Includes articles by: Ulrich Arnswald, Jens Kertscher, Matthias Kross, Thomas Macho, Walter Mesch, Dieter Mersch, Regine Munz, Hans Julius Schneider, Hans-Peter Schutt, Ilse Somavilla, Samuel C. Wheeler III, Anja Weiberg, Rüdiger Zill.

The volume contains the papers given at a conference held in Basle in Autumn 2006 on the writer Philipp von Zesen (1619-1689). The publication – the first collected volume devoted to this author for 35 years – displays the whole breadth of Zesen's work: Apart from his lyric poetry and novels, the papers discuss his linguistic and poetological innovations together with his contributions to nature philosophy, mythology, historiology and politics.

La teoría de la propiedad de Locke tiene como escenario el estado de naturaleza, cuyo correlato empírico es la colonización inglesa de América. Este es el supuesto que permite articular la apelación a la teología para fundar la propiedad privada de modo unilateral y en cualquier lugar del mundo; el desplazamiento del criterio de necesidad a la teoría del valor para justificarla; así como el supuesto de abundancia que la hace posible sin requerir pacto político ni consenso social. En este (...) sentido, si su teoría de la propiedad resultó esencial para legitimar el liberalismo que moldeó América desde la colonización inglesa y la Constitución norteamericana, el hecho de que América sea el ejemplo para su teórico más temprano y destacado, permite comprender mejor el carácter esencial de la relación entre liberalismo y colonialismo. Locke's theory of property appears in the context of the state of nature, whose empirical correlate is the English colonization of America. This is the basis upon which three elements can be articulated: the appeal to theology in order to found unilaterally private property anywhere in the world; the change from the criterion of necessity to the theory of value to justify private property; and the assumption of abundance which makes it possible without having recourse to political pact or social consensus. In this sense, if Locke's theory of property has come to be essential to legitimize the liberalism which modelled America since the English colonization and the American constitution, the fact that America is the example for its earliest and most distinguished theorist, allows to a better understanding of the essential nature of the relationship between liberalism and colonialism. (shrink)

A critique of algorithmic rationalisation offers at best some initial reasons and preliminary ideas. Critique is understood as a reflection on validity. It is limited to an “epistemological investigation” of the limits of the calculable or of what appears “knowable” in the mode of the algorithmic. The argumentation aims at the mathematical foundations of computer science and goes back to the so-called “foundational crisis of mathematics” at the beginning of the 20th century with the attempt to formalise concepts such as (...) calculability, decidability and provability. The Gödel theorems and Turing’s halting problem prove to be essential for any critical approach to “algorithmic rationalisation”. Both, however, do not provide unambiguous results, at best they run towards what later became known as “Gödel’s disjunction”. The chosen path here, however, suggests the opposite way, insofar as, on the one hand, the topos of creativity appear constitutive for what can be regarded as cognitive “algorithmic rationalisation” and which encounters systematic difficulties in the evaluation of non-trivial results. On the other hand, the investigations lead to a comparison between the “mediality” of formally generated structures, which have to distinguish between object-and metalanguages, and the “volatile” differentiality of human thought, which calls for syntactically non-simulatable sense structures. (shrink)

This chapter establishes the concept of a “symbolic system of representation“ to make clear how it is possible that humans use not only the language-based system of representation for cognitive contents but also a many layered non-linguistic system, a system which we probably share with other species. A symbolic system of representation denotes a general concept of a performance of which our language is only one single case, but which nevertheless is most easily explained through the case of language. A (...) system of representation should enable us to form and manipulate an idea of a state of affairs or of an event without having the appropriate intuition of it. We usually think that we do this only using linguistic expressions, but this is not the whole truth. Language is one system of representation, but we can in principle conceive of other systems of representation with the same performance. Husserl’s theory of meaning already reveals this possibility. A phenomenological analysis reveals that a non-linguistic system of representation is in fact still functioning in our own consciousness. We simultaneously use different means of representation, the most prominent of which are language, gestures, feelings and scenic images. It is especially fruitful to investigate the scenic mode of daydreaming as a central form of non-linguistic thinking. Through a close comparison of alternative systems of representation, the systematic difference of usual semantics in normal language systems based on convention and the more natural similarity semantics of some non-linguistic systems of representation is revealed. (shrink)

Since there is no really elaborated theory of the dialectic of nature, it is not only desirable but necessary to take a look at some of Hegel's original intuitions, which in many cases lost their distinctness in his later works, or fell victim to the exigencies of his system. Philosophy makes use not only of reasoning but also of intuition. In respect of the mass which offers persistent resistance to a notional solution, it is important to find a suitable image (...) for developing a first approximation to the understanding of the question. According to Hegel, the metaphors of circular and gyratory motion are well-suited for this. Here it is essential to clarify what we can gain by a structural interpretation of such ideas. I think that an attempt has to be made to bring out the contemporary relevance of the topic. Doing so is always a delicate matter, but it is a must if undertakings of the present kind are to be anything more than philological expositions of Hegel's philosophy, if they are to make a real contribution to reflection on the foundations of physics. I shall first give a brief review of the arguments put forward in the Encyclopedia; then I shall analyse Hegel's interpretation of circular and gyratory motion and discuss the possibility of bringing out the relevance of his ideas; finally, I shall draw certain conclusions in respect of the principles involved in comprehending the divisibility of matter, and in putting forward a philosophical interpretation of the theory of relativity. (shrink)

What corresponds to the present-day ‘transcendental-pragmatic’ concept of ultimate grounding in Hegel is his claim to absoluteness of the logic. Hegel’s fundamental intuition is that of a ‘backward going grounding’ obtaining the initially unproved presuppositions, thereby ‘wrapping itself into a circle’ – the project of the self-grounding of logic, understood as the self-explication of logic by logical means. Yet this is not about one of the multiple ‘logics’ which as formal constructs cannot claim absoluteness. It is rather a fundamental logic (...) that only makes logical textures possible at all and so owns transcendental character. The non-contradiction-principle is an example for this. Es- sential is that it is ‘under-cover-effcient’ as soon as meaningful concepts are used. Self-explication of the fundamental logic then means explicating its implicit under-cover validity, in fact by means of the fundamental logic itself. As is shown this is the affair of dialectic which thereby is to be understood as ultimate grounding of the fundamental logic. This is analyzed in detail using the example of the being/non-being-dialectic. As is demonstrated each explication step generates a new implicit issue and therewith a new explication-discrepancy inducing an antinomical structure that anew forwards the explication procedure. So this is entirely determined by itself. Decisive for the ultimate grounding argumentation is that thereby an objectively verifyable procedure is found, which is apparently possible only in a Hegelian framework. In contrast the immediate evidence of a speech act claimed by the transcendental-pragmatic position has only private character, which is grounding-theoretically irrelevant. (shrink)

Dass Kunst Sinnliches zu vergeistigen und Geistiges zu versinnlichen vermag, macht ihren Wesenskern und zugleich Rätselcharakter aus. Dass dieses Rätsel immer erneut als unaufgelöst erscheint, bedeutet auch, dass eine fortdauernde Irritation von Kunst ausgeht. Das Bestürzende der Kunst ist dies, dass sie den scheinbar unversöhnlichen Gegensatz des Geistigen und Sinnlichen zugleich als versöhnt erscheinen lässt: als Ver-Sinnlichung von Ideellem. Hegels These, dass die Kunst, eben durch diese Bindung an Sinnliches, 'ihrer eigentlichen Bestimmung nach für uns ein Vergangenes' sei, erscheint so (...) gesehen problematisch. Hat die geistesgeschichtliche Entwicklung die Kunst ihrer Irrelevanz überführt im Vergleich mit den nach Hegel höheren Formen des Geistigen, der Religion und der Philosophie? Entscheidend ist die Bewertung des sinnlichen Elements – dies näher zu klären wird hier in der Konfrontation der Hegelschen These mit den Kunstdeutungen Heideggers und Adornos unternommen. (shrink)

Essential for the concept of the law of nature is not only spatio-temporal universality, but also functionality in the sense of the dependency on physical conditions of natural entities. In the following it is explained in detail that just the neglect of this functional property is to be understood as the real reason for the occurrence of the Goodman paradox – with the consequence, that the behavior of things seems to be completely at the mercy of change of unique unrepeatable (...) temporal points. It is exactly this (mis-)understanding that also generated the induction problem. From the intrinsic connection between universality and functionality, however, – that is my claim – the ontological consequence of a nature results, for which lawfulness is coupled to essentially functionally defined time sequences, thereby implying a potentiality dimension of nature, too. (shrink)

Essential for the concept of the law of nature is not only spatio-temporal universality, but also functionality in the sense of the dependency on physical conditions of natural entities. In the following it is explained in detail that just the neglect of this functional property is to be understood as the real reason for the occurrence of the Goodman paradox. As a consequence, the behavior of things seems to be completely at the mercy of the temporal change of unique absolute (...) temporal points. It is exactly this (mis-)understanding that also generated the induction problem. From the intrinsic connection between universality and functionality, however, - that is my claim - the ontological consequence of a nature results, for which the potentiality of lawfulness is coupled to essentially functionally defined time sequences. (shrink)

[[[ (Here only the chapters 3 – 8, see *** ) First I argue that the prohibition of linguistic self-reference as a solution to the antinomy problem contains a pragmatic contradiction and is thus not only too restrictive, but just inconsistent (chap.1). Furthermore, the possibilities of non-restrictive strategies for antinomy avoidance are discussed, whereby the explicit inclusion of the – pragmatically presuposed – consistency requirement proves to be the optimal strategy (chap.2). ]]] The central question here is that about the (...) actual reason for antinomic structures. It turns out to be a form of negative self-conditioning (chap.3). This makes it necessary to clarify the status of negative concepts (chap.4). The generalization of these considerations (chap.5) leads to the actual analysis of the antinomic basic structure (chap.6): Decisively for the pragmatics of the concept is that it positively owns a meaning, so that positivity is always constituted by the concept qua concept. Thus a negative concept is characterized by a fundamental ambivalence: From a semantic point of view it has negative character, in its pragmatic status as a concept, however, it has positive character. If the meaning is especially that of a negative self-reference, the ambivalence leads to the antinomic constellation of a negative self-condition – that is the crux of the matter here! The concept thus possesses the property defined by it exactly when it does not possess it and vice versa. A closer analysis shows that the function of reflective structures for the occurrence of antinomies has to be judged much more differentiated than previous opinions suggest. Not only are four forms of reflectivity to be distinguished in this context – ontic, semantic, pragmatic reflectivity, and especially the form of negative self-condition; but it is also apparent that these are intertwined with each other in a way that is difficult to be understood. The astonishing variety of relationships associated with this makes the irritation that has always emanated from the antinomy problem appear more comprehensible. In the developed pragmatic perspective furtheron parallels to the structure of self-consciousness become visible (chap.7). I conclude with considerations about the significance of the antinomic structure for the problem of dialectics, especially for the synthesis formation of mutually exclusive terms (chap.8). (shrink)

Esse paper pretende introduzir alguns argumentos no debate atual em Filosofia da Religião, especialmente na controvérsia contra o Naturalismo. Nossa abordagem irá focar no significado moral da ideia de Deus, bem como em outros conceitos morais relevantes, a saber, os conceitos de consciência moral, mundo moral e a ideia mesma de “bem”. Em suma, é nossa intenção demonstrar que a maioria de nossas ideias morais está relacionada a uma Pessoa: Deus. Essa conclusão, como pretendemos demonstrar, refuta o Naturalismo.

There are reasons for reservations with respect to the postulated function of Broca's area. Evidence for the psychological reality of the relevant traces does not exist. In addition, because the syntax of non- (or partly) configurational languages is not described in terms of empty categories, no receptive agrammatism should be observed in these languages. Aphasia should not be examined in isolation from its cognitive components.

Der vorliegende Band beinhaltet Texte der internationalen philosophischen Forschung, die die vielfältigen Aspekte des Lebens sowohl der theoretischen als auch der praktischen Vernunft sowie ihr Verhältnis zur Religion thematisieren.