Resnik’s argument relies upon an undefended and unjustified overvaluation of liberty. First, he overlooks some important arguments in favour of restrictions to liberty, and his consideration of the two he does review is unfair; second his account grossly overestimates the autonomy of our food choices; and lastly his mechanism for balancing liberty against other concerns involves an illicit double counting of the weight of individual liberty.

The WHO Commission on the Social Determinants of Health revealed that there is a 28-year disparity between the life expectancy in the poorest postcode and the richest postcode of Glasgow (CSDH, 2008). There are two sets of questions that it is important to ask about health inequalities like these: first, epidemiological questions about the mechanisms that cause inequalities in health and the measures that are effective in reducing them. Second, normative questions about which inequalities in health are wrong and why (...) they are wrong. The papers in this symposium result from the inaugural conference of UCL's Centre for Philosophy, Justice and Health (CPJH) and focus on the relationship between these epidemiological and normative questions. (shrink)

I. We have been warned by Professor H. L. A. Hart not to think of the word ‘justice’ as an all-encompassing moral word, and, so far as it goes, the warning is surely one we should heed. But “justice” is a concept so complex as to make the warning necessary. I do not intend my remarks as countering Hart's claim, but they thrust in a different direction. They are aimed at the fact that our concept of justice permeates and conditions (...) our use of a wide variety of other concepts such as freedom, equality and happiness. It is a common practice, among those who seek to elucidate the concept of justice, to appeal to these other concepts in an unanalyzed way. Thus, John Rawls, in formulating his now famous “two principles,” which are offered as an elucidation of one sense of justice, assumes that we understand such notions as maximum liberty and equality of opportunity before the concept of justice has itself been clarified. Few in recent decades have done more than Rawls to enrich the philosophical literature on justice, but I want to suggest that some very misleading inferences might be drawn from this opening gambit. (shrink)

Philosophers have often bluntly said, and more often tacitly assumed that careful and reasonable men will confine themselves to two very rigid ways of talking. Vile must either show that what we say is a theorem deducible from assumed axioms and postulates, or we must show that what we say is made probable by evidence. This book is at heart an attack upon the idea that rationality requires any such straitjacket, and it repudiates the dichotomy between "analytic" philosophy and philosophy (...) “in the grand tradition.” Rationality is here conceived as a subtle and complex temper of deciding, most needed precisely where what we have to say cannot be stuffed into the two narrow pigeonholes in question. Originally published in 1957. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

(2014). Killing without Heart: Limits on Robotic Warfare in an Age of Persistent Conflict. Journal of Military Ethics: Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 106-111. doi: 10.1080/15027570.2014.910017.

Early research examining the relationship between corporate social practices and candidate attraction generally concludes that prospective employees prefer to be affiliated with socially responsible organizations (Dolan, 1997; Greening & Turban, 2000; Turban & Greening, 1996). A basic assumption embedded in these studies is that there is a generalized consensus among job candidates regarding the factors that constitute a desirable social record. Our project challenges this assumption and seeks to uncover variation among prospective job candidates’ attraction to specific organizations’ social practices. (...) We draw on the model of stakeholder orientation outlined by Mitroff (1983) to build a theoretical framework to explain variations in candidate attraction to specific practices and to guide the development of propositions that outline how candidates might be attracted to certain practices. Analysis of pilot data provides an illustration of how various corporate social practices cluster in a manner that is consistent with the theoretical propositions. (shrink)

James Ward was a renowned philosopher and psychologist who criticised the objective principles of scientific naturalism. Believing in the primacy of the subject–object relationship for human experience, he rejected the detached perspective of the sciences; coming to the final conclusion that matter is fundamentally derived from mind, and mind is given coherence by the existence of God. This metaphysical belief was derived from his observations as a psychologist during the earlier part of his career, and his understanding that (...) the subject cannot be reduced to a passive receiver of the objective world. This volume, which was originally published in 1911, was based upon the Gifford Lectures given during the years 1907–10. It constitutes a further development of Ward's beliefs into the form of a complete system, and it remains of value to anyone with an interest in philosophy, psychology or phenomenology. (shrink)

James Ward was Professor of Mental Philosophy and Logic at the University of Cambridge. First published in 1899, this two-volume work consists of his Gifford Lectures, delivered between 1896 and 1898, in which he criticises Naturalism, and Agnosticism, in favour of Idealism, in which spiritual and non-material phenomena are central to human experience. The lectures in Volume 1 set Naturalism and Agnosticism within the context of the Mechanical Theory, arguing against its claim that experience can be fully described (...) in terms of mechanical concepts such as motion, energy and force. Exploring the ideas of prominent thinkers such as Newton, Huxley and Spencer, these thought-provoking discussions continue to inform and evoke debate among philosophers and natural scientists. (shrink)