The stated subject of these lecture courses given by Husserlbetween 1910 and 1918is ‘reason, the word for the mental activities and accomplishments that govern knowledge, give it form and supply it with norms.’ They show their author still pursuing the course set out in the Logical Investigations up to the end of the second decade of the century and displaying utter consistency with stands that he began taking on meaning, analyticity, Platonism, manifolds, mathematics, psychologism, etc. in the 1890s. Thus, they (...) undermine many idées reçues about the development of his thought. The centerpiece of this work is an exploration of the realm of meaning. Moreover, they add new dimensions to standard discussions by taking readers back to the place where phenomenology and analytic philosophy diverged. They show that Husserl tangled long and hard with the very ideas that went into the making of the latter and offer a wealth of interesting insights into sense and meaning, theory of judgment, complete and incomplete meanings, states of affairs, extensional logic, the relationship between logic and mathematics, functions and arguments, propositional functions, quantification, existential generalization, the word ‘all,’ number theory, sets, modality, deductive theory, ideas that are still under discussion today. Prepared for oral delivery in the classroom, they are refreshingly lively and spontaneous. They are clearer, more explicit, and readable than the books Husserl published during his lifetime. (shrink)

Hierbei beruhrt Husserl auch Themen, welche die Grenzen der Methode aufzeigen, z.B. die eidetische Variation meines eigenen Charakters.

-Das durchgehende Thema der vorliegenden Untersuchung ist die zeitliche Konstitution eines reinen Empfindungsdatums und die einer solchen Konstitution zugrunde liegende Selbstkonstitution der 'phanomenologischen Zeit'.- Martin Heidegger, 1928".

I argue that the moral right to privacy is the moral right to consent to access by others to one’s personal information. Although this thesis is relatively simple and already implicit in considerations about privacy, it has, nevertheless, been overlooked by philosophers. In the paper, I present and defend my account of the moral right to privacy, respond to possible objections to it, and attempt to show its advantages over two recent accounts: one by Steve Matthews and the other by (...) Adam Moore. I also offer reasons to think that my account can be assimilated into a broad range of fundamental ethical approaches (i.e., a variety of consequentialist,deontological, and natural law approaches). Given the number and variety of such approaches, however, I can only attempt to make a prima facie case for the adaptability of the proposed account. (shrink)

Das von Husserl als "wissenschaftstheoretischer Teil" bezeichnete dritte Buch seiner Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie (1913) wurde, entgegen der ursprünglichen Absicht, von ihm selbst nie zur Veröffentlichung gebracht. Dessen ungeachtet verdient dieser Text jedoch gerade für das frühe Denken Husserls besondere Beachtung. So zeigt sich an ihm die deutliche Trennung von phänomenologischer und ontologischer Forschung, wird hier der applikative Wert der Phänomenologie für die empirische Wissenschaft betont und stellen sich vor allem mögliche Wege in die transzendentale Phänomenologie (...) dar. (shrink)

In a paper in this journal (Wall 2016), the author of the present paper critiqued Scott Forschler's attempt (2013) to establish that Jens Timmermann's argument (2005) against R. M. Hare's attempt (1981) to bridge the Kantian-consequentialist gap is unsuccessful. Forschler's thesis is that Hare's utilitarianism is strictly normative, not metaethical. In Hare's ethical rationalism, which is metaethical but contains no intrinsic ends (Forschler 2013), reason determines the proper ends, and preference satisfaction has no value prior to reason's determinations (Forschler 2013). (...) The present author responded that Hare's moral approach presupposes that preference satisfaction is the ultimate end (Wall 2016) and that an analysis of preference satisfaction in Hare's moral approach cannot be confined to normative ethics. Forschler's rejoinder (2017) suggests that Hare's moral theory was misinterpreted by the author, who now shows that such a judgment results from significant oversights concerning the foundation of Hare's moral theory and utilitarian foundations. (shrink)

Résumé L’approche morale d’Alasdair MacIntyre est classée parmi les formulations très importantes de l’éthique philosophique contemporaine. Pourtant, MacIntyre et ses commentateurs ont négligé les exigences fondamentales des théories éthiques téléologiques (théories éthiques orientées vers une fin ou un but). Dans cet article, nous verrons exactement où MacIntyre a commis une erreur dans la construction de son approche morale téléologique aristotélicienne-thomiste, l’erreur la plus fondamentale étant son incapacité à poursuivre et à développer des fins ultimes. L’approche morale de MacIntyre, qui tente (...) héroïquement de combiner des éléments fondamentaux antiques et médiévaux tout en attribuant aux pratiques sociales un rôle de premier plan dans la formation de la pensée morale, ne parvient pas à fournir un fondement téléologique justificatif déterminé. (shrink)

Physicians who are impaired, engage in unprofessional behavior, or violate laws may be barred from further practice. Likewise, medical students may be dismissed from medical school for many infractions, large and small. The welfare of patients and the general public must be our first priority, but when we assess physicians and students who have erred, we should seek to respond as caringly and fairly as possible. This piece will explore how we may do this at all stages of the proceedings (...) physicians and students may encounter. This may include helping them to resume their medical careers if and when this would be sufficiently safe and beneficial for patients. (shrink)

I attempt to identify a problem running through the foundation of R. M. Hare’s ethical prescriptivism and the more recent sentimentalism/ethical expressivism of Simon Blackburn. The non-cognitivism to which Hare and Blackburn’s approaches are committed renders them unable to establish stable contents for basic moral principles and, thus, incapable of conducting a logical analysis of moral terms or statements. I argue that objective-descriptive- natural ethical theories are in a much better position to provide a satisfying account of the logical analysis (...) of moral terms or statements. Such ethical theories can arrive at basic moral principles with stable contents, thus paving the way for the kind of descriptive approach that can accommodate stable truth conditions. This, in turn, provides stable grounds for the logical analysis of moral terms and statements. (shrink)

Intentionnalité et être au monde. Husserl. Edmund4070.

The author describes an alternative approach that careproviders may want to consider when caring for patients who request interventions that careproviders see as futile. This approach is based, in part, on findings of recent neuroimaging research. The author also provides several examples of seemingly justifiable “paternalistic omissions,” taken from articles in this issue of The Journal of Clinical Ethics (JCE). The author suggests that while careproviders should always give patients and their loved ones all potentially relevant information regarding “futile” decisions, (...) careproviders may wish to consider, paradoxically, not giving advice in these situations, when the advice is based mostly or wholly on their own moral views, based on this same, ethical rationale. (shrink)

Clinicians and ethicists routinely encounter complex ethical dilemmas that seem intractable, which have been described as ethical Gordian knots. How can they best assist patients and surrogate decision makers who are entangled in struggles around the capacity to make life-or-death treatment decisions? In this article I describe unconventional and unorthodox approaches to help slice through these dilemmas.

The author suggests that a “first generation” task in bioethics is to give patients the information they need; a “second generation” task is to do this in the most effective way; and a “third generation” task is to avoid harming patients by imposing value biases. The author discusses ways to pursue this third generation task.

This book presents a straightforward account of disease, the problems of practice, and the moral, legal and financial questions in the field.

In the history of Indo-European peoples warriors were known to possess characteristic physical and ethical features which went together with special social status. This is undoubtedly true of ancient Greeks. According to Homer characters who made heroic feats depicted in his books had moulded their personality in accordance with requirements of arete and battle was the best means to achieve this end, even though particular ways of obtaining it were heavily affected by subjective considerations. The individualism of the epic heroes (...) can best be seen in the freedom they enjoyed to choose any method of fighting that suited them at the moment. The highest credit, however, was given for the fortitude displayed in a duel monomachia, which often awarded the warrior with eternal fame. But in exceptional circumstances the heroes resorted to guiles mētis or ambushes dolos. We have no ground to believe, therefore, that any kind of „chivalry code” was observed at that time. (shrink)

There have been ongoing debates as to how, or even whether, we should clinically classify gender diversity in children through clinical classification manuals. So‐called ‘depathologizing’ is argued as being vital to address the stigma that these children are somehow disordered or sick. Yet one argument in favour of continued clinical classification for transgender and gender non‐conforming children is that it better facilitates access to specialist psychological support. I argue that whilst continued clinical classification offers a seemingly pragmatic solution to ensuring (...) access, it does in fact obscure our understanding of the individual needs of these children. In this paper I address fundamental issues that aim to better our understanding of need and thus why a child may benefit from specialist support. I do so by critiquing a paper I nearly wrote, which argued for the ongoing continued classification of gender incongruence in children. Ultimately, I argue that specialist psychological support and care should be driven by the needs of the individual child, as determined by the child and those involved with their care. By bettering our understanding as to why specialist psychological support may be beneficial for some, we move past the focus of such specialist support being provided because of the child’s gender diversity. Methodologically the paper may be unusual, in comparison to traditional normative counter‐argumentative bioethical position papers, but by presenting an argument for depathologization of gender diversity of children in this way there is also an alternative insight into the methods of bioethics. (shrink)

A first principle in ethics consultation is that reasoning is essential. A second principle is that the religious and cultural views of patients and their surrogates are usually respected. What can be done when these principles collide—when patients or surrogates have religious or cultural views and beliefs that clinicians find unreasonable or even offensive? Mediation may provide some approaches to assist us in providing the most ethically appropriate assistance.