Plato's First Alcibiades was the recognised introduction to the dialogues of Plato in late antiquity, because it addresses the important question of the nature of the self. Only by discovering this can we understand the perspective from which we view the rest of reality. It was also considered as a necessary first step in our pursuit of happiness, for unless we know what we are we cannot know what will bring about our fulfilment - and without the (...) fulfilment of our true nature we cannot be happy. As a key to human understanding and happiness, the dialogue is as important today as it was in antiquity. Approximate Stephanus pagination accompanies the text. Added to this dialogue, in the form of additional notes and an introduction, is much of Proclus' Commentary written on the understanding that "it will be found by those who are deeply skilled in the philosophy of Plato, that each of his dialogues contains that which the universe contains." The Commentary reveals to the thoughtful student the depths of this important dialogue, its universal form, and its living heart - which is the quickening of the soul by the touch of divine vision. Three modern essays, written with the newcomer in mind, accompany the text and commentary: A Survey of the Soul and Socrates as the Symbolic Daemon of the Alcibiades by Tim Addey, and Possibilities of Self by Guy Wyndham-Jones. (shrink)

Recently discovered documents have shown how Gentzen had arrived at the final form of natural deduction, namely by trying out a great number of alternative formulations. What led him to natural deduction in the first place, other than the general idea of studying “mathematical inference as it appears in practice,” is not indicated anywhere in his publications or preserved manuscripts. It is suggested that formal work in axiomatic logic lies behind the birth of Gentzen’s natural deduction, rather than any single (...) decisive influence in the work of others. Various axiomatizations are explored in turn, from the classical axioms of Hilbert and Ackermann to the intuitionistic axiomatization of Heyting. (shrink)

In narrative style, Plato and the Founding of the Academy illustrates how the dialogue usually known as the Republic is constructed on the basis of simple but technical mathematical and harmonical principles, or numbers.

Plato and the Virtue of Courage canvasses contemporary discussions of courage and offers a new and controversial account of Plato's treatment of the concept. Linda R. Rabieh examines Plato's two main thematic discussions of courage, in the Laches and the Republic, and discovers that the two dialogues together yield a coherent, unified treatment of courage that explores a variety of vexing questions: Can courage be separated from justice, so that one can act courageously while advancing an unjust (...) cause? Can courage be legitimately called a virtue? What role does wisdom play in courage? What role does courage play in wisdom? Based on Plato's presentation, Rabieh argues that a refined version of traditional heroic courage, notwithstanding certain excesses to which it is prone, is worth honoring and cultivating for several reasons. Chief among these is that, by facilitating the pursuit of wisdom, such courage can provide a crucial foundation for the courage most deserving of the name. (shrink)

Dr Brandwood's book presents a factual and critical account of the more important of the various attempts that have been made to establish the order of composition of Plato's dialogues by analysing his diction and prose style. Plato's literary activity covered fifty years and there is almost no direct evidence, either external or internal, to help in establishing the relative order of his writings. Until the middle of the nineteenth century people were dependent on personal interpretation of the (...) probable line of development of Plato's thought and doctrines, but then a less subjective method was discovered, which relied instead on the observation of changes in Plato's prose style. Dr Brandwood examines the investigations of each scholar individually, checking the correctness of the methodology and the accuracy of the statistics, before arriving at fairly definite conclusions of his own, at least as far as the works of Plato's middle and old age are concerned. (shrink)

The first five chapters of the second book of Aristotle's Politics contain a series of criticisms levelled against Plato's Republic. Despite the abundance of studies that have been done on Aristotle's Politics, these chapters have for the most part been neglected; there has been no book-length study of them this century. In this important new book, Robert Mayhew fills this unfortunate gap in Aristotelian scholarship, analyzing these chapters in order to discover what they tell us about Aristotle's political philosophy. (...) Mayhew demonstrates that in Politics II 1-5, Aristotle is presenting his views on an extremely fundamental issue: the unity of the city. Indeed, he states, almost all of Aristotle's criticisms of the Republic center on this important subject in one way or another. Only by understanding Aristotle's views on the proper unity of the city, Mayhew explains, can we adequately discover his views on the proper relationship between the individual and the city. Students and scholars of classical political philosophy will be greatly interested in this innovative book. (shrink)

This article treats Plato’s Ion as a test-case. It is widely accepted in literature about Plato that he was a consistent and systematic thinker, whose dialogues express his views and complement each other, and that each dialogue has a main purport which the reader should discover or be told about by the commentator even before reading the dialogue. In the first section of this article, specimen passages from the literature on Plato are cited and discussed. In the (...) second part I point out some serious contradictions, sometimes bordering on dishonesty, in Socrates’ treatment of Ion, in the sequence of his arguments, and in his use of words in different senses without warning his interlocutor. The offshoot of it is that one cannot simply accept the consistent, dogmatic image of Plato the dogmatic preacher, and only reading the dialogue as drama may help us have a guess at what Plato is playing at. (shrink)

An obvious feature of Plato’s writings that distinguishes them from the works of later Platonists is his use of the dialogue form. Even more specifically and strikingly, the character of Socrates—whose voice is sometimes so hard to disentangle from that of Plato himself—occupies centre stage in almost all of Plato’s writings, while he is conspicuous by his absence from those of later Platonists. Yet the voice of Socrates can still be heard in the writings of later Platonists, (...) even though it is not presented in a dramatic form as in Plato’s dialogues. This chapter investigates a key Socratic theme that remains very important in later Neoplatonic writers, namely the ability of the individual to seek for and find knowledge, particularly self-knowledge. In Plato’s own representation of Socrates in his dialogues, Socrates is portrayed as speaking of himself in almost religious terms, presenting himself as a revealer of the truth to others. In their pessimistic view of human beings’ ability to discover the truth, and in their emphasis upon the need for divine revelation, the later Neoplatonists exhibit an understanding of the role of Socrates which reflects the way in which Plato has him portray himself in his dialogues. Thus, the voice of Socrates continues to speak in the writings of the Neoplatonists, despite their abandoning of the dialogue form which Plato used to make him address the reader explicitly. (shrink)

AT PHAEDO 96A-C Plato portrays Socrates as describing his past study of "the kind of wisdom known as περὶ φυσέως ἱστορία." At 96c-97b, Socrates says that this study led him to realize that he had an inadequate understanding of certain basic concepts which it involved. In consequence, he says at 97b, he abandoned this method and turned to a method of his own. But at this point in the dialogue, instead of proceeding immediately to describe his method, Plato (...) has him interjecting a complaint concerning Anaxagoras and his view that everything should be explained in terms of Mind. His complaint is that Mind would order things in the best possible way and that, therefore, an account of things in terms of Mind would amount to showing that they are ordered in the best possible way. But Anaxagoras did not show this and, instead, offered other kinds of explanations of the various phenomena. Socrates is not just criticizing Anaxagoras here for not doing what he set out to do; he makes it clear, for example at 99b-c, that he believes that the best kind of explanation of the phenomena would be to show that they are ordered in the best possible way. But he was unable to discover an explanation of this kind, either for himself or from others, and so turned to a method which he calls "second best". The actual description of this method is contained in two passages, 99e5-100a7 and 101d5-e1. Between these passages, Socrates invokes the doctrine of Forms and, in particular, the formula. (shrink)

Plato and the Elements of Dialogue focuses on the structural features of Plato’s writings and tries to show how he uses these features in provocative and interesting ways. Instead of focusing merely on why Plato wrote dialogues, this book tries to discover and disclose what the dialogues are, positioning it as a complement to the already large concerns about Plato’s use of the dialogue form.

The Cleitophon has recently been discovered to be Plato's dialogue introducingThe Republic. In this volume of essays, Editor, Translator, and Author Mark Kremer introduces seminal work that understands The Cleitophon as an ancient discussion of what scholars today refer to as posthumanism and postmodernism. Thoroughly original, this volume is an invaluable resource to all disciplines that attempt to come to terms with our emerging global society.

This posthumous book represents the first publication of one of the seminars of Cornelius Castoriadis, a renowned and influential figure in twentieth-century thought. A close reading of Plato's _Statesman_, it is an exemplary instance of Castoriadis's pragmatic, pertinent, and discriminating approach to thinking and reading a great work: "I mean really reading it, by respecting it without respecting it, by going into the recesses and details without having decided in advance that everything it contains is coherent, homogeneous, makes sense, (...) and is true." Castoriadis brings out what he calls _The Statesman_'s "quirky structure," with its three digressions, its eight incidental points, and its two definitions, neither of which is deemed good. He does not hesitate to differ with the text, to show that what is, in appearance, secondary is really essential, and that the denunciation of the Sophists accommodates itself quite well to the use of sophistical procedures. Castoriadis shows how _The Statesman_ takes us into the heart of what is distinctive in the late Plato: blending, acceptance of the mixed, of the intermediate. These transcriptions of Cornelius's afford the reader an opportunity to discover his trenchant, convincing, energetic, provocative, and often droll voice. Here is a hitherto unknown Castoriadis, who reflects as he speaks, collects himself, corrects himself, and doesn't hesitate to revisit key points. In short, this is Castoriadis's thinking in action. (shrink)

This collection of essays, first published two decades ago, presents central feminist critiques and analyses of natural and social sciences and their philosophies. Unfortunately, in spite of the brilliant body of research and scholarship in these fields in subsequent decades, the insights of these essays remain as timely now as they were then: philosophy and the sciences still presume kinds of social innocence to which they are not entitled. The essays focus on Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Hobbes, Rousseau, and Marx; (...) on the 'adversary method' model of philosophic reasoning; on principles of individuation on philosophical ontology and philosophy of language; on individualistic assumptions in psychology; functionalism in sociological and biological theory; evolutionary theory; the methodology of political science; and conceptions of objective inquiry in the sciences. In taking insights of both Liberal and Marxian women's movements into the purportedly most abstract and value-free areas of Western thought, these essays chart sexist and androcentric assumptions, claims and practices in the cognitive, technical cores of Western sciences and their philosophies. They begin to identify the distinctive aspects of women's experiences and locations in male-supremacist social structures which can provide resources needed for the creation of post-androcentric thinking in research, scholarship, and public policy. Such uses of feminist insights remain controversial today, and even among some feminists. These authors were all junior researchers and scholars two decades ago; today many are among the most distinguished senior scholars in their fields. Their work here provides a splendid opportunity for upper-level undergraduate and graduate students in philosophy and the social sciences to explore some of the most intriguing and controversial challenges to disciplinary projects and to public policy today. (shrink)

Uncovers in the works of Plato and Nietzsche, not some royal road to truth, but rather the intensity of their love and commitment to the life of thought, whatever it discovers and wherever it might lead.

Beginning with a reading of Plato's Statesman, this work interrogates the relationship between life and being in Plato's thought. It argues that in his later dialogues Plato discovers--or invents--a form of true or real life that transcends all merely biological life and everything that is commonly called life.

The surprising story of how Greek classics are being pressed into use in contemporary China to support the regime’s political agenda As improbable as it may sound, an illuminating way to understand today’s China and how it views the West is to look at the astonishing ways Chinese intellectuals are interpreting—or is it misinterpreting?—the Greek classics. In Plato Goes to China, Shadi Bartsch offers a provocative look at Chinese politics and ideology by exploring Chinese readings of Plato, Aristotle, (...) Thucydides, and other ancient writers. She shows how Chinese thinkers have dramatically recast the Greek classics to support China’s political agenda, diagnose the ills of the West, and assert the superiority of China’s own Confucian classical tradition. In a lively account that ranges from the Jesuits to Xi Jinping, Bartsch traces how the fortunes of the Greek classics have changed in China since the seventeenth century. Before the Tiananmen Square crackdown, the Chinese typically read Greek philosophy and political theory in order to promote democratic reform or discover the secrets of the success of Western democracy and science. No longer. Today, many Chinese intellectuals use these texts to critique concepts such as democracy, citizenship, and rationality. Plato’s “Noble Lie,” in which citizens are kept in their castes through deception, is lauded; Aristotle’s Politics is seen as civic brainwashing; and Thucydides’s criticism of Athenian democracy is applied to modern America. What do antiquity’s “dead white men” have left to teach? By uncovering the unusual ways Chinese thinkers are answering that question, Plato Goes to China opens a surprising new window on China today. (shrink)

The Cleitophon has recently been discovered to be Plato's dialogue introducingThe Republic. In this volume of essays, Editor, Translator, and Author Mark Kremer introduces seminal work that understands The Cleitophon as an ancient discussion of what scholars today refer to as posthumanism and postmodernism. Thoroughly original, this volume is an invaluable resource to all disciplines that attempt to come to terms with our emerging global society.

This posthumous book represents the first publication of one of the seminars of Cornelius Castoriadis, a renowned and influential figure in twentieth-century thought. A close reading of Plato’s Statesman, it is an exemplary instance of Castoriadis’s pragmatic, pertinent, and discriminating approach to thinking and reading a great work: “I mean really reading it, by respecting it without respecting it, by going into the recesses and details without having decided in advance that everything it contains is coherent, homogeneous, makes sense, (...) and is true.” Castoriadis brings out what he calls The Statesman’s “quirky structure,” with its three digressions, its eight incidental points, and its two definitions, neither of which is deemed good. He does not hesitate to differ with the text, to show that what is, in appearance, secondary is really essential, and that the denunciation of the Sophists accommodates itself quite well to the use of sophistical procedures. Castoriadis shows how The Statesman takes us into the heart of what is distinctive in the late Plato: blending, acceptance of the mixed, of the intermediate. These transcriptions of Cornelius’s afford the reader an opportunity to discover his trenchant, convincing, energetic, provocative, and often droll voice. Here is a hitherto unknown Castoriadis, who reflects as he speaks, collects himself, corrects himself, and doesn’t hesitate to revisit key points. In short, this is Castoriadis’s thinking in action. (shrink)

Late ancient Platonists and Aristotelians describe the method of reasoning to first principles as "analysis." This is a metaphor from geometrical practice. How far back were philosophers taking geometric analysis as a model for philosophy, and what work did they mean this model to do? After giving a logical description of analysis in geometry, and arguing that the standard (not entirely accurate) late ancient logical description of analysis was already familiar in the time of Plato and Aristotle, I argue (...) that Plato, in the second geometrical passage of the "Meno" (86e4-87b2), is taking analysis as a model for one kind of philosophical reasoning, and I explore the advantages and limits of this model for philosophical discovery, and in particular for how first principles can be discovered, without circularity, by argument. (shrink)

The unity of Plato's writings is discovered in their connection with Plato's life; they are parts of a "great confession." Wolff reconstructs Plato's life on the basis of his works and interprets his works in the light of his biography. The relevant facts of Plato's life, on Wolff's view, are the trial and death of Socrates, political movements and the study and criticism of other philosophers. These facts tend to throw light on Plato's development but (...) contribute little to our understanding of the internal unity of individual dialogues.--R. G. S. (shrink)

There are three main views of the development of Plato’s distinction between being and becoming which have been defended in recent times. Most scholars have thought that Plato always held the same version of the distinction despite appearances to the contrary. But some who have taken this position have thought that Plato took the realm of being to consist of things which never change in any way, and the realm of becoming to consist of things which are (...) never stable in any way. Others have thought that Plato’s account of things in the realm of becoming was not so extreme. They have maintained that the realm of being is made up of things which never change in any way, but that the realm of becoming consists of things which constantly change while they exist in many ways. The third view belongs to those who have held that Plato did in his middle dialogues take the extreme view of becoming and the extreme version of the distinction which that entails. But later, they claim, he discovered that the distinction was incoherent. He therefore abandoned it, and the metaphysical doctrine of degrees of reality which he had based on it, altogether. (shrink)

Plato was the first philosopher to discover the metaphysical phenomenon of plural-subjects and plural-predication; e.g. you and I are two, but neither you, nor I are two. I argue that Plato devised an ontology for plural-predication through his Theory of Forms, namely, plural-partaking in a Form. Furthermore, I argue that Plato used plural-partaking to offer an ontology of related individuals without reifying relations. My contention is that Plato’s theory of plural-relatives has evaded detection in the exegetical (...) literature because his account of plural-subjects through the Theory of Forms had not been recognised for what it is. I further submit that Plato’s handling of related individuals through plural-predication is not only a “first” in philosophy, but also an “only”, having remained a unique account in the metaphysics of relations. I hope that Plato’s account will introduce a fresh approach to contemporary debates on the subject. (shrink)

This paper focuses on two methodological questions that arise from Plato’s account of collection and division. First, what place does the method of collection and division occupy in Plato’s account of philosophical inquiry? Second, do collection and division in fact constitute a formal “method” (as most scholars assume) or are they simply informal techniques that the philosopher has in her toolkit for accomplishing different philosophical tasks? I argue that Plato sees collection and division as useful tools for (...) achieving two distinct goals – generating real definitions and discovering the basic natural kinds of a given domain of knowledge – both of which occupy a preliminary stage in his account of philosophical inquiry. As to the second question, I claim that the evidence for seeing collection and division as a formal method is weak. Although Plato calls the procedure a technê and a methodos, he makes no real attempt to formalize it in any way. For Plato, collection and division do not constitute an algorithmic process that can be learned from a rule book. Instead the ability to collect and divide properly are skills that good dialecticians must acquire through the kind of hands-on training illustrated by the Sophist and Statesman. Whereas Aristotle insists on formal rules for making proper divisions, Plato seems to emphasize the need to recognize where the natural joints of the world are. In this sense, Plato’s Sophist and Statesman and Aristotle’s Topics and Analytics present two very different pictures of collection and division. (shrink)

The Plato MS. designated by Bekker as Ω and by Burnet as O escaped the investigation of editors of the text of Plato for nearly a century, because it was wrongly cited by Bekker as Vat. 796. Finally, in 1908 Rabe published an account of the missing MS., which he had discovered in the Vatican library listed as Vat. gr. 1. Until its rediscovery the opinion of Jordan prevailed that it was a comparatively late MS., copied from A (...) . It actually belongs, however, to the late ninth or early tenth century—i.e. it is of almost equal age with A and B. (shrink)

Plato’s dialogues show Socrates at different ages, beginning when he was about nineteen and already deeply immersed in philosophy and ending with his execution five decades later. By presenting his model philosopher across a fifty-year span of his life, Plato leads his readers to wonder: does that time period correspond to the development of Socrates’ thought? In this magisterial investigation of the evolution of Socrates’ philosophy, Laurence Lampert answers in the affirmative. The chronological route that Plato maps (...) for us, Lampert argues, reveals the enduring record of philosophy as it gradually took the form that came to dominate the life of the mind in the West. The reader accompanies Socrates as he breaks with the century-old tradition of philosophy, turns to his own path, gradually enters into a deeper understanding of nature and human nature, and discovers the successful way to transmit his wisdom to the wider world. Focusing on the final and most prominent step in that process and offering detailed textual analysis of Plato’s _Protagoras_, _Charmides_, and _Republic_, _How Philosophy Became Socratic_ charts Socrates’ gradual discovery of a proper politics to shelter and advance philosophy. (shrink)

This little book contains lectures given by Vlastos in the summer of 1972 in the Danz Lectures series of the University of Washington. His theme relates to that often rather paternalistic exercise of plotting out the extent to which Science was Revealed to the Greeks. In his view, "it was not given to them... to grasp the essential genius of the scientific method." However, they did discover "the conception of the cosmos that is presupposed by the idea of natural science (...) and by its practice". This discovery, an intellectual "revolution," was of the view, upheld by the Presocratic physiologoi, that the world is characterized by "unbreachable regularities" which make the world a "cosmos," which "constitute the order of nature and, if known, would yield the ultimate explanation of every natural phenomenon". This was revolutionary since it rejected the traditional belief in an unlimited area of possible divine supernatural intervention in the world, a belief which made perception of the universe a perception of an "irrational universe". Thus, "for the first time in history", man achieved, with Presocratic physiologia, "a perception of a rational universe". In the remaining two chapters of the book, Vlastos examines Plato, represented as a "fierce opponent" of the revolution who appropriated the newly discovered cosmos, refashioning it "on the pattern of his own idealistic and theistic metaphysics". This interpretation of Plato is developed mainly through a study of the Timaeus and especially of the "Theory of Celestial Motions" and of the "Theory of the Structure of Matter". Plato appears as opposed to the "impiety" of the physiologoi, proposing himself in the Timaeus a transcendent god as his primary cosmological principle. At the same time, the Timaeus reflects, as Vlastos shows in a brief survey of earlier and contemporary Greek astronomy, an awareness of the "empirical facts" established by the astronomers and Plato’s desire to reconcile these facts with his metaphysical, theological, a priori convictions. This reconciliation involved postulating a system of celestial circular motions, a theory whose "scientific value" Vlastos does not doubt, despite its dependence on a "metaphysical scheme". Vlastos concludes that although Plato fully acknowledged a supernatural power in the universe, he guaranteed the regularities of nature against divine intervention. There is an unfailing natural law. However, its ground for Plato is not natural but supernatural. In examining the "Theory of the Structure of Matter", Vlastos again finds that Plato’s world-order resembles very much that of the physiologoi and, like theirs, is "safe from supernatural interference". The "elementarism" of the Timaeus is shown to be indebted to the Atomists, but also to innovate by opening the way to the intertransformability of elementary corpuscules. What "scientific value" does this theory of the transformation of elements have? It is neither entailed nor contradicted by observation. Vlastos suggests rather that its grounds are "aesthetic". At any rate, Vlastos concludes that although Plato opposed the physiologoi in reintroducing supernatural agency, he annexed their conception of cosmos. In his "perversely original way," he thus "sustained the faith that our world is cosmos. He gave rational men a pious faith to live by in two millennia all through which science was more prophecy than reality". Some of Vlastos’ more extensive footnotes are collected in an Appendix, which is followed by a Bibliography and Indices. (shrink)

The aim of this index of pre-1500 Platonic manuscripts is to prepare for a complete reediting of a new edition of Plato's works. The project, which began over ten years ago, brings together in one collection microfilms of all the older extant manuscript material. The index first lists the manuscripts according to the libraries in which they are found, including the library shelf number. The second half of the index lists the manuscripts by dialogue. The need for a new (...) edition of the Platonic text is based--for the most part--on the findings of E. R. Dodds in his work on the Gorgias. Dodds discovered that the nineteenth-century textual scholars oversimplified matters by assuming that the extant manuscripts were handed down by scribes. Dodds has shown that as much editing was done as transcribing; hence, the manuscripts could include "extensive possible unsystematic contamination." Also, the nineteenth-century scholars erred in assuming a "fixed rule of evidence." Thus--of three manuscripts-two having similar readings would be accepted and the third considered erroneous. However, probability theory shows that the agreement of two against one will work seven out of eight times. But the eighth instant will have the single reading as the right one--with no way of telling which out of the eight instances will have the single reading as the original. This new and convenient index should enhance Platonic scholarship.--J. J. R. (shrink)

Hugh H. Benson explores Plato's answer to Clitophon's challenge, the question of how one can acquire the knowledge Socrates argues is essential to human flourishing-knowledge we all seem to lack. Plato suggests two methods by which this knowledge may be gained: the first is learning from those who already have the knowledge one seeks, and the second is discovering the knowledge one seeks on one's own. The book begins with a brief look at some of the Socratic (...) dialogues where Plato appears to recommend the former approach while simultaneously indicating various difficulties in pursuing it. The remainder of the book focuses on Plato's recommendation in some of his most important and central dialogues-the Meno, Phaedo, and Republic-for carrying out the second approach: de novo inquiry. The book turns first to the famous paradox concerning the possibility of such an inquiry and explores Plato's apparent solution. Having defended the possibility of de novo inquiry as a response to Clitophon's challenge, Plato explains the method or procedure by which such inquiry is to be carried out. The book defends the controversial thesis that the method of hypothesis, as described and practiced in the Meno, Phaedo, and Republic, is, when practiced correctly, Plato's recommended method of acquiring on one's own the essential knowledge we lack. The method of hypothesis when practiced correctly is, then, Platonic dialectic, and this is Plato's response to Clitophon's challenge. (shrink)

This is a beginning text, with an ingenious format. Each of the five sections consists of seven or eight articles or excerpts, of varying difficulty. Each opens with two excerpts from classic philosophers, presenting alternative formulations of major problems in an area of philosophy. The other selections are by contemporary writers. Each section closes with a fictional dialogue between the men who set the problems. The author hopes that students will find the easy selections provocative and so be encouraged to (...) attempt the less readily understandable. The sections are designed to lead into one another, from "Political and Social Philosophy," with which most students have some acquaintance, to other areas, each presupposed by those preceding, that is, to "Ethics and the Moral Life," "Philosophy of Religion," "Theory of Knowledge and Experience," and finally to "Metaphysics." The selections are fresh, varied, and well-chosen to stimulate discussion. For example: Plato and Hobbes introduce "Political and Social Philosophy," followed by Stuart Hampshire, Michael Oakeshott, Jean-Paul Sartre, C. I. Lewis, John Rawls, and Edward Kent. Berkeley and James introduce "Theory of Knowledge and Experience." Contemporary selections are by Bertrand Russell, A. J. Ayer, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Martin Buber, Georg Simmel.--L. G. (shrink)

In his greatest work the greatest thinker of his era, if not of all time, Plato, writing in one of the greatest, if not even the greatest epoch in the intellectual, artistic, and literary history of mankind, held up a mirror not only to his own age but to every age, not least our own, in the glowing radiance of his unsurpassed genius. This essay is an attempt to look on the world around us with his searchlight. Addressing on (...) this subject a select company of educated and intelligent men and women, I discovered that several of them had attempted but had failed to read through The Republic. They could not see the wood for the trees, lost their way, and gave up the guest. (shrink)

Discover philosophy's impact on Christianity in this new theology textbook.

John Palmer begins his academic writing career with a text concerning the at times fragmentary and widely scattered influence of Parmenides upon the Platonic corpus. A glimpse and reglimpse at the nuances that Palmer brings to light is worthwhile. The text makes use of footnotes, which, opposed to endnotes, facilitate a more rapid assimilation. A lengthy reference list guides the reader to paths of specific interest—this being important in the determination of the difference between Palmer’s reading of Plato and (...) Plato’s employment of Parmenides. The text is systematic in approach and at times employs formal, logical equations in order to make its points clearer. Palmer explores Plato’s epistemology, metaphysics, and pursuit of specific problems. He demonstrates no intention to discover an “accurate” Platonic interpretation of Parmenides. Instead he endeavors to determine the amount and extent of influence on the mind of Plato by snatching up segments and sometimes shreds of Parmenidian influence, a dialectical hermeneutic of Platonic art form. Plato interprets Parmenides; Palmer interprets Plato’s Parmenides. Thus with a metaphysic of interpretation and potential misinterpretation Palmer secondarily attempts an implied reconstruction of the creative process of Plato’s poetic prose genius. Still, this method of interpreting the interpretation is an apparent strength of the work, since the approach is not so simple as to ensure the boredom of the reader and the reader is obliged to scrutinize his or her own interpretation of Plato and Plato’s dialogue with Parmenides in order to determine his or her level of agreement with Palmer. Thus, Palmer certainly propels the reader toward a sort of speculation and philosophical inspiration in general, no doubt one of Plato’s intentions. Still one cannot escape the speculative aspect of the text. There is, after all because of the problematic manner in which ancient works come to us, little conclusive proof of the truth of Palmer’s assertions besides his own, admittedly thorough, scholarship. Additionally, Plato himself may not have held the answers to the implicit questions that motivated Palmer since creative thinkers take inspiration from other thinkers without explicit acknowledgment. Palmer is thus out on a limb, yet he seems to have made ample preparations by thorough scholarship and he provides useful conjecture. He cites interpretive examples of Parmenidian influence in works of Plato and indeed there is need and room for speculation. (shrink)

If Platonic dialogues are dramas, then Socrates' interlocutors can be understood in their full humanity rather than foils for Socrates. This essay examines Crito, not as he appears in the dialogue named after him, but in the Euthydemus, where he reveals himself to a much greater degree. Here Crito is revealed as a successful businessman, a lover of money, who also has protective feelings about his son Critobolus. The physical frailty is a cause of concern. By understanding Crito in these (...) terms, it is possible to discern how the passion of envy governs much the way Crito responds to events. One also discovers that Crito does not always say what he means, but has a tendency to only reveal his own vulnerabilities after he has learned of the vulnerabilities of those with whom he is conversing, in this case, Socrates. But Crito is not entirely selfish. As a father, and as a friend of Socrates, he is also driven by a desire to be philanthropic. The nature of Crito's philanthropy is made manifest in the way he chastises Socrates for admitting, in public, that he does not necessarily believe in the gods of the city. Crito understands the consequences for Socrates of such an admission. Finally, Crito, the lover of money, also has an understanding of what philosophy is: something that can be owned. It is more like what an ideology is than the Socratic quest for wisdom. This analysis prepares one for a return to Plato's Crito, and to a consideration of the relationship of the Socratic life to politics and money-making. (shrink)

In this essay, we outline the central thesis of our recent book: A Platonic Theory of Moral Education: Cultivating Virtue in Contemporary Democratic Classrooms. We argue that the ethical, epistemological, political, and metaphysical doctrines typically attributed to Plato are not doctrines Plato holds, or at least are not doctrines that he holds in the way he is interpreted to have done. We claim that if we understand Plato’s relationship to these supposed doctrines better, we would discover that (...) Plato’s views are not wildly implausible or ill-suited for contemporary democracies and the schooling they provide for their children. Rather, they are plausible and well-suited to contemporary democratic education. This essay briefly outlines some of our reasons for holding this position. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Plato and Leibniz against the MaterialistsEmily GrosholzImportant parallels hold between Leibniz’s attitude towards materialism and that of Plato. Both philosophers were interested in and hostile to materialism, and their qualified rejection of materialism became crucial to the systems of their maturity. Leibniz’s attachment to Plato began very early: in a text of 1664 Leibniz quoted the Timaeus, 1 and in another of 1670 he claimed that (...) the Timaeus, along with the Parmenides and the Phaedo, were his favorite dialogues. 2 The influence of the Timaeus is quite apparent in Leibniz’s correspondence with the French Platonist Nicholas Remond (1713–16) and certain essays (particularly “On the Ultimate Origination of Things” [1697] and “Tentamen Anagogicum”), where he appeals to Plato in distinguishing his own position from the materialism of his day, which revived and transformed that of Leucippus and Democritus, Epicurus, and the poet Lucretius.The way in which Leibniz resists and circumvents materialism in these letters and essays has a family resemblance with the way Plato addresses and solves certain metaphysical problems, some of them raised by materialism, in the Timaeus. All the same, the Platonic and Leibnizian strategies also diverge in significant respects. For Plato belongs to the ancient world and Leibniz to the modern world, in which the topic of subjectivity becomes central. Although both philosophers make essential use of abstract mathematical schemata to organize and inform their philosophical positions, Plato tends to give them a constitutive role and Leibniz a regulative role. [End Page 255]What is the point of establishing this analogy, a likeness nuanced by unlikeness, in the metaphysical strategies of Plato and Leibniz? First, it is important to examine philosophical genealogies. In this case the genealogy is attested by Leibniz himself, who feels at once indebted to and impatient with his forebear. Yet it has received much less scholarly recognition than the more obvious link between Aristotle and Leibniz. Second, this kind of examination exhibits the shape and tensile strength of metaphysical systems, as tragedy or fiction exhibits the extent and limits of moral and political systems. I assume that certain metaphysical problems and certain possibilities for metaphysical systems recur through time and that those things that are perennial in philosophy point to what is eternal about it, but I also believe that there is something peculiar about modernity, which imposes a sea-change on philosophy after Descartes. Materialism is a recurrent metaphysical possibility with which contemporary philosophers must still come to terms; the peculiar nature of modern philosophy introduces new ways to address materialism. Surely the study of how Plato and Leibniz took the measure of materialism will be illuminating for philosophers interested in such questions.I. Modern scholars debate over whether Plato knew the writings of Democritus and addressed himself to them. The classical authors were unanimous in the opinion that Plato regarded Democritus as one of his most important opponents. According to an often repeated anecdote, Plato wanted all the writings of Democritus burnt and only gave up this wish when it was clear that the writings were already too widely circulated. 3Commentators have pursued this alleged opposition in various directions. Hammer-Jensen 4 and Natorp 5 have argued that Plato discovered the works of Democritus in the midst of writing the Timaeus and that one can trace their influence in the latter part of the dialogue. Thus they find Plato heavily indebted to Democritus. Taylor, by contrast, rejects the influence of Democritus on Plato altogether. [End Page 256]There is no need to bring in Democritus, and it is perhaps most likely that Plato had never read his works. We cannot prove such a proposition, but we shall at least see that there is not a single sentence in the Timaeus which shows any knowledge of Democritus. Moreover, it is very doubtful whether Plato would have learned anything from Democritus if he had read him. 6However, Taylor’s conviction that Plato would not have been interested in Democritus is based on the assumption, central to his commentary, that the Timaeus must be read as a Pythagorean text, and this in itself is debatable. After all, Plato chose Timaeus the Locrian as the protagonist of... (shrink)

The Cratylus is Plato's principal discussion of language, and has generated immense interpretive controversy. This thesis offers a new interpretation of the Cratylus, starting from the idea that it is essentially a normative enquiry, to be interpreted alongside Plato's ethical and political works. Just as the Statesman attempts to determine the nature of the statesman, so too the basic project of the Cratylus is to discover what constitutes a true, correct name. But this aim is doomed in the (...) case of language: names turn out to be a kind of imitation, and as such incapable of real correctness. ;The Cratylus discusses two theories of 'the correctness of names': conventionalism and naturalism. First, Socrates refutes the conventionalist thesis that any name anyone sets down for an object is correct. This thesis is, I suggest, of interest as a reasonable way to support the commonsensical assumption that all actual names are correct--an assumption which would preclude Plato's normative project. Socrates then elaborates naturalism, with an outsize, vaguely playful etymological discussion which has baffled interpreters. I argue that the etymological section serves above all as an agonistic display, establishing the authority of the philosopher to determine the value of etymologising and to treat the subject of names as he deems fit. ;Etymology is succeeded by the mimetic account of names as imitations. This is followed by a 'reexamination' of naturalism in which Socrates apparently turns against it, concluding with a partial rehabilitation of convention. This conclusion is the other major interpretive stumbling-block of the Cratylus. Here I argue that no rejection of naturalism is implied. Rather, its status is shown to be limited by its own consequences--a paradox, but one which does amount to or entail conventionalism. This reading is developed further by reference to the similar position expressed in the Seventh Letter. ;An End-Note discusses the explanation of false statement presented in the Sophist: I argue against the common view that it uses syntactic ideas in a way which represents a significant departure from the Cratylus. (shrink)

The Socratic elenchus is a method of philosophical enquiry attributed by Plato, in his dialogues, to his teacher Socrates. It is a method that uses a dialectic technique of questioning and answering to try to discover the truth of the issue under investigation. For Plato’s Socrates, the fundamental question for human beings is that of how to live, thus the enquiries he initiates concern our understanding of what it is to act ethically. In order to begin to enquire (...) into how to act in a virtuous manner, however, Socrates claimed that we must first know what virtue is. We must, that is, first understand the meaning of virtue before we can consider its application it to any particular kind of action; we must first be able to answer the question “what is x?” before considering whether a particular action or kind of action is an instance of x. This requirement leads to what is known as the ‘Socratic Paradox’: if we have to first establish what x means before we confirm or discount cases of it, then how can our enquiry ever commence; how can we begin in asking questions about x if we don’t yet know what x is? Philosophy has continued to grapple with the Socratic paradox since Plato’s formulation of it. This presentation will explain how the paradox is produced out of the elenchus and consider the ways in which Wittgenstein’s account of family resemblance sheds new light upon this age-old issue. [From the Author]. (shrink)

Can we make sense of the dogma of Parmenides' poem, that only being is? The prospect that Parmenides presents a perplexity, rather than a solution, forms the central hypothesis of this dissertation. Plato's Socrates seems to have understood this, and we, too, may fear our failure to fathom Parmenides' words and understand his meaning. Every attempt to penetrate Parmenides' thinking becomes unwittingly entangled in an impossible dilemma of trying to account for itself within the austere singularity of being, in (...) seeming defiance of the goddess' injunction against saying or thinking what is not. Thinking requires non-being to individuate or recognize itself, but even the minimal duality needed to acknowledge oneself is most emphatically denied. Parmenides' dogma, however, no less than his reasoning, has proven always attractive, despite its clear implication that everything we do is illusion. The goddess' distinction between Aletheia and Doxa, and her arguments, exacerbate this problem, although these two parts are commonly seen as the kernel of Parmenides' thought. Parmenides' proem grounds this fundamental split in a third and allows us to glimpse the poem's more aporetic structure. Parmenides' thinking is first approached through what his poem says and implies about itself. Its impossibility in light of its own argument points toward self-awareness and a discovery of the ineradicable duality of thinking. A second approach begins with the poem's ancient title, Peri Phuseos, and examines several pre-Parmenidean uses of the word phusis that show enigmatic implications from its first appearance. Scholars suggesting a prototypical concept of nature in early uses of phusis seem to gild the lily. Plato appears as a third locus for inquiry about Parmenides' thinking, and the intersection of Socrates and Parmenides is traced across the dialogues. The structure of Parmenides' poem appears knowingly imitated by Plato frequently, which bears significantly on his representations of Socrates' life and philosophic education. Socrates' caution about whether he understood Parmenides parallels a caution expressed as his "second sailing." Socrates' turn to speeches shows his concern with discovering intention, which perhaps animates his fear of awesome Parmenides but also suggests him to be Socrates' inchoate precursor concerning soul. (shrink)

This essay is based on two premises. The first concerns the vision of writing proposed by Plato in Phaedrus and especially the conception of philosophical writing as a maieutic game. The structurally polyvalent way in which Plato approaches philosophical issues also emerges in the dialogues. The second concerns the birth and the development of historical analysis in parallel with the birth of philosophy. On this basis the text investigates a series of data about the relationship between Plato (...) and "the facts". 1) If we compare the Apology of Socrates with other sources, we discover a series of important “games” that Plato performs to achieve the results he proposes. 2) The famous passage of Phaedo 96A-102A, which concludes with the Ideas and with a reference to the Principles, expresses definite judgments on the Presocratics. 3) In his works Plato attributes to the sophists some merits, even if the outcome of their contri-bution is overall negative. 4) However, in the fourth complicated diairesis of the Sophist, there is a "sophist of noble stock", an educator who can only be Socrates. 5) Plato in the Sophist shows the weakness of the Gigantomachy, and proposes an adequate definition of the beings: the power of undergoing or acting. This reveals, before the Philebus and the Timaeus, the dynamic and dialectical nature of his philosophy In summary, a multifocal vision emerges, adapted to an intrinsically complex reality. (shrink)

If Z hu Xi had been a western philosopher, we would say he synthesized the philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus: that he took from Plato the theory of forms, from Aristotle the connection between form and empirical investigation, and from Plotinus self-differentiating holism. But because a synthesis abstracts from the incompatible elements of its members, it involves rejection as well as inclusion. Thus, Z hu Xi does not accept the dualism by which Plato opposed to the (...) rational forms an irrational material principle, and does not share Aristotle’s irreducible dualism between form and prime matter, or his teleology. Neither does he share Plotinus’ indifference to the empirical world. Understanding how these similarities and differences play out against one another will help us discover what is at stake in their various commitments. (shrink)

Human lives are full of pleasures and pains. And humans are creatures that are able to think: to learn, understand, remember and recall, plan and anticipate. Ancient philosophers were interested in both of these facts and, what is more, were interested in how these two facts are related to one another. There appear to be, after all, pleasures and pains associated with learning and inquiring, recollecting and anticipating. We enjoy finding something out. We are pained to discover that a belief (...) we hold is false. We can think back and enjoy or be upset by recalling past events. And we can plan for and enjoy imagining pleasures yet to come. This book is about what Plato, Aristotle, the Epicureans and the Cyrenaics had to say about these relationships between pleasure and reason. (shrink)