When prospective parents use in vitro fertilization, many of them hope to generate more embryos than they intend to implant immediately. The technology often requires multiple attempts to reach a successful pregnancy, and couples can cryopreserve any excess embryos so that they have them on hand for later attempts. As part of obtaining informed consent for IVF or cryopreservation, clinics typically ask patients to specify their preferences for the embryos in the event of divorce or death, offering options such as (...) use of the embryos by a specified partner, donation to research, or discarding the remaining embryos. Still, many courts face a recurring problem: the partners dissolve their relationship, and one party wants to use the frozen embryos over the objections of the other. Courts and legislatures have struggled with how to handle these cases, which seem to pit one partner's right to procreate against the other's right not to procreate. In this essay, we use one of the most recent decisions in this line of cases—the Appellate Court of Illinois's decision in Szafranski v. Dunston—to explain the current state of the law and make recommendations for changes. The issue is ripe for revisiting because in the last year, embryo disputes have become a battlefront for larger conflagrations over the moral status of embryos. (shrink)

The argument from potentiality for embryo protection relies on the assumption of a specific developmental potential of human embryos: as human embryos under normal conditions naturally developing into beings whose strong moral status is uncontroversial, namely into human persons, they likewise enjoy strong moral status. In my paper, I endeavour to spell out the ontological foundations of the argument from potentiality and to discuss them critically in the light of new empirical findings in embryology. Particular attention is hereby paid (...) to recent attempts to analyse the relevant notion of potentiality in terms of dispositions possessed by human embryos. I argue that, putting aside inappropriate essentialist speculations, there is no straightforward disposition of an embryo to become a person; such a disposition, if any, being rather successively generated in a multi-factored, highly context-sensitive process of biological development. (shrink)

Anja Karnein has suggested that because of the importance of respect for persons, law and policy should require some human embryos created in vitro to be available for adoption for a period of time. If no one comes forward to adopt the embryos during that time, they may be destroyed (in the case of embryos left over from fertility medicine) or used in research (in the case of embryos created for that purpose or left over from fertility medicine). This adoption (...) option would increase the number of embryos available for couples looking for help in having children, but that effect is less important—Karnein argues—than the observance of respect for human persons. As possible persons, she holds that embryos ought to be treated, as if they will become children, if only for a while. If enacted as a matter of law and policy, an ‘adoption option’ would wrongly interfere with the dispositional rights women and men ought to have over embryos they create in the course of trying to have children. Karnein's proposal would also deprive researchers of certainty that the embryos they create for research would actually be available that way, leading to increased burdens of time and money and maybe even to more embryos than would otherwise be produced. Karnein's analysis does not show, moreover, that any duty of rescue applies to embryos. No woman is required to adopt any embryo, which significantly undercuts the justification for an obligatory adoption period. (shrink)

In vitro fertilization (IVF) involves making embryos outside of the human body, which has spurred debate about the status of the embryo, embryo research and donation. We explore couples’ perceptions about embryos and their thoughts and acceptability about various disposition decisions in Norway. Based on an ethnographic study including interviews and observations in an IVF clinic, we show that couples do not perceive their pre-implantation IVF embryos to be human lives; rather, they consider successful implantation the start (...) of life. We suggest that this response indicates a change in the perception of the human embryo or the fertilised egg fromincipient life—a viewpoint that was dominant in the discussions of embryo research in the 1980s and 1990s. We also show how this view of the pre-implantation embryo elucidates why donating embryos to research appears acceptable but donating to other infertile couples seems rather difficult. Before transfer to a woman’s uterus, the embryo exists in a liminality; it is not yet human life but a living cell with potential for both researchandpregnancy. When an embryo is implanted and pregnancy is confirmed, human life activates; the embryo becomes potential kin, influencing couples’ struggles with donating embryos to other couples. (shrink)

Is it permissible to use a human embryo in stem cell research, or in general as a means for benefit of others? Acknowledging each embryo as an object of moral concern, Louis M.Guenin argues that it is morally permissible to decline intrauterine transfer of an embryo formed outside the body, and that from this permission and the duty of beneficence, there follows a consensus justification for using donated embryos in service of humanitarian ends. He then proceeds to (...) show how this justification commands assent even within moral and religious views commonly thought to oppose embryo use. Beneath his moral reasoning lies a carefully constructed metaphysical foundation incorporating accounts of the ontology of development, embryos, and species. He also incisively discusses nonreprocloning, reprocloning, ectogenesis, and related scientific frontiers. This compelling philosophical study will interest all concerned to understand virtue and obligation in the relief of suffering. (shrink)

Do human embryos have a disposition to personhood? This has been argued within recent attempts to reformulate the classical argument from potentiality for the protection of human embryos with the help of the concept of disposition. In this paper, I analyse the central ontological premise of this new approach and show that any hopes of rehabilitating in dispositionalist terms the idea of a potential to personhood inherent in human embryos are mistaken. The dispositionalist version of the potentiality argument (...) navigates in same metaphysical waters as its predecessor and, hence, collides just the same with biological facts concerning human embryogenesis. (shrink)

The relation between respect for family and reproductive choice and use of IVF technology is in dispute in recent legal cases on the disposition of frozen embryos. Couples in IVF programs should be encouraged to stipulate in advance binding instructions regarding the disposition of such embryos.

Disputes between separated couples over whether frozen embryos can be used in an attempt to create a child create a moral dilemma for public policy. When a couple create embryos intending to parent any resulting children, New Zealand’s current policy requires the consent of both people at every stage of the ART process. New Zealand’s Advisory Committee on Assisted Reproductive Technology has proposed a policy change that would give ex-partners involved in an embryo dispute twelve months to come to (...) an agreement before the embryos are destroyed. New Zealand’s current policy and the proposed policy both favour the person who wishes to avoid procreation. Two alternative policy approaches that do not favour procreative avoidance are considered. Using pre-fertilisation contracts to determine the decision reached in embryo disputes allows the couple’s wishes at the time the embryos are created to determine what happens to the embryos if they separate. However, pre-fertilisation contracts are agreements about healthcare and personal relationships, and changing circumstances can make enforcing such agreements unjust. Finally, it is argued that New Zealand’s Family Court system should be used to reach decisions that balance the interests of those involved in the dispute. (shrink)

Informed consent is medico-legal orthodoxy and the principal means by which research encounters with the body are regulated in the UK. However, biomedical advancements increasingly frustrate the degree to which informed consent can be practiced, whilst introducing ambiguity into its legal significance. What is more, feminist theory fundamentally disrupts the ideologically liberal foundations of informed consent, exposing it as a potentially inadequate mode of bioethical regulation. This paper explores these critiques by reference to a case study—embryo donation to health (...) research, following fertility treatment, as regulated by the HFEA 1990—and contends that informed consent cannot adequately respond to the material realities of this research encounter. Thereafter, by drawing on feminist theories of vulnerability, this paper proffers an alternative bioethical approach, which calls for structural reform in recognition of the fundamentally bilateral constitution of self and society and a renewed appreciation for the affective/dispositional tenor of lived experience. (shrink)

This article is dedicated to the question of normative aspects in which the relation between responsibly acting subjects and manipulable embryos has to be established. It advocates the thesis that “reflexive identity” between acting subject and treated embryonal “object” is the pivotal and starting point of the debate: the acting subject acts towards a form of objective human existence, which it has undergone by itself and therefore recognizes not only itself, but also poses the condition of possibility of its own (...) current sovereignty in acts. Against this background the concept of “Personalism”, which is found in the German “ESchG” (Embryo Protection Act) and “StZG” (Stem Cell Act), can be understood. If there are new questions arising from complex, technically mediated manipulations of the embryo today, as its entire synthetic production has become possible, it leads to the question regarding the normative meaning of “Besonderung” (particularity/particularization) and the identification of species as living individuality as such. Consequently, it raises the question of the normative relevance of corporal self-objectivations of individuals, which never passes over to just material circumstances. This also applies when embryos are obtained from iPS cells where the biotic substrate, as well as its “administration” and “utilization”, is not regarded an anonymous, but biotic substrate that is embedded in individual biographies that are undetachable and never completely lost. “Biopolitics” that place human biotic substrate in the disposition of arbitrary interests already has to be rejected in the interest of maintaining a perspective of reflexive identity as well as in the horizon of interpersonality. (shrink)

The widespread abandonment of frozen embryos by the gamete providers or intentional parents urgently demands a solution. Most centres react by requiring patients to enter a prior agreement governing the future disposition of their embryos in all foreseeable circumstances. These dispositional directives are inappropriate and self defeating in the event of contingencies in which the patients remain competent to execute an updated directive. Internal and external changes may invalidate the prior directive by altering the situation as represented by the (...) couple at the initiation of treatment to such an extent that it no longer corresponds with the actual situation at the time of the execution of the disposition. The prior agreement should only be considered binding if the agreement among the partners on a specific option was a material condition for one of the partners to start treatment. (shrink)

The Tennessee Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. Davis, a case that raises the question of how to allocate frozen embryos in the event of divorce, addresses many of the legal issues posed by in vitro fertilization. The decision considers the interests of the progenitors as well as of the children who may result. For example, the court held that gamete providers' discretion regarding the disposition of embryos can be limited only when their decisions would harm the children who (...) might be born. The court also made clear that efforts to seek genetic parenthood are protected only when accompanied by a desire to raise the resulting children, a conclusion that also affects other reproductive technologies. In addition to elaborating an analytic framework, the court set guidelines for resolving disputes when the couples had made no prior agreements, including holding that while the embryos are ex-utero the desire to avoid genetic parenthood almost always trumps the wish to become a parent. The well-reasoned analysis in Davis v. Davis should help shape legal and ethical discussion regarding the use of in vitro fertilization for many years to come. (shrink)

Approximately 800,000 human embryos are currently in cryostorage in the United States. The Catholic Church holds that in vitro fertilization and cryopreservation of human embryos are intrinsically evil. IVF continues to increase at a rate of approximately 9 percent per annum. Many Catholic couples have used IVF as a means to conceive a child. There are typically additional embryos that are cryopreserved for later use. Once a couple has reached the number of children they desire, they are faced with a (...) very difficult moral decision regarding the disposition of their remaining frozen embryos. The biological parents must choose one of four options. Three result in death of their frozen embryos. Only one can possibly result in life. The only moral option is embryo adoption, a life-giving choice that is strongly supported by Sacred Scripture and Sacred Tradition. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 14.3 : 441–447. (shrink)

This essay evaluates the moral logic of ‘liberal eugenics’: the ideal of genetic control which leaves decisions about what sort of people to produce in the hands of individual parents, absent government intervention. I argue that liberal eugenics cannot be justified on the basis of the underlying liberal theory which inspires it. I introduce an alternative to Rawls's social primary goods that might be called natural primary goods: hereditable mental and physical capacities and dispositions that are valued across a range (...) of projects and pursuits. I suggest that reproductive genetic biotechnologies like embryo selection, cellular surgery, and genetic engineering, which aim to enhance ‘general purpose’ traits in offspring are less like childrearing practices a liberal government leaves to the discretion of parents than like practices the state makes compulsory. I argue that if the liberal commitment to autonomy is important enough for the state to mandate childrearing practices such as health care and basic education, that very same interest is important enough for the state to mandate safe, effective, and functionally integrated genetic practices that act on analogous all‐purpose traits such as resistance to disease and general cognitive functioning. I conclude that the liberal case for compulsory eugenics is a reductio against liberal theory. (shrink)

Some commentators maintain that gestational surrogates are not ‘mothers’ in a way capable of grounding a claim to motherhood. These commentators find that the practices that constitute motherhood do not extend to gestational surrogates. We argue that gestational surrogates should be construed as mothers of the children they bear, even if they fully intend to surrender those children at birth to the care of others. These women stand in a certain relationship to the expected children: they live in changed moral (...) circumstances by reason of their pregnancy, and they engage in the practices said to define motherhood in the post‐birth context. By contrast, ovum donors and embryo donors are not similarly ‘mothers’ because they do not find themselves involved in these circumstances. Not all women involved in three‐parent in vitro fertilization qualify as mothers either. Given this analysis of mothering, we note that transmen who gestate children are engaged in mothering activity even if they otherwise function as a father to those children. By itself, this defence of the maternity of gestational surrogates does not confer moral title to the children they bear; gestation would not by itself override the contractual arrangements gestational surrogates have made regarding the disposition of their children. This interpretation of gestational surrogates as mothers does, however, undercut cultural understandings of these women as mere ‘vessels’, devoid of entitlement to respect as persons and parents. We also consider the meaning of mothering for ‘brain‐dead’ women kept alive to give birth and for the prospect of extracorporeal gestation. (shrink)

What is the moral status of humans lacking the potential for consciousness? The concept of potentiality often tips the scales in life-and-death medical decisions. Some argue that all human embryos have the potential to develop characteristics—such as consciousness, intellect, and will—that we normally associate with personhood. Individuals with total brain failure or in a persistent vegetative state are thought to lack the potential for consciousness or any other mental function. Or do they? In Potentiality John Lizza gathers classic articles alongside (...) newly commissioned chapters from leading thinkers who analyze the nature of potentiality in bioethics, a concept central to a number of important debates. The contributors illustrate how considerations of potentiality and potential persons complicate the analysis of the moral consideration of persons at the beginning and end of life. A number of works explicitly uncover the Aristotelian background of the concept, while others explore philosophical issues about persons, dispositions, and possibility. The common assumption that potentiality is intrinsic to whatever has the potentiality is challenged by a relational view of persons, an extrinsic account of dispositions, and attention to how extrinsic factors affect realistic possibilities. Although potentiality has figured prominently in bioethical literature, it has not received a great deal of logical, semantic, and metaphysical analysis in contemporary philosophical literature. This collection will bring these thorny philosophical issues to the fore. Incorporating cutting-edge research on the topic of potentiality, this thought-provoking collection will interest bioethicists, philosophers, health care professionals, attorneys engaged in medical and health issues, and hospital and governmental committees who advise on policy and law concerning issues at the beginning and end of life. (shrink)

abstract This essay considers the moral status of certain practices that aim to enhance offspring traits. I develop an objection to offspring enhancement that draws on an account of the role morality of parents. I work out an account of parental ethics by reference to premises about child development and to observations about parenting culture in the United States. I argue that excellence in parenthood consists in a dual responsibility both to guide children toward the good life and to accept (...) them as they are. I conclude that prenatal manipulation of healthy and normal characteristics in human offspring fails to balance the dispositional extremes of control and restraint to which many parents today are susceptible. I apply this account of good parenting to the challenging case of height enhancement for short but otherwise healthy children. Finally, I reply to objections, first, about the phenomenology of bearing normative obligations to people who do not yet exist and, second, about the moral logic of criticizing embryo selection in the context of assisted reproduction when we accept child selection in the context of adoption. (shrink)

: Plato's founding position in the tradition of epistemological nativism has been underestimated. In addition to his notorious, naively non-dispositional model of learning as recollection, Plato offers several neglected dispositional models of innate ideas, including Diotima's model of mental pregnancy in the Symposium, in which maturing mental embryos begin not with the actual content of the knowledge to be acquired, but with a specific potentiality that must be actualized through series of specific kinds of experience and mental activity. A survey (...) of dialogues from Meno to Phaedrus shows that Plato typically favors such dispositional models, and that he raises doubts about the non-dispositional details of the recollection model where it occurs. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to contribute detailed ethnographic material to broaden the scope of what we mean by reproductive technology. Technology can be defined not only by a series of laboratory techniques (such as artificial insemination and embryo transfer) that are drafted into the daily management of the animal body, but also by a range of on-farm management strategies and working routines, as well as the cultural dispositions, social networks and tacit knowledge of the actors involved. RT (...) is communicated to lay operators and disseminated amongst semi-professional figures such as breed experts, herd inspectors and technical consultants. The practical contexts in which reproductive knowledge is popularized and applied provide ample scope for local negotiations, resistance and conflict. Professional knowledge about breed-improvement is personalised and appropriated by operators and plays a role in power relations and the exercise of personal charisma as well as being specific to context, in particular the nuances of pre-existing relationships of trust, friendship, kinship or hierarchy. No wonder then that many ambivalences and compromises coexist in the practice of applying ‘reproductive knowledge’ to breed selection. (shrink)

Who has more rights-the mother or the fetus? Interdisciplinary in scope and character, this latest volume of Humana's classic series, Biomedical Ethics Reviews, focuses on the complex moral and legal problems involving human fetal life. Each article in Bioethics and the Fetus provides an up-to-date review of the literature and advances bioethical discussion in its field. The authors have avoided much of the technical jargon of philosophy and medicine in order to speak directly to a broad and general readership. Topics (...) include: • maternal-fetal conflict • the disposition of aborted fetuses • frozen embryos • creating children to save sibling's lives • fetal tissue transplantation • moral implications of fetal brain integration • the embryo as patient • prenatal diagnosis. Probing deeply into these thorny issues, Bioethics and the Fetus offers thought-provoking reading-and paves the ground for new insight-for a host of healthcare and other professionals, as well as concerned laypersons. (shrink)

When it comes to caring about and helping those in need, our imaginations tend to be weak and our motivation tends to be parochial. This is a major moral problem in view of how much unmet need there is in the world and how much material capacity there is to address that need. With this problem in mind, the present paper will focus on genetic means to the enhancement of a moral capacity—a disposition to altruism—and of a cognitive capacity (...) that facilitates use of the moral capacity: the ability to grasp vividly the needs of individuals who are unknown and not present. I will address two questions, with more extensive attention to the first question. First, assuming we had excellent reason to believe that the enhancements were safe, effective, and available to all who desired them, would seeking these enhancements be inherently morally acceptable—that is, free of inherent wrongness? Second, would it be wise for a society to pursue these enhancements? I will defend an affirmative answer to the first question while leaving the second question open. (shrink)

Numerous research groups are now utilizing Basic Formal Ontology as an upper-level framework to assist in the organization and integration of biomedical information. This paper provides elucidation of the three existing BFO subcategories of realizable entity, namely function, role, and disposition. It proposes one further sub-category of tendency, and considers the merits of recognizing two sub-categories of function for domain ontologies, namely, artifactual and biological function. The motivation is to help advance the coherent ontological treatment of functions, roles, and (...) dispositions, to help provide the potential for more detailed classification, and to shed light on BFO’s general make-up and use. (shrink)

This paper argues that the consensus physicalist antireductionism in the philosophy of biology cannot accommodate the research strategy or indeed the recent findings of molecular developmental biology. After describing Wolperts programmatic claims on its behalf, and recent work by Gehring and others to identify the molecular determinants of development, the paper attempts to identify the relationship between evolutionary and developmental biology by reconciling two apparently conflicting accounts of bio-function – Wrights and Nagels (as elaborated by Cummins). Finally, the paper seeks (...) a way of defending the two central theses of physicalist antireductionism in the light of the research program of molecular developmental biology, by sharply reducing their metaphysical force. (shrink)

Most technology is used properly for their intended purpose, but certain technological breakthroughs have a dual-use nature, pose risks or lead to unintended consequences when applied in some areas...

BackgroundThis article explores the reasons in favour of revising and extending the current 14-day statutory limit to maintaining human embryos in culture. This limit is enshrined in law in over a dozen countries, including the United Kingdom. In two recently published studies, scientists have shown that embryos can be sustained in vitro for about 13 days after fertilisation. Positive reactions to these results have gone hand in hand with calls for revising the 14-day rule, which only allows embryo research (...) until the 14th day after fertilisation.Main textThe article explores the most prominent arguments in favour of and against the extension of the 14-day limit for conducting research on human embryos. It situates these arguments within the history of the 14-day limit. I start by discussing the history of the 14-day limit in the United Kingdom and the reasons behind the decision to opt for a compromise between competing moral views. I then analyse the arguments that those who are generally in favour of embryo research put forward in support of extending the 14-day rule, namely the argument of the beneficence of research and the argument of technical feasibility. I then show how these two arguments played a role in the recent approval of two novel techniques for the replacement of faulty mitochondrial DNA in the United Kingdom. Despite the popularity and widespread use of these arguments, I argue that they are ultimately problematic and should not be straightforwardly accepted. I end by making a case for respecting value pluralism in the context of embryo research, and I present two reasons in favour of respecting value pluralism: the argument of public trust and the argument of democracy.ConclusionI argue that 14-day limit for embryo research is not a valuable tool despite being a solution of compromise, but rather because of it. The importance of respecting value pluralism needs to be considered in any evaluation concerning a potential change to the 14-day rule. (shrink)

In bioethics as in the sciences, enormous discussions often concern the very small. Central to public debate over emerging reproductive and regenerative biotechnologies is the question of the moral status of the human embryo. Because news media have played a prominent role in framing the vocabulary of the debate, this study surveyed the use of language reporting on human embryo research in news articles spanning a two-year period. Terminology that devalued moral status—for example, the descriptors things, property, tissue, (...) or experimental material —was found to outnumber fivefold those that affirmed any degree of moral status above that of inanimate cellular matter; for example, living, human life, or human being. A quarter of the articles failed to note that the embryos under discussion were human. These findings confirm that even among scientific and philosophical experts a diversity of opinion exists on society's moral obligations to nascent human life. The skewed linguistic distribution also indicates a distinct bias. Concerned readers should take notice when any category of humanity becomes subject to prejudicial and disparaging language and the value of vulnerable human life is trivialized alongside sensational assertions of anticipated medical cures. The responsibility for holding the media to a higher standard of truth and fairness falls to us all. (shrink)

This review uses nutritional markers of normal and impaired development to address the question; what makes a viable mammalian preimplantation embryo? Resolution of this question is important to ensure the long‐term safety of embryo‐based biotechnologies in man and domestic animals, the optimisation of embryo production and culture conditions and the development of methods to select viable embryos for replacement. After considering the nutrition of embryos and somatic cells, and the phenomenon of caloric restriction, it is concluded that (...) preimplantation embryo survival is best served by a relatively low level of metabolism; a situation achieved by reducing the concentrations of nutrients in culture media and encouraging the use endogenous resources. BioEssays 24:845–849, 2002. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Background: Genetics research is controversial in Native American communities, and the disposition and ownership of biological specimens are central issues. Within Native communities, there is considerable variety in tribal members’ views. This article reports the results from an ethnographic study conducted with a Native American community in the southwestern United States. The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship (past and present) between the tribe and biomedical/genetics research. Methods: Qualitative interviews were conducted with 53 members of a (...) Native American community. Interviewees were purposively recruited to include an approximately equal number of past research participants and nonparticipants, as well as individuals with and without diabetes. Tribal members were also asked whether they identified as a “traditional person,” an emic category used in the community. Results: Tribal members’ views on specimen disposition were linked with their identification as a traditional or nontraditional person. Individuals identifying as traditional people were more likely to believe that biological specimens should be returned at the end of a study and should not be used after the research participant's death, and that they were the property of the individual who provided them. These perspectives were related to broader concerns about fragmentation of the body-self. Conclusions: Through gaining an understanding of the cultural logic related to specimen disposition, researchers may be able to work more effectively with Native American communities on developing procedures for genetics studies. The process of informed consent and other study procedures can be adapted to be culturally respectful of Native American communities. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Future Directions for Human Cloning by Embryo Splitting:After the HullabalooCynthia B. Cohen (bio)In October 1993, a paper entitled, "Experimental Cloning of Human Polyploid Embryos Using an Artificial Zona Pellucida," was presented at a joint meeting of the American Fertility Society and the Canadian Fertility and Andrology Society. Although it was awarded a prize, its authors, who are affiliated with George Washington University, decided against calling a press conference (...) to announce their findings. Word of their experiment soon leaked out, however, and the New York Times blazoned on its front page that human embryo cloning had been achieved. The story was accompanied by a diagram of cloning by nuclear transplantation.Newspapers and television networks around the world picked up the story and embellished it. The idea of unlimited, xeroxed copies of human beings gripped the public imagination. Wild scenarios of hundreds of Hitlers plotting to take over the world and of clones giving birth to their own twins enlivened media reports. Only gradually did it become clear that the term "polyploid" in the title of the paper referred to abnormal embryos that could never develop into living human beings and that "cloning" referred to embryo splitting or twinning, not to nuclear transplantation or the transfer of a donor nucleus into an enucleated egg. Once this sank into public consciousness, the "hullabaloo," as Dr. Howard W Jones, Jr., called it, died down.It left in its wake unanswered questions about the ethics of splitting embryos. During the height of the publicity given to the George Washington experiment, newspaper and TV stories had not delved in any depth into the ethical issues it raised. Ethicists, given limited time to discuss the ethical questions at stake, had been quoted in quick, simplistic responses. Some had offered little analysis of the rights and wrongs of embryo splitting, but, revealing tremendous creative talent, had spun out [End Page 187] imaginary and frightening applications of the procedure. This was a story essentially about ethics in which ethics was never really discussed.The National Advisory Board on Ethics in Reproduction* (NABER), an independent, multidisciplinary group that addresses ethical issues in modern reproductive science, technology, and care, became concerned about the sparsity of reflective ethical debate about embryo splitting. NABER's chair, Albert Jonsen, observed that "reporters phoning ethicists for comment and ethicists appearing on talk shows do not a debate make. Debate requires face to face (or at least essay to essay) argument among persons sharing the same information. This has yet to take place." Consequently, NABER decided to convene a workshop on human cloning by embryo splitting at the National Academy of Sciences in February 1994. The board invited participants who would provide a broad range of opinion about the ethical and public policy issues entailed by human embryo splitting. Embryologists, ethicists, reproductive biologists, public policy experts, staff from the National Institutes of Health (NIH), legal scholars, journalists, and infertility specialists were among those who participated. The feature articles in this issue of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal derive from that workshop. Their authors were given free rein to take whatever stance they deemed ethically supportable.The first article is designed to provide some understanding of the science of human cloning as a basis for exploring the ethical issues raised by this set of techniques. Jacques Cohen, a leading reproductive embryologist, and Giles Tomkin, a science writer, both of Cornell University Medical School, explain, in a way that is clear to laypersons and biologists alike, the meaning, nature, and function of cloning. They discuss recent: advances in this area and offer an assessment of feasible uses of human cloning procedures, hoping to dispel what they view as mistaken fears about its future applications. Dr. Howard W Jones, Jr., a pioneer infertility specialist, briefly comments on Cohen and Tomkin's paper, pointing out that embryo splitting may not improve pregnancy results if genetic heterogeneity is required for successful embryo transfer and implantation.In the next article, three major ethical arguments against human cloning by embryo splitting are analyzed and rejected by Ruth Macklin, an expert in reproductive ethics from Albert Einstein College of Medicine. She finds the first argument, that the worth of individuals... (shrink)

The present article describes and critically evaluates the medical/social distinction as used in the context of embryo selection through pre-implantation genetic diagnosis . According to such a distinction, while embryo selection for medical purposes, for example preventing the birth of a child with severe genetic disease, may be ethically justified, screening and the selection of embryos for social reasons, such as the implantation of an embryo of specific gender or one that carries the gene responsible for intelligence, (...) should not be allowed. The article challenges the automatic and repeated use of such a distinction in ethical debates concerning PGD. It is argued that existing justifications for the medical/social distinction seem not to support the conclusion that such a distinction should determine whether embryos should be returned for implantation or misused by genetic parents in a conclusive way. The article further analyzes alternative proposals to the medical/social distinction in light of which embryo selection should be ethical, and concludes with the author’s own proposal for ethical reasoning in the area of embryo selection. Under such a proposal, any embryo selection that would, on balance, increase the variety of potential life plans for the future child from which he or she will be able to choose is prima facie ethically justifiable. (shrink)

ABSTRACT On 22 January 2001, the UK became the first country to approve of embryonic stem cell research by passing the Human Fertilisation (Research Purposes) Regulations 2001, which legislated new research purposes for which early embryos can be used, in addition to those approved by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. Legal advisory committees, most notably the Chief Medical Officer's Expert Group and the House of Lords’ Select Committee, have offered various reasons, which can also be found in the (...) ethics literature, to justify this change. Those examined here are the views that: 1. Early embryos lack relevant qualities (or ‘the argument from lack of qualities’) and 2. Early embryos only have a potentiality to become humans with moral status (or ‘the argument from potentiality’). The validity of these arguments is questioned and a case is made for egalitarian speciesism. Embryos have moral status (used here in the restricted sense of the status possessed by all members of the class of beings which deserve the greatest moral significance in equal measure). They have more value than the value that should be assigned to nonhuman beings from the start of fertilisation. Current UK legislation on embryo research is immoral. (shrink)

One prominent argument against the use of preimplantation genetic diagnosis to select a deaf embryo with the aim of creating a deaf child is that it violates the child’s right to an open future. This paper challenges the open future argument against deaf embryo selection, criticizing its major premise that deafness limits a child’s opportunity range in ways that compromise their future autonomy. I argue that this premise is not justified and is supported by negative presumptions about deaf (...) embodiments that are suspect and in need of further argumentation. First, available interpretations of the open future concept fail to justify the devaluation of deaf traits as inherently autonomy-diminishing. Second, arguing against deaf embryo selection requires demonstrating that a deaf trait generally constrains opportunity ranges independent of social context. But such analyses neglect important social and relational components of autonomy. For these reasons, merely appealing to the child’s right to an open future does not sufficiently support the conclusion that deaf embryo selection is wrong. (shrink)