Scientists, philosophers, and other researchers commonly assert their theories. This is surprising, as there are good reasons for skepticism about theories in cutting-edge research. I propose a new account of assertion in research contexts that vindicates these assertions. This account appeals to a distinct propositional attitude called endorsement, which is the rational attitude of committed advocacy researchers have to their theories. The account also appeals to a theory of conversational pragmatics known as the Question Under Discussion model, or QUD. (...) Hence, I call the theory the EQUD model. Motivating this account is a recognition that the speech act of assertion has two roles to play in research contexts. The first is the advocacy role, in which researchers assert a theory in order to advocate for it. The second is the evidential role, which is used to add to the common stock of information available to a field of inquiry. The EQUD model provides an account of warranted assertion for both these roles in research contexts. This success provides support for the theory of endorsement. It also provides support for information updating accounts of assertion. (shrink)

Two related studies focused on the effects that a questionable supervisory conduct has on the endorsement and vulnerability of the supervisor, as well as on judgments of supervisory morality. Male and female undergraduate and graduate business students were asked to read the account of a personnel manager who violates employee confidentiality concerning certain personality test results, but who has had a previous record of increasing or decreasing productivity. The studies revealed varying patterns of leadership endorsement, vulnerability, and judgments (...) of morality following this questionable or unethical conduct as a result of the personnel's manager's record and the subjects' sex. (shrink)

(1979). From endorsement to disintegration: Progressive education from the golden age to the green paper. British Journal of Educational Studies: Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 191-209.

Support is given to Habermas's argument that we interpret thoughts only by seeing persons as actually justified in their circumstances. Habermas holds further that his argument extends to moral thinking, in that we understand it only by actually taking the moral point of view, and he thinks this is illustrated by Kohlberg's theory of moral development. While this illustration is denied here on the ground that Kohlberg's theory accepts Rawls's theory of justice, it is argued that the extension to morality (...) can be made with a theory like Gewirth's, in which morality appears as a form of rationality. (shrink)

Because an agent’s constitutive luck may seem to preclude free will, it may seem to preclude moral responsibility. An agent is basically morally responsible for performing actionAat timetonly if there is another possible world with the same past up totand the same laws of nature in which the agent does not performAatt. A compatibilist can solve the constitutive luck problem for moral responsibility without worrying about basic moral responsibility. According to compatibilism, if determinism is true, then agents can be morally (...) responsible for performing actions without being basically morally responsible for performing them. But a libertarian who thinks agents can be basically morally responsible for what they do must explain how basic moral responsibility is possible. ACT-endorsing libertarianism can both solve the constitutive luck problem for moral responsibility and explain how agents can be basically morally responsible for what they do. (shrink)

Should retirees be allowed to work? Should working imply forfeiting one’s retiree status? Are retirement and work incompatible? Manuel Valente has recently shown that distinguishing between leisure and free time has significant implications for thinking about retirement. Valente argues that, whilst it may be intuitive to think of retirement in terms of leisure (work-freeness), liberals would better think of retirement as free time (control over one’s time). Hence, working retirees is not an oxymoron. In this comment to Valente’s article I (...) question whether perfectionism grounds a reason to protect free time, as Valente understands the concept. I also suggest that Valente’s claim that liberals should care about free time finds further support in a hybrid view of wellbeing that appeals to endorsement. (shrink)

It is valuable for inquiry to have researchers who are committed advocates of their own theories. However, in light of pervasive disagreement, such a commitment is not well explained by the idea that researchers believe their theories. Instead, this commitment, the rational attitude to take toward one’s favored theory during the course of inquiry, is what I call endorsement. Endorsement is a doxastic attitude, but one which is governed by a different type of epistemic rationality. This inclusive epistemic (...) rationality is sensitive to reasons beyond those to think the particular proposition in question is true. Instead, it includes extrinsic epistemic reasons, which concern the health of inquiry more generally. Such extrinsic reasons include the distribution of cognitive labor that a researcher will contribute to by endorsing a particular theory. Recognizing endorsement and inclusive epistemic rationality thus allows us to smooth a tension between individual rationality and collective rationality. It does so by showing how it can be epistemically rational to endorse a theory on the basis of the way this endorsement will benefit collective inquiry. I provide a decision theoretic treatment for inclusive epistemic rationality and endorsement which illustrates how this can be accomplished. (shrink)

Celebrity endorsement has been used for decades to promote products to consumers. As employees are one of the primary stakeholders and are known as second consumers, their concerns about celebrity endorsement effectiveness and pride need attention for building their identification with an organization. This study investigated the internal branding process by examining employees’ brand orientation, celebrity-organization value congruence, and the accuracy of employee portrayal. Data are collected from a leading multinational bank in Pakistan through a structured questionnaire. The (...) results of the study showed that when employees felt celebrity endorsement matched organizational values, the celebrity successfully portrayed actual corporate values. Thus, employees believed that endorsement effectively gained consumers’ attention and built a strong corporate image. The study affirmed that employees’ sense of pride toward their organization motivates them to identify with it. Furthermore, the results showed that value congruence mediates the relationship between brand orientation and endorsement effectiveness, while pride mediates the relationship between endorsement effectiveness and organization identification. Service organizations could use brand orientation to gain accurate employee portrayal that revives their pride and attachment with the organization and enhances corporate identification. The future directions and limitations are discussed. (shrink)

In this article, I shall suggest an approach to the justification of normative moral principles which leads, I think, to utilitarianism. The approach is based on asking what moral norms we would each endorse if we had no prior moral commitments. I argue that we would endorse norms that lead to the satisfaction of all our nonmoral values or goals. The same approach leads to a view of utility as consisting of those goals that we would want satisfied. In the (...) second half of the article, I examine the implication of this view for several issues about the nature of utility, such as the use of past and future goals. The argument for utilitarianism is not completed here. The rest of it requires a defense of expected-utility theory, of interpersonal comparison, and of equal consideration. (shrink)

It is often irrational to believe philosophical claims because they are subject to systematic disagreement, under-determination, and pessimistic induction. Along with some other authors in this volume, I argue that many philosophers should (and do) have a different attitude to their own philosophical commitments. On my account, this attitude is a form of epistemic acceptance called endorsement. However, several objections have been raised to this view and others like it. One worry is that endorsement is spineless: that people (...) who merely endorse their theories fail to have a stable, global commitment to their views. A second worry is that endorsement, and the assertions it licenses, are objectionably insincere. Here, I defend the theory of endorsement from these objections. I suggest that endorsement can be more resilient than belief, while better supporting both intellectual courage and humility. Then, I argue that endorsement can be perfectly sincere, since it is not deceptive. (shrink)

In this study, we investigated endorsement of two types of prescriptive views of aging, namely active aging and altruistic disengagement. The study comprised a large international sample of middle-aged and older adults, covering the age range from 40 to 90 years. Participants rated their personal endorsement of prescriptive views of active aging and altruistic disengagement targeting older adults in general. Findings showed that endorsement was higher for prescriptions for active aging than for prescriptions for altruistic disengagement. Age (...) groups in the sample differed regarding their endorsement of both prescriptive views of active aging and altruistic disengagement with older adults showing higher endorsement than middle-aged adults did. Prescriptive views of active aging and altruistic disengagement related positively to each other and to the superordinate social belief that older adults should not become a burden, which attests to their functional similarity. In contrast, prescriptive views of active aging and altruistic disengagement were associated with psychological adjustment in opposite ways, with endorsement of active aging being related to better adjustment outcomes such as life satisfaction and subjective health. Our findings highlight the internalization of prescriptive views of aging in older people and their implications for their development and well-being. (shrink)

This paper responds to a paradox Marilyn Strathern raises concerning who endorses a community first model of the village of Elmdon, according to which it is a community and the good of the community should take priority over individual interests. It is middle-class newcomers, whose peripheral position requires greatest sacrifice from them, if the model is to be implemented. I propose two solutions to the puzzle.

Food has become a prominent object of everyday moral discussions. This study examines how gender, political orientation, and country of origin are connected to moral foundation endorsement in food-related moral thinking. Respondents were university students (N = 371) from Finland, Denmark, and Italy who completed a word association task, in that given stimulus words were “ethical food” and “unethical food.” Results showed a presence of five moral foundations in the data, and indicated high prevalence of the Purity/Sanctity foundation in (...) food-related moral thinking. As expected, gender differences emerged in the endorsement of the Fairness/Reciprocity and the Purity/Sanctity foundations. Also, between-country differences emerged in four of the five moral foundations, indicating that even within Europe countries may differ from each other in their endorsement of foundations. The results also verified the previously found effect of political orientation in three of the five moral foundations, although the study used a completely new and different type of method compared with previous studies. The study concludes by proposing more cross-national comparative studies where the focus is on the specific objects of moral thinking. (shrink)

The study of the interrelationship between ethnomedicinal knowledge and socio-cultural values needs to be studied mainly for the simple reason that culture is not only the ethical imperative for development, it is also the condition of its sustainability; for their exists a symbiotic relationship between habitats and cultures. The traditional communities around Binsar Wildlife Sanctuary of Uttarakhand state in India have a rich local health care tradition, which has been in practice for the past hundreds of years. The present study (...) documents the Ethnomedicinal uses of 54 medicinal and aromatic plants (MAPs) along with their botanical and vernacular names, family, habit, habitat, threat status, collection season, purpose of collection, quantity, conservation practices, market potential and part(s) used in traditional health care system. The documented species belonging to 38 families have been used to cure more than 47 different kinds of ailments. These MAPs collected from the wild in a particular season and used as per the method prescribed by traditional herbal healers (Vaidyas) that provide effective results. Perception of local people during field trips based on socio-demographic characters showed them to prefer herbal system of treatments and they understood the status of traditional health care systems in the region. The study reveals that approximately 70 % population of the study area depend on herbal systems of treatments and preferred to visit Vaidyas for curing a variety of ailments because the traditional system of medicine is one of the most important prevailing systems in the region where modern health care facilities are rare or in very poor conditions. The organic cultivation practices of selected MAPs were demonstrated to rural inhabitants through capacity building training program and participatory action research framework approaches for sustainability and enhancement of livelihood security. A series of workshops and village level meetings on traditional health care systems were organized and forming/registered a strong association of Vaidyas for making their traditional system of health care more practical and effective. The study emphasizes the potentials of the ethnomedicinal research, conservation practices, socio-cultural and religious ethics for promoting traditional plants based treatments and also the need to document the indigenous knowledge for scientific validation before its industrial application. (shrink)

The article deals with Hurka?s critique of Kymlicka and Arneson?s critique of Dworkin on endorsement constraint thesis, according to which a person cannot have a valuable life if values are imposed on her - primarily by state action - overriding her preferences and convictions on the good life. This thesis has often been identified with neutral liberalism and counterposed to perfectionism. The text argues against Hurka?s and Arneson?s argument that mild coercion and paternalistic reduction of trivial, bad or worthless (...) options can indeed bring about a more valuable life. Their argument does not acknowledge adequately the difference between coercion from a person?s immediate social environment and state coercion, which are not equally legitimate. My critique, however, does not exclude the legitimacy of perfectionistic measures, as a person could accept as justified state intervention concerning the support of particular values or goods, while at the same time not endorsing those values and goods. Not all endorsed goods or activities should be treated equally, as more relevant and valuable ones can be legitimately supported by particular policy. (shrink)

In saying ‘N knows that p’, where the supposed knowing is gained through rational reflection (the paradigm form of knowing, conceptually), I endorse N’s belief as rationally held, and hence correct (the ‘RhCB’ analysis). We understand this ‘hence’ not as ‘hence, infallibly’ but as ‘hence in fact’– a reliability reading, not implying infallibility (cf. the use of ‘hence’ to attribute non‐deterministic causation). The false appearance of inconsistency in our taking knowing to require an infallible guarantee of correctness while regularly attributing (...) knowledge where we lack an absolute guarantee arises from misreading of the ‘hence’ as implying infallibility, partly due to the mistaken assumption that ‘know’ functions purely descriptively. Though aware that rationality may occasionally fail to ensure correctness, we accept it as sufficing to yield knowledge wherever it does not fail – a consistent non‐infallibilist understanding of what knowing requires. (shrink)

A central question for assessing the merits of Amartya Sen's capability approach as a potential answer to the “distribution of what”? question concerns the exact role and nature of freedom in that approach. Sen holds that a person's capability identifies that person's effective freedom to achieve valuable states of beings and doings, or functionings, and that freedom so understood, rather than achieved functionings themselves, is the primary evaluative space. Sen's emphasis on freedom has been criticised by G. A. Cohen, according (...) to whom the capability approach either uses too expansive a definition of freedom or rests on an implausibly active, indeed “athletic,” view of well-being. This paper defends the capability approach from this criticism. It argues that we can view the capability approach to be underpinned by an account of well-being which takes the endorsement of valuable functionings as constitutive of well-being, and by a particular view of the way in which endorsement relates to force and choice. Footnotes1 I would like to thank Paul Bou-Habib, Ian Carter, Matthew Kramer, Ingrid Robeyns, Peter Vallentyne, and two Economics and Philosophy referees for very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I am also grateful to the participants of the Edinburgh ECPR Workshop, the Hoover Chair Seminar in Louvain-La-Neuve, the King's College Moral Philosophy Group in Cambridge, the Nuffield Political Theory Workshop in Oxford, and the session on the Capability Approach at the Philadelphia APSA Annual Conference. (shrink)

Recently there has been much philosophical interest in the analysis of concepts to determine whether they should be removed, revised, or replaced. Enquiry of this kind is referred to as conceptual engineering or conceptual ethics. We will call it revisionary conceptual analysis (RCA). It standardly involves describing the meaning of a concept, evaluating whether it serves its purposes, and prescribing what it should mean. However, this stands in tension with prescriptivism, a metasemantic view which holds that all meaning claims are (...) prescriptions. If prescriptivism is correct, then one is faced with two options: either (1) give up on the possibility of RCA, or (2) come up with a version of RCA that is consistent with the idea that all meaning claims are prescriptive. In this paper we offer an argument for (2). (shrink)

The study examined the effect of celebrity attractiveness, celebrity trustworthiness, and celebrity cause fit on the attitude toward green cosmetics. This was followed by the effect of brand awareness, brand associations, brand loyalty, perceived quality, brand credibility on brand equity, including the impact of attitude toward green cosmetics and brand equity on the willingness to purchase green cosmetics among of young Chinese consumers. This study adopted a cross-sectional design and collected quantitative data from 301 respondents using a structured questionnaire, which (...) was distributed online using various social media platforms. It was found that celebrity attractiveness, celebrity trustworthiness, and celebrity cause-fit had a significant impact on the attitudes toward green cosmetic, while brand loyalty, perceived quality, and brand credibility substantially affected brand equity. Moreover, the attitudes toward green cosmetics and brand equity had a strong impact on the willingness to purchase green cosmetics. To increase the sales for green cosmetics, the advertisements for it should have appeal, trustworthiness, and cause-fit celebrities to improve consumers’ attitudes and willingness to purchase green cosmetics. Finding of this study provide a guideline for green cosmetic manufacturers, to direct their resources to enhance brand loyalty, credibility, and perceived quality of the product they produce by highlighting the difference between conventional and green cosmetics. (shrink)

Recent findings from psychology and behavioral economics suggest that we are “predictably irrational” in the pursuit of our interests. Paternalists from both the social sciences and philosophy use these findings to defend interfering with people's consumption choices for their own good. We should tax soda, ban cigarettes, and mandate retirement savings to make people healthier and wealthier than they’d be on their own. Our thesis is that the standard arguments offered in support of restricting people’s consumption choices for their own (...) good also imply support for “epistocratic” restrictions on people’s voting choices for their own good. Indeed, the philosophical case for paternalistic restrictions on voting choices may be stronger than the case for restricting personal consumption choices. So, paternalists face a dilemma: either endorse less interference with consumption choices or more interference with voting choices. (shrink)

Experiences of thought-insertion are a first-rank, diagnostically central symptom of schizophrenia. Schizophrenic patients who undergo such delusional mental states report being first-personally aware of an occurrent conscious thought which is not theirs, but which belongs to an external cognitive agent. Patients seem to be right about what they are thinking but mistaken about who is doing the thinking. It is notoriously difficult to make sense of such delusions. One general approach to explaining the etiology of monothematic delusions has come to (...) be known as the endorsement model. This model claims that the patient holds her delusional belief because she simply trusts her bizarre experience and takes it at face value. The content of the bizarre experience thus plays a central role in the etiology of delusions. Despite being widely discussed with respect to delusions like Capgras and Cotard, an endorsement model of thought-insertion has not yet been formulated. This article seeks to fill this void by fleshing out and defending the endorsement approach to delusions of inserted thoughts. It aims to show that such an approach can be defended against objections that have been raised in the literature. In particular, it will be argued that there is nothing wrong with the idea of being first-personally aware of a thought which is presented in consciousness as being someone else's. The upshot is that with respect to delusions of thought-insertion, the endorsement model turns out to be a viable account of why patients come to believe that someone else is inserting thoughts into their minds. (shrink)

Starting from the discussion on the original set of criteria advanced by Clark and Chalmers (1998) meant to avoid the overextension of the mind, or the so-called “cognitive bloat”, we will sketch our solution to the problem of criteria evaluation, by connecting it to the search for a mark of the mental. Our proposal is to argue for a “weak conscientialist” mark of the mental based on transparent access, which vindicates the role of consciousness in defining what is mental without, (...) however, identifying the mental with the conscious. This renovated link between mind and consciousness, spelled out through the concept of transparency, further develops some of our previous work on the topic (Di Francesco 2007; Di Francesco and Piredda 2012) and is partially inspired by Horgan and Kriegel (2008). (shrink)

There is evidence indicating that the Capgras delusion is grounded in some kind of anomalous experience. According to the endorsement model, the content of the delusion is already encoded in the Capgras subject's experience, and the delusion is formed simply by endorsing that content as veridical. Elisabeth Pacherie and Sam Wilkinson have in different ways attempted to articulate a comprehensive defence of this strategy, but here I argue that the endorsement model cannot be defended along the lines envisioned (...) by either of them. I then offer a more promising way of spelling out the model, according to which the anomalous experience implicated in Capgras is metaphorical in character. (shrink)

The state plays a major role in corporate social responsibility in emerging and transitional economies and often influences firms through political connection, and hence knowing how firms respond to the state’s CSR initiatives can inform policy making and has important implication on the sustainability of society and environment. However, existent studies show conflicting results on politically connected firms’ CSR participation. We examine the relationship between political endorsement and firms’ engagement in different types of CSR simultaneously. Using a representative sample (...) of more than 1,000 private firms in the early 2000s, we find that politically endorsed firms engage more in philanthropic donation, but less in environmental practices, which impose higher costs and constraints than philanthropy. This is consistent with our explanation that they attempt to maintain legitimacy and discretion through selective engagement in CSR. Our study contributes to research on CSR in transitional economies by reconciling conflicting findings about the CSR engagement of politically connected firms, provides a new lens to illuminate firms’ strategic response in CSR, and has important policy implications. (shrink)

This paper tests the comparative effectiveness of spokes-characters, both ‘celebrity’ and ‘non-celebrity’, in promoting healthy versus non-healthy foods. An experimental study among 6- to 7-year-old children in Belgium demonstrates that adding a spokes-character to a food product increases the appetite, the wished-for frequency of consumption and the expected number of purchase requests for that product. This finding holds true for healthy foods as well as for unhealthy foods. The effect of the celebrity spokes-character exceeds that of a similar gnome. Nevertheless, (...) the latter is also capable of promoting the healthy and unhealthy products. These findings suggest that using ‘celebrity’ spokes-characters to promote healthy foods to children might indeed be an effective strategy to change children’s diets. Even the use of similar, non-celebrity spokes-characters could be quite fruitful. (shrink)

Moran’s conception of self-knowledge, in his book Authority and Estrangement, is connected to an extremely rationalistic conception of intentional action. I will argue that this rationalistic commitment can be avoided without renouncing the most basic aspects in his account of self-knowledge.

Summary Background Self-binding directives instruct clinicians to overrule treatment refusal during future severe episodes of illness. These directives are promoted as having potential to increase autonomy for individuals with severe episodic mental illness. Although lived experience is central to their creation, service users’ views on self-binding directives have not been investigated substantially. This study aimed to explore whether reasons for endorsement, ambivalence, or rejection given by service users with bipolar disorder can address concerns regarding self-binding directives, decision-making capacity, and (...) human rights. Methods This study used qualitative data from an internet-based survey distributed to the mailing list of the UK charity Bipolar UK, which contained multiple closed and open questions on advance decision-making in bipolar disorder. Quantitative analysis of a closed question about self-binding directives had already demonstrated endorsement amongst a very high proportion of participants with bipolar disorder who completed the survey. We conducted thematic analysis of responses from those participants who answered a subsequent open question about reasons for their view. Research was co-produced within a multi-disciplinary team, with clinical, legal, and ethical expertise, and lived experience of bipolar disorder. Ideas and methodologies associated with all these areas of expertise were used in the analysis of these reasons and to gain insight into the thoughts of individuals with bipolar disorder about self-binding directives and associated issues. Findings Between Oct 23 and Dec 5, 2017, 932 individuals with a self-reported clinical diagnosis of bipolar disorder completed the internet survey, with 565 (154 men; 400 women; 11 transgender or other) providing free text answers to the open question. A large majority of respondents endorsed self-binding directives, nearly all describing a determinate shift to types of distorted thinking and decision-making when unwell as their key justification. Responses indicating ambivalence were dominated by logistical concerns about the drafting and implementation of self-binding directives, while those who rejected self-binding directives also cited logistical concerns, validity of their thinking when unwell, and potential contravention of human rights. Interpretation This study is, to our knowledge, the first large study of reasons why mental health service users might endorse or reject the use of self-binding directives. The findings provide empirical support for introducing self-binding directives into mental health advance decision-making practice and policy and may help to address enduring ethical concerns surrounding possible implementation of the directive while a person retains decision-making capacity. The opinions expressed here in responses given by multiple service users with bipolar disorder challenge a prominent view within international disability rights debates that involuntary treatment and recognition of impaired mental capacity constitute inherent human rights violations. Funding The Wellcome Trust . (shrink)

Fodor & Lepore (2001) and Williamson (2003) attack the inferentialist account of concept possession according to which possessing or understanding a concept requires endorsing the inference patterns constitutive of its content. I show that Fodor & Lepore's concern – that the conception places an exorbitant epistemological demands on possessors of a concept – is met by Brandom's tolerance of materially bad nonconservative inferences. Such inferences themselves, as Williamson argues, present difficulties for the 'understanding as endorsement' conception. I show that, (...) properly understood, Brandom's broad conception of inferential role, which encompasses social-perspectival inferential connections, has the resources to respond to Willianson's challenge. (shrink)

In her recent article ‘Moral Responsibility Without Libertarianism’, Lynne Rudder Baker contends that libertarian intuitions can be accommodated by compatibilist conditions for moral responsibility. She proposes a principle called the ‘Reflective Endorsement View’ which she believes is capable of achieving this end. The Reflective Endorsement View holds that once an agent reflectively identifies with his actions in a particular way, he is morally responsible for those actions, irrespective of whether he has the power to do otherwise or the (...) cause of the action ultimately originates in him. I contend that Baker’s compatibilist Reflective Endorsement View is too stringent and exclusive for moral responsibility. I argue this on the basis that the very intuitions that led Baker to formulatethe various conditions that must be satisfied for moral responsibility can be used to show the inadequacy of her position. (shrink)

We take self‐governance or autonomy to be a central feature of human agency: we believe that our actions normally occur under our guidance and at our command. A common criticism of the standard theory of action is that it leaves the agent out of his actions and thus mischaracterizes our autonomy. According to proponents of the endorsement model of autonomy, such as Harry Frankfurt and David Velleman, the standard theory simply needs to be supplemented with the agent's actual (...) class='Hi'>endorsement of his actions in order to make room for our autonomy. I argue that their proposal fails and that a more substantive enrichment of the standard theory is called for. (shrink)

In her analysis of pejoratives, Eva Picardi rejects a too sharp separation between descriptive and expressive content. I reconstruct some of her arguments, endorsing Eva’s criticism of Williamson’s analysis of Dummett and developing a suggestion by Manuel Garcia Carpintero on a speech act analysis of pejoratives. Eva’s main concern is accounting for our instinctive refusal to endorse an assertion containing pejoratives because it suggests a picture of reality we do not share. Her stance might be further developed claiming that uses (...) of pejoratives not only suggest, but also promote a wrong picture of reality. Our refusal to endorse implies rejecting not only a wrong picture of reality but also a call for participation to what that picture promotes. (shrink)

This paper develops a retributivist argument for leniency in punishment. It argues that even retributivists who defend desert-based punishment have a reason, internal to their view, to prefer more lenient over more severe punishments when there are doubts concerning how much punishment an offender deserves. This is because retributivists should take an asymmetrical view to underpunishment and overpunishment, and because the likelihood of overpunishment goes up with the severity of punishment. The radicalness of the ensuing leniency depends on the strength (...) of the asymmetry in value between underpunishment and overpunishment. (shrink)

The standard approach to the core phenomenology of thought insertion characterizes it in terms of a normal sense of thought ownership coupled with an abnormal sense of thought agency. Recently, Fernández (2010) has argued that there are crucial problems with this approach and has proposed instead that what goes wrong fundamentally in such a phenomenology is a sense of thought commitment, characterized in terms of thought endorsement. In this paper, we argue that even though Fernández raises new issues that (...) enrich the topic, his proposal cannot rival the version of the standard approach we shall defend. (shrink)

I argue that recognizing a distinct doxastic attitude called endorsement, along with the epistemic norms governing it, solves the self-undermining problem for conciliationism about disagreement. I provide a novel account of how the self-undermining problem works by pointing out the auxiliary assumptions the objection relies on. These assumptions include commitment to certain epistemic principles linking belief in a theory to following prescriptions of that theory. I then argue that we have independent reason to recognize the attitude of endorsement. (...) Endorsement is the attitude of resilient and committed advocacy which is appropriate for researchers to have toward their own theory. Recognizing the importance of endorsement, and of its resiliency, gives us reason to deny the epistemic principles that serve as auxiliary assumptions in the self-undermining objection. This defuses the objection, and provides additional support for the theory of endorsement. (shrink)

Previous research demonstrates the critical role moral disengagement plays in unethical decision-making. This study investigates the relationships among moral endorsement, shareholder-value orientation, moral disengagement, and moral judgment on issues of different moral intensities. The results of a scenario-based survey conducted in China confirm the negative (positive) impact of moral disengagement (moral intensity) on moral judgment. The findings reveal that both moral endorsement and shareholder-value orientation of decision-makers significantly influence moral judgment and that moral intensity moderates the relationships between (...) moral endorsement and moral judgment, and between shareholder-value orientation and moral disengagement. The study’s theoretical contributions, managerial implications, and limitations are discussed. (shrink)

Virtual anime endorsement has been prevalent as an advertising strategy, and many companies invest massive amounts of money into virtual endorsements. While previous studies have found that endorser-product congruence is related to consumer brand attitude and purchase intention, it is not known whether moderate incongruence between a virtual anime endorser and a product has a positive influence on brand attitude and purchase intention. This study developed a 1 × 2 experiment to investigate the influences of virtual anime endorser–product congruence (...) and moderate the endorser–product incongruence on consumer brand attitude and purchase intention. Product involvement played a key moderating role in the relationships of virtual anime endorser–product congruence and the endorser–product incongruence with consumer attitudes. A total of 919 participants were recruited from animation-related venues and stores in Taiwan. The findings of this study validated the interaction effects of virtual anime endorser-product congruence and incongruence on these two consumer responses, i.e., brand attitude and purchase intention. This study further investigated the moderating effect of product involvement in the relationships of virtual anime endorser–product congruence and moderate the endorser–product incongruence with consumer responses. The findings of this study provide a valuable reference regarding endorsers and product patterns through which enterprises can maximize their value. (shrink)

Perszyk has argued that Molinists cannot consistently endorse the consequence argument because of a structurally similar argument for the incompatibility of true Molinist counterfactuals of freedom and the ability to do otherwise. Wierenga has argued that on the proper understanding of CCFs, there is a relevant difference between the consequence argument and the anti-Molinist argument. I argue that, even on Wierenga’s understanding of CCFs, there is in fact no relevant difference between the two arguments. Moreover, I strengthen Perszyk’s challenge by (...) highlighting further relevant similarities between CCFs and facts about the laws. (shrink)

A primary goal of clinical practice is to respect patient autonomy. To promote this goal for patients who have lost the ability to make their own decisions, commentators recommend that surrogates make their treatment decisions based on the substituted judgment standard. This standard is commonly interpreted as directing surrogates to make the decision the patient would have made in the circumstances, if the patient were competent. However, recent commentators have argued that this approach—attempting to make the decision the patient would (...) have made if competent—is theoretically problematic, practically infeasible, and ignores the interests of the patient9s family and loved ones. These commentators conclude that the substituted judgment standard should be revised significantly, or abandoned altogether. While this response would avoid the cited problems, it also would require substantial changes to clinical practice and would raise significant problems of its own. The present paper thus considers the possibility that the criticisms do not point to problems with the substituted judgment standard itself; instead, they point to problems with the way it is most commonly interpreted. This analysis suggests that the substituted judgment standard need not be dramatically revised or abandoned. Instead, it should be interpreted in a way that effectively promotes respect for the autonomy of incompetent patients. The ‘endorsed life’ interpretation described here helps clinicians and surrogates to achieve this important goal. To clarify this approach, we explain how it differs from three other recently proposed alternatives to the standard interpretation of the substituted judgment standard. (shrink)

Since McCall (1966), the heterodox principle of propositional logic that it is impossible for a proposition to be entailed by its own negation—in symbols, ¬(¬φ→φ)—has gone by the name of Aristotle’s thesis, since Aristotle apparently endorses it in Prior Analytics 2.4, 57b3–14. Scholars have contested whether Aristotle did endorse his eponymous thesis, whether he could do so consistently, and for what purpose he endorsed it if he did. In this article, I reconstruct Aristotle’s argument from this passage and show that (...) he accepts this thesis. Further, I show that the argument he gives is, making plausible assumptions, a correct proof in a consistent fragmentary nonclassical metalogic for a metatheorem he previously states concerning his assertoric syllogistic. In this way, Aristotle’s argument emerges as a fascinating case study in the use of a nonclassical metalogic to prove a result about a nonclassical object system. (shrink)

Real agents rely, when forming their beliefs, on imperfect informational sources (sources which deliver, even under normal conditions of operation, both accurate and inaccurate information). They therefore face the ‘endorsement problem’: how can beliefs produced by endorsing information received from imperfect sources be formed in an epistemically acceptable manner? Focussing on the case of episodic memory and drawing on empirical work on metamemory, this article argues that metacognition likely plays a crucial role in explaining how agents solve the (...) class='Hi'>endorsement problem. (shrink)