In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:.. MERELY A MAN OF LETTERS" an interview with Jorge Luis Borges* Philosophy and Literature: Why don't you tell us about some of the philosophers who have influenced your work and in whom you have been the most interested? Jorge Luis Borges: Well, I think that's an easy one. You might talk in terms of two: Berkeley and Schopenhauer. But I suppose Hume might be worked in also, because, (...) after all, Hume refutes Berkeley. Really, he comes from Berkeley—even if Berkeley comes from Locke. You might think of Locke, of Berkeley, and of Hume as being three links in an argument..... But I suppose that when someone refutes someone else in philosophy, he is carrying on the argument. P&L: And Schopenhauer? Borges: Schopenhauer is very different from Hume. Of course, Schopenhauer had his idea of the Will. That is not to be found in Hume.... The case of Berkeley was different. I suppose he thought of God as being aware of all things all the time, if I don't get him wrong. If we go away, does this room disappear? No, because God is thinking about it. Now, in the case of Schopenhauer, I was rereading Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, The World as Will and Idea, and I was rather taken aback, or baffled I should say, puzzled by something that keeps on recurring in Schopenhauer. Of course it may have been a slip of the pen, but as he goes back to it, and as he was a very careful writer, I wonder if it is a slip of the pen. For example, Schopenhauer begins by saying that the universe, the stars, the spaces in between, the planets, *On April 14, 1976, two editors of Philosophy and Literature, along with an interested colleague, interviewed Jorge Luis Borges at Michigan State University, where he held a position as visiting professor for the winter term. These remarks are edited from the transcript of that conversation. 337 338Philosophy and Literature this planet, those things, have no existence—except in the mind which perceives them. But then, to my surprise—and I suppose you can explain this to me, since you are philosophers and I am not—what Schopenhauer says is that all those things have no existence except in the brain. And that the universe—I remember these words, I don't think I'm inventing them now—"ist ein Gehirnphänomen," that the world is a cerebral phenomenon. Now, I was baffled. Because, of course, if you think of the universe, I suppose the brain is as much a part of the external world as the stars or the moon. The brain after all is a system of visual, of tactile, perceptions. He keeps on insisting on the brain. I don't think, for example, that Bishop Berkeley insists on the brain, or Hume, who would have insisted on the mind, consciousness. P&L: People sometimes say that they see Berkeley in stories like "Orbis Tertius." Borges: Yes, I suppose they do. Well, of course. But in that story I was led by literary means also. P&L: How do you distinguish the literary from the philosophical means in that story? Could you explain that? Borges: Very easily.... Encyclopedias have been my chief reading. I have always been interested in encyclopedias. I used to go to the Biblioteca National in Buenos Aires—and since I was so shy, I felt I could not cope with asking for a book, so I looked on the shelves for the Encyclopaedia Britannica. I would pick up any chance volume and I would read it. One night I was richly rewarded, because I read all about the Druses, Dryden and the Druids—a treasure trove, no?—all in the same volume, "Dr-." Then I came to the idea of how fine it would be to think of an encyclopedia... a very rigorous one of course, of an imaginary world, where everything should be linked. For example, you would have a language and then a literature, and then a history and so on. Then I thought I would write a story of a fancy encyclopedia. Of course that would require many different people to write it... (shrink)

This is a book symposium on Steffen Borge’s The Philosophy of Football. It has contributions from William Morgan, Murray Smith and Brian Weatherson with replies from Borge.

Emma Borg examines the relation between semantics and pragmatics, and assesses recent answers to fundamental questions of how and where to draw the divide between the two. She argues for a minimal account of the interrelation between them--a 'minimal semantics'--which holds that only rule-governed appeals to context can influence semantic content.

Jorge Luis Borges is working for decades now on the execution of the nightmare. Perhaps his most celebrated instance is "Tlon, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius ". It would take much work to sift the fabricated references in Borges' works from the ones deliberately misread from the over-emphasis on an author's casual remark, etc.

Some demonstrative expressions, those we might term ‘bare demonstratives’, appear without any appended descriptive content (e.g. occurrences of ‘this’ or ‘that’ simpliciter). However, it seems that the majority of demonstrative occurrences do not follow this model. ‘Complex demonstratives’ is the collective term I shall use for phrases formed by adjoining one or more common nouns to a demonstrative expression (e.g. ‘that cat’, ‘this happy man’) and I will call the combination of predicates immediately concatenated with the demonstrative in such phrases (...) the ‘matrix’ of the expression. The question, then, is how we should construe the logical form of such expressions within a semantic theory for our language; and I wish to suggest that some recent answers to this question are, in fact, mistaken. The structure of the paper is as follows: first, I wish to highlight two (often underlying) assumptions about the nature of noun phrases in general, and suggest that, if they are both adopted, they apparently constrain the possible accounts of the logical form of complex demonstratives to just three options. The second and third parts of the paper will be concerned with expanding these options and arguing that none of them are adequate; thus the major part of the paper is concerned with the negative claim that the most obvious moves to make in this area must actually fail on closer inspection. The fourth and final section will then (very briefly) sketch the positive thesis of the paper: that we can deliver a clear and cohesive account of complex demonstratives, armed simply with elements which we will draw from David Kaplan’s theory of demonstratives, but only at the cost of rejecting (or at least refining) one assumption we recognised initially. (shrink)

In stakeholder theory, most research on cooperation has been focused on inter-organizational collaboration field centered at the dyadic level, excluding the relational or network data. Relational or network data are important as the firms do not simply respond to each stakeholder individually but to an interaction of influences from the entire stakeholder set. The purpose of this article is to analyze the cooperation process among the firm and its stakeholders by considering the relational data and to describe the role of (...) the firm in such cooperation processes. The empirical evidence is provided by an inductive in-depth case study on the company 'Gas-Nat' and its stakeholders cooperating on the 'natural gas pipeline program' in Argentina. To do so, I combined both quantitative sociometric data and qualitative data from grounded theory and ethnographic observations. This research suggests a stakeholder cooperation model based on structural and relational factors. The results indicate that stakeholder cooperation is not just determined by stakeholder position, but they can vary depending on the political opportunity structure in the network and on the framing process. It was found that network structure may create a context for selective cooperation but doesn't explicitly determine it which is different from the previous research in stakeholder network literature. The role of the firm in the cooperation process was found as a tertius iungens role which implies to join, unite, or connect, and it is different from the existing prominent network literature of tertius gaudens. (shrink)

This study aims to further understand children’s capacity to identify and reason about pretend emotions by analyzing which sources of information they take into account when interpreting emotions simulated in pretend play contexts. A total of 79 children aged 3 to 8 participated in the final sample of the study. They were divided into the young group and the older group. The children were administered a facial emotion recognition task, a pretend emotions task, and a non-verbal cognitive ability test. In (...) the pretend emotions task, the children were asked whether the protagonist of silent videos, who was displaying pretend emotions, was displaying a real or a pretend emotion, and to justify their answer. The results show significant differences in the children’s capacity to identify and justify pretend emotions according to age and type of emotion. The data suggest that young children recognize pretend sadness, but have more difficulty detecting pretend anger. In addition, children seem to find facial information more useful for the detection of pretend sadness than pretend anger, and they more often interpret the emotional expression of the characters in terms of pretend play. The present research presents new data about the recognition of negative emotional expressions of sadness and anger and the type of information children take into account to justify their interpretation of pretend emotions, which consists not only in emotional expression but also contextual information. (shrink)

In spite of the thousands of articles on stakeholder theory, research on value creation has had a shorter history and narrower breadth. Only a few studies have researched value creation from stakeholder perspective looking at how stakeholders appropiate value or the processes or activities by which stakeholders create value. Consequently to date, certain questions still remain unanswered regarding how a firm should treat stakeholders in order to create value. Several questions arise specifically from the stakeholder's side: What does "value" mean (...) for a particular group of stakeholders and how do firms create these different types of value? How do we measure the value created by stakeholders? The purpose of this paper is to answer these questions from Amartya Sen's Capability Approach, identifying and measuring stakeholders' capabilities in the value creation process. Stakeholder Capability is the adequate concept for understanding stakeholder welfare rather than the utility function concept. The empirical evidence comes from an in-depth case study of the company The Grobo Group and its stakeholders. According to the results, the following stakeholder capabilities are relevant to value creation: being employable, being autonomus, being innovative, being entreprenurial, being responsive, being socially integrated, being emphatic, being "green" and being healthy. (shrink)

The 'Gettier Problem' has been central to epistemology since 1963, when Edmund Gettier presented a powerful challenge to the standard analysis of knowledge. Now twenty-six leading philosophers examine the issues that arise from Gettier's challenge, setting the agenda for future work on the central problem of epistemology.

In the fiercely competitive global business environment, the attainment of excellence is contingent upon the efficient management of human resources and their alignment with sustainable development goals. This study examines the interplay between labour practices, social sustainability and organizational performance, with a focus on the often-ignored perspectives of employees. Employees, often neglected as critical stakeholders, shape corporate values and strategy. The study uses a quantitative approach, having applied the partial least square method for the proposed research model. Questionnaire responses from (...) 574 Portuguese employees reveal that labour practices (employee development, employee participation and equal opportunity) positively influence perceived social sustainability. Perceived social sustainability positively influences perceived organizational performance. The examined labour practices only exhibit a positive influence on perceived organizational performance when perceived social sustainability acts as a mediator. Companies must place a high priority on the perceptions of their employees to achieve social sustainability. This involves incorporating inclusive, participative and proactive policies regarding human resources policies, thereby leveraging the mutual advantages derived from labour practices. This demonstrates the pivotal role of social sustainability in companies' decision-making processes, as it substantially contributes to enhancing organizational performance. This study emphasizes the importance of integrating social sustainability to maximize organizational performance, providing valuable insights for business leaders. The original model, social sustainability-driven organizational performance, which is based on employees' perceptions, identifies labour practices as antecedents of social sustainability, and the influence of social sustainability, both directly and as a mediator, on organizational performance, is presented. (shrink)

As populations around the globe become increasingly culturally diverse, just inter-personal relations seem dependent on our ability to find new ways of communicating with people from other cultures whose values and linguistic strategies may vary from our own cultural practices. Hence, in the increasing body of literature on intercultural education, intercultural education means helping students to acquire the right language and communication skills for enabling mutual understanding and transformation between cultures. However, several post-colonial scholars have pointed out that there is (...) a tendency to homogenise differences and neglect relations of power and the culturally untranslatable in the Western conception of language. This paper explores some implications of the post-colonial critique of intercultural education by following Luce Irigaray's writings on language and communication. Taking as its point of departure the Western ‘common sense’ conception of language as an instrument for communication and transfer of information, the paper first elaborates on the importance of exploring new ways of relating to language if we want to speak and listen to the other as other. It then offers a close reading of Martin Heidegger's existential analysis of the nature of language as Saying-Sowing and of Irigaray's response as she develops it in two of her later works. By way of conclusion the paper discusses how a more poetic and attentive listening could open up for a transformative and non-hierarchical communication in difference, and considers what implications this has for the promotion of social justice and pluralism in intercultural education. (shrink)

Kant is categorical about the relation between virtue and the controlling of inclinations:Since virtue is based on inner freedom it contains a positive command to a human being, namely to bring all his capacities and inclinations under his reason's control and so to rule over himself. Virtue presupposes apathy, in the sense of absence of affects. Kant revives the stoic ideal of tranquilitas as a necessary condition for virtue: ‘The true strength of virtue is a tranquil mind’ . In the (...) Anthropology and the Doctrine of Virtue, apathy is taken in the sense of freedom from affects. In these texts, Kant maintains that we must strive toward a state in which affects are absent. (shrink)

Minimal Semantics asks what a theory of literal linguistic meaning is for - if you were to be given a working theory of meaning for a language right now, what would you be able to do with it? Emma Borg sets out to defend a formal approach to semantic theorising from a relatively new type of opponent - advocates of what she call 'dual pragmatics'. According to dual pragmatists, rich pragmatic processes play two distinct roles in linguistic comprehension: as (...) well as operating in a post-semantic capacity to determine the implicatures of an utterance, they also operate prior to the determination of truth-conditional content for a sentence. That is to say, they have an integral role to play within what is usually thought of as the semantic realm. Borg believes dual pragmatic accounts constitute the strongest contemporary challenge to standard formal approaches to semantics since they challenge the formal theorist to show not merely that there is some role for formal processes on route to determination of semantic content, but that such processes are sufficient for determining content. Minimal Semantics provides a detailed examination of this school of thought, introducing readers who are unfamiliar with the topic to key ideas like relevance theory and contextualism, and looking in detail at where these accounts diverge from the formal approach. Borg's defence of formal semantics has two main parts: first, she argues that the formal approach is most naturally compatible with an important and well-grounded psychological theory, namely the Fodorian modular picture of the mind. Then she argues that the main arguments adduced by dual pragmatists against formal semantics - concerning apparent contextual intrusions into semantic content - can in fact be countered by a formal theory. The defence holds, however, only if we are sensitive to the proper conditions of success for a semantic theory. Specifically, we should reject a range of onerous constraints on semantic theorizing (e.g., that it answer epistemic or metaphysical questions, or that it explain our communicative skills) and instead adopt a quite minimal picture of semantics. (shrink)

Over the last decades, understanding the sources of the difficulty of Bayesian problem solving has been an important research goal, with the effects of numerical format and individual numeracy being widely studied. However, the focus on the comprehension of probability numbers has overshadowed the relational reasoning demand of the Bayesian task. This is particularly the case when the statistical data are verbally described since the requested quantitative relation (posterior ratio) is misaligned with the presented ones (prior and likelihood ratios). In (...) this regard, here I develop the proposal that research on Bayesian reasoning might improve by considering the notational alignment framework of mathematical problem-solving. Specifically, this framework can help to understand the sources of the main difficulties underlying Bayesian inferences based on verbal descriptions. In essence, the present proposal supports the general claim in math education regarding the need to foster relational comprehension to avoid misleading alignments and improve problem solving. (shrink)

The restrictive grammatical format suggested in GPSG provides an extremely interesting alternative to transformational approaches to grammar. However, we have seen that the way the grammar is currently organized, it will in certain cases fail to give the correct interpretation to sentences with displaced constituents. Whenever a left or rightward displaced constituent contains an element that can stand in an anaphoric relation with some other element in the sentence, i.e. contains a quantifier or a pronoun, the semantic rules as given (...) do not provide the intended reading. It should be made clear, however, that this shortcoming pertains to one particular type of GPSG, namely one whose interpretation procedures make use of lambda abstraction. The problematic cases addressed here do not by themselves invalidate the syntactic framework of a GPSG. It seems quite plausible that one could construct a semantics that does not depend on lambda conversion, in which case the problem addressed in this note is presumably no longer relevant. One such proposal is put forward in Cooper (forthcoming) where a non-movement syntax is combined with interpretation procedures that do not involve translation into a lambda calculus. (shrink)

(2013). A Passion for Pushing the Limits. World Futures: Vol. 69, The Complexity of Life and Lives of Complexity, pp. 359-381.

This is the story of an adventurous life of pushing limits to expand our understanding of ourselves in our universe?as an explorer, as a scientist, as a philosopher, as a political animal, as a mother and grandmother, even as an artist?concluding with the realization that all we have to go on is our stories. This is what most differentiates us from other species, even from our own cells: that we tell each other stories of What, How, and Why Things Are (...) as They Are. We do not live as they do in the eternally Now moment, deeply interconnected within All That Is; rather we live in a mental trajectory from deep past to far future, making up stories about ourselves and everything else, coloring our perceptions with these stories and acting them out. We make them up differently in art, science, politics, economics, religion, and whatever, but however much we insist they are truths, they remain the more or less plausible human stories by which we necessarily live our lives individually and collectively. (shrink)

The aim of this study was to deepen nurses’ understanding of the importance of carefully managing the first nurse-patient encounter in a psychiatric setting according to each patient’s suffering and future hopes. The study was carried out using an action research approach. The action planned was the implementation of a conceptual model reflecting Eriksson’s caring theory. Data were collected by interviews with nurses and observational notes kept in a research diary. The data analysis followed the procedure of qualitative content analysis. (...) A generalization of the entire learning process shows the first nurse-patient encounter to be a moral commitment in nursing. A theoretical framework of nursing assessment conveying knowledge about the patient as unique and being a whole person can support the nurse in encouraging the patient to enter into a relationship. This insight stimulated the nurses in this study to reflect on the moral responsibility of continuing the relationship and initiating an ongoing nursing process. Awareness of this responsibility made them reflect more on the possibility of nurses taking autonomous actions in order not to abandon the patient and to avoid feeling guilty. (shrink)

According to standard philosophical and clinical understandings, pain is an essentially mental phenomenon (typically, a kind of conscious experience). In a challenge to this standard conception, a recent burst of empirical work in experimental philosophy, such as that by Justin Sytsma and Kevin Reuter, purports to show that people ordinarily conceive of pain as an essentially bodily phenomenon—specifically, a quality of bodily disturbance. In response to this bodily view, other recent experimental studies have provided evidence that the ordinary (‘folk’) concept (...) of pain is more complex than previously assumed: rather than tracking only bodily or only mental aspects of pain, the ordinary concept of pain can actually track either of these aspects. The polyeidic (or ‘many ideas’) analysis of the folk concept of pain, as proposed by Emma Borg et al., captures this complexity. Whereas previous empirical support for the polyeidic view has focused on the context-sensitivity of the folk concept of pain, here we discuss individual differences in people’s ‘pain priors’—namely, their standing tendencies to think of pain in relatively mind-centric or body-centric ways. We describe a preliminary empirical study and present a small number of findings, which will be explored further in future work. The results we discuss are part of a larger programme of work which seeks to integrate philosophical pain research into clinical practice. For example, we hypothesise that variations in how patients with chronic pain are thinking about pain could help predict their responses to treatment. (shrink)

The Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) field presents not only a landscape of theories but also a proliferation of approaches, which are controversial, complex and unclear. This article tries to clarify the situation, mapping the territory by classifying the main CSR theories and related approaches in four groups: (1) instrumental theories, in which the corporation is seen as only an instrument for wealth creation, and its social activities are only a means to achieve economic results; (2) political theories, which concern themselves (...) with the power of corporations in society and a responsible use of this power in the political arena; (3) integrative theories, in which the corporation is focused on the satisfaction of social demands; and (4) ethical theories, based on ethical responsibilities of corporations to society. In practice, each CSR theory presents four dimensions related to profits, political performance, social demands and ethical values. The findings suggest the necessity to develop a new theory on the business and society relationship, which should integrate these four dimensions. (shrink)

Human beings are the only creatures known to engage in sport. We are sporting animals, and our favourite pastime of football is the biggest sport spectacle on earth. The Philosophy of Footballpresents the first sustained, in-depth philosophical investigation of the phenomenon of football. In explaining the complex nature of football, the book draws on literature in sociology, history, psychology and beyond, offering real-life examples of footballing actions alongside illuminating thought experiments. The book is organized around four main themes considering the (...) character, nature, analysis and aesthetics of football. It discusses football as an extra-ordinary, unnecessary, rule-based, competitive, skill-based physical activity, articulated as a social kind that is fictional in character, and where fairness or fair play - contrary to much sport ethical discussion - is not centre stage. Football, it is argued, is a constructive- destructive contact sport and, in comparison to other sports, is lower scoring and more affected by chance. The latter presents to its spectators a more unpredictable game and a darker, more complex and denser drama to enjoy. The Philosophy of Footballdeepens our understanding of the familiar features of the game, offering novel interpretations on what football is, how and why we play it, and what the game offers its followers that makes us so eagerly await match day. This is essential reading for anybody with an interest in the world's most popular game or in the philosophical or social study of sport. nstructive- destructive contact sport and, in comparison to other sports, is lower scoring and more affected by chance. The latter presents to its spectators a more unpredictable game and a darker, more complex and denser drama to enjoy. The Philosophy of Footballdeepens our understanding of the familiar features of the game, offering novel interpretations on what football is, how and why we play it, and what the game offers its followers that makes us so eagerly await match day. This is essential reading for anybody with an interest in the world's most popular game or in the philosophical or social study of sport. (shrink)

Inspired by the work of Hannah Arendt, this response article focusses on the tension between hope in the future and lost hope in the present inherent in the modern idea of progress. The backdrop of the Suite ‘Education after Progress’ is some of the interrelated challenges that we are facing today, such as climate change, new pandemics, mass migration, and the rise of populism. Drawing on different philosophical concepts and strands, the five articles in the Suite explore what it would (...) mean to learn and educate beyond the imagery of progress. Thinking beyond, however, is never an easy task and the question becomes how to orient oneself in this new philosophical landscape without losing track of what is educationally important and meaningful. After responding to each article, focussing on five possible connections between them (change, orientation, time, situatedness, and immanence), the response article concludes with the more general question of what place, if any, concepts as the past, conservation, and preservation have in an education ‘after’ progress. (shrink)

The Monty Hall Dilemma (MHD) is a two-step decision problem involving counterintuitive conditional probabilities. The first choice is made among three equally probable options, whereas the second choice takes place after the elimination of one of the non-selected options which does not hide the prize. Differing from most Bayesian problems, statistical information in the MHD has to be inferred, either by learning outcome probabilities or by reasoning from the presented sequence of events. This often leads to suboptimal decisions and erroneous (...) probability judgments. Specifically, decision makers commonly develop a wrong intuition that final probabilities are equally distributed, together with a preference for their first choice. Several studies have shown that repeated practice enhances sensitivity to the different reward probabilities, but does not facilitate correct Bayesian reasoning. However, modest improvements in probability judgments have been observed after guided explanations. To explain these dissociations, the present review focuses on two types of causes producing the observed biases: Emotional-based choice biases and cognitive limitations in understanding probabilistic information. Among the latter, we identify a crucial cause for the universal difficulty in overcoming the equiprobability illusion: Incomplete representation of prior and conditional probabilities. We conclude that repeated practice and/or high incentives can be effective for overcoming choice biases, but promoting an adequate partitioning of possibilities seems to be necessary for overcoming cognitive illusions and improving Bayesian reasoning. (shrink)

Mirror neurons are neurons which fire in two distinct conditions: (i) when an agent performs a specific action, like a precision grasp of an object using fingers, and (ii) when an agent observes that action performed by another. Some theorists have suggested that the existence of such neurons may lend support to the simulation approach to mindreading (e.g. Gallese and Goldman, 1998, 'Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind reading'). In this note I critically examine this suggestion, in both (...) its original and a revised form (due to Iacoboni et al., 2005, 'Grasping the intentions of others with one's own mirror neuron system'), and argue that the existence of mirror neurons can in fact tell us very little about how intentional attribution actually proceeds. (shrink)

‘Pragmaticist’ positions posit a three-way division within utterance content between: (i) the standing meaning of the sentence, (ii) a somewhat pragmatically enhanced meaning which captures what the speaker explicitly conveys (following Sperber and Wilson 1986, I label this the ‘explicature’), and (iii) further indirectly conveyed propositions which the speaker merely implies. Here I re-examine the notion of an explicature, asking how it is defined and what work explicatures are supposed to do. I argue that explicatures get defined in three different (...) ways and that these distinct definitions can and do pull apart. Thus the notion of an explicature turns out to be ill-defined. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this article, I consider Bernard Suits’ Utopia where the denizens supposedly fill their days playing Utopian sports, with regard to the relevance of the thought experiment for understand...

Sport, Ethics and Philosophy, Volume 6, Issue 3, Page 401-406, August 2012.

John Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities of objects has meet resistance. In this paper I bypass the traditional critiques of the distinction and instead concentrate on two specific counterexamples to the distinction: Killer yellow and the puzzle of multiple dispositions. One can accommodate these puzzles, I argue, by adopting Thomas Reid’s version of the primary/secondary quality distinction, where the distinction is founded upon conceptual grounds. The primary/secondary quality distinction is epistemic rather than metaphysical. A consequence of Reid’s primary/ (...) secondary quality distinction is that one must deny the original version of Molyneux’s question, while one must affirm an amended version of it. I show that these two answers to Molyneux’s question are not at odds with current empirical research. (shrink)

Kripke complained that counterpart theory makes modal claims be about counterparts and not about us, and that it is a misguided model of modality since we do not care about counterparts in the same way we care about ourselves. The first part of the complaint, I argue, has been met by Hazen and Lewis, while the second can be countered by observing that most of our modal concerns are about role‐fillers and that counterparts are well‐suited to such concerns. The role‐filler (...) analysis of modal concerns, however, does not seem to capture certain attitudes ‐ especially that of regret. Regret, however, I will argue, is not intrinsically modal and thus is no challenge to my general analysis of modal concerns. (shrink)

Au cours de la dernière décennie, plusieurs projets de danse inclusive, dans lesquels des danseurs professionnels handicapés et non handicapés collaborent, ont été lancés en Suède. L’article explore les expériences des regards et des émotions des danseurs et des leaders avec et sans handicap – lors de rencontres avec le public et les autres personnes qui les entourent – d’un point de vue phénoménologique. Onze entretiens qualitatifs ont été réalisés. Les personnes interrogées croisent des regards remplis de bienveillance, de surprise, (...) de pitié et de fascination. Les émotions collent au corps des danseurs handicapés et suscitent un malaise à gérer. Cependant, les danseurs handicapés et les membres du public handicapés peuvent également se rencontrer dans un regard de reconnaissance. Les regards internes des compagnies sont également importants. Lorsque les danseurs handicapés ne sont intégrés que physiquement ou lorsque les différences sont cachées, le potentiel de changement se perd. Si les chorégraphes et le public réussissent à regarder au-delà du corps lui-même, une identification empathique peut exister. Une autre stratégie consiste à rompre complètement avec le voyeurisme en bloquant tous les regards. Les compagnies montrent de nouvelles façons d'interagir, élargissant ainsi les possibilités pour les corps valides comme handicapés. (shrink)

Mark Lilla aborda en _Pensadores temerarios_ el intrigante tema de los diversos intelectuales del siglo XX que sucumbieron, en distinto grado, a la fascinación del poder totalitario, sus líderes carismáticos o sus mesiánicas ideologías.

In this paper, I present a systematic approach to stakeholder theory based on social capital: the stakeholder social capital approach. Social capital is a relatively novel concept in stakeholder theory, which in previous research was not properly defined or systematically developed. This paper aims to fill this gap by taking into account the specificities of the stakeholder theory, which implies an explicit consideration of values. Therefore, the stakeholder social capital concept is defined by four dimensions (relational, cognitive, structural and evaluative) (...) instead of three (relational, cognitive and structural). I present the stakeholder social capital approach according to Donaldson and Preston's distinction: the descriptive, instrumental and normative. The descriptive perspective implies mapping the stakeholder networks based on the four dimensions and implies a shift toward relationships rather than groups of stakeholders. The instrumental perspective based on the relational view focuses on the drivers of relational rents within the network (relational assets, knowledge routines, complementary resource endowments and effective governance) and the normative perspective aims to foster a relational view of society. (shrink)

A common deflationary tendency has emerged recently in both philosophical accounts and comparative animal studies concerned with how subjects understand the actions of others. The suggestion emerging from both arenas is that the default mechanism for understanding action involves only a sensitivity to the observable, behavioural (non-mental) features of a situation. This kind of ‘smart behaviour reading’ thus suggests that, typically, predicting or explaining the behaviour of conspecifics does not require seeing the other through the lens of mental state attribution. (...) This paper aims to explore and assess this deflationary move. In §1 I clarify what might be involved in a smart behaviour reading account via looking at some concrete examples. Then in §2 I critically assess the deflationary move, arguing that, at least in the human case, it would in fact be a mistake to assume that our default method of action understanding proceeds without appeal to mental state attribution. Finally in §3 I consider briefly how the positive view proposed here relates to discussions about standard two-system models of cognition. (shrink)

A standard objection to so-called ‘minimal semantics’ (Borg 2004, 2012, Cappelen and Lepore 2005) is that minimal contents are explanatorily redundant as they play no role in an adequate account of linguistic communication (those making this objection include Levinson 2000, Carston 2002, Recanati 2004). This paper argues that this standard objection is mistaken. Furthermore, I argue that seeing why the objection is mistaken sheds light both on how we should draw the classic Gricean distinction between saying and implicating, and (...) how we should think about the key philosophical notion of assertion. Specifically, it reveals that these ideas are best understood primarily in socio-linguistic terms (resting on the degree of liability a speaker is held to have for linguistically conveyed content). (shrink)