In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Being and Time. A Translation of “Sein und Zeit by Martin HeideggerP. Christopher SmithMartin Heidegger. Being and Time. A Translation of “Sein und Zeit. Translated by Joan Stambaugh. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996. Pp. xix + 487. Paper, $18.95.A new English translation of Heidegger’s best book, Sein und Zeit has been eagerly anticipated ever since the appearance of the Macquarrie/Robinson translation in 1962.1 For anyone (...) with an ear for German would find that, in turning Heidegger’s visceral prose into wooden terminology, this first pathbreaking and very scholarly translation failed completely to render the startling and wholly untraditional diction of this work, a diction that rocked a staid and stifling academia and that in lectures preceding the book’s publication had therefore attracted students in droves, among them Leo Strauss, Hanna Arendt, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Karl Löwith, Herbert Marcuse, and Hans Jonas. At long last, a new translation, Joan Stambaugh’s, is here, but, unfortunately, it is no better in this crucial regard, and it is not as scholarly either. (Macquarrie/Robinson do provide many detailed and useful accounts of their choices of translation.) Indeed, the new translation often seems to be a mere revision of the old and falls into much of the old translation’s terminological uprooting of Heidegger’s sometimes thick but always earthy language. Here are three examples.In S we find this rendering of Heidegger’s preliminary account of the phenomenological method he will apply in “laying out” our “factual” human existence “there” “in the world” of our cooperative taking care of life’s tasks:This “a priori” of the interpretation of Da-sein is not a structure which is pieced together, but rather a structure which is primordially and constantly whole. It grants various perspectives on the factors which constitute it. These factors are to be kept constantly in view, bearing in mind the preceding whole of this structure.(S 37)In M/R this same passage is translated, somewhat more readably and accurately, as:In the interpretation of Dasein, this structure is something ‘a priori’; it is not pieced together, but is primordially and constantly a whole. If affords us, however, various ways of looking at the items which are constitutive for it. The whole of this structure always comes first; but if we keep this constantly in view, these items, as phenomena, will be made to stand out.(M/R 65) [End Page 148]We note, first, how many of the M/R translations are taken over by S: “not a structure... pieced together,” which mistranslates “keine zusammengestückte Bestimmtheit” (SZ 41) or “not a determination arrived at bit by bit,” and “[structure]... primordial(ly) and constant(ly) (a) whole” for “eine ursprünglich und ständig ganze Struktur,” in which the English “primordial” turns the rather ordinary “ursprünglich” or “originally” into a technical term. Indeed, this phrase might best be rendered in more usual English along the lines of “This structure, assumed a priori... is originally, and continues to be, a whole.” For the point, lost in S but preserved in M/R with their “however,” is precisely that even though Dasein has been determined ahead of time to have the basic structure of a whole, we can still elucidate different sides of it phenomenologically by “throwing them into relief” (compare Heideger’s “phänomenal abzuheben”). In S, Heidegger’s pivotal “phänomenal” is lost altogether.Here, next, is how S renders Heidegger’s account of the call of conscience, which calls us back from our having lost ourselves in pressed busyness and vain chattering, at just that moment when these lose all their significance for us and go dead:The call is lacking any kind of utterance. It does not even come to words, and yet it is not at all obscure and indefinite. Conscience speaks solely and constantly in the mode of silence. Thus it not only loses none of its perceptibility, but forces Da-sein thus summoned and called upon to the reticence of itself.(S 252–53).And here is the M/R translation:The call dispenses with any kind of utterance. It does... (shrink)

Students of the Orestes are fortunate to have two excellent commentaries at their disposal, by C. W. Willink and M. L. West . Neither will help them to understand this line, which is ‘the only allusion to Ganymede's horsemanship’ , because ‘no story of riding by Ganymede is known’ . But we are repeatedly reminded that the scene with the Phrygian has far fewer affinities with tragedy than with comedy, and εριπιδαριστοφαíζεται Comedy provides the clue, specifically at Ar. Vesp. 50If. (...) and Lys. 676ff. The reference is to the variety of equestrianism for which Ganymede is far from unknown . For Innoavvr) here describes a σχμα ρωτικóν and the line means Ganymedes concubinus, Iovis supini inguini insidens et equitans, sc. inter causas fuit malorum propter Iunonis invidiam Troianis immissorum. (shrink)

AS formas históricas e institucionais do cristianismo em Itália fazem com que a filosofia se deva necessariamente confrontar com ele. Além disso, é também evidente que autores como Nietzsche ou Heidegger têm igualmente uma grande influência na península itálica. O artigo examina os escritos de quatro autores contemporêneos os quais, uns mais do que outros, se inspiram nos autores alemães antes mencionados para dar um sentido, frequentemente redutor, mas por vezes também respeitoso da fé dos crentes, ao cristianismo de (...) que a cultura italiana não pode fazer abstracção. Estes filósofos, unidos numa comum sensibilidade ao ser humano, estão também particularmente atentos, ainda que de maneiras muito variadas, à provocação do mal. A categoria da 'Kenose', derivada da meditação sobre a diferença ontológica e da contestação de um saber absoluto disponível para a razão religiosa, acompanha a reconstrução filosófica daquilo que, no cristianismo, mais profundamente toca os autores estudados neste artigo; o seu entendimento do cristianismo, contudo, depende muito da percepção nietzscheana do instante. /// The article starts with the assumption that the historical and institutional forms of Christianity in Italy make it unavoidable for philosophy to confront itself with it. It also mentions the great influence that authors like Nietzsche and Heidegger have in the Italian peninsula. The article proceeds to analyze the writings of four contemporary Italian thinkers. All these authors are inspired by the above mentioned German thinkers and aim at making sense, frequently in a reductive manner but also in a mode respectful of the believers' faith, of Christianity, something of which the Italian culture cannot make abstraction. These four Italian philosophers are particularly united in a common sensibility to the human being and attentive, even though in very different manners, to the provocation of evil. For them, the category of 'Kenosis', derived from the meditation on the ontological difference and the protest against an absolute knowledge available to the religious reason, goes together with the philosophical reconstruction of what in Christianity most touches them. The article also shows, finally, that for these authors the understanding of Christianity depends to a great extent of the impact of nietzschean thought. (shrink)

Context. The identification of the sources that reionized the Universe and their specific contribution to this process are key missing pieces of our knowledge of the early Universe. Faint star-forming galaxies may be the main contributors to the ionizing photon budget during the epoch of reionization, but their escaping photons cannot be detected directly due to inter-galactic medium opacity. Hence, it is essential to characterize the properties of faint galaxies with significant Lyman continuum photon leakage up to z 4 to (...) define indirect indicators allowing analogues to be found at the highest redshift. Aims. Long gamma-ray bursts explode typically in star-forming regions of faint, star-forming galaxies. Through LGRB afterglow spectroscopy it is possible to detect directly LyC photons. Our aim is to use LGRBs as tools to study LyC leakage from faint, star-forming galaxies at high redshift. Methods. Here we present the observations of LyC emission in the afterglow spectra of GRB 191004B at z = 3:5055, together with those of the other two previously known LyC-emitting LGRB, to determine their LyC escape fraction and compare their properties. Results. From the afterglow spectrum of GRB 191004B we determine a neutral hydrogen column density at the LGRB redshift of og =17:2 0:15, and negligible extinction. The only metal absorption lines detected are C iv and Si iv. In contrast to GRB 050908 and GRB 060607A, the host galaxy of GRB 191004B displays significant Ly emission. From its Ly emission and the non-detection of Balmer emission lines we constrain its star-formation rate to 1 SFR 4:7 M yr. 1. We fit the Ly emission with a shell model and find parameters values consistent with the observed ones. The absolute LyC escape fractions we find for GRB 191004B, GRB 050908 and GRB 060607A are of 0:35+0:10.0:11, 0:08+0:05.0:04 and :20+0:05.0:05, respectively. We compare the LyC escape fraction of LGRBs to the values of other LyC emitters found from the literature, showing that LGRB afterglows can be powerful tools to study LyC escape for faint high-redshift star-forming galaxies. Indeed we could push LyC leakage studies to much higher absolute magnitudes. The host galaxies of the three LGRB presented here have all M1600 >.19:5 mag, with the GRB 060607A host at M1600 >.16 mag. LGRB hosts may therefore be particularly suitable for exploring the ionizing escape fraction in galaxies that are too faint or distant for conventional techniques. Furthermore the time investment is very small compared to galaxy studies. (shrink)

Thử nhìn lại nguồn gốc và vai trò của đạo đức và pháp luật trong lịch sử phát triển xã hội -- Những đặc điểm của đạo đức và pháp luật trong triết lý phát triển của nền văn hóa truyền thống Việt Nam --Vấn đề đạo đức và pháp luật trong tư tưởng Hồ Chí Minh và trong thực tiễn xà hội ta từ Cách mạng tháng Tám 1945 -- Thực trạng đạo đức và việc thực thi pháp luật (...) trong xã hội ta ngày nay -- Vai trò của đạo đức và pháp luật trong sự nghiệp công nghiệp hóa, hiện đại hóa hiện nay ở Việt Nam. (shrink)

Artiklen perspektiverer på den almene pædagogiks aktuelle, pressede tilstand, i lyset af de centrale, transnationale udviklingstendenser inden for uddannelsesstyring der har gjort sig gældende de sidste ca. 25-30 år. Dette gøres, ved at tage afsæt i de såkaldte antinomier, som en række pædagogiske forskere har forholdt sig til som definerende for moderne pædagogik. Denne tematik blevet sat på dagsordenen af aktuelle uddannelsesforskere som bl.a. Alexander von Oettingen; Michael Uljens; Lars Løvlie; Gert Biesta, Birgit Schaffar og Dietrich Benner. Oettingen ser nærmere (...) bestemt spørgsmålet om pædagogisk professionalitet som spaltet i fire antinomiske paradokser, der angår Rationalisering ; Pluralisering ; Individualisering og Civilisering. Disse pædagogiske paradoksaliteter har en rod bl.a. hos Kant, Rousseau og Herbart. Artiklen søger gennem fokusering af sådanne pædagogiske antinomier eller paradokser at vise, hvorledes den transnationale uddannelsesrevolution de sidste 25-30 år har udtyndet den almenpædagogiske undermuring af begreberne: I. professionalitet, II. læring, III. autenticitet og IV. dannelse. Dermed fokuseres de almenpædagogiske problemstillinger der kendetegner disse fire begreber. Dette gøres for at vise, hvorledes den transnationale uddannelsesstyring i dette lys udgør en bekymrende afvikling eller sammenklapning af pædagogikkens almene grundtræk. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:AUTHORITY, PUBLIC DISSENT AND THE NATURE OF THEOLOGICAL THINKING IN A RECENT analysis of the Catholic scene, Lutheran Richard John Neuhaus described the controversy over authority and dissent in the Catholic Church as " theologically debased and ecumenically sterile." My own reading of the literature on dissent inclines me to concur with the substance of this judgment. Broad historical, cultural, and theological contexts have inevitably been neglected as the (...) issues raised by public dissent have come to be narrowly conceived in terms of academic policy and ecclesisastical law and discipline. The objective of this paper is to explore the larger theological context of the topic of public dissent and in particular to consider Neuhruus' judgment that the "present Roman Catholic preoccupation with church authority is... theologically debased because it fixes attention not upon the truth claims derived from God's self-revelation but upon who is authorized to set the rules for addressing such truths, if indeed they are truths." 1 A Perspective on the Current Debate The attitude of " dissent " as such would normally be expected to occupy only a subordinate place in accounts of the nature of theological thinking. Intellectual inquiries are usually undertaken with a view to affirmation and oonstruction rather than critique and dissent. Despite the volume of literature which it has spawned, the current debate in fact reflects this expectation. The theological substance of the issue of dissent qua dissent has been thorough1 Richard John Neuhaus, The OathoUc Moment: The Paradow of the Church in the Postmodern World (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), p. 89. 185 186 J. A. DI NOIA, O.P. ly rehearsed.2 The dissident case for the legitimacy of public dissent has been stated forcefully and exhaustively.3 Important defenses of the classical Catholic position have been advanced by bishops and theologians alike.4 Increasingly the literature on both sides has become repetitive-a sign that, in its present form, the debate has reached something of a theological impasse. What clarity has been achieved in the theological discussion of the specifics of the Curran case continues to be threatened by confusions about the crucial differences between public and private dissent, between an ecclesiastically chartered university and other Catholic institutions of higher learning, and between the withdrawal of the canonical dicense to teach and the imposition of silence upon a theologian.5 The issues have come 2 Bp. Juan Arzubs, "Criteria for Dissent in the Church," Origins 7 (1978), 748-750; Archbp. Joseph L. Bernandin, "Magisterium and Theologians: Steps Towards Dialogue," Ohicago Studies (1978), 151-158; Yves Congar, O.P. The Magisterium and Theologians: A Short History, Theology Digest (1977), 15-20; John Connery, S.J., "The Non-Infallible Moral Teaching of the Church," Thomist 51 (1987); 1-16; Hans Kiing & Jiirgen Moltmann eds., The Right to Dissent: Concilium 158 (1982) ; Archbp. William J. Levada, "Dissent and the Catholic Religion Teacher," Origins 16 (1986), 195-200; Bp. James Malone, "How Bishops and Theologians Relate," Origins 16( 1986), 169-174; Archbp. Daniel Pilarczyk, "The Church and Dissent," Origins 16 (1986), 175178 ; Karl Rahner, "Theology and the Magisterium," Theology Digest 29 (1981)' 257-61. s Charles E. Curran, Faithful Dissent (Sheed & Ward, 1986) ; "Authority and Dissent in the Roman Catholic Church," in William W. May, ed., Vatican Authority and American Oatholie Dissent (New York: Crossroad, 1987), pp. 27-34, and in the same volume essays by Richard McCormick and Anne Patrick. A markedly alarmist collection of essays pressing the dissident case is Hans Kiing and Leonard Swidler, eds., The Ohuroh in Anguish (Harper & Row, 1987). 4 Patrick Granfield The Limits of the Papacy (New York: Crossroad, 1987), esp. pp. 153-168; Archbp. Roger M. Mahony, "The Magisterium and Theological Dissent," in May, pp. 16-26; William E. May, "Catholic Moral Teaching and the Limits of Dissent," ibid., pp. 87-102; Germain Grisez, The Way of the Lord Jesus (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1983), Vol. I, pp. 849-856, 871-916; Francis -Sullivan, Magisterium (Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist 1983) passim. s Joseph A. O'Hare's "Faith and Freedom in Catholic Universities" points to the significance of the second distinction, while Margaret Farley's "Moral AUTHORITY, PUBLIC DISSENT, THEOLOGICAL THINKING 187 to be framed in an idiom in which... (shrink)

tập 1. Tư tưởng Việt Nam từ đầu Công nguyên đến cuối thời Lý.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 379 Hoedl) would warrant a less minimalistic interpretation of Thomas's prominence in the theological controversies of the 70s and 80s of the thirteenth century. This volume claims to examine Thomas's work and influence in light of the newest research. This is very true of Wielockx's article, but not every contribution equally justifies this claim. Still, this collection is a welcome addition to the ongoing investigation of Thomas's (...) thought. It is all the more regrettable, then, that the publishers have decided upon such an exhorbitant price, apparently resigning themselves to the belief that there is no market for the book outside libraries which have already ordered the series. The editors and contributors deserve a wider audience. Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften Munich RICHARD SCHENK, O.P. Edith Stein: Scholar, Feminist, Saint. By FREDA MARY 0BEN. New York: Alba House, 1988. Pp. 80. $5.95 (paper). Essays on Woman. By EDITH STEIN. Edited by Dr. L. Gelber and Romaeus Leuven, O.C.D. Translated by Freda Mary Oben. The Collected Works of Edith Stein, Teresa Benedicta of the Cross, Discalced Carmelite, 1891-1942, vol. 2. Washington, DC: ICS Publications, 1987. Pp. ix + 290. $7.95 (paper). Whether as an ample introduction for one unfamiliar with Edith Stein or as a further education for one who already appreciates her legacy, these two books will serve the reader well. The saintly philosopher and educator became a Carmelite nun and eventually a victim of the Holocaust; she was beatified in 1987. Doctor Freda Mary Oben is well qualified to interpret Stein's writings as she, like Edith Stein, is a convert from Judaism to Catholicism and a scholar as well. She began to study Edith Stein after her conversion but }lad to learn German to do it. Essays on Woman is a testimonial to Oben's nearly 30year enterprise. This work is a translation of Die Frau, Ihre Aufgabe nach Natur und Gnade, which contains Edith Stein's lectures and writings on woman, compiled and edited by Dr. L. Gelber and Romaeus Leuven, O.C.D., of the Archivum Carmelitanum Edith Stein in Brussels. These two works can be read in either order, as each supports and elucidates the other, but for an introduction, Edith Stein: Scholar, Feminist, Saint should be read first. Since Oben refers to Stein as Edith in this work, this reviewer will do the same. 380 BOOK REVIEWS The Edith Stein work consists of three chapters. Chapter One is a 37-page, well-documented biography supported by quotations from Edith's writings. Oben's straightforward, lucid style enhances this compact account of the variety of interesting, inspiring, and gripping details of Edith's life. Oben recounts her own tour of the significant places in Edith's life: Breslau, Gottingen, Bergzabern, Speyer, Miinster, Cologne, Echt, Auschwitz. The narrative is supplemented with eight pages of Stein family photographs in the middle of the book. Throughout her life, Edith Stein maintained a strong love for her family and her own Jewish people. Integrated with this is the develop· ment and growth of her intellectual life: from an ambivalence toward school to her being among the first women to enter a university to her becoming a university professor, all the while struggling from being at first unable to pray to later working among scholars who were deep· ly spiritual. Several of these scholars were converts from Judaism to Christianity and even to Catholicism. Oben shows how Edith followed this same route, relating her scholarly insights in psychology and philosophy to her spiritual ones and finally turning to Catholicism after a casual encounter with a biography of St. Teresa of Avila. Oben shows how, once a Catholic, Edith used her intellectual ability to study the link between woman's nature and religious education. By 1932 Edith was recognized as the intellectual leader of Catholic feminism in Europe. Oben tells of Edith's entrance into the Carmelite Convent in Cologne in 1933, her life there as Sister Teresa Benedicta of the Cross, and her decision, foreseeing the Holocaust, to hear the Cross for the Jewish people. In a brief but captivating account, Oben tells of Edith's hasty transfer from Cologne to... (shrink)

In this paper the problem of the relation between belief and acceptance is discussed in view of recent literature on the topic. Belief and acceptance are characterized in terms of a number of properties, which show both the similarities and the dissimilarities between these notions. In particular it is claimed - contrary to some recently expressed views - that acceptance need not be intentional action and that the differences between belief and acceptance do not boil down to the simple view (...) that acceptance, contrary to belief, is based on the agent's direct exercise of his will. Acceptance which is not based on intentional action is shown in the paper to be especially closely related to belief, especially to linguistic belief. Thus if a person is in a non-intentional-ly acquired and held state of acceptance that something p, he also believes that p. Another general difference is that acceptance is language-dependent while there can be non-linguistic belief. Collective beliefs and acceptances are also briefly discussed in the paper Among other things, it is noted that the notion of wide as contrasted with truth-oriented, narrow acceptance is central in the collective case. (shrink)

Th e autho r brief ly e xplain s th e epistemol o gica l line s an d methodol o gica l principle s of th e theo r y h e d e v elop s i n Principi a iuris . T eori a de l diritt o e dell a democ r acia . Th e author ha s bee n w orkin g o n thi s subjec t fro m th e 1960 s an (...) d i n thi s a r ticl e h e brief ly set s ou t the metho d adopte d , th e objec t o r un i v ers e o f th e theoretica l discours e an d th e aim s pursued by hi s theo r y . Thi s theo r y i s a r ticulate d i n t w o pa r ts : th e theo r y o f l a w d e v elope d usin g a axiomati c metho d an d th e theo r y o f constitutiona l democra c y , w hic h i s a n empirica l and no r mat i v e inte r pretatio n o f th e fo r me r , bot h connecte d by th e isomo r phi c relationshi p that join s democra c y an d th e constitutiona l paradig m o f th e r ul e o f l a w. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A CONTRADICTION IN SAINT THOMAS'S TEACHING ON CREATION THEODORE J. KONDOLEON Villanova University Villanova, Pennsylvania 0 THOSE FAMILIAR with Saint Thomas's writings is generally known that the Angelic Doctor changed his position on a number of philosophical issues during the course of his relatively short professional career. For instance, there is his opinion concerning the instrumental role of higher creatures in the creation of the universe-something he allowed as (...) possible in his Commentary on the Sentences but later rejected in his Disputed Question On the Power of God and in the Summa Theologiae. Another example is Thomas's view on the possibility of an actual infinite multitude, an opinion he accepted in the early Disputed Question On Truth but argued against in the Summa Theologiae.1 However, to change one's mind on a particular issue is not to contradict oneself, since to do that is to say or hold, in the same time frame, pwhile also saying or holding not p. However, in his Treatise on Creation in the Summa Theologiae, Saint Thomas does, at least once, contradict himself in what he has to say on the question of the demonstrability of the world's temporal beginning, a contradiction which, to my knowledge, has never previous1 On the question whether higher creatures can be instrumental causes in the creation of lower creatures see In Sent. IV, d. 5, q. 5, a. 3; De potentia Dei, q. 3, a. le and Summa Theologiae, I, q, 45, a. Sc. On the issue of an actual infinite multitude see D. Q. De veritate, q. 2, a. 9 and Summa Theologiae, 1, q. 7, a. 5. However, in the De aeternitate mundi-a work possibly written after Saint Thomas completed the first part of his Summa-Aquinas asserts, towards the end of this work, that no demonstration has as yet been forthcoming that God cannot produce a multitude that is actually infinite. 51 52 THEODORE J. KONDOLEON ly been noted. In what follows I intend to expose this contradiction and to see whether there is any possible way for him to escape it. I In article 1 of Question 46 of the Prima pars, Aquinas argues that it cannot be demonstrated that the world of creatures always existed, given that the actual existence of creatures depends upon the causal will of God and the only thing which God wills necessarily is Himself.2 Consequently, whether or not the world exists, or is created eternally or with a temporal beginning, are matters entirely up to God's free will.3 In the following article he argues that neither can the world's temporal beginning be demonstrated but that this is something known only by faith.4 It cannot be demonstrated from the world itself since demonstration proceeds by way of knowledge of the universal essences of things and universals abstract from the hie et nunc, or from the question of temporal origin.5 Nor can it be proved from the world's efficient cause-the divine will-seeing that God's will cannot be investigated by reason except as regards those things which God wills necessarily (and what He wills about creatures is not among 2 " Dicendum nihil praeter Deum ab aeterno fuisse. Et hoc ponere non est impossibile. Ostensum est enim supra quad voluntas Dei est causa rerum. Sic ergo necesse est esse sicut necesse est Deum velle ilia, cum necessitatis effectus ex necessitate causae dependeat, ut dicitur in Meta. Ostensum est autem supra quod, absolute loquendo, non est necesse Deum velle aliquid nisi seipsum." ST I, q. 46, a. le. Latin quotations from Saint Thomas appearing in the footnotes are from the Leonine edition. 3 " Non est ergo necessarium Deum velle quod mundus fuerit semper. Sed eatenus mundus est quatenus Deus vult illum esse, cum esse mundi ex voluntate dependeat, sicut ex sua causa. Non est igitur necessarium mundum semper esse: Unde nee demonstrative probari potest." Ibid. 4 " Dicendum quod mundum non semper fuisse sola fidei tenetur, et demonsrtative probari non potest; sicut et supra de mysterio Trinitatis dictum est." Ibid., a. 2c. 5 "Et hujus ratio est, quia novitas mundi non potest demonstrationem recipere ex parte ipsius mundi... (shrink)

Th e basi c pu r pos e o f thi s w or k consist s o f eliminatin g som e o f th e m yth s an d paradigms tha t cu r rent ly info r m th e assessmen t o f scienti f i c e vidence . I n orde r t o accomplis h this object i v e , th e autho r sta r t s fro m th e (...) premis e tha t thes e m yth s an d paradigms , produce d with th e d ev elopmen t o f forensi c science , ar e minimizin g th e rol e o f judge s i n judicia l proceedings fo r th e bene f i t o f e xpe r ts . Thi s ca n lea d t o a violatio n o f du e proces s an d n e glectin g that judicia l processe s ar e aime d a t resolvin g conflicts . Th e autho r refer s speci f ical l y t o th e m yth o f in f allibilit y an d th e pa r adig m o f identi f ication , accordin g t o w hic h scienti f i c e vidence ca n posit i v e ly identif y a n ind i vidua l o r objec t throug h p h ysica l traces . B y ana l yzin g the recen t doctrin e o n th e assessmen t o f scienti f i c e vidence , th e autho r conclude s o n th e need t o adop t th e pa r adig m o f likelihood . Thus , th e judg e stil l hold s th e rol e i n th e ev aluation o f e vidence , an d guarantee s tha t th e goal s o f th e proces s wil l b e respected. (shrink)

This article considers the issues of adaptation and organization of the educational process, barrier-free environment and readiness for professional activity of students with disabilities in inclusive education in conditions of inclusive education in a medical university. The relevance of this work is determined by one of the priority areas of state policy in the field of higher education – access to higher education for people with disabilities in inclusive education. Inclusive education at the university is designed to ensure not only (...) the realization of the right of students with disabilities in inclusive education to higher education, but also to solve the problems of socialization and professional demand for such people. In order to improve the process of introducing inclusive education at the Ryazan State Medical University named after Academician I.P. Pavlov, a study was conducted, the main problems and ways of solving them were identified, related to the organization of the educational process, the conditions of the barrier-free environment and the readiness for professional activity of students with disabilities in inclusive education. An increase in the proportion of university teachers who have undergone advanced training in inclusive education also contributes to solving problems. Adaptation of educational programs and educational and methodological support for persons with disabilities includes psychological, pedagogical and tutor support etc. The organization of the educational process using distance education technologies is one of the priority conditions for teaching students with disabilities and/or HIA. The use of this technology makes it possible to significant-ly expand and modify some educational standards for students with disabilities in inclusive education, namely, to create an individual way for each student with disabilities in inclusive education in a medical university. It is proposed to use training techniques such as: online consultation of teachers; VR technologies; availability of training materials 24/7; online webinars that facilitate the inclusion of such students in the educational and research activities of the university. The professionally organized educational space and educational process of the university provide not only a high level of mastery of professional competencies, but also contribute to the formation of personal qualities of students with disabilities in inclusive education, necessary for their successful socialization, life and activity in society. (shrink)

The number of speaking actors in Old Comedy has been much discussed, but no consensus has been reached. The old assumption that the number was three, as in tragedy, was shaken when it was realized that some scenes of Aristophanes have four characters on-stage at once, all taking part in the dialogue: for example, in Lys. 77–253 we have Lysistrate, Kalonike, Myrrhine, and Lampito, and in Frogs 1414–81 we have Dionysos, Aiskhylos, Euripides, and Plouton. Rees therefore argued that there was (...) no fixed number, but that view was not generally accepted. A more widely held view is that there were three principal actors with additional performers for small parts. However, there is no evidence contemporary with Aristophanes which distinguishes three actors from the others in this way, and it is probable that writers of later periods who mention three actors are referring to their own times and did not have authentic information about the fifth century. The passage which DFA, p. 149, seems to regard as the most trustworthy is in a brief account of comedy attributed to Tzetzes: πιγενμενος δ Κρατνος κατστησε μν πρτον τ ν τ κωμδ πρσωπα μεχρ τριν, στσας τν ταξαν4 DFA paraphrases this as ‘Cratinus reduced the disorderliness and, in some sense, fixed the number of regular actors at three’. But πρσωπα means ‘masks’ or ‘characters’; it does not mean ‘actors’ . What the writer meant by saying that Kratinos settled the masks or characters in comedy at ‘up to three’ is not clear, but his statement is useless as evidence for the number of actors. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:AQUINAS ON THE ROLE OF EMOTION IN MORAL JUDGMENT AND ACTIVITY JUDITH BARAD Indiana State University Terre Haute, Indiana MONG PHILOSOPHERS who have discussed the role of emotion in morality there is much disagreement. At one extreme there is a tradition of ethical thinkers, represented by David Hume, who juxtapose reason and emotion and hoM that the choice of ultimate va:1ues is always made by the emotional side of (...) our natul'e. Insisting that emotion, not reason, is the foundation of moral philosophy, Hume says "Reason is, and ought to he, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any office other than to serve and obey them." 1 Conv:erseily, Immanuel Kant adamantly insists that reason must be the sole determinant of morality. Since morality is stricrtly a rational endeavor, the emotions (or what he more generrully called the incJinations), whethei!.' beneficent or ma1e:fiicent, should never be alilowed to intrude into our moral judgments. Each extreme claims that a part of our nature, respectiv 'e,ly reason or emotion, is not essentirul to the moral life. Hut the be1lief that we shouM sev;er any part of our nature from swch a pervasive area of our lives leads to unfortunate consequen1ces. If we base our understanding of morality on Hume's call for the slavish submission of reason, we can justify all kinds of social exploitation and sensuous indulgence. On the other hand, if we follow Kant's ideal of suppressing our emotions, then bodi1ly desires can appear ba:d to us, and we may irrationaHy disaJfow many human needs, both to ourselv;es and to others. i David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 3, 3. 397 398.TUDITH BARAD But on this question of the role of emotion in mol'lwl judgment, Aquinas oiooupies a position intermediate between Kant and Hume. He neither dismisses reason as a guide to practical affairs nor regards emotions as mere obstacles to be overcome in form.mating a moral judgment. For Aquinas even though e&ch of the human £acmlties has a unique role to perform, an individual £unctions in his entirety in the moral sphere. This essay will focus on how our emotions can support as well as impruir our moraJ conduct. The purpose of this study is to show thrut emotion may be either 1an impediment or a usefuJ srtimu1us to obj·ectiv;e moral decision malcing, obscuring our morrul judgments or 11einfol'lcing our commitments. Obviously, Hume's argument ·that reason cannot judge or criticize the emotions is very foreign to Aquinas's thought, and no one has yet ruttemp ;!Jed 1to subsume one •ruooount under the other. Afan Donagan, however, has clwimed that Aquinas's moll"al theory " anticipates Kant's metaphysics of morals," because of what " both ~are] found to 1say about motiViation." 2 But, contrary to Donagan 's claim, this study will make clear rlihat in the area of how emotions a:ffrect our moral life ·the two g11eat thinkers pal'lt company. To understand how emotion :liun:ctions mthe moral judgment, we must fust examine what Aquinas means by "emotion." 3 He describes :emotion as a spontaneous.feeling consisting of both a phy;siofogical 1and an affective response to an object.4 He observes that emotion involves virtually ithe en2 Alan Donagan, " Teleology and Consistency in Theories of :Morality as Natural Law," in Georgetown Symposium on Ethics, edited by Rocco Porreca (Lanham, :Md.: University Press of America, 1984), p. 96. a Throughout this paper I will use the word "emotion " for the Latin passia, since " passion" has a more intense connotation in contemporary English than the term employed by Aquinas. "Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica, (Westminster, :Md.: Christian Classics, 1981), I-II, q.22. In the first article of this question, Aquinas says that " Passion... is only in respect of a bodily transmutation." Quoting Damascene in the third article, he says " Passion is a movement of the sensi· tive appetite when we think of good or evil." I have combined both passages to arrive at Aquinas's description of emotion. AQUINAS ON EMOTIONS AND MORALS 399 tire human being: intd1ect, sense cognition, spontaneous volition, and bodily changes. Aquinas bases this position on his hylomorphic... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:EXISTENTIAL PROPOSITIONS IN THE THOUGHT OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS A REVALENT VIEW of St. Thomas Aquinas's position on the logic of propositions has been that according to him propositions of the :form, x is, hold a privileged place, that they are in a special sense " existential," and that such propositions straight.forwardly attribute the act of exi,stence to an individual or to a class of individuals.1 Some texts seem (...) to support such an interpretation. For example, in his commentary on Aristotle's Perihermeneias, Aquinas says: " To clarify this we must note that the verb 'is ' itself is sometimes predicated in an enunciation, as in ' Socrates is.' By this we intend to signify that Socrates really is." 2 This passage seems to treat the predicate " exists " or " is " as unproblematical, as though it had a straightforward meaning needing little clarification, at least in the context of a logical treatise. On the basis of such a text, one may be tempted to infer that for Aquinas " Socrates exists " has the same logical form as " Socrates sits," and that " Men exist " is of the same form as " Men are mortal.'' Peter Geach has shown, however, that Aquinas's doctrine here is not as simple as it may first appear. For Aquin,as some of the propositions which have the grammatical form of x is have 'a different logical form.3 Geach points out that for Aquinas the sentence, "Blindness exists," for example, actual1 E.g., Etienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1952), 190-215. 2 Super Peri, Bk. II, lect. 2, # 212. Cf. Summa Contra Gentiles, Bk. II, ch. 37 at "FJ11J hoc..•." a Peter Geach, in P. T. Geach and G. E. M. Anscombe, Three Philosophers (New York: Cornell University, 1961), 88 ff; Peter Geach, "Form and Existence," in Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. A. Kenny (New York: Notre Dame U., 1969), pp. 41-47. 605 606 PATRICK LEE ly means, Something or other is blind. That is, blind is the real predicate rather than exists. Mo11eover, Geach argues, the logical peculiarity of this sentence is equally found in any sentence of the form, "an F exists." Such a proposition, " does not,attribute actuality (existence) to an F, but F-ness to something or other..." 4 And yet Geach will not apply rthis interpretation to all sentences of the form, " x is." He al'lgues that sentences in which " is " or " exists " is. joined to a logically pl'oper name are in a different category. Unlike in general propositions such as "an F exists," in such singular propositions, those using logically proper names, Geach,argues, actual existence is attributed to or predicated of an individual. "We have here a sense of 'is ' or 'exists ' that seems to me to be certainly a genuine predicate of individuals: the sense of ' exists ' in which one says that an individual came to exist, still exists, no longer exists, etc...."5 I believe that, while Geach's position is more accurate than the first interpretation, mentioned above, it is nevertheless still inaccurate on certain key points. While it is misleading to say that for Aquinas exists is never a genuine predicate; nevertheless, I will argue that it is his position that exists or existence is not a genuine predicate in any proposition which does not refer back to a previous proposition (or to what is known in or by previous propositional knowledge). Let us crull a proposition which refers to something known in a previous proposition a " second-order p11oposition," and one that does not thus refer a " first-order proposition." Then, I shall argue that for Aquinas exists is not a genuine predicate in any first-order proposition. Moreover, I believe that these points are crucial to understanding Aquinas's position on existence as well as his position on how knowledge is related,to reality, i.e., his realism. In this article I would like to examine Aquinas's thought on the logic of existential propositions and discuss its significance for epistemology. 4 Geach, " Form and Existence," Zoo. int., p. 45. 5 Ibid., p. 46. EXISTENTIAL PROPOSITIONS IN AQUINAS 607 In sections... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:AQUINAS AND HEIDEGGER: THE QUESTION OF BIDLOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY VINCENT GUAGLIARDO, O.P. Dominican School of Philosophy and Theology Graduate Theological Union Berkeley, Oalifornia I N IDS BOOK, Hediegger and Aquinas: An Essay on Overcoming Metaphysics, John D. Caputo recommends a " deconstruction" of Aquinas' philosophical theology in order to let.the true ·element orf his thought, mysticism, come to the fore. Caputo argues persuasively that Aquinas' thought, expressed ·as.it is in (...) the garh of metaphysics, cannot escape Heidegger':s critique of met:aiphysfos as "onto-theo-logioal ". Aquinas, no more thoo.any other thinker of the West, has succeeded mavoiding this iorgorttenness. Those Thomi:sts who have tried to argue that Aquinas.is an exception rto this critique, Caputo oontends, have not succeeded in presenting their case. The verdict o.f Heidegger stainds. The on:ly reoourrse left is thart of deconstruction, which Capurto presents ais gaining mther than losing the true Aquinas precisely because deconstruction.allows us to move from the said (the metaphysical dimension) fo rbhe uil!said (the mystical dimension) of Aquinas' thought. The uns1aiid is the kernel, the center a;ro:und which whatever Aquinas says moves. It is the true dimension which his thinking il'eally seeks: union with God, in wh~ch both the union and God 1are themselves rineff1a;ble.1 There is, however,.a disturbing problem which I find wti:th Capui;o's conclusion. This problem does not have to do with his oonte!lltion that the true kernel of St. Thomas' thought!is mysticail. Ra.ther, the problem concerns what is being disen1 See John D. Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas: An }j}ssay on Overcoming Metaphysics (N.Y.: Fordham University Press, 1982), pp. 211 & 247-8. 407 408 VINCENT GUAGLIARDO; O.P. gaged and put out of play tin the deconstrrucrb.ion, namely: philosophical thoology.2 What are the iimplicatfons of such a movie? Are they desirable for theology? Ought we and oan we, 1a;s Caputo suggests, disengage,and leave behind St. Thomas' philosophical theology because metaphysical without there being any true loss? Might we be facing a;n impoverishment of another kind: in a moI"e " radical " seeking of the dii.vine might we not be losing something m'a foI"getfulness of ourselves as,.after 1 all, omy human? ls not this something precisely the,realm of the humanitas of the homo huma,nus, which Heidegger 's thinking seeks Ito point out and draw us closer to, where humanitas refers to our necessary trelation to Heing, from whlch relation we as humans cannot detach ourselves so long as we are " auf die Erde "? 3 The ~oblematic In beginning our inquiry I would like to distinguish three different regions of human engagement in which the over1appii.ng of one onto the other ii.s not.always easy to discern: philosophy, phl1osopihioal theology and mysticism.. I want to say "iphilosophical theology " and not simply " theology " because I think that it ii.s not possible to thoologize without 1 at the same time also philosophiizing. I 1think St. Tihomas thought this as well. 'l\hat is why his theology was always philosophioa ;l, 1in dialogue wiith :the philosophers: Aristotle, the Platonists, Ma~monides and the Ail1abs. In saying this, however, I do not mean to,say that philosophy 1and theology 1 are 1 the same. Now the altemativce which Caputo would ha,ve us embrace, because presumably not onto-theo-logioal, is that of a "reli2 See Caputo, op. cit., 11 & 283. a" Die Wahrheit des Seins denken, heisst zugleich die humaniitas des homo humanus denken " (" Brief iiber den Humanismus," in W egmarken (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978), p. 349). This Latin expression is a.lso used by St. Thomas in De ente et essentia, III, to designate the formal principle (rationality) by which. the whole (an individual human being) becomes a whole. Also see In Met., VII, Leet. 5, nn. 1378-1380. THE QUESTION OF PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY 409 giious 1alerthi0Jogy" of mysticism.4 One is.then led to ask whether and if,so, how, the same person could ibe hoth a philosopher and 1a mystic, i.e. both!a thinker and a person of [aith. Do they remain " existentially " opposed,,as... (shrink)

We look at various notions of a class of definability operations that generalise inductive operations, and are characterised as “revision operations”. More particularly we: (i) characterise the revision theoretically definable subsets of a countable acceptable structure; (ii) show that the categorical truth set of Belnap and Gupta’s theory of truth over arithmetic using \emph{fully varied revision} sequences yields a complete \Pi13 set of integers; (iii) the set of \emph{stably categorical} sentences using their revision operator ψ is similarly \Pi13 and which (...) is complete in Gödel’s universe of constructible sets L; (iv) give an alternative account of a theory of truth—realistic variance that simplifies full variance, whilst at the same time arriving at Kripkean fixed points. (shrink)

This work considers the future of driving in terms of both its short- and long-term horizons. It conjectures that human-controlled driving will follow in the footsteps of a wide swath of other, now either residual or abandoned human occupations. Pursuits that have preceded it into oblivion. In this way, driving will dwindle down into only a few niche locales wherein enthusiasts will still persist, much in the way that steam train hobbyists now continue their own aspirational inclinations. Of course, the (...) value of any such prognostication is in direct proportion to the degree that information is conveyed, and prospective uncertainty reduced. In more colloquial terms: the devil is in the details of these coming transitions. It is anticipated that we will see a progressive transformation of the composition of on-road traffic that will be registered most immediately in the realm of professional transportation in which the imperative for optimization exceeds that in virtually all other user segments. The transition from manual control to full automation will be more punctate than gradualist in is evolutionary development. As performance optimization slowly exhausts the commercial sector, it will progressively transition more into the discretionary realm by dint of simple technology transfer alone. The hedonic dimension of everyday driving will be dispersed and pursued by progressively fewer individuals. The traveling window of generational expectation will soon mean that human driving will be largely ‘forgotten,’ as each sequential generation matures without this, still presently common, experience. Indications of this stage of progress are beginning to... (shrink)

Objective: The objectives of this study are to understand the current functions, structure and operation of hospital ethics committees (HECs) in Shanghai and to facilitate their improvement. Methods: (1) A questionnaire survey, (2) interviews with secretaries and (3) on-site document reviews of HECs in Shanghai were used in the study, which surveyed 33 hospitals. Results: In Shanghai, 57.56% of the surveyed hospitals established HECs from 1998 to 2005. Most HECs used bioethical review of research involving human subjects as well as (...) bioethical review or consultation regarding medical care services and administrative decision- making. Of the surveyed HECs, 14.3% did not provide any formal bioethical training to the HECs’ members and many HECs had no standard operating procedures. Some HECs had no clear definition of what was “conflict of interest” that should be considered by the HECs, while 44.4% of the HECs did not perform continuing review. Discussion: After the issues of related national regulations, more and more hospitals established HECs in Shanghai, but the functions of HECs need to be further developed and formal training on bioethics should be provided to HEC members. To assure the independence and good performance of HECs, the conflict of interest procedure, the standard operating procedures and bioethical review should be improved. Conclusion: HECs in Shanghai had developed in the preceding 10 years and they played great roles in protecting the rights and welfare of human subjects and patients; some areas need improvement. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:TAKING OTHER RELIGIONS SERIOUSLY: SOME IRONIES IN THE CURRENT DEBATE ON A CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY OF RELIGJ:ONS * 1GAvIN D'CosTA West London Institute of Higher E'ducation Isleworth, Middlese111 HE QUESTION oi Christian attitudes to the world eligions is becoming increasingly important. An lnterpretatwn of Religion is emblematic of a growing trend, which runs across 1denominational lines, that attempts fo take other,religions seriously. John Hick.argues that for most of its ihistory (...) Christianity has hrud a rpolitioaUy and theologicrully imperialist attitude towards the ireligions of the world. Superiority :and uninformed arrogance have generally prev:ailed with the accompanying attitude that the religions of the world 1aire 1 generally sinful and incapable of being 1 salvific. The 1 time has come foT a change of a;ttitude: the wol"ld reHgions must be taken seriously :and this means ·affil"ming them as alternative paths to salvation, possibly neither worse nor better than·Christianity. This Hick cru1ls a "pluralistic" outlook. The agenda is irrudical and Hick's Vioice is not solitary. Hick'1 s hook!is a ma;gisteri:al 4rn paiges and is ibrused on his Giffol'ld Lectmes of 1986-87. It contains cons!i.derruble indological, philosophicail and theological material, hut in what follows I shall,be dea1ing with one aspect oll!ly, his argument for p1uiialism. Hick is acknowledged :as a leading irepresentative of this pluralistic approach. Initially he began as a conservative,and exclusivist Christian,and has over the years enoompassed a wide!l.'ange of thoofogica1 positions now,culminating *John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989). 519 520 GAVIN D'COSTA in this p11esent rbook.1 In :this review discussion I propose that many o[ the most mdical strategies in the theology of re1ligions in 'Spite 0£ their wish to take other rreligions seriously have an il'!Onic tendency to do just the opposite! In attempting to be genuinely accommodating to the 11eligions 0£ the world, Hick, I will argue, unwittingly ends up in danger of accommodating none, including Christianity. This tendency, which iI believe to 1be clearly illustrated in Hick's rrecent rbook, is shared in various degrees hy numerous theologians pursuing a, pluralist p111oject similar to that of Hick's.2 It would he foolish to assume they are " all the 'Saime," hut they certainly share common theological and philosophical tendencies which I wish to isolate and comment on. I should 1state dearly that iby such a critique I do not intend to discount the possibility that 1 a:ll religions ma,y lead fo God, but that the stmtegies often employed to a111g111e.for this are deepJy problematic. ~o put Hiok"s new rbook into :perspective it will he helpful to wace its genesis 1briefly. In 1973, using an astronomical analogy, Hick suggested a Copernican revolution in the Christian theoology of rreligions whereby Christians should "shift from the 1 He began, in his own words, as a "strongly evangelical and indeed fundamentalist " Christian: see God Has Many Names (London: Macmillan, 1980), p. 2. See also my analysis of his entire pilgrimage in John Hick's Theology of Religions (London/New York: University Press of America, 1987). 2 For some of those on Hick's trajectory, see A. Race, Olllristians and Religious Pluralism (London: SCM, 1983); Paul Knitter, No Other Name'! (New York: Orbis, 1985); Wilfred Cantwell Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion (New York: Harper & Row, 1978); R. Ruether, Pluralism and Ohristology; the latter three and other influential co-contributors (including Hick) are to be found in The Myth of Christian Uniqueness: Towards a Pluralistio Theology of Religions, ed. J. Hick and P. Knitter (New York: Orbis, 1987). More recently, we can see the extremely thin line between pluralists and essentialist "inclusivists" in E. Hillman, Many Paths·: A Oatholic Approach to Religious Pluralism (New York: Orbis, 1989), who marries K. Rahner and W. C. Smith, divorces faith from history and tradition, and thereby provides an essentialist analysis. See the pertinent comments of K. Surin on Smith's essentialist project in "An Examination of the Discourse of John Hick and Wilfred Cantwell Smith", in Religious Pluralism and Unbelief, ed. I. Hamnett (London, Routledge... (shrink)

This paper situates the moral domain of practice within the context of a particular description of nursing practice – one that sees human interaction at the heart of that practice. Such a description fits not only with professional rhetoric but also with literature from patients and recent empirical work exploring the nature of nursing practice.Martha Levine in her 1977 description of ethics, within the context of nursing practice, indicated that what was important from an ethical perspective was how we interact (...) with each other, with patients and colleagues, on a daily basis. What enables such interaction to display moral sensitivity, insight into patient need, and a focus on the good for the patient? Of relevance when answering this question is the empirical evidence indicating that professional socialization, as a nurse or a doctor, may dull the individual’s moral sense. If this is the case, cognizance needs to be taken of such evidence when identifying theoretical approaches from mainstream ethics that may provide insight and value for nurse education. It is suggested that such insight and value can be gained from a consideration of the work of Aristotle, Murdoch, and Vetlesen. (shrink)

I n th e inte r na l histo r y o f Zapatism o th e mos t remarka b l e featur e i s th e symbiotic proces s w hic h occur s bet w ee n th e Zapatist a gue r rilla s i n th e mountain s o f Chiapa s an d the indigenou s peopl e i n th e communities . Th e fo r me r g i v (...) e milita r y inst r uctio n t o th e latte r , w hil e sl o w ly adoptin g thei r v alue s an d ideol o g y . I n th e en d , bot h fo r m a n ew milita r y o r ganization , th e Zapatist a A r m y o f Nationa l Liberation . Thi s a r m y i s uniqu e compared wit h othe r milita r y o r ganizations , a s i t act s on ly defens i v e ly t o protec t indigenou s rights an d i t i s no t a n independenc e m o v ement , autonomou s i n it s functioning , l e gitimat e and l e gal , wit h a hig h representatio n o f w ome n ( w h o especial ly singl e ou t thi s o r ganization), mad e u p o f socia l suppo r t base s an d a traine d an d discipline d militia , strong ly suppo r ted by c i vi l societ y , h a vin g a radica l leftis t ideol o g y , w hic h remain s i n constan t rebellio n and resistanc e t o pressure s fro m th e authorities , th e M e xica n a r m y an d paramilitaries. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:PLATO'S PARMENIDES AND ST. THOMAS'S ANALYSIS OF GOD AS ONE AND TRINITY SHERWIN KLEIN Fairleigh Dickinson University Hackensack, New Jersey IN HIS CRITICISM of the Neopfatonic interpretation of the Parmenides, Cornford says, "The fanguage throughout is as dry and prosaic as a textbook on algebra; there is little here to suggest that the One has any religious significance as there is in the other case to suggest that x, (...) y, and z are a trinity of unknown gods." 1 I agree with Cornfo11d that the Neopl1 atoniJc interpreta.tion is very speculative and seriously flawed. Nonethe1ess, the "negative theology" these interpreters attribute to Plato is instruic1tive. More than this, it can be shown that opinions like Cornford's are, to say the least, unimaginative. I intend to est1 ablish, in the first and main part of this artide, the logical agreement between the PJatonic and Thomistic analyses of an absoJuteiy simple unity. The argument at Parmenides 137b-142a, Blato's analysis of the absoluteJy one, prov ]des a basis for determining what God, as an absolutdy simple unity, is not. By applying this 'argument in the Parmenides to St. Thomas's discussion of God as one, I shaill show that what appears to be " as dry and prosai:c as a textbook on algebra " has, contrary to Cornfo11d, " religious significance." In the second part of this article, I shall use the arguments at Parmenides 157b-159b and 159b-160b to determine what can 1 Plato and Parmenides: Parmenides' Way of Truth and Plato's Parmenides, trans. with introduction and commentary by Francis MacDonald Cornford (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1939), p. 131. 229 230 SHERWIN KLEIN be predicated of God, if St. Thomas's analysis of the Trinity is to aoco:rd with the articles of faith (God as an abso1utely simple unity as weU as a Trinity). Once again, we shall see the ":religious significance" of Plato's analysis and the irony of Cornfo11d's suggestion about the meaninglessness of applying Plato's analysis to " a trinity of unknown gods." I We should first he clear about how St. Thomas uses the term "one" as applied to God. In Q. n, A. 1 of the Prima Pars (The Unity of God),2 he distinguishes between one as "the negation of division" and one as "the principle of number." The first sense, which he calls the transcendental sense, applies to God; in this sense the one is opposed to the many as the undivided is :to the divided. Human beings cannot know what God is, but we can determine what God is not, e.g., not-many, the transcendental sense of being absolutely simple. (The human intdlect can only know the composite or tha,t which pertains to the composite; it cannot know that which is abso1ut ~ly sample or undivided.) St. Thomas says, "He is supremely undivided inasmuch as He is divided neither actually nor potentially by any mode of division; since He is altogether simple." 3 If we :compare the analysis of God as absolutely one or simple with the first hypothesis of the one in the Parmen~des, i.e., if the one is one, what can be predicated of it, then we shall notice an important similarity. If the one is simply one, none of the categories which can determine the nature of the one are predicable of it. Similarly, God as absolutely one or simple cannot be understood in,a positive manner (His nature is incomprehensible). However, He can be understood negatively. And what we can say negatively about God parallels 2 References are to the Summa Theologica in Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aqu-Ynas, ed. Anton C. Pegis, vol. I (New York: Random House, 1945). a ST, I, q. 11, a. 4, c.; Pegis, p. 90. PLATO AND AQUINAS 231 Plato's determination of what is not predicable of the one as simple. To show what God is not, we must negate what does not apply to Him; this reveals the simplicity of God. If the one is one (in St. Thomas's transcendenta.l sense of "one " as simple ), says Plato, it cannot be many and, therefor:e, cannot have... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ethics & the Enviornment 6.2 (2001) 119-124 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Eugene Odum: Ecosystem Ecologist and Environmentalis Eugene Odum: Ecosystem Ecologist and Environmentalist. Betty Jean Craige. The University of Georgia Press, Athens, 2001, pp. 226. $34.95. ISBN 0-8203-2281-4 (Hardback) A serendipity initiated this review. A half hour before checking my voice mail and receiving the invitation to write this review, I stood at the University of Georgia (...) Press table at the Association for the Study of Literature and the Environment (ASLE) conference in Flagstaff, Arizona. Picking up Betty Jean Craige's new text, I thought to myself, "This book looks interesting! I'm going to have to read it!" Not only did that wish come true; now I have the opportunity to share my thoughts.Prima facie, it may seem odd to print a review on a biography of a scientific ecologist in an environmental ethics journal. In fact, however, nothing could be more appropriate. The science of ecology is directly relevant--even essential--to the ethics of the environment: the human/nonhuman dynamic is contingent upon the identity of human beings, the essence of natural systems, and the interactive relationship between the two. As an environmental philosopher, it was this realization which directed me to the life sciences. [End Page 119]I recommend that environmental philosophers read Craige's book for at least three reasons. First, as just mentioned, the science of ecology addresses some of the necessary conditions for developing an environmental ethic--the ontology of natural systems and the relationship of biota (including Homo sapiens) with the abiotic environment.Second, and more specifically, Odum is a scientist of special concern to environmental philosophers--not to mention moral philosophers and philosophers of science--with his reticence to take seriously the is/ought (or fact/value) gap first identified by the great David Hume. As is widely known, philosophers and scientists who maintain the existence of such a gap contend that it is logically impossible to derive value-laden statements, such as ethical statements, from value-free statements, such as factual statements. According to this line of reasoning, the only way to move from the observation that human activity is causing species extinction to the imperative PRESERVE SPECIES! is another normative assumption that anthropogenic species extinction is bad. Thus Odum is at loggerheads with Bertrand Russell when the philosopher writes: "... questions as to 'values' lie wholly outside the domain of knowledge. That is to say, when we assert that this or that has 'value,' we are giving expression to our own emotions, not to a fact[.]" Siding with Russell against Odum, many ecologists refrain from making ethical (and hence environmentalist) injunctions.What makes Odum especially fascinating is that he recovered from the hangover of Modernity which numerous scientists and philosophers still suffer from: the inability of moving from descriptive science to prescriptive ethics. As Craige remarks over and over again, Odum moves easi-ly between ecology and environmentalism (p. 64): "His inclusion of human beings in ecosystems turned ecosystem ecologists into environmentalists--that is, advocates of policies and social behaviors protective to the natural environment--erasing the line traditional to Western thought between science and politics" (p. 45. See also p. xvii, p. 41). Odum's attitude marks a major breakthrough for the project of grounding environmental ethics in ecological science.Third, Odum is a great scientist whose work is relevant to a host of other philosophical issues. In our recent book, The Philosophy of Ecology: From Science to Synthesis (University of Georgia Press, 2000), Frank Golley and I struggled not to include a piece by Odum in every section of the book. Odum's work has implications for every area in the philosophy of ecology: the ontology of the ecological entity, the reductionism/holism [End Page 120] debate, the rationalism/empiricism debate, evolutionary ecology, and the relationship of ecology to ethics. In light of my work in the philosophy of ecology and familiarity with Odum's research--not to mention meeting him personally several times--I find several of Craige's statements perplexing. When she writes... (shrink)

W illia m o f Ockha m w a s a F rancisca n fria r , a theol o gia n an d a v e r y singula r philo sophe r . H e l i v e d a t a tim e o f crisi s an d durin g th e transitio n o f philosop h y an d theol o g y . Hi s secularis m i s manifeste d i n (...) th e defens e o f a radica l separatio n bet w ee n th e religious an d secula r p ow ers . Assigne d t o th e philosophica l cu r ren t o f nominalism , h e deal t a s e v ere b l o w t o th e metap h ysica l realis m o f Aristotl e an d Thoma s Aquina s an d h e ad v ocate d the separatio n o f reaso n an d f aith , bet w ee n philosop h y an d theol o g y an d thu s h e unde r mined th e ideol o gica l foundation s o f th e churc h o f hi s time . H e w a s accuse d o f heres y because o f hi s nominalism , althoug h h e himsel f condemne d P op e Joh n XXI I a s heretica l fo r his conceptio n o f p o v e r t y , a concep t f a r rem o v e d fro m ev angelica l principle s an d especial ly fro m th e notio n o f th e F rancisca n orde r . H e defende d th e separatio n o f churc h an d stat e and h e denie d th e P ope ’ s authorit y i n secula r matters . H e flat ly asse r te d freedo m o f conscience an d Luthe r too k hi m a s a teache r. (shrink)

The role of emotions in ethics is often taken by philosophers and others as antithetical to rationality. On the most basic level (in undergraduate philosophy exams and elsewhere), stating an opinion in the form "I feel that p" can be a way of sidestepping the demand for reasons. But emotions can sometimes also be seen as supplying reasons for moral judgment to the extent that they involve evaluations--and a way of communicating them across different moral perspectives.

Th e con fusion a nd b arren ness o f psycho logy is no t to be e xplain ed b y calling it a “yo ung science”; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set theory.) For in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion. (As in the oth er case, con cep tual co nfusion and m ethod s of pro of.) (...) The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems that trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by. (PI p. 232). (shrink)

SummaryThe Gricean maxims of conversation are regulated by a supermaxim which determines what is relevant or not for a particular conversation. This maxim, involving a pragmatical knowledge, imposes specific restrictions on conversational strategy. It is called the “maxim of conversation topology” because it fixes the topos of a conversation.RésuméDans cet article nous démontrons que les maximes de la conversation, établies par H.P. Grice, sont dominées par une supermaxime qui détermine ce qui est pertinent et ce qui n'est pas pertinent pour (...) une certaine conversation. Cette maxime, qui implique une connaissance ?on;ordre pragmatique, impose des restrictions spécifiques sur la stratégie de conversation. Cette supermaxime, axiomatiquement premiére, est appelée ici la maxime de la topologie de la conversation, puisque c'est elle qui fixe le topos?on;une conversation.ZusammenfassungDie Maximen, die Grice für die Durchführung einer Konversation aufstellt, werden ihrerseits durch eine Obermaxime geregelt, die bestimmt, was für eine gegebene Konversation relevant ist oder nicht. Die Maxime involviert pralctisches Wissen und legt der angewendeten Strategie spezifi‐sche Einschränkungen auf. Sie wird die Maxime der Konversationstopologie genannt, weil sie den Topos einer Konversation festlegt. (shrink)

The figure of Peter the Tomb, various aspects of his life and activity, as well as the era called by his name, have long been the subject of study by numerous scholars, comprehensive and meticulous research. It is enough to mention the works of M.Grushevsky, A.Zhukovsky, V.Klimov, A.Kolodny, V.Nichik, O.Sarapin, L.Filipovich and V.Shevchenko, in which the phenomenon of the metropolitan, his spiritual and religious dominant, is thoroughly and thoroughly explained, the influence of P. Mogila's heritage on the past and present. (...) And yet it is impossible to talk about the exhaustiveness of this topic, because such inexhaustibility is dictated by the very universe of its multidimensional activity. This is what determines the relevance of the proposed article. And this, in turn, gives rise to reflections on the need for scientific innovative understanding of religious philosophy as a constant basis of thinking of Petro Mohyla, which, in particular, was reflected in his "Notebook", which is still a little-studied phenomenon of Ukrainian spiritual culture, for the first time it saw the world only in 1995, more than 60 years after its invention by M. Grushevsky. This work, like all narratives on the spiritual and religious themes that make up it, is an integral part of the metropolitan's religious and philosophical heritage. (shrink)

It has been argued that the fundamental laws of physics are deceitful in that they give the impression of greater unity and coherence in our theories than is actually found to be the case. Causal stories and phenomenological relationships are claimed to provide a more acceptable account of the world, and only theoretical entities — not laws — are considered as perhaps corresponding to real features of the world.This paper examines these claims in the light of the author's own field (...) of research: high energy physics. Some of the distinctions upon which the above conclusions are based are found not to be tenable in practice. Examples from experimental particle physics are presented which suggest an important role of the underlying theoretical structure which cannot be overlooked. It is argued that the fundamental theories must, in fact, be treated as being as worthy or unworthy of ontological commitment as the entities they postulate or the phenomenological relationships they inspire. Whilst it is conceded that aspects of the current theoretical formalism belie literal interpretation, it is maintained that revision in these particular areas need not affect the symmetry principles, particle spectra, or coupling strengths that largely determine the empirical content of the theory. (shrink)