizonte dentro do qual as doutrinas cristãs e a sistemática teológica têm de se afirmar e elucida o modo como a sotereologia tem de ser construída. Deste modo, a teologia dramática determina-se a si mesma como um empreendimento fundacional. Para o autor do artigo, trata-se aqui de um caso exemplar no que respeita à génese de categorias teológicas especiais. (shrink)

Over the past thirty-odd years, the feminist contribution of the ethic of care has changed the way in which scholars and ‘lay people’ think about and approach ethical practices in our contemporary society. These changes are important in two significant ways. First, the contribution of feminist work to the body of ethics as a whole is a valuable addition. Second, by drawing attention to the concrete context of moral decision-making, particularly the notion of care, feminist scholars have opened the door (...) for meaningful discussion and understanding of the word care as it is involved in moral decision-making. The latter is where Lonergan’s theory of ethics is most beneficial.The article is written in four sections. It begins with a brief review of a feminist perspective on the ethic of care; a second section explores Lonergan’s identification of levels of consciousness as relevant to feminist notions of care; a third section explores the influence of Aquinas on Lonergan’s theory of ethics and richly applies this fuller context (linking feelings, plans, actions and decisions) to feminist contributions; a final section enlarges significantly on the meaning of the word care by introducing Lonergan’s idea of functional specialization as an ‘ethic of ethics’ that will care about the field of ethics in a radically new way. (shrink)

It is only for persons that the question, “How shall I live?” arises, and it arises inevitably, even if in an inarticulate and unreflective manner. Persons must deliberate, decide, plan, and schedule their actions. Openness with respect to ends confronts them, and they must structure and direct their lives by determining what sort of career to trace out, even if it proves to be a career of routine or unambitious undertakings. Circumstances can constrain and compel, and the openness persons (...) confront can be closed off by external factors. But it is intrinsic to the nature of persons that the exercise of capacities for thought and action may be directed this way or that. There are perhaps nonpersons whose activity is to be explained with reference to beliefs and desires. But even if they act in an end-directed way, they do not experience openness with respect to ends and do not order and orient their life histories by deliberative considerations. (shrink)

This article examines Bernard Lonergan's account of the meaning, functions, and importance of art, focusing on the chapter on art in his Topics in Education (volume 10 of The Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan), the text derived from his 1959 Cincinnati lectures on philosophy of education. The essay begins by identifying important parallels between Lonergan s analysis of art and selected elements in the philosophies of Aristotle, Saint Augustine, Kant, Hegel, Tolstoy, Collingwood, and Heidegger. It (...) then focuses upon Lonergan's particular emphasis on artistic creation and appreciation as an exercise of human liberty, and as a testimony to the freedom of human consciousness. Developing this theme, it explores how Lonergan's analysis answers three critical questions: 1) what does art liberate us from? 2) what does art liberate us for? and, 3) why is art always about freedom? /// O presente artigo constitui uma análise da posição de Bernard Lonergan acerca do sentido, das funções, e da importância da arte, análise esta centrada no capítulo sobre a arte que se encontra na obra Topics in Education (volume 10 das Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan), texto este derivado das conferências pronunciadas pelo filósofo canadiano, em 1959, em Cincinnati, sobre Filosofia da Educação. O artigo começa com o estabelecimento de importantes paralelos entre as análises de Lonergan acerca da arte e alguns elementos escolhidos nas filosofias de Aristóteles, Santo Agostinho, Kant, Hegel, Tolstoi, Collingwood, e Martin Heidegger. Seguidamente, o artigo concentra-se na ênfase dada por Lonergan à criatividade e avaliação artísticas, mostrando de que modo uma e outra constituem exercícios maiores da liberdade humana, e, nessa medida, devem ser vistas como testemunhas privilegiadas da liberdade da consciência humana. Assim, ao desenvolver este tema, o artigo explora o modo como a análise de Lonergan responde às seguintes três questões críticas fundamentais: 1) de que coisas nos liberta a arte? 2) para que coisas nos liberta a arte? e 3) por que razão tem a arte sempre a ver com a liberdade? (shrink)

In three parts, this paper seeks 1) to provide a synopsis of Bernard Lonergan‟s proof for the existence of God as presented in chapter nineteen of Insight, 2) to explain how Lonergan later came to critique his approach in Insight 19 in light of subsequent philosophical developments, and 3) to assess the ongoing relevance of Lonergan‟s Insight 19 argument given that aforementioned critique.The issues discussed in this paper are important for a variety of reasons.First, Lonergan‟s (...) argument for the existence of God may in fact be a sound argument. Second, Lonergan prefaced his argument with the incredibly bold and enticing claim that while arguments for the existence of God are many, all such arguments are implicitly included in the general form of his own argument.And third, however one may assess the preceding claim, the second and third parts ofthis paper will raise fundamental questions regarding the function and existential significance of any philosophical proof for the existence of God, and by doing sowill contribute to contemporary discussions concerning the relevance of philosophical theology. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:LONERGAN'S "CRITICAL REALISM" AND RELIGIOUS PLURALISM TIMOTHY R. STINNETT University of Detroit Mercy Detroit, Michigan THE PHENOMENON of religious pluralism is raising ome basic questions for philosophical thought that must e faced not only by philosophies not linked to any particular religious tradition but also by the theologies or philosophies of specific religious traditions. Christian theologians seem first to have discovered the range of questions raised by religious (...) pluralism in the face of apparently conflicting truth claims. No less important, however, are certain moral questions: how the advocates of the various religious traditions should bear witness to their respective traditions, and how they should go about identifying and correcting the ideological biases that seem inevitably to occur as the result of the historical and cultural conditions in which their respective witnesses emerge and develop. Thus, a philosophical treatment of religious pluralism will need to make explicit the relevant conditions of truth by which religious claims must be assessed. It will also need to clarify how apparently conflicting truth claims may be examined to see whether they are genuinely conflicting and then how genuinely conflicting truth claims may be adjudicated. Bernard Lonergan's philosophy of critical realism may be considered a valuable resource for addressing such questions insofar as he undertakes to answer such fundamental questions as " What am I doing when I am knowing? Why is doing that knowing? What do I know when I do it? " 1 Attention to these questions 1 Bernard Lonergan, Method vn Theology (New York: The Seabury Press, 1979), p. 25. See also Bernard Lonergan, A Third Collection: Papers by Bernard I. F. Lonergan, S.J., edited by Frederick E. Crowe, S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1985), p. 210. 97 98 TIMOTHY R. STINNETT promises clarification about how religious truth claims may be shown to be true (and thus to count as " knowledge ") and how genuinely conflicting truth claims may be adjudicated. It also promises to clarify how one may recognize ideological bias and correct for it in a fully reflective understanding of a particular religious witness. For Lonergan, answers to the three questions cited above provide respectively a cognitional theory, an epistemology, and a metaphysics, all three of which together constitute his philosophy of critical realism.2 In this essay I will explore the relevance of his critical realism for philosophical treatment of questions raised by religious pluralism. After an analysis of the salient features of Lonergan's philosophy, I will consider the disadvantages and advantages it affords a philosophy of religious pluralism. By attending to the disadvantages I will register an immanent criticism of Lonergan's critical realism, and I will atexplain how it must be revised in order to become a useful resource for treating philosophical questions raised by religious pluralism. Lonergan's "Critical Realism" The human capacity to know is for Lonergan what constitutes human being as spirit. " Let us say," he writes, that intelligibility that is not intelligent is material, and that intelligibility that is intelligent is spiritual.... But inasmuch as we are spiritual, we are orientated towards the universe of being, know ourselves as parts within that universe, and guide our living by that knowledge.8 Knowing, then, is a process with distinguishable moments, and it is completed in action consistent with what is known. Moreover, what can be known by a human subject determines the parameters of "proportionate being." The coordination of all of the departments of human knowledge is the object of metaphysics, 2 Method in Theology, pp. 25, 83, 261, 316. See also Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, revised ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), pp. 322ff., p. 350. a Insight, p. 516. LONERGAN ON RELIGIOUS PLURALISM 99 which Lonergan defines as " the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being." 4 Proportionate being is not, however, a comprehensive term for everything that exists ; there is also "transcendent being." Transcendent being is revealed as mystery, and knowledge of it is obtained through the operation of grace in religious conversion.5 But I will postpone discussion of this knowledge of transcendent being for the moment. The orientation of the human spirit toward " the universe of being" manifests itself in "the primordial drive" to know. "It... (shrink)

Almost everything that we do, we do by doing other things. Even actions we perform without deliberation or conscious planning are composed of ‘smaller’, subsidiary actions. But how should we think of such subsidiary actions? Are they fully-fledged intentional actions (in the sense of things that we do for reasons) in their own right? In this paper I defend an affirmative answer to this question, against a recently influential form of scepticism. Drawing on a distinctive kind of ‘action-demonstrative’ representation, I (...) show that the sceptic's arguments do not go through. (shrink)

In the science–and–theology dialogue, it becomes imperative that theologians develop sophistication in empirical method. Albert Einstein stated that to understand what physicists do we should not listen to what they say but watch what they do. Still, he wrote incisively about method in physics. Theologian and philosopher Bernard Lonergan developed a methodical approach to theology that was influenced by the natural sciences. I present Einstein's thought on epistemology and the relationship between sense experience and theory. (...) I then turn to Lonergan's understanding of empirical method in the natural sciences, generalized empirical method, and his treatment of Einstein's work. (shrink)

On the basis of his acquaintance with theoretical elementary particle physics, and following the lead of Thomas Torrance, John Polkinghorne maintains that the data upon which a science is based, and the method by which it treats those data, must respect the idiosyncratic nature of the object with which the science is concerned. Polkinghorne calls this the "accommodation" (or "conformity") of a discipline to its object. The question then arises: What should we expect religious experience and theological method to (...) be like if they are accommodated to the idiosyncratic nature of God? Polkinghorne's methodological program is typical of postcritical positions in the theology-science dialogue in holding that the fiduciary element in theological method is simply a species of the fiduciary element that is a de facto part of all knowing—in other words, theological method does not differ in fundamental kind from the methods of the natural sciences. But this program may contain the seeds of an alienation of theological method from the transcendence of God similar to the double self-alienation of theology described by Michael Buckley in At the Origins of Modern Atheism. I contend that something like Bernard Lonergan's position on how the method of faith seeking understanding is related to the methods of the natural sciences is exactly the sort of thing that one should expect on the supposition of Polkinghorne's principle of accommodation, at least if the God who is the object of theological science is transcendent. The way in which the divine differs from all other objects ought to be disclosed or reflected in religious experience and theological method. Polkinghorne charts the course for an accommodated theology, but it seems to be Lonergan who is more intent on following it. (shrink)

Michael Thompson recently advanced a “naïve action theory” as an alternative to the “sophisticated” accounts of action displayed by ordinary folk psychology. In what follows I defend the plausibility of intentional psychology and folk psychological explanations. I do this in two ways. First I question that naïve explanations are more naïve than the ones provided by folk psychology and suggest that the latter are phenomenologically prior to the former. Second, I focus on the role of intentionality in deliberation and (...) action planning, suggesting that folk psychology provides a better answer than naïve theory to the question of what makes actions intentional. (shrink)

The widespread influence of skeptical and relativist philosophies has led to an abandonment of empiricist accounts of objectivity in historical investigation. Can one do justice to the historical conditionedness of the historian without totally denying objectivity in historical judgments? This article introduces Bernard Lonergan's answer to this question. Lonergan contends that one can avoid both the Scylla of naive empiricism, fostering the myth of some simple backward gaze at the facts of the past, and the Charybdis of (...) total relativism. He proposes a form of perspectivism which, he believes, does justice both to the belief of the majority of working historians that they are gradually increasing our knowledge of the past, and to the points brought out by writers on historiography, such as the "metahistorians," concerning the impossibility of ascending to some god's-eye view of the historical process.Lonergan's perspectivist position is built upon a prior philosophical account of cognition and epistemology, which I outline here. I will then move on to some immediate concerns of working historians, such as value judgments in history, the relationship of historical data to the facts the historian claims to know, and the criteria of selection used by the community of historians. In treating these issues I will highlight some of the areas of convergence and divergence between Lonergan's work and that of other philosophers and historians who have written on historiography. (shrink)

A plausible constraint on normative reasons to act is that it must make sense to use them as premises in deliberation. I argue that a central sort of deliberation – what Bratman calls partial planning – is question-directed: it is over, and aims to resolve, deliberative questions. Whether it makes sense to use some consideration as a premise in deliberation in a case of partial planning can vary with the deliberative question at issue. I argue that the best explanation (...) for this is that reasons are contrastive or relativized to deliberative questions. (shrink)

What does it mean to be truthful? What role does truth play in our lives? What do we lose if we reject truthfulness? No philosopher is better suited to answer these questions than Bernard Williams. Writing with his characteristic combination of passion and elegant simplicity, he explores the value of truth and finds it to be both less and more than we might imagine.Modern culture exhibits two attitudes toward truth: suspicion of being deceived and skepticism that (...) objective truth exists at all. This tension between a demand for truthfulness and the doubt that there is any truth to be found is not an abstract paradox. It has political consequences and signals a danger that our intellectual activities, particularly in the humanities, may tear themselves to pieces.Williams's approach, in the tradition of Nietzsche's genealogy, blends philosophy, history, and a fictional account of how the human concern with truth might have arisen. Without denying that we should worry about the contingency of much that we take for granted, he defends truth as an intellectual objective and a cultural value. He identifies two basic virtues of truth, Accuracy and Sincerity, the first of which aims at finding out the truth and the second at telling it. He describes different psychological and social forms that these virtues have taken and asks what ideas can make best sense of them today. Truth and Truthfulness presents a powerful challenge to the fashionable belief that truth has no value, but equally to the traditional faith that its value guarantees itself. Bernard Williams shows us that when we lose a sense of the value of truth, we lose a lot both politically and personally, and may well lose everything. (shrink)

What can--and what can't--philosophy do? What are its ethical risks--and its possible rewards? How does it differ from science? In Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, Bernard Williams addresses these questions and presents a striking vision of philosophy as fundamentally different from science in its aims and methods even though there is still in philosophy "something that counts as getting it right." Written with his distinctive combination of rigor, imagination, depth, and humanism, the book amply demonstrates why (...) Williams was one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century. Spanning his career from his first publication to one of his last lectures, the book's previously unpublished or uncollected essays address metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics, as well as the scope and limits of philosophy itself. The essays are unified by Williams's constant concern that philosophy maintain contact with the human problems that animate it in the first place. As the book's editor, A. W. Moore, writes in his introduction, the title essay is "a kind of manifesto for Williams's conception of his own life's work." It is where he most directly asks "what philosophy can and cannot contribute to the project of making sense of things"--answering that what philosophy can best help make sense of is "being human." Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline is one of three posthumous books by Williams to be published by Princeton University Press. In the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument was published in the fall of 2005. The Sense of the Past: Essays in the History of Philosophy is being published shortly after the present volume. (shrink)

What can--and what can't--philosophy do? What are its ethical risks--and its possible rewards? How does it differ from science? In Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline , Bernard Williams addresses these questions and presents a striking vision of philosophy as fundamentally different from science in its aims and methods even though there is still in philosophy "something that counts as getting it right." Written with his distinctive combination of rigor, imagination, depth, and humanism, the book amply demonstrates (...) why Williams was one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century. Spanning his career from his first publication to one of his last lectures, the book's previously unpublished or uncollected essays address metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics, as well as the scope and limits of philosophy itself. The essays are unified by Williams's constant concern that philosophy maintain contact with the human problems that animate it in the first place. As the book's editor, A. W. Moore, writes in his introduction, the title essay is "a kind of manifesto for Williams's conception of his own life's work." It is where he most directly asks "what philosophy can and cannot contribute to the project of making sense of things"--answering that what philosophy can best help make sense of is "being human." Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline is one of three posthumous books by Williams to be published by Princeton University Press. In the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument was published in the fall of 2005. The Sense of the Past: Essays in the History of Philosophy is being published shortly after the present volume. (shrink)

This article presents the results of an empirical study which argues that ethical judgment is not sufficient, by itself, to explain ethically questionable behavior in consumption. The study adopts Ajzen's Theory of Planned Behavior and presents results from a self-completion survey questionnaire covering five scenarios describing ethical consumer dilemmas. Confirmatory factor analysis was used to assess measurement structures, and the proposed model was estimated using logistic regression. Three antecedents, namely Social Norm (an extension of the construct of Subjective Norm), Perceived (...) Behavioral Control, and Perceived Unfairness are found to have a significant and positive impact on intention to engage in ethically questionable behavior. The finding that Perceived Unfairness has a significant impact is of particular interest, implying that the perception of an unfair relationship with a supplier will increase the probability that a consumer would consider behaving unethically. The results also suggest that intentions to engage in ethically questionable behavior vary across different situations. Firms seeking to proactively broach discourses with stakeholders will inevitably need and want to understand further the whole range of consumer perceptions toward business. In other words, to take note not only of what consumers believe in, but equally what they do and choose to act upon. (shrink)

Logic in Action/Doron Avital Nothing is more difficult, and therefore more precious, than to be able to decide (Napoleon Bonaparte) Introduction -/- This book was born on the battlefield and in nights of secretive special operations all around the Middle East, as well as in the corridors and lecture halls of Western Academia best schools. As a young boy, I was always mesmerized by stories of great men and women of action at fateful cross-roads of decision-making. Then, like as today, (...) I felt the full weight of the moment of truth as it confronts the individual, the man or woman of action, with the imminent necessity to decide. Alongside, as I was climbing up the ladder of education, I found myself just as well captivated by the great intellectual stories of our times, in particular 20th century analytic philosophy and, at its core, the machinery of modern logic. How do then the cool contemplative modes of the philosophical and analytic outlooks, that are better fitting of the philosopher's armchair at the fireplace, hang together with the heat of the battlefield or the angst of the ticking clock of time left to the completion of a daring special operation? Growing up I was pondering exactly that. Not accidently, and in fact as consequence, I have chosen a course in life that challenged me to visit the poles of both theory and practice. I set myself on a mission to unravel the tension between the contemplative inquiry, supposedly theoretical, aiming at the logical structure of things, and the uncompromising test of life and action. The puzzle of the gap between theory and practice has become ever since the guiding question of my life. -/- Not long ago, I met two friends, Avner Shor, a veteran combat soldier of the special forces unit I eventually commanded, and Aviram Halevi, a fellow officer with whom I served. Why will we not put into writing the ideas that guided us during our years of military action, we wondered. At that time, I used to deliver the keynote lectures to the senior officers' course of Israel central intelligence organization, the Mossad. For this I already had to put some of these ideas in writing. Avner was quick to introduce me with a notable publisher and even helped me write the first chapter. With Aviram I sat to many meetings, where he would challenge me with key questions, and we followed them with memories of operations and battles, aiming to draw the required lessons. This served me well when I finally sat down to write the first draft of the book. The result was more extensive than me and my friends had expected. I had to add a particularly long chapter dealing with the story of modern philosophy and logic. This was required, I felt, as no decision-making process lives in an intellectual vacuum. Knowingly or subconsciously, the intellectual climate of the time guides us for better or worse with the decisions we finally take. The initial draft was naturally cumbersome and inaccessible. But here I had the privilege of meeting a particularly talented editor, Rami Rothholtz. I found in Rami both an editor and a critical reader. As an infantry combat soldier at youth and now a senior journalist and editor, Rami insisted on simplifying and refining my ideas. Had it not been for his work, this book would have been literally unreadable. *** I opened my book with a brief description of a single night of a special operation deep at the Lebanon Bekaa valley, far away from Israel northern border. The mission was to kidnap a senior terror leader known to be holding in captivity an Israeli pilot. This was also the last special operation I commanded in my military career. A single special operation night, but what had to precede it? For sure, many months of intense and skillful preparations. What is Planning? This is the question with which I open up chapter (2) of the book. I confront in this chapter two approaches to planning. The first is the one I saw as a mission to myself to cultivate in my many years of military service. The second is the one I saw as representing a deep-rooted fallacy that holds a firm grip on today's conventional wisdom about planning. To further examine the logic of the competing models, I was required in chapter (3) to analyze the concept of "The Standard". I argue that the false model of planning has its roots in an attitude of an uncompromising adherence to the power of literal obedience to standards and rules. The standard, or what is outlined by a rule as prescribing a future course of action, is seen as an answer to the fundamental tension between theory (planning) and practice (execution). I argue in contrast that the standard does not produce an answer but rather what I call: "A Well-Defined Question". In essence, it is a meticulously-well-planned invitation to exercise a fresh judgment. A judgement that has as an anchor the default answer that the standard produces but is open to extension as it confronts the new frame of reference of the test of reality. In chapter (4), I present a new tool for planning and execution: "The Polygon of Risks" or "The Polygon of Execution". The Polygon is a geometric illustration of the underlying tension that exists between all dimensions of the operational project. The construction and conceptualization of the trade-offs that exist between the various dimensions - segments of the polygon - is the first topic on the planner's agenda. I position the concepts of "Daring" and "Taking Proactive and Well-Informed Risks" as necessary logical constituents of the polygon and show how in contrast the false model of planning is responsible for an operational culture that is risk-averse. It encourages, in fact, the piling up of false securities at the segments' level that eventually lead to the collapse of the polygon. The necessary trade-offs relationships that exist between the segments of the polygon express the fundamental tension between partnership and competition: partnership in a joint goal and competition over resources, both material and abstract. When this tension is not managed well, that is, when the players' local optimizations overshadow the global optimization required for the success of the project, the execution polygon collapses. In this scenario, we may find the setting of the bar of "High Standards" in a players' spheres of responsibility to conceal a hidden agenda of personal insurances taken against a possible failure. Once the overall risk is not mitigated by way of collaborative joint executional dialogue, the process that leads to a collapse of the polygon is literally unstoppable. *** In chapter (5), I discuss "(Fateful) Decisions". I examine the way in which we should translate the polygon into sequential critical decisions on the timeline. The execution polygon is not a rigid scaffolding but a dynamic conceptual illustration of the -/- project. It will need now to be converted into successive decision junctions. We will find the content of a decision and its timing on the timeline to be inseparable. The right decision is the one that is taken at the right time. The moment of decision is in fact the last moment of deliberation, the first moment available for action, i.e. the first possible "Can" is also the latest possible "Must". Deciding too soon is analog to the "Jumping of the Gun". The decision maker is forcing a pre-conceived answer to a state of affairs not ripe for an answer, e.g. the target in the shooting range is not yet erected. Late to decide and the decision maker may envision what he or she should have done but reality is no longer available for them to harness it right, e.g. consider a tennis player's frustration when reviewing a too-late-to-react move in the video replay. I review in this chapter many fateful decisions, both historical, from Napoleon's Waterloo, to a Bridge Too Far of WWII, to the failed rescue attempt of American hostages at the time of the Iranian Revolution, as well as fateful decisions I had to take in the course of my military life, both in combat and in special operations, and show the sense in which they all answer to our analysis. The theme of chapter (6) is "The Moment of Truth". This is the moment when everything is on the line and from which there is no turning back. I discuss the formative repetitive structure of the schooling and simulation phase and contrast it with the "One Shot, One Opportunity" nature of the moment of truth. This is extremely helpful when we analyze the logical structure of failures as unwarranted repetitions of past lessons. The schooling curriculum indeed consists of important abstractions drawn from lessons of the past. However, it is when we project them in a fashion that is literal or mechanical that we cross path with the possibility of a failure. The paradox of education is that what we must repeat in school and simulation must be extended and not repeated in real life. What is required of us so we do not fall into the fallacy of repetition in face of the moment of truth is the core subject of the discussion of this chapter. In chapter (7), I took a lengthy philosophical detour surveying the intellectual drama of modern logic, and in general, the story of 20th century analytic philosophy. Readers who choose to bypass the somehow demanding narrative of this drama can do so and still keep the argumentative thread of the book. However, even by way of skipping the more technical parts, I would still urge the readers to delve into the discussion in this chapter as I believe this would grant them a deeper understanding of the overall conceptual framework. I explore here the work of two key figures: the logician Kurt Gödel and the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, both were crowned in 2000 by TIME Magazine, as the leading Logician and Philosopher, respectively, of the 20th Century. I review the fascinating logical result of Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem and examine its relevance as setting a theoretical limit to the power of formalization. This amazing logical result - a result that shakes the logical foundations of 20th century thought in as much as the discovery of irrational numbers shook the foundations of the Pythagorean program of the ancient Greeks - bears significantly on the question of action and the blind trust we place in the power of formalization in the form of protocols and rules. It is here that Wittgenstein's philosophy enters in full force. We follow Wittgenstein as he dismantles our conception of rules as if there were "Railroads to Infinite", i.e. as prescribing for us in-advance their proper employments in all possible -/- future eventualities. Instead we propose that the dilemma of action demands of us an extension of rules rather than a mechanical or blind repetition of their literal imperative. In turn, this extension can serve as a new lesson added to the curriculum of school and simulation. The theme of chapter (8), the concluding chapter, is Strategy, Logic, and Ethics. The chapter comes to place the ethical dilemma in the conceptual map we presented in the book. I discuss here the tension between strategy as a process of setting goals and deriving backward as it were the steps that are necessary for achieving these goals, to the inescapable dictation of the ethical imperative. This unavoidable tension is particularly important against the backdrop of contemporary culture that is guided by a vision of personal success and achievement that may threaten our ability to do what is right. Most of all, I am troubled in this chapter, with the role logic may play, first as a liberating force enabling a change that is tuned to the ethical imperative, and second, as a force designed to justify on logical grounds, as it were, the existing power structure. It is in this junction that brave individuals will be called to challenge the governing logic of the zeitgeist - logic that operates now as an oppressive force that serves the vested interest of beneficials of the existing order. When success is favored over doing what is right, as we must admit is the prevailing cultural mood of our times, that the words of Emanuel Kant carry their full weight: "Do the Right thing and leave the Consequences to God". For this we need heroes and heroines that challenge the time by bearing the full weight of responsibility that comes with the doing of what is Right. *** This book was written more than anything from the perspective of the heroes and heroines of action. Sometimes they may be missing the exact words or the full insight into the solid logical complexity that stands between them and the doing of what is right. They feel what is right to do on the battlefield of life, whether in real battle, in political or economic life or whether in the life of creativity and the quest of the intellect. They do need, in analogy, proper logical and intellectual artillery. I hope they will find the logical cannons they require as they travel through the pages of this book. The rest is in their hands at the Moment of Truth. -/- Doron Avital, Tel Aviv 2011 -/- . (shrink)

According to the deliberative view of democracy, the legitimacy of democratic politics is closely tied to whether the use of political power is accompanied by a process of rational deliberation among the citizenry and their representatives. Critics have questioned whether this level of deliberative capacity is even possible among modern citizenries--due to limitations of time, energy, and differential backgrounds--which therefore calls into question the very possibility of this type of democracy. In my dissertation, I counter this line of criticism, arguing (...) that deliberative democrats and their critics have both idealized the wrong kind of citizen deliberation. Citizen deliberation should not be concerned with the indeterminate project of "translating" abstract democratic principles and values into everyday cases of political problem-solving. Instead, deliberation should take the form of analogy, just as we already find it in everyday politics and affairs. When ordinary citizens use analogies, they do not derive decisions from general principles or values, but they still reason nonetheless. Seen from this analogical perspective, deliberative democracy is already a practical reality to a large degree. When an election is on the horizon, a campaign season arises in which debates, forums, and "barstool" dialogues exponentially increase the amount of citizen deliberation. In these settings, citizens can readily be seen to be mapping analogous past candidates, elections, issues, and problems onto those currently on the ballot so as to reason about them. Consequently, analogical reasoning allows citizens to treat the majority rule mechanisms that proliferate in real politics as "deliberative outlets," which is to say, as catalysts of deliberation akin to the "creative outlets" that catalyze self-expression in the arts. While citizens may recognize majority rule mechanisms as catalysts of deliberation, many democratic theorists will hesitate to embrace this vision of the practical reality of deliberative politics. Isn't analogical reasoning too low in rigor to be placed at the heart of the deliberative ideal? I develop two arguments to explain the foundational role analogy plays in deliberation and to counter such critics. First, I draw on the explosion of research on analogical reasoning over the past two decades to show that it is far more rigorous and systematic than many suppose. Second, I argue that to the extent that citizen deliberation is concerned with rational planning, rather than just reasoning in general, analogical reasoning is logically superior. When we reason about what to do, we make plans that incorporate predictions about what is likely to ensue when a given course of action is selected. However, as soon as predictions enter into deliberation, its underlying logic changes as well. The reason for this change in logic is that as our probabilistic reasoning expands, the probability of its conclusions degenerates. Therefore, when assessing probabilities, we no longer should seek decisions derived from long, elegant chains of reasoning that connect our various options to generalities like values and principles. Instead, what we need is "short and sweet," or terse, humble lines of reasoning, which are more congruent with this form of deliberation. Thus, to the extent that democratic deliberation is involved in rational planning, it calls not for the elegant, deductive kind of reasoning idealized by proponents and critics of deliberative democracy alike. Instead, democratic deliberation calls for the "short and sweet," analogical kind of decision-making we associate with ordinary citizens already. After all, as research has shown, analogies are a much preferred and rigorous way by which even experts engage in probabilistic reasoning. By focusing on analogical reasoning, I therefore conclude that the practical reality of deliberative democracy should be recognized in ways that might ordinarily be dismissed. (shrink)

I finished the first draft of this lecture just before the NATO bombing campaign against Serbia began — a campaign that provides, I think, a prime example of the failure of international society. A double failure in this case: its political agencies were not able to respond in a timely fashion to the disaster of the former Yugoslavia, and then they were not able to find a more effective form of military intervention. The problem both times wasn't one of organization (...) but of political will, and I am afraid that I won't have much to say in this lecture about how to solve it. No doubt there are organizational structures that lend themselves to swift and strong action in a crisis.But these structures can as easily produce reckless and cruel acts as wise ones, and so we need to limit their powers. And then, properly limited, they may not act at all. This dilemma is an old one, and my way of dealing with it — which, as you will see, is to multiply structures and agents in the hope that somewhere, somehow, someone will do the right thing — will certainly seem inadequate. I concede immediately that I cannot produce an organizational chart showing how a decision to act rightly in international society would be deliberated, and decided, and then resolutely carried out. There is no such procedural or organizational solution; we have to think instead of a political strategy for coping with crises and for creating the sorts of agents that might cope successfully. That's my goal. It doesn't answer to the urgency of the daily news, but these days nothing could answer.I imagine the possible political arrangements of international society as if they were laid out along a continuum marked off according to the degree of centralization. Obviously, there are alternative markings: the recognition and enforcement of human rights could also be measured along a continuum, as could democratization, economic laissez-faire, welfare provision, pluralism, and so on. But I think that focusing on centralization is the best way of opening a discussion of international politics and the quickest way to reach all the other political and moral questions, above all the classical question: what is the best or the best possible regime? What constitutional goals should we set ourselves in an age of globalization?My plan is to present seven possible regimes or constitutions or political arrangements. I will do this discursively, without providing a list in advance, but I do want to list the criteria against which the seven arrangements have to be evaluated: these are their capacity to promote peace, distributive justice, cultural pluralism, and individual freedom. Obviously, within the scope of a single lecture, I will have to deal much too briefly and summarily with some of the arrangements and some of the criteria. This is especially regrettable since the criteria turn out to be inconsistent with, or at least in tension with, one another. So my argument will be complicated, and could be, probably should be, much more so. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:METHOD DIVORCED FROM CONTENT IN THEOLOGY? AN ASSESSMENT OF LONERGAN'S METHOD IN THEOLOGY TERRENCE REYNOLDS Brown University Providence, Rhode Island IN IDS INTRODUCTION to Method in Theology, Bernard Lonergan flatly maintains that he intends to· write not theology but only method in theology.1 He therefore proposes.to concern himself solely with the operations theologians perform and to suspend consideration of the objects they seek to expound. He (...) is looking for "a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results." 2 To arrive at his method, Lonergan relies upon the cognitional theory which he ha,d outlined with great sophistication in Insight. He argues that the dynamism of the human mind and the principles of its operations as revealed by introspective psycihology lead to a model of the nature of scientific method in general and, by extension, to method in theology. It is through the transcendental method that Lonergan discovers in the procedures of the human mind the basic pattern of operations by which wl1l cognitiona1 activity takes plaice. This pattern, he maintains, yields cumulative results in thelogical inquiry as well as in any fie1d of investigation. He therefore intends to demonstrate that theology can be studied in the same manner as any other discipline. Critics have respectfully suggested that, while Lonergan's system is an imposing one, he has introduced unworkable and 1 Bernard Lonergan, Method 4ln Theology (New York, 1979), p. XII. 2 Lonergan, Method, p. 5. 245 246 TERRENCE REYNOLDS misleading distinctions into his work; in particular, he has fa~led to explicate his thoologiicaJ. p11emises and thereby leaves uTIJc!lear the presuppositions upon which his Method rests. Method, they argue, cannot be divorced from theology, and the p11ecise writing of the form.er cannot be carried out without attention to the latter. Avery Dulles, Mauri!Oe Wiles, and Anthony Ke1ly have all leveled the charge that Method suffers from this detaichment of method from content. The purpose of this essay wiH he to discuss Lonergan's achievement in Method in Theology but then to consider the extent to which his critics may be right. Um:Lerstanding Lonergan's methodologiical enterprise requires a familiarity with his cognitionrul theory as delineated in Jnsi,ght, for his complex theory of knowing establishes the anthropology upon whiJCh he grounds his Method. Basically, he pr:obes.for ·the answers to thl"ee questions: 1) What happens when we a11e knowing? 2) Why do we cal~ that knowing? and 3) What is known when that is happening? The ans1wer to the first question yie1ds his cognitionrul theory, the second his epistemology,.and the thi11d his met:aphysics.3 Since •all knowing is a quest.for explanaition, founded upon the ass111mption of the intelligibility of the universe, the on-going search for explanation in the finite sphere implies a finail e:q>i1anation and this is be[ng itseH. In apprehending the processes of cognition, one can begin to recognize the means by which the search for·this reality is universally conducted: Thoroughly understand what it is to understand, and not only will you understand the broad lines of all that there is to be understood, but you will possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern, opening upon all further developments of understanding.4 a Lonergan, Method, p. 25. 4 Bernard Lonergan, Insight (New York, 1957), p. XVIII. Lonergan's cognitional theory draws from the work of Thomas and Kant but moves creatively beyond them in his emphasis upon the dynamism of the human mind and the nature of the reality it perceives and comes to know. For Kant, to whom Lonergan's work is often compared, the mind imposes a conceptual framework and an intelligible order upon that which it seeks to understand METHOD AND CONTENT IN THEOLOGY Lonergan's use of introspective psychology reveals four levds in human consciousness, the empir1ca1, the intellectual, the rationa1l, and the moml. The empirical ~eveJ. concentrates upon experience itself and involves the hasic questioning and intel"est in one's surroundings which all subsequent self-transcende1J1ce presupposes. It is " experiencing one's experiencing, understanding, judging and deciding." 5 Intellectual consciousness considers the elements passed on to it as " unknown " by... (shrink)

Arnold Burms: Professor Williams has said that he is willing to answer some of our questions about his work. Given the amount of work he has to do here in a few days, this was a generous decision for which we are genuinely grateful. Professor Van de Putte will start the discussion with some questions about the relation between theory and practice.André Van de Putte: In Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy you situate ethical thought in the context of a (...) movement of reflection. To quote from page 112: “It is too late at this stage to raise the prior question: `Why reflection?' — too late in terms of this inquiry, and always too late in terms of the question itself, since one could answer it without prejudice only by not considering it.” And just before that quotation you also said that “the drive to theory has roots in ethical thought itself” and a little bit further you say: “The important question at this point is why reflection should be taken to require theory.” Now I would like to elaborate a little bit on these remarks and ask you to comment on what I'm going to say.Three things should be stressed concerning ethical reflection which are important for moral philosophy and for our understanding of moral philosophy. The first one is this: the person who is reflecting is already part of a concrete society when he or she starts reflecting. That means that he or she has been socialized in a concrete ethos and has already an experience of a substantive ethical life. In this sense he or she does not need to invent ethical life.The second remark is this: ethical reflection is in itself already the expression of an ethical intention. By asking the question `How should one live?', one shows that one is interested in living an ethical life. In this sense I can agree with what I think you say in Ethics, namely that the question `Why should I be moral?' is not meaningful for a moral thinker. The answer to the moral question, the results of his reflection are not meant to convince him or his readers to be moral. On the contrary, he starts precisely from this interest in morality and tries to understand what it means to be moral, what his wish to be moral implies.My third point is the most important. In starting his reflection the thinker has as it were decided that his answer will only be acceptable if it is valid for all, if it can be justified for all. In the moral question itself, a norm of universality is implied. And given the fact that the moral question is itself the expression of an ethical intention, this is important. If he would not assume this norm, he would in my view not really be posing the question. We can immediately understand this if we consider the alternative.Suppose a moral thinker who assumes that an answer to the moral question will be valid only when it suits him. Would we say in this case that this person is really asking the moral question? I do not think so. To put this another way, my thesis is that in the reflection the person who reflects is subjecting himself to the law of thinking itself, to the law of reason, in other words, to the law of universality, of non-contradiction. In the question he discovers this law as a norm for himself asking the moral question and thus as a norm inherent in moral intention. I think that this is precisely what Kant discovered and why for so many there is an important link between ethics and reason and why we are, as you say, driven to theory: since we want a universal answer, since a moral norm implies universality, we are looking for a theory, for a universal justification. But this is not yet the full story. All that I have said only becomes visible on the reflective level. It is only visible, as it were, once one starts reflecting.This means that the norm of universality cannot and must not be understood as a concrete norm which can and should replace the norms of the concrete ethos we all already live in when we start reflecting. I think rationalism in ethics is precisely that: the belief that this norm and what one hopes to deduce from it can and should replace the concrete ethos. I think it must be clear that this cannot be done. As we all know the Kantian imperative is formal and negative and does not produce any content. If we need content — and of course we need it — it should come from our historical ethos. (shrink)

Although the question of human knowing and of being occupies a primary place in the history of human thought, it remains a controversial problem in philosophy. Any meanings that a thinker may assign to the three basic philosophic issues of knowing, objectivity and reality will eventually demarcate his school of thought, and fundamentally determine of cognitional theory, epistemology and metaphysics. Bernard Lonergan stands out as an innovative thinker who has handled this contentious problem in an expressive and methodical (...) manner. His philosophy of Self-Appropriation is a philosophic program that underpins the basic issues and disciplines in a way that is significant for all human inquiries. This work explores the original meanings and interrelations of the three basic philosophic disciplines of cognitional theory, epistemology and metaphysics. After a critical analysis of how the basic issues in philosophy have been handled in the course of history, it offers what are considered as the original meanings and methodical relations of these basic disciplines and issues. Cognitional theory the methodical basics of both epistemology and metaphysics. Since the human desire to know being is the parent of all human inquires, the consideration of the human conscious subject and his cognitional subject and his cognitional operations is prior to and is the ground of the metaphysical explorations. Epistemology is the critical phase that verifies and validates cognitional theory; and methaphysics is an enter-prise that deals with the character of the real. (shrink)

It is argued that one answer to the question of the rationality of emotion hinges on the different roles in action selection played by emotions when one is aware of them versus when one is not aware of them . When unaware of one’s emotions, they are: not able to enter into one’s deliberations about what to do, and more likely to be automatically acted out. This is a problem for rationality because emotional action urges are often “false positives”. (...) In contrast, awareness of emotions crucially allows emotional responses to be inhibited: such inhibition is necessary for truly rational action selection. Furthermore, awareness enables Reflective Revision—the modification of one’s theories and action plans as a result of awareness of inconsistencies between theories and data, and action plans and goals. (shrink)

: The answer to the question of what health care services should be covered by a managed care plan is straightforward; the plan should cover whatever the consumer is willing to pay for. From the plan's perspective, the consumer is the payer, that is, the employer who negotiates the plan; not the individual patient whose personal preferences and interests may be quite different. Since managed care organizations contract with payers to arrange for health care services within a defined set (...) of benefits, there is a broader question as well: Within the benefits chosen by the payer, what actually is covered? Criteria for determining "medical necessity," which managed care plans frequently use as the basis for coverage, are discussed. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:OBJECTIVITY AND RELlGIOUS TRUTH: A COMPARISON OF WILFRED CANTWELL SMITH AND BERNARD LONERGAN DENNIS M. DOYLE University of Dayton Dayton, Ohio WILFRED CANTWELL SMITH •and Bernard Lonergan both propose a new agenda for theology n response to ;the same basic cultura.I developments.1 Both Smith and Lonergan pinpoint the crux of the current siturution!aJS the convergence of various cultures in a world where Western culture (...) had.been heM by its pwrticiipants to be univers•al.and normrutive. The majo'l" problem concerning religious truth :that 1 arises out of this situation concerns universality. Formulrutions tha:t were once taken for granted are now seen to he relative to their context. Concepts that it.T1anscend particular formulations are themselves recognized irus indigenous to 1a culture. T·ruth itself is questioned as to whether it too is not!l'elative to eaich oontert. The responses of Smith and Lonergan to this situa:tion are remarkably ·similar in structure. In the midst of these similarities, 1 however, arise some differences with important implications concerning oibjectivity, itruth, and theology in a global context. Objec:tivity, Method, and Human Knowledge Smith and Lonergan both 'address rthe issue of human knowing before establishing their programs for theo1 logy.2 For botih, 1 Smith's proposal is put forth in Towards a World Theology (Phila.: Westminster Press, 1981 )• Lonergan's proposal can be found in Method in Theology (N.Y.: Herder and Herder, 1972). 2 Smith's reflections on human knowing are in "Objectivity and the Humane Sciences,'' in Towards a World Theology, pp. 56·80'. Lonergan's 461 462 DENNIS M. DOYLE a major problem in wayis of conceiving human knowing in recent centuries has heen an ohjectivism according to which knowledge was iheld to he absolute without regard to human SUJbjectivity and without an openness to other cultures. Both find a £acile cultural remtivism to he.an unsatisfactory reaction to this problem. In response, :both Smith and Lonergan try to re-root human knowing in a human conte:rl. Lonergan does ·this hy establishing the ground of knowing in an analysis of human intentionality. Smith does this by estaiblishing the ground of knowing in a mutual interchange between persons who participate in some traditions and who are observers of other traditions. Smith la.bels such knowing ·a" 001·iporaite critica1 self-iconsciousness." What emerges from such consciousness is "humane knowledge." Although some major di:ffevences arise at this point, the context of istructul'lal similarities must he noted.3 For hoth Smith and Lonergan, hruman knowing is intrinsically connected with :the quality of living both individually and oommullla1ly. Eiach in his own way stresses that knowing is vitally linked to the consciousness of individuals. Each in his own way stresses that knowing takes place within ·community, and that the breadth and quality of the community affects the breadth and quality of the knowing. Smith •and Lonergan both, furthermore, envision the taisk of theology as the conceptualization and articulation in a new context of wihat was once known in a strictly objective, theoretical f:vame;work. Both, finailily, 'lay ouit the major work on human knowing is Insight: A Study of Human Understo;nding (N.Y.: Philosophical Library, 1957). For a summary view, see chapter one of Method in Theology. For Lonergan's position on objectivity, see "The Origins of Christian Realism" in A Second Collection (Phila.: Westminster Press, 1974), ·pp. 239-61. a For an earlier comparison of the methods of Smith and Lonergan, see Walter E. Conn, "'Faith' and 'Cumulative Tradition' in Functional Specialization : A Study in the Methodologies of Wilfred Cantwell Smith and Bernard Lonergan," Studies in ReligiOn/Soiences Religieuses 5 (1975/76) : 221-46•.Although this article was published before several of Smith's major works in the area, the methodological similarities unearthed by Conn still hold true. WILFRED CANTWELL SMITH & BERNARD LONERGAN 463 problem specifically in terms of tmnscending false subject/object :dichotomies. At this point, however, differences between Smith and Lonwgian begin to emerge, foir each attempts to transcend false.suibjoot/oibject dichotomies in a different way. Lonergan holds that objectivity is the fruit of authentic ;subjectivity.4 1t is intended hy the self-transcending subject who loves... (shrink)

We tend to suppose that the ancient Greeks had primitive ideas of the self, of responsibility, freedom, and shame, and that now humanity has advanced from these to a more refined moral consciousness. Bernard Williams's original and radical book questions this picture of Western history. While we are in many ways different from the Greeks, Williams claims that the differences are not to be traced to a shift in these basic conceptions of ethical life. We are more like the (...) ancients than we are prepared to acknowledge, and only when this is understood can we properly grasp our most important differences from them, such as our rejection of slavery. The author is a philosopher, but much of his book is directed to writers such as Homer and the tragedians, whom he discusses as poets and not just as materials for philosophy. At the center of his study is the question of how we can understand Greek tragedy at all, when its world is so far from ours. Williams explains how it is that when the ancients speak, they do not merely tell us about themselves, but about ourselves. _Shame and Necessity_ gives a new account of our relations to the Greeks, and helps us to see what ethical ideas we need in order to live in the modern world. (shrink)

In this important new book, Jacques Derrida talks with Bernard Stiegler about the effect of teletechnologies on our philosophical and political moment. Improvising before a camera, the two philosophers are confronted by the very technologies they discuss and so are forced to address all the more directly the urgent questions that they raise. What does it mean to speak of the present in a situation of "live" recording? How can we respond, responsibly, to a question when we know (...) that the so-called "natural" conditions of expression, discussion, reflection, and deliberation have been breached? As Derrida and Stiegler discuss the role of teletechnologies in modern society, the political implications of Derrida's thought become apparent. Drawing on recent events in Europe, Derrida and Stiegler explore the impact of television and the internet on our understanding of the state, its borders and citizenship. Their discussion examines the relationship between the juridical and the technical, and it shows how new technologies for manipulating and transmitting images have influenced our notions of democracy, history and the body. The book opens with a shorter interview with Derrida on the news media, and closes with a provocative essay by Stiegler on the epistemology of digital photography. In Echographies of Television, Derrida and Stiegler open up questions that are of key social and political importance. Their book will be of great interest to all those already familiar with Derrida's work, as well as to students and scholars of philosophy, literature, sociology and media studies. (shrink)

Although informed consent is important in clinical research, questions persist regarding when it is necessary, what it requires, and how it should be obtained. The standard view in research ethics is that the function of informed consent is to respect individual autonomy. However, consent processes are multidimensional and serve other ethical functions as well. These functions deserve particular attention when barriers to consent exist. We argue that consent serves seven ethically important and conceptually distinct functions. The first four functions (...) pertain principally to individual participants: (1) providing transparency; (2) allowing control and authorization; (3) promoting concordance with participants' values; and (4) protecting and promoting welfare interests. Three other functions are systemic or policy focused: (5) promoting trust; (6) satisfying regulatory requirements; and (7) promoting integrity in research. Reframing consent around these functions can guide approaches to consent that are context sensitive and that maximize achievable goals. (shrink)

Critical philosophy has always challenged the division between theory and practice. At its best, it aims to turn contemplation into emancipation, seeking to transform society in pursuit of equality, autonomy, and human flourishing. Yet today’s critical theory often seems to engage only in critique. These times of crisis demand more. Bernard E. Harcourt challenges us to move beyond decades of philosophical detours and to harness critical thought to the need for action. In a time of increasing awareness of economic (...) and social inequality, Harcourt calls on us to make society more equal and just. Only critical theory can guide us toward a more self-reflexive pursuit of justice. Charting a vision for political action and social transformation, Harcourt argues that instead of posing the question, “What is to be done?” we must now turn it back onto ourselves and ask, and answer, “What more am I to do?” Critique and Praxis advocates for a new path forward that constantly challenges each and every one of us to ask what more we can do to realize a society based on equality and justice. Joining his decades of activism, social-justice litigation, and political engagement with his years of critical theory and philosophical work, Harcourt has written a magnum opus. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 33.3 (2000) 298-302 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Rhetoric Retold: Regendering the Tradition from Antiquity Through the Renaissance Rhetoric Retold: Regendering the Tradition from Antiquity Through the Renaissance. Cheryl Glenn. Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL: Southern Illinois UP, 1997. Pp. xii + 235. $19.95 paperback; $49.95 hardback. The past decade has produced a number of collections on women and rhetoric, women in rhetoric, and feminist approaches (...) to rhetoric. Reviewers of these collections have commended their contributions as pioneering works [End Page 298] in a new field while calling for book-length studies offering sustained appraisals of individual women figures and theoretical bases for approaching individual women and rhetorical issues, which must be approached differently if women and feminist issues are to be incorporated into the study of rhetoric. Ethos and audience, intention and identification, agonistic argumentation and collective narrative modes of argumentation--each of these takes on new shadings and nuances when women's practices are examined, and when various feminist theories are employed to assess those practices.Glenn's study is a welcome newcomer, a sustained analysis of rhetorical issues across periods, an analysis developed by spotlighting a series of women figures. Very deliberately, Glenn includes "heroic" figures such as Aspasia and Elizabeth I alongside their "lesser" sisters: the marginalized, until now unheard, and often uneducated women who developed rhetorics within severe restraints. The exposition illuminates a number of points in current feminist theory that are shaping rhetorical studies. Some may fault the selections in Glenn's study, and the inevitable omissions, and some may object that focusing on women's silence is yet another victim narrative. Careful readers, however, will find that the discussion of silence in women's rhetoric deftly reverses the traditional negative connotations: "Silence is perhaps the most undervalued and under-understood traditionally feminine rhetorical site" (175). Silence need not be read simply as "passivity. Silence may take many forms and serve many functions" (176), including "enlightened presence" (177).In "Cartographies of Silence" (The Dream of the Common Language, New York: Norton, 1978), Adrienne Rich writes, Silence can be a plan rigorously executed the blueprint to a life Do not confuse it with any kind of absence. (17) Rhetoric Retold begins and concludes by "mapping the silences" of women's presence in the history of rhetoric, and in the very conception of rhetoric. Like Rich, Glenn defines the subtle complexities of silence and absence: silence can indeed be a plan, rigorously executed. We should not confuse it with any kind of absence. Until recently, most histories of rhetoric have not given much attention to women as individual figures or as practitioners [End Page 299] of distinct rhetorical genres. Quite to the contrary, many histories have simply asserted, without proof or evidence, that women have always been forbidden to study or practice rhetoric. Strong assertions of absence belie the truth intimated by Democritus's rebuke: "A woman must not practice argument. This is dreadful. To be ruled by a woman is the ultimate outrage for a man" (Ancilla to the PreSocratic Philosophers, trans. Kathleen Freeman, Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1983, 103). Glenn's double starting point is the question, who left them out, and why? Their absence from our histories has been one among many sources of their silence. The historiographical discussion happily avoids simple charges of phallocentrism and misogyny and instead looks at how entire systems of culture, within different periods, constructed women's roles and voices. Deep background detail within each historical section provides a welcome context for thinking through complex questions of what is rhetorical among the many women's discourses presented for consideration.Although Glenn's study does not dwell on this point, some of the fault for the omission of women from histories of rhetoric, and evidence of the rigorous deliberateness of that omission, can be found in the robust maleness of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century classical philology, and the neoclassical educational systems it underwrote. The quip in Pope's "Epistle 2: To a Lady" of The Moral Essay, "Nothing so true as once you [Martha... (shrink)

This book is the result of over 30 years of collaboration among its authors. It uses the systematic account of our common morality developed by one of its authors to provide a useful foundation for dealing with the moral problems and disputes that occur in the practice of medicine. The analyses of impartiality, rationality, and of morality as a public system not only explain why some bioethical questions, such as the moral acceptability of abortion, cannot be resolved, but also provide (...) a method for determining the correct answer for those occasions when a bioethical question has a unique correct answer. This new edition includes an entire chapter that has been added to address the controversial issue of abortion within the authors' distinct framework. This book presents the latest revisions of the authors' orignial analyses of the concepts of death and disease, analyses that have had a significant impact on the field of bioethics. It also includes an added chapter on mental disorders, where the authors' definition influenced what psychiatry classifies as a mental disorder, and so has had an impact that reveals beyond the field of bioethics. In this edition, the authors also offer a new, more developed perspective on the concept of valid or informed consent by considering what information physicians should be required to know before proposing screening, diagnostic testing, prescribing medications, or performing surgery. The book also integrates some of the important insights of the field of clinical epidemiology into its discussion of valid consent. Its account of paternalism and its justification, perhaps the most ubiquitous moral problem in medical ethics, has had considerable influence. Its discussion of euthanasia and physician assisted suicide challenges the standard views that have been put forward by both proponents and opponents of physician assisted suicide and voluntary active euthanasia. (shrink)

Suppose I am a leeway sceptic: I think that, whenever I face a choice between two courses of action, I lack true alternatives. Can my practical deliberation be rational? Call this the Deliberation Question. This paper has three aims in tackling it. Its constructive aim is to provide a unified account of practical deliberation. Its corrective aim is to amend the way that philosophers have recently framed the Deliberation Question. Finally, its disputative aim is to argue that leeway sceptics cannot (...) deliberate entirely rationally about what to do, because of the connection between deliberating and deciding. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Catholic Social Teaching in Global PerspectiveRon MercierCatholic Social Teaching in Global Perspective Edited by Daniel Mcdonald, SJ Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 2010. 218 pp. $26.00The collection of essays in Catholic Social Teaching in Global Perspective, the second in a Gregorian University series, responds to a question posed to its authors: “How can you reflect on your particular continent and its ‘culture’ in order to best apply... CST [Catholic social (...) teaching] in your area of the world?” (x). Although the responses of the various authors to that challenge are uneven, the deliberate emphasis on a cultural-critical approach makes this [End Page 211] volume noteworthy and a significant contribution to the discussions in the field.Thomas Hughson’s introductory essay frames the task provocatively. Exploring the work of Bernard Lonergan and Robert Doran on culture, he takes aim at the ways in which “common good” and “Catholic social teaching” too often serve as categorical realities, as if they had a universal and absolute meaning applicable to any concrete situation. He recasts CST by placing it in dialogue with contemporary currents in philosophy and social science and notes both the broader meaning and the fluidity of social justice within CST. He develops what he calls a “modified eudemonistic perspective... to highlight incompleteness in social justice and a common good taken by themselves” (25). This calls for a “reflexive culture,” along the lines of the “transcendental humanism” in Benedict XVI’s Caritas in veritate. While the emphasis on “human flourishing” certainly has a long history in the tradition, Hughson’s approach empowers local communities to make CST their own as a mode of discerning what fosters or undermines human flourishing. For too long CST “has ignored how movement toward just social practice depends on two factors, reflexive culture ‘from above’ and popular culture ‘from within’ practicality” (22). This perspective links well with the insights and concerns of liberation theology, notably its ecclesiology, and helps clarify the meaning and potential of CST.Several essays in the volume pick up this theme even as they explore the many prisms through which one can understand “culture.” David Kaulemu reflects on the African situation in ways similar to Paulinus Odozor and Agbonkhianmeghe Orobator, calling for “moral/cultural/spiritual efforts to accompany our political and economic reforms” (37). He explores cultural resources for and barriers to human flourishing in an African context. Agnes Brazal (East Asia) and Joseph Jadhav (India) write in a similar vein: Brazal on the relationship between the role of “harmony” in an East Asian world view and the fragmentation and hybridity engendered by globalization; Jadhav on the interplay between CST and local culture in an arid rural part of India, which has created possibilities for culturally transformative action. John Coleman’s rich and nuanced reflection on North American (especially US) culture underlines the challenges CST faces.Sandie Cornish and David Freeman (Australia) and Johan Verstraeten (EU) explore ecclesiological perspectives: how episcopal, religious, and lay groups have read “the signs of the times” in their area, though largely without a cultural-critical frame. Curiously, the volume avoids any cultural critique of the Church; the dialectic “from above” and “from below” remains ad extra, although Coleman does note how US bishops have frequently undercut their ability to engage culture by focusing narrowly on the institutional interests of the Church. [End Page 212]In sum, the volume advances the work of CST by reframing key concepts within a broader perspective, in particular one that invites voices “from below.” It exposes the reader, especially those familiar with CST, to contemporary dialogues on the ethical significance of “culture” while deepening the value of CST for contemporary reflection. Contributions from Latin America and Eastern Europe, though, would have strengthened the volume.Ron MercierSt. Louis UniversityCopyright © 2012 The Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

Questions concerning the relationship between nature and grace, reason and faith are central to Christian anthropology. With philosopher/theologian Bernard Lonergan’s essay “Natural Knowledge of God” as a starting point, these questions will be considered in conversation with the work of Rene Girard and theologian James Alison. Lonergan agrees with Karl Rahner that, with regard to these questions, dogmatic theology needs to be transposed into a theological anthropology. Given that Girard is an anthropologist of religion and culture who (...) is open to theology, his work can be useful in effecting such a transposition. For example, Girard’s thought can help us understand what Lonergan means when he writes: “I do not think that in this life people arrive at natural knowledge of God without God’s grace, but what I do not doubt is that the knowledge they so attain is natural.” Implicit in this statement is an awareness that “natural reason” needs to be freed of its biases before it can operate freely and “naturally.” Girard’s anthropological approach to the Bible helps to explain why this is the case. (shrink)

This paper expands on the notion of "moral conversion" (advanced by Bernard Lonergan but underdeveloped in his work) by developing a typology that uses two "cross-hatching" criteria. First, it distinguishes between moral conversions that have to do with a person's relation to moral obligation, good and evil, and between moral conversions that have to do with how a person regards the question of happiness and the meaning of life. Secondly, it distinguishes between conversions regarding the _content_ (what (...) is good/evil or the meaning of life?), regarding _attitude_ (becoming committed to doing good or to the meaning-seeking process), and regarding _coherence_ (conforming one's actual life to what is understood to be right/wrong or meaning-giving). Combining both criteria leaves us with six types of moral conversion. Each type is then illustrated and supported with concrete real-life narratives. I conclude with an attempt at a definition of moral conversion that includes all types. The article is a summary of Chapter 5 of my dissertation (2008) "Narratives of Hope: A Philosophical Study of Moral Conversion.". (shrink)

It is commonly assumed in the philosophical literature that in order to acquire an intention, the agent has to settle a question of what to do in practical deliberation. Carruthers, P. has recently used this to argue that the acquisition of intentions can never be conscious even in cases where the agent asserts having the intention in inner speech. Because of that Carruthers also believes that knowledge of intentions even in first person cases is observational. This paper explores the (...) challenge Carruthers’ argument throws up for accounts that also rely on the notion of settling a question for intention acquisition, but who also want to maintain at the same time that knowledge of intentions in the first person case is not observational. (shrink)

In his recent address to the Aristotelian Society, Aurel Kolnai suggests that games exhibit what he calls a “genuine paradoxy.” I do not believe that he has shown this to be the case, even on the most permissive interpretation of what it means to be a paradox. Kolnai has, however, called attention to an aspect of games which invites further investigation, and I should like to advance the following considerations not so much as a criticism of Kolnai as (...) an attempt to take the investigation along a path which Kolnai has indicated, but which he has not himself, in my opinion, followed. It is not that Kolnai does not say many interesting, indeed penetrating, things about games, for he does. That Kolnai's inquiry is an important contribution to the philosophy of games is not in question. What is questionable is whether paradox has very much to do with that contribution. (shrink)

What is the point of asking yourself what to do and then thinking hard about it if all the thinking is settled in advance? What is the point of trying to figure out how to run your life if determinism governs your every reflection? Do we not have to suppose that determinism is false if we are to take our own deliberations seriously? The question has long been taken to bedevil the doctrine of determinism. It has been (...) supposed that determinists can have no good answer to it. Well, Professor Kapitan is one good philosopher who thinks otherwise. He takes things forward. His piece will repay your close attention. (shrink)

Three years before his death, Michel Foucault delivered a series of lectures at the Catholic University of Louvain that until recently remained almost unknown. These lectures—which focus on the role of avowal, or confession, in the determination of truth and justice—provide the missing link between Foucault’s early work on madness, delinquency, and sexuality and his later explorations of subjectivity in Greek and Roman antiquity. Ranging broadly from Homer to the twentieth century, Foucault traces the early use of truth-telling in ancient (...) Greece and follows it through to practices of self-examination in monastic times. By the nineteenth century, the avowal of wrongdoing was no longer sufficient to satisfy the call for justice; there remained the question of who the “criminal” was and what formative factors contributed to his wrong-doing. The call for psychiatric expertise marked the birth of the discipline of psychiatry in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as well as its widespread recognition as the foundation of criminology and modern criminal justice. Published here for the first time, the 1981 lectures have been superbly translated by Stephen W. Sawyer and expertly edited and extensively annotated by Fabienne Brion and Bernard E. Harcourt. They are accompanied by two contemporaneous interviews with Foucault in which he elaborates on a number of the key themes. An essential companion to _Discipline and Punish_, _Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling_ will take its place as one of the most significant works of Foucault to appear in decades, and will be necessary reading for all those interested in his thought. (shrink)

Believing that p, assuming that p, and imagining that p involve regarding p as true—or, as we shall call it, accepting p. What distinguishes belief from the other modes of acceptance? We claim that conceiving of an attitude as a belief, rather than an assumption or an instance of imagining, entails conceiving of it as an acceptance that is regulated for truth, while also applying to it the standard of being correct if and only if it is true. We (...) argue that the second half of this claim, according to which the concept of belief includes a standard of correctness, is required to explain the fact that the deliberative question whether to believe that p is transparent to the question whether p. This argument raises various questions. Is there such a thing as deliberating whether to believe? Is the transparency of the deliberative question whether to believe that p the same as the transparency of the factual question whether I do believe that p? We will begin by answering these questions and then turn to a series of possible objections to our argument. (shrink)

This book examines the question of what parental obligations procreators incur by bringing children into being. Prusak argues that parents, as procreators, have obligations regarding future children that constrain the liberty of would-be parents to do as they wish. Moreover, these obligations go beyond simply respecting a child’s rights. He addresses in turn the ethics of adoption, child support, gamete donation, surrogacy, prenatal genetic enhancement, and public responsibility for children.

Ethics is highly relevant to grand technological interventions into basic planetary systems on a global scale (roughly, “geoengineering”). Focusing on climate engineering, this chapter identifies a large number of salient concerns (e.g., welfare, rights, justice, political legitimacy) but argues that early policy framings (e.g., emergency, global public good) often marginalize these and so avoid important questions of justification. It also suggests that, since it is widely held that geoengineering has become a serious option mainly because of political inertia, there are (...) important contextual issues, especially around the paradoxical question, “What should we do, ethically speaking, given that we have not done, and will continue not to do, what we should be doing?” Taking such issues seriously helps to explain why some regard geoengineering as ethically troubling and highlights the largely neglected threat of interventions that discriminate against future generations (“parochial geoengineering”). We should take seriously the risk that, far from being simply a welcome new tool for climate action, geoengineering may become yet another manifestation of the underlying problem. (shrink)

“What are we to do next?” is a question that spontaneously emerges in our daily lives, for example, in planning a family vacation, and the question is permeated by a mood of adventure. Ethics as functional collaboration envisions an adventure-anticipating team of individuals who are reaching for better vacations for one and all. Collectively the team is to reach both for a serious understanding of the concrete and particular, be it the local high school or local economy, and for (...) a timely and humane reply to the question “What next?” Their reaching is to make more efficient and beautiful the way they divide up a large number of questions of the type “What is the current situation?” “How did we get here?” “What do we want?” and “What are we to do next?” Whatever small steps we actors in the drama of higher or lower education might take to realize such collaboration are fundamentally good steps, that is, what we are to do next. (shrink)

What is the place of coherence, or structural rationality, in good first-personal deliberation? According to Kolodny (2005), considerations of coherence are irrelevant to good first-personal deliberation. When we deliberate, we should merely care about the reasons or evidence we have for our attitudes. So, considerations of coherence should not show up in deliberation. In response to this argument, Worsnip (2021) argues that considerations of coherence matter for how we structure deliberation. For him, we should treat incoherent combinations of attitudes (...) as off-limits in deliberation. Some important questions are left unanswered by both camps. What do we mean by considerations of coherence “showing up” in first-personal deliberation? How do we interpret the divide between reasons-responsiveness and coherence? How should we interpret cases in which considerations of coherence interact with other norms or requirements? In this paper, I show how Haack’s (1993) crossword puzzle analogy sheds light on these questions. Also, the crossword puzzle analogy allows us to evaluate Kolodny’s objection and identify promising avenues for future research. (shrink)

Our subject is what we do not know; and this is a meeting under the auspices of philosophy—a meeting, indeed, designed to advance UNESCO's programme in philosophy. The conjunction of this subject and these auspices already confronts us with certain questions. How is philosophy related to ignorance?

This paper seeks to explain why the debate over the personhood of the embryo goes nowhere and is more likely to generate confusion than conviction. The paper presents two arguments. The first aims to establish that the question of the personhood of the embryo cannot be resolved by turning to science, althoughthe debate about the embryo has largely been a debate about the scientific facts. It is claimed that the rough facts on which the parties to the debate agree admit (...) ofmultiple more refined accounts, among which science is powerless to adjudicate. So what happens is that the arguments go round and round, neither party convincing the other, both infuriating each another. The second argument concerns the implications of this claim for the many controversies involving the embryo. Here the question is how people who do not know what to make of the embryo might go about deciding how it should be treated. (shrink)