In Morality and Global Justice, Michael Boylan presents us with a set of solutions to some of the world’s most pressing moral issues. Boylan claims that his solutions are not utopian; instead, they are practical, workable policy recommendations that governments and other organizations should adopt. For the most part, Boylan is correct; there are no obviously insurmountable obstacles to implementing many of his recommendations. But, as he himself admits, his position on immigrants and refugees borders on the utopian (Boylan 2011, (...) 204). In what follows, I will discuss two concerns that I have about his position. The first concern (1) is consequentialist: I fear that implementing a policy of open borders may lead to economic, environmental, and political consequences that are on balance undesirable. The second (2) is practical: even if American citizens have moral reasons for supporting a policy of open borders, they may have reasons of self-interest for rejecting it. If this is correct, then Boylan may have a difficult time garnering the support necessary to make the policy a reality. (shrink)

This volume answers questions that lead to a clearer picture of third-person self- knowledge, the self-interpretation it embeds, and its narrative structure. Bringing together current research on third-person self-knowledge and self-interpretation, the book focuses on third-person self-knowledge, and the role that narrative and interpretation play in acquiring it. It regards the third-personal epistemic approach to oneself as a problem worthy of investigation in its own right, and makes clear the relation between third-person self-knowledge, self-interpretation, and narrative capacities. In recent years, (...) the idea that each person is in a privileged position to acquire knowledge about her own mental states has come under attack. A growing body of empirical research has cast doubt upon the existence of what philosophers call ‘first person self-knowledge’, i.e., knowledge about our mental states that is often thought to be immediate, transparent, and authoritative. This line of thought has led some philosophers to claim that what seems to be ‘first-person self-knowledge’ is really just ‘third-person self-knowledge,’ i.e., knowledge about our mental states that is inferential, opaque, and fallible. This book discusses challenges for first-person knowledge and explores the true nature of third-person knowledge. (shrink)

This essay looks at the important, but often neglected, contribution that self‐interpretation makes to emotional self‐knowledge. We engage in acts of self‐interpretation when (A) we try to understand what it is that we are feeling, or, relatedly, what it is that we ought to be feeling. On such occasions, we draw upon social and personal narratives as well as on the emotional conceptual repertoires at our disposal. We also engage in acts of self‐interpretation when (B) we try to ascertain the (...) meaning or significance of an emotion, treating it as a datum, or piece of evidence, upon which to make inferences or further Interpretations. Although we often seem to have first‐person privileged access to our mental states, the third‐person strategy of self‐interpretation can be a valuable source of self‐knowledge. I focus here upon the role that self‐interpretation plays in providing us with knowledge about our emotional experiences. (shrink)

Is it possible to develop a personal narrative that is not fictitious or self-deceptive? In this essay, I will look at the way that personal narratives contribute to self-deception. In so doing, I will consider the narrative that the narrator or pastor of André Gide’s Pastoral Symphonie develops while reflecting upon his romantic relationship with his blind adopted “daughter”, Gertrude. Although the pastor’s narrative is largely self-deceptive, we need not fear that all narratives are equally delusional. When a narrative is (...) not self-deceptive, it can make a positive contribution to self-knowledge and moral understanding. (shrink)

Life is so wretched that it would be impossible to endure were it not for the luminous beams of illusion that guide us through its darkest moments. Many argue, perhaps not to this degree, that were it not for some modest illusions about the world and ourselves we would experience a serious decline in quality of life. On those not-so-good days, this claim strikes me as irresistible. How would I endure life and maintain my sanity if I had to embrace (...) each and every disgusting and disheartening fact about the world? Perceiving the world in a way that is neither clear-eyed nor complete may not be without its advantages. But even if being mistaken about the world or self-deceived causes one to be healthier or more comfortable, it is worth asking whether there is something to be said against a life of this kind. Might there not be some knowledge about ourselves or the world that we ought to have? Do not these ‘positive illusions,’ or flattering but inaccurate beliefs that people have about themselves and the world, interfere with their ability to live the good life? In the first part of this paper, I will briefly review the psychological literature which suggests that mild self-deception in the positive direction contributes to, rather than compromises, a person’s well-being. I will then, in the second part of the paper, examine what three thinkers, Joseph Butler, Immanuel Kant, and W.K. Clifford, have said about the wrongfulness of self-deception. While their arguments call attention to various reasons for thinking that some cases of self-deception might give rise on balance to negative consequences, they fail to show that all cases must have this effect. In the final part of the paper, I will consider whether our interest in autonomy might provide us with a better explanation of the supposed wrongfulness of self-deception. I will try to show that in virtue of being mistaken alone, the self-deceiver generally experiences some loss of a particular kind of autonomy. Nevertheless, my analysis will leave open the following two possibilities: that the loss of autonomy was autonomously brought about, and that the loss of autonomy in question may result on balance in an increase in the self-deceiver’s autonomy. (shrink)

Is abortion a question of personal morality? Liberals and feminists often embrace this idea, but so also do those who are personally opposed to abortion. Someone may claim to believe personally that abortion is wrong without holding the corresponding public belief. I am interested in what exactly one means when one says that abortion is a question of personal morality. In Sec. II, I consider three influential interpretations of the claim that abortion is a question of personal morality. After showing (...) that each of these interpretations is inadequate, I develop a fourth that avoids some of the problems with the first three (in Sec. III). But even on this interpretation, the claim that abortion is a question of personal morality is difficult to defend. This is because we cannot show that abortion is a question of personal morality without first knowing something about the moral status of the fetus. I conclude the paper with some pessimistic remarks concerning our ability to arrive at a compromise position on abortion. (shrink)

Childress et al. (2023) describe a disagreement between the competent patient and the physician recommending withdrawal of life-sustaining therapy (WLST). While the scenario is specific to ECMO, th...

In this volume we will focus on how educators in high schools (grades 9-12) can incorporate the teaching of ethics effectively across all disciplines.

_In _Challenging the One Best System_, a team of leading education scholars offers a rich comparative analysis of the set of urban education governance reforms collectively known as the “portfolio management model.”_ They investigate the degree to which this model—a system of schools operating under different types of governance and with different degrees of autonomy—challenges the standard structure of district governance famously characterized by David Tyack as “the one best system.” The authors examine the design and enactment of the portfolio (...) management model in three major cities: New Orleans, Los Angeles, and Denver. They identify the five interlocking mechanisms at the core of the model—planning and oversight, choice, autonomy, human capital, and school supports—and show how these are implemented differently in each city. Using rich qualitative data from extensive interviews, the authors trace the internal tensions and tradeoffs that characterize these systems and highlight the influence of historical and contextual factors as well. Most importantly, they question whether the portfolio management model represents a fundamental restructuring of education governance or more incremental change, and whether it points in the direction of meaningful improvement in school practices. Drawing on a rigorous, multimethod study, _Challenging the One Best System_ represents a significant contribution to our understanding of system-level change in education. (shrink)

Mere physical experiences of warmth, distance, hardness, and roughness are found to activate the more abstract psychological concepts that are analogically related to them, such as interpersonal warmth and emotional distance, thereby influencing social judgments and interpersonal behavior without the individual's awareness. These findings further support the principle of neural reuse in the development and operation of higher mental processes.

At the request of the Midwest Bioethics Center (MBC), we surveyed nurses' and physicians' attitudes and needs regarding Hospital Ethics Committees (HECs). The primary objective of this research project was to inform the practices and policies of the Ethics Committee Consortium of the Bioethics Center.Four thousand eight hundred and twenty-nine surveys were distributed to the medical and nursing staff of eight Kansas City metropolitan area hospitals. One thousand and fifty-five surveys were returned, representing a response rate of 21%.

The problem of theorizing privacy moves on two levels, the first consisting of an inadequate conceptual vocabulary and the second consisting of an inadequate institutional grammar. Privacy rights are supposed to protect individual subjects, and so conventional ways of understanding privacy are subject-centered, but subject-centered approaches to theorizing privacy also wrestle with deeply embedded contradictions. And privacy’s most enduring institutional failure modes flow from its insistence on placing the individual and individualized control at the center. Strategies for rescuing privacy from (...) irrelevance involve inverting both established ways of talking about privacy rights and established conventions for designing institutions to protect them. In terms of theory, turning privacy inside out entails focusing on the conditions that are needed to produce sufficiently private and privacy-valuing subjects. Institutionally, turning privacy inside out entails focusing on the design, production, and operational practices most likely to instantiate and preserve those conditions. (shrink)

Secularism is usually thought to contain the project of self-deification, in which humans attack God’s authority in order to take his place, freed from all constraints. Julie E. Cooper overturns this conception through an incisive analysis of the early modern justifications for secular politics. While she agrees that secularism is a means of empowerment, she argues that we have misunderstood the sources of secular empowerment and the kinds of strength to which it aspires. Contemporary understandings of secularism, Cooper contends, (...) have been shaped by a limited understanding of it as a shift from vulnerability to power. But the works of the foundational thinkers of secularism tell a different story. Analyzing the writings of Hobbes, Spinoza, and Rousseau at the moment of secularity’s inception, she shows that all three understood that acknowledging one’s limitations was a condition of successful self-rule. And while all three invited humans to collectively build and sustain a political world, their invitations did not amount to self-deification. Cooper establishes that secular politics as originally conceived does not require a choice between power and vulnerability. Rather, it challenges us—today as then—to reconcile them both as essential components of our humanity. (shrink)

Some of the literature about teaching issues of race and racism in classrooms has addressed matters of audience. Zeus Leonardo, for example, has argued that teachers should use the language of white domination, rather than white privilege, when teaching about race and racism because the former language presupposes a minority audience, while the latter addresses an imaginary or presupposed white one. However, there seems to be little discussion in the literature about teaching these issues to an audience that is in (...) fact predominantly minority. Leonardo assumes that minority students need little convincing about the reality of white domination, but students of color are not a monolithic group. The paper addresses some specific challenges the author has faced teaching theories of white domination to a predominantly minority student audience in New York City. Leonardo is right that audience matters, but audience turns out to matter in ways that defy common assumptions. (shrink)

Introduction -- Entering the gallery : Hegel's overall project and the project of the logic -- The skepticism of Hume and Kant -- Reason overgrasps reality -- Essential, necessary universals -- Reason drives itself : semantics and syntax -- Hegel's argument -- Hegel's overall project -- The conceptual and semantic project of the logic -- The syntactic project of the logic -- Introduction -- The doctrine of quality -- The doctrine of quantity -- The doctrine of measure -- Wrap up (...) being : comments on syntax -- Introduction -- Essence as the ground of existence -- The doctrine of appearance -- The doctrine of actuality -- Wrap up essence : comments on syntax -- Introduction -- The doctrine of the object -- The doctrine of the idea -- Wrap up concept : comments on syntax -- Epilogue: Hegel's materialism, optimism, and faith. (shrink)

Maybee asserts that racial group formation and identity politics may be more complex than simply shared cultural practices or skin color. They may be based on political interests and commitment to liberation and antiracist struggles.

Within the political economy of informational capitalism, commercial surveillance practices are tools for resource extraction. That process requires an enabling legal construct, which this essay identifies and explores. Contemporary practices of personal information processing constitute a new type of public domain—a repository of raw materials that are there for the taking and that are framed as inputs to particular types of productive activity. As a legal construct, the biopolitical public domain shapes practices of appropriation and use of personal information in (...) two complementary and interrelated ways. First, it constitutes personal information as available and potentially valuable: as a pool of materials that may be freely appropriated as inputs to economic production. That framing supports the reorganization of sociotechnical activity in ways directed toward extraction and appropriation. Second, the biopolitical public domain constitutes the personal information harvested within networked information environments as raw. That framing creates the backdrop for culturally situated techniques of knowledge production and for the logic that designates those techniques as sites of legal privilege. (shrink)

A survey was conducted in a naturalistic setting, within wine tasting rooms, to explore how consumers' sustainability attitudes and subjective norms influence their decision to purchase wines from wineries which have adopted an environmental management program. The results indicate that both are significant predictors of intentions and explain over half of the variation in intentions to purchase. In addition, identifying environmental organization members is a useful approach in identifying a segment of consumers having stronger levels of these antecedents and, therefore, (...) more likely to purchase from wineries using sustainable grape growing practices (than non-members) Consumers who are environmental organization members are more likely to be interested in organic products, as well. Information on sustainable grape growing practices is relevant and influential for a specific segment of consumers, those consumers more passionate about the environment, and increases their intentions to purchase from wineries who have adopted these practices. (shrink)

The article makes four interrelated claims: (1) The mechanism approach to social explanation does not presuppose a commitment to the individual-level microfoundationalism. (2) The microfoundationalist requirement that explanatory social mechanisms should always consists of interacting individuals has given rise to problematic methodological biases in social research. (3) It is possible to specify a number of plausible candidates for social macro-mechanisms where interacting collective agents (e.g. formal organizations) form the core actors. (4) The distributed cognition perspective combined with organization studies could (...) provide us with explanatory understanding of the emergent cognitive capacities of collective agents. (shrink)

This Article examines the regulatory state through the lens of evolving political economy, arguing that a significant reconstruction is now underway. The ongoing shift from an industrial mode of development to an informational one has created existential challenges for regulatory models and constructs developed in the context of the industrial economy. Contemporary contests over the substance of regulatory mandates and the shape of regulatory institutions are most usefully understood as moves within a larger struggle to chart a new direction for (...) the regulatory state in the era of informational capitalism. A regulatory state optimized for the information economy must develop rubrics for responding to three problems that have confounded existing regulatory regimes: platform power — the power to link facially separate markets and/or to constrain participation in markets by using technical protocols; infoglut — unmanageably voluminous, mediated information flows that create information overload; and systemic threat — nascent, probabilistically-defined harm to be realized at some point in the future. Additionally, it must develop institutions capable of exercising effective oversight of informationera activities. The information-era regulatory models that have begun to emerge are procedurally informal, mediated by networks of professional and technical expertise that define relevant standards, and financialized. Such models, however, also have tended to be both opaque to external observation and highly prone to capture. New institutional forms that might ensure their legal and political accountability have been slow to develop. (shrink)

The Venetian state has aptly been called a work of art. So absolute and necessary appear its fictions that continuity and tradition are always in the foreground, while change recedes to the distant horizon. It is this quality of timeless truth that characterizes the “myth of Venice”: Venice remains perfect and unchanged while other governments rise and fall. It remains unchanged because of two things: the “perfect” system of government, combining the best features of monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy; and the (...) reliance on impartial justice, the key to preserving harmony between conflicting groups. (shrink)

In "Rethinking Rationality" I argue that a certain family of accounts of rationality that have historical roots in the history of philosophy and that have been recommended as ways of life, if actually adopted by people as ways of life, will make them psychologically unhealthy. I compare the sort of psychological illness they will have to the sort of illness experienced by alcoholic and other addictive persons. In effect, I suggest, the family of accounts of rationality I have in mind (...) recommends that people become addicted to rationality. ;The sort of picture of rationality that I have in mind is what I call an "external" account of rationality. An external account of rationality is an account that asks someone to adopt another's point of view in deciding what to do. In the history of philosophy most of the relevant external accounts have asked agents to adopt a completely impersonal perspective. Moreover, these pictures ask people who adopt them as ideal ways of life to ensure that each decision they make correspond to and be approved of by the rational picture. I argue that people who thus live their lives will become unhealthy by losing contact with their personal inner lives and identities, and thus with an important part of their humanness. ;Historical representatives of the family of accounts I criticize include Socrates, Kant, and Hegel, under particular interpretations. I also criticize Nicholas Rescher as a modern representative of that same historical tradition. ;The argument for this view, after an initial introductory chapter, is presented through close examinations of Genevieve Lloyd's The Man of Reason, pop-psychologist John Bradshaw's Bradshaw On: The Family, Soren Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments and Friedrich Nietzsche's Twilight of the Idols. (shrink)

In this new theoretical approach to disability, Maybee traces societal constructions of human physicality along three dimensions: the personal body, the interpersonal body, and the institutional body. Each dimension has played a part in defining people as disabled in terms of employment, healthcare, education, and social and political roles.

As the prospects for a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict have dwindled, Jewish scholars in the United States have increasingly invoked the concept of diaspora to counter a purported Jewish consensus regarding Zionism. In this essay, I critique prominent exponents of this approach (Judith Butler, Jonathan and Daniel Boyarin) from a diasporic (i.e., non-Zionist) standpoint. My concern is not that Butler and the Boyarins attack Israel publicly, endorse a binational solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, and/or support the movement (...) for Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions—rather, it is that they lack a compelling vision for diasporic politics. Their visions prove wanting because they contest Zionism on the terrain of Jewish identity. To loosen Zionism’s hold, Butler and the Boyarins recover alternative approaches to the attainment or grounding of Jewish identity. Yet when framed as an ethic of particular identity, diasporic thinking can neither rebut Zionism’s political arguments, nor can it develop alternative models of Jewish self-rule. Instead of theorizing Jewish identity, I argue, diasporic thinkers should envision Jewish political solidarity beyond the confines of the nation-state. (shrink)

Anhedonia, or a deficit in the liking, wanting, and seeking of rewards, is typically assessed via self-reported “in-the-moment” emotional and motivational responses to reward stimuli and activities. Given that mental imagery is known to evoke emotion and motivational responses, we conducted two studies to investigate the relationship between mental imagery use and self-reported anhedonia. Using a novel Reward Response Scale (adapted from the Dimensional Anhedonia Rating Scale, DARS; Rizvi et al., Citation2015) modified to assess deliberate and spontaneous mental imagery use, (...) Study 1 (N = 394) compared uninstructed and instructed mental imagery use, and Study 2 (N = 586) conducted a test of replication of uninstructed mental imagery use. Results showed that greater mental imagery use was associated with higher reward response scores (Study 1 & 2), and this relationship was not moderated by whether imagery use was uninstructed or instructed (Study 1). Importantly, mental imagery use moderated the convergence between reward response and depression scale measures of anhedonia, with lower convergence for those reporting higher mental imagery use (Study 1 & 2). Results suggest that higher spontaneous mental imagery use may increase self-reported reward response and reduce the convergence between reward response scale and depression questionnaire measures of anhedonia. [199 / 200 words]. (shrink)