Philosophers often claim that humility is a dependent virtue: a virtue that depends on another virtue for its value. I consider three views about this relation: Specific Dependence, Unspecific Dependence, and Fittingness. I argue that, since humility cannot uniquely depend on another virtue, and since this uniqueness is desirable, we should reject Specific and Unspecific Dependence. I defend a Fittingness view, according to which the humble person possesses some objectively good quality fitting for humility. I show beyond Slote’s original characterization (...) of the dependence relation that, even if humility’s value depends on having objectively good qualities, humility itself can be one such quality. So, humility can depend on itself. I call this view Bootstrapped Fittingness. (shrink)

Current management of people with prolonged disorders of consciousness is failing patients, families and society. The causes include a general lack of concern, knowledge and expertise; a legal and professional framework which impedes timely and appropriate decision-making and/or enactment of the decision; and the exclusive focus on the patient, with no legitimate means to consider the broader consequences of healthcare decisions. This article argues that a clinical pathway based on the principles of the English Mental Capacity Act 2005 and using (...) time-limited treatment trials could greatly improve patient management and reduce stress on families. There needs to be early and continuing use of formal best interests meetings, starting between 7 and 21 days after onset of unconsciousness. The treatment options need to evolve as the clinical state and prognosis becomes more certain. A formal discussion of treatment withdrawal should occur when the upper bound of predicted recovery falls below a level the patient would have considered acceptable, and it should always be discussed when the condition is considered permanent. Any decision to stop treatment should be contingent on a formal second opinion from an independent expert who should review the clinical situation and expected prognosis, but not the best interests decision. The article also asks how, if at all, the adverse effects on the family and the resource implications of long-term care of people left in a prolonged state of unconsciousness should be incorporated in the process. (shrink)

Most jurisdictions require a patient to consent to any medical intervention. Clinicians ask a patient, ‘Given the pain and distress associated with our intervention and the predicted likelihood of this best-case outcome, do you want to accept the treatment?’ When a patient is incapable of deciding, clinicians may ask people who know the patient to say what the patient would decide; this is substituted judgement. In contrast, asking the same people to say how the person would make the decision is (...) substituted interests.1 The UK Mental Capacity Act 2005 uses the latter approach, and my comments appertain to that approach. When a patient lacks capacity, the question facing clinicians is, ‘Given the likely outcome of this treatment plan for the patient’s life in the long term, would the patient decide to accept the plan?’ This answer depends on the patient’s wishes, values and other factors they would use when deciding. The proposed development of an algorithm involves the following:2. (shrink)

The utterance “I am humble” is thought to be paradoxical because a speaker implies that they know they are virtuous or reveals an aim to impress others – a decidedly non-humble aim. Such worries lead to the seemingly absurd conclusion that a humble person cannot properly assert that they are humble. In this paper, I reconstruct and evaluate three purported paradoxes of humility concerning its self-attribution, knowledge and belief about our own virtue, and humility's value. I argue that humility is (...) not genuinely paradoxical and that these puzzles do not have meaningful implications for its conceptual analyses. I instead offer error theoretical explanations of humility's apparent paradoxicality. (shrink)

Psychological situationism is the view that our behavior is ordered by external features of situations as opposed to robust character traits. Philosophical situationists have taken this claim to be conservatively revisionary for ethics; on their view, situationism problematizes only character, not any essential features of our ethical deliberation. Little has been said, however, about how these revisions motivate situationists’ claim that we ought to redirect our attention from cultivating virtues to managing situational influences on behavior. Virtue theorists have typically responded (...) to situationists by arguing that skill-based practical wisdom—the exercise of which underwrites all other virtues—can be appropriately sensitive to situational influences. Following this response, discussions about the prescriptive consequences of situationism have largely resulted in a stalemate. In this paper, I argue that situationism faces a dilemma: it is either too conservative to be ethically revisionary or too radical to inform our ethical deliberation. I argue that both horns of this dilemma are unacceptable. Thus, we should reject situationist revisions to our ethical deliberation, and conclude that situationism is not conservatively revisionary for ethics. (shrink)

Unveiling the Past—Preparing the Conditions for Human Beings to Live in the Midst of One Another Again? A Response From Living in Northern Ireland Content Type Journal Article Category Symposium Pages 333-335 DOI 10.1007/s11673-011-9334-y Authors Derick Wilson, University of Ulster, School of Education, Coleraine, Co. Londonderry, BT52 1SA UK Journal Journal of Bioethical Inquiry Online ISSN 1872-4353 Print ISSN 1176-7529 Journal Volume Volume 8 Journal Issue Volume 8, Number 4.

Philosophers often characterize modesty as a disposition that primarily or exclusively involves individual attitudes about one’s worth in relation to others. Borrowing from William James, I offer an interpersonal view of modesty that requires an emotional disposition sensitive to causing others offense based upon one’s self-presentation. On this view, modesty is a trait with the following three necessary features: (1) the modest person, A, endorses a norm of self-presentation M, (2) A is justified in believing that another person, B, endorses (...) M, and (3) A is emotionally disposed to avoid offending B by violating M. These conditions account for the variety of modesty norms about one’s merits and achievements, personal objects, and traditional modesty norms in dress and self-presentation. (shrink)

Professor Charles Foster1 argues that the recent decision by the Supreme Court2 on the process of making decisions about medical treatment in people who lack capacity due to a prolonged disorder of consciousness is fostering medical paternalism. He considers that the judgment shows ‘ deference to the guidelines of various organisations ’ and then that ‘ The guidance has effectively become a definitive statement of the relevant obligations,’ concluding that ‘ This usurps the function of the law.’ Healthcare teams make (...) all decisions concerning medical care provided; no-one else can. Both the clinicians themselves, and any guidance provided to them, must comply with the Mental Capacity Act 2005.3 Lady Black’s judgment makes clear that ‘ The basic protective structure is established by the MCA 2005 ’ and that the associated Code of Practice4 ‘ contains valuable guidance ’. She specifically highlights that the decision-maker must ensure that ‘ account has been taken of the patient’s previously expressed wishes and those of people close to him, as well as the opinions of other medical personnel. The MCA 2005 requires this to happen, and is reinforced by the professional guidance available to doctors.’ The Act says: ‘ He must consider, so far as is reasonably ascertainable— 1. the person’s past and present wishes and feelings (and, in …. (shrink)

Trialism is a term that is been used in Christian Theology, which is the doctrine that human is made up of three components which are; the Spirit, the Soul and the Body, giving rise to what is known as Christain Trialism. The term trialism was introduced in philosophy by John Cottingham as an alternative interpretation of the Cartesian Dualism (Mind-Body dualism) of Rene Descarte, by adding a third substance called Sensation in what he termed as Cartesian Trialism (MindSensation-Body trialism). Going (...) in line with the trialism nature of human by Cottingham, I think that the third substance Sensation is limited in explaining the processes between the Mind and the Body. So, I think that the substance Sensation should be replaced with the substance which I call “Submind” which is involved with the processes of memories, sensations, emotions and reflexes, which lead to what I term “Derician Trialism” (Mind-Submind-Body trialism). I believe that the mind is involved with high level consciousness, the Submind is involved with low level consciousness and the body has no consciousness. (shrink)

Expressivists, such as Blackburn, analyse sentences such as 'S thinks that it ought to be the case that p' as S hoorays that p'. A problem is that the former sentence can be negated in three different ways, but the latter in only two. The distinction between refusing to accept a moral judgement and accepting its negation therefore cannot be accounted for. This is shown to undermine Blackburn's solution to the Frege-Geach problem.

In Sex and Culture (1934), Unwin studied 80 primitive tribes and 6 known civilizations through 5,000 years of history and found a positive correlation between the cultural achievement of a people and the sexual restraint they observe.

A difficulty is exposed in Allan Gibbard's solution to the embedding/Frege-Geach problem, namely that the difference between refusing to accept a normative judgement and accepting its negation is ignored. This is shown to undermine the whole solution.

This article presents hospitality as a pivotal value in the context of increasing diversity that characterises the complex relations in which leadership emerges. After reviewing the concept of Otherness in philosophy, the notion of hospitality as developed by Richard Kearney in relation to his philosophy of religion is introduced. The case of Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Chief Albert Luthuli is then presented as a biographical leadership study from the African context to illustrate how hospitality as open response to radical Otherness (...) may inspire collaboration and foster positive change. The article then addresses ways in which the notions of hospitality and Otherness present new opportunities to leadership studies for responding to the relational challenges of the globalised world. Amidst an increased scholarly focus on relationality and the need for relational intelligence, globalisation routinely confronts leaders and their followers with radical Otherness. Through dialogue between theology, philosophy of religion and leadership studies and by presenting a case from the African context, the article offers in print what is called for in the global context, namely an open response to the alterity of the Other that enables collaboration amidst increasing diversity. CONTRIBUTION: Proceeding from a transdisciplinary engagement, the article illustrates that leadership studies stood to benefit from dialogue with theology and philosophy of religion, which offers ways of addressing the Otherness that characterise the globalised context of leadership. (shrink)

It is argued that current solutions to the question of how to individuate events do not work. Jonathan Bennett's thesis that the indeterminacy here is only semantic, not ontological, is refuted. An alternative account of why events resemble facts (although their identity criteria are less fine-grained) is defended.

The author argues that is not obvious what it means for our beliefs and assertions to be "truth-directed", and that we need to weaken our ordinary notion of a belief if we are to deal with radical scepticism without surrendering to idealism. Topics examined also include whether there could be alien conceptual schemes and what might happen to us if we abandoned genuine belief in place of mere pragmatic acceptance. A radically new "ecological" model of knowledge is defended.

The question of whether it is permissible to quantify into a modal context is re-examined from an empiricist perspective. Following Wiggins, it is argued that an ontology of continuants implies essentialism, but it is also argued, against Wiggins, that the only conception of necessity that we need to start out with is that of analyticity. Essentialism, of a limited kind, can then be actually generated from this. An exceptionally fine-grained identity criterion for continuants is defended in this context. The debate (...) between Wiggins and Ayer over the legitimacy of de re modality is then examined in the light of these results, and it is argued that my position is consistent with Ayer’s minimalist assumptions. It is also argued that non-continuants will not sustain the essential/accidental distinction, thus giving some concessions to the sceptics. It is also shown that there are close connections between these issues and the more modern two-dimensionalist way of disentangling the necessary from the a posteriori, and that the latter needs to learn from the former. (shrink)

This paper describes the author’s development and use of a diagramming model in preparing a legal case for which he was responsible. He combined Wigmorean analysis and object oriented techniques in order to model arguments based on generalisations taken from the real world and from legal precedent. The paper addresses the modelling issues, but in particular identifies the very real benefits that affected the way the case was conducted. Those areas in which the model came into its own were principally (...) the structuring of evidence, the preparation for the cross-examination of witnesses, and ensuring a consistent approach from picking up the case to making the closing submissions. (shrink)

Moral relativism is the doctrine that morality may vary from culture to culture. Given the difficulty of saying when two individuals belong to the same culture it can be taken in more or less radical forms. In its least radical form it means nothing more than that, although morality is fixed and universal for human beings, Martian morality may be different. In its most radical form it implies that each person has his own morality which may vary from one individual (...) to another and from one moment to the next. (shrink)

A major part of the mind–body problem is to explain why a given set of physical processes should give rise to qualia of one sort rather than another. Colour hues are the usual example considered here, and there is a lively debate between, for example, Hardin, Levine, Jackson, Clark and Chalmers as to whether the results of colour vision science can provide convincing explanations of why colours actually look the way they do. This paper examines carefully the type of explanation (...) that is needed here, and it is concluded that it does not have to be reductive to be effective. What needs to be explained more than anything is why inverted hue scenarios are more intuitive than other sensory inversions: and the issue of physicalism versus dualism is only of marginal relevance here. (shrink)

A persistent tradition existed in antiquity linking Caria with the island of Crete. This central theme of regional history is mirrored in the civic mythologies, cults and toponyms of southwestern Anatolia. This book explains why by approaching this diverse body of material with a broad chronological view, taking into account both the origins of this regional narrative and its endurance. It considers the mythologies in the light of archaeologically attested contacts during the Bronze Age, exploring whether such interaction could have (...) left a residuum in later traditions. The continued relevance of this aspect of Carian history is then considered in the light of contacts during the Classical and Hellenistic periods, with analysis of how, and in which contexts, traditions survived. The Carians were an Anatolian people; however, their integration into the mythological framework of the Greek world reveals that interaction with the Aegean was a fundamental aspect of their history. (shrink)

History shows alarming shifts in the way that people with intellectual disabilities have been regarded. Locke doubted whether they could be counted among the human, while Rousseau hailed them as unspoiled children who could help us be better; the eugenicists despised them as perpetuating “feeble-mindedness,” while the religious praised them as holy innocents. Throughout, however, they have been seen metaphorically, as symbolic figures who incite hatred or inspire wonder, but rarely as real people. This article, written by the father of (...) a young man with severe disabilities, rejects such thinking. The author explains how intellectual disabilities work as a Brechtian “alienation effect” and challenge our core system of values and explores how they make us reconsider much of what we take for granted. (shrink)

The issue of mandatory cycle helmets is highly contentious. The aim of this paper is not to argue for or against legislation but to suggest criteria on which the debate should focus. This is done by attempting to answer the question: 'What criteria must be met before cycle helmet wearing is enforced?' Consideration is given to principles, precedents and consequences and four criteria are suggested. The criteria are to do with effectiveness, personal liberty, public acceptability and the promotion of the (...) public health benefits of cycling. (shrink)

Divine law theories of metaethics claim that moral rightness is grounded in God’s commands, wishes and so forth. Expressivist theories, by contrast, claim that to call something morally right is to express our own attitudes, not to report on God’s. Ostensibly, such views are incompatible. However, we shall argue that a rapprochement is possible and beneficial to both sides. Expressivists need to explain the difference between reporting and expressing an attitude, and to address the Frege-Geach problem. Divine law theorists need (...) to get past the Euthyphro dilemma, and to avoid moral externalism. This paper shows how a combined theory helps us to achieve this. (shrink)

Max Ungar (1850-1930) was born in Boskovice, Moravia, and pursued an academic career in mathematics at Vienna University [Franz Brentano was one of his examiners]. His memoirs describe his escape from Orthodox Judaism into a century of high liberalism and the turning to science and knowledge and his failure to achieve the humanism that he was devoted to as a result of anti-Semitism. Although he wrote his memoirs chronologically, there is a recognisable leitmotif: on the one hand his escape from (...) Orthodox Judaism into a century of high liberalism and the turning to science and knowledge; while on the other hand it charts his failure as a devotee of the humanism he was dedicated to as result of his pursuit of science and knowledge. In this respect Max Ungar’s reminiscences written in 1928 but covering the period 1855 – 1892/1928 are particularly significant for their overlapping topics: for its Jewish history during the Austro-Hungarian monarchy in the 19th century and for the portrayal of identity in the modern period. He concentrates on important events in his life, passing the matura/school exam. Helping in his father's business. Falling in love, keeping the engagement a secret, while at university. His time at university and his love of mathematics. Also the academic intrigues and pettiness - not much has changed. Then leaving academic life and working in the business. Trying to get back into academia 5 years later, but without success. His home life, travels with family, visiting friends, information about his wider family: who married whom, how they met, who died, etc. Stories from the business. The difficult relationship with his father. His critical stance towards Judaism. He also relates incidents of anti-semitism in business but also at university. This is the first translation of Ungar’s memoir into English (originally written in German) - translated by Miroslav Imbrisevic. The book is free to download. (shrink)

Properties and concepts are similar kinds of thing in so far as they are both typically understood to be whatever it is that predicates stand for. However, they are generally supposed to have different identity criteria: for example, heat is the same property as molecular kinetic energy, whereas the concept of heat is different from the concept of molecular kinetic energy. This paper examines whether this discrepancy is really defensible, and concludes that matters are more complex than is generally thought. (...) The distinction between canonical and non-canonical designators, as applied to such entities as propositions, properties and concepts, is examined, as are causal realist accounts of the semantics of such terms as ‘electricity’ and ‘mass’. (shrink)

Processions in the Greek East were organised according to a clear visual schema, which helped to impose order and provide meaning. This demarcation was primarily enacted materially, with ritual roles frequently defined by the carrying of objects or accoutrements. This article focuses on the diversity and local particularities of roles terminating in -phoros during the Hellenistic and imperial periods, as evidenced by the epigraphic record. It explores how intrinsic these material dimensions were to the processional experience in the Greek world, (...) probing what they contributed to the aesthetics of procession and how they were ‘read’, both by participants and observers. (shrink)

Rivault’s book offers a comprehensive overview of the religious landscape of Caria as it relates to cults of Zeus, and is a reworked version of her doctoral thesis, examined at the University of Bordeaux in 2016. The book is structured around three chapters that each seek to speak to different elements of Zeus’ domain, with a short introduction and conclusion. The bulk of the text consists of what is effectively a catalogue of the different cult epicleses of Zeus that are (...) found in Caria acros... (shrink)

Deflationism is usually thought to differ from the correspondence theory over whether truth is a substantial property. However, I argue that this notion of a ‘substantial property’ is tendentious. I further argue that the Equivalence Schema alone is sufficient to lead to idealism when combined with a pragmatist theory of truth. Deflationism thus has more powerful metaphysical implications than is generally thought and itself amounts to a kind of correspondence theory.

. Editorial. Ethics, Place & Environment: Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 85-85.

An expressivist theory of consciousness is outlined. The suggestion that attributions of consciousness involve an essentially projective element is carefully examined, as is the view that ‘zombism’, defined as the thought that certain people are unconscious although physically normal, is a largely affective and not wholly cognitive (hypothetical) disorder. A comparison is drawn between ‘zombism’ and the Capgras delusion. The notion of supervenience is shown to be deeply problematic when applied to projected properties, as is the distinction between weak and (...) strong varieties. It is concluded that, contrary to most received opinion, consciousness and values are not all that different as far as these modal considerations are concerned. (shrink)

(2001). Landscapes and Ethics - Introduction. Ethics, Place & Environment: Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 219-219.