Kevin Williams; The Dilemma of Michael Oakeshott: Oakeshott's treatment of equality of opportunity in education and his political philosophy, Journal of Philoso.

The aim of this essay is to bring to light the role played by concern for the ēthos of citizens in the establishment and preservation of regimes by virtuous legislative activity, with special reference to democratic forms of government. To this goal, I will lay stress on the idea of “political friendship”, which Aristotle explores in his ethical works in relation to the power of virtuous legislative activity to shape the habits of citizens. An analysis of different types of democratic (...) regimes will show that they lack of authentic political friendship. I will also contend that, although democratic measures might occasionally ameliorate and preserve imperfect regimes, Aristotle continues to maintain a negative view of such politeiai. (shrink)

A demographic revolution is taking place in Europe and worldwide. According to World Health Organization estimates, the number of people aged 60 and over is growing faster than any other age group. This change in the population structure affects disease patterns and is deemed to cause an increase in the demands on healthcare systems. This raises concerns about the ethics of healthcare delivery . What criteria should direct healthcare distribution? Is it right to meet the demands of an ageing population, (...) to the detriment of the younger strata of population? a. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Psychiatric Treatment and the Problem of Equality:Whose Justice, Which Rationality?Floris Tomasini (bio)KeywordsInvoluntary treatment, democracy, equality, impartialityCraig Edwards in his article "Ethical Decisions in the Classification of Mental Conditions As Mental Illness" provides the reader with a socially normative, rather than a naturalistic understanding of mental illness, one that, in particular, promotes a normative understanding of mental illness as a form of evaluating dysfunctional personhood. In doing so, (...) Edwards is not interested in undermining psychiatric expertise, but exploring some of the practical consequences that flow from it, such as involuntary psychiatric treatment.My concern about psychiatric treatment in general and involuntary psychiatric treatment in particular, is three-fold, the third concern adding to the arguments already rehearsed by Edwards and others. The first concern is about the value neutrality of mental illness. Any dysfunctional conception of mental illness is not value neutral according to Fulford; dysfunction is, straightaway, a normative concept and is heavily influenced by a patient's desires and values. The second concern is about competing and conflicting values that arise in a person's psychiatric treatment. Again, there exists a legitimate variation in people's evaluative judgments about mental health conditions, for which a degree of democratic compromise might be required in negotiating conflicting values in a person's psychiatric treatment (Fulford and Colombo 2004). Without wishing to examine any of the philosophical foundations or counter-arguments to these claims in this short discussion paper, my third concern is about how to ethically negotiate between conflicting values in a person's psychiatric treatment. In other words, what might democratic compromise consist in? How might democratic compromise be implemented in terms of an ethically relevant principle?Any democratic enterprise, by definition, favors or is characterized by social equality and is egalitarian in nature (New Oxford English Dictionary 1999, 490). To be able to negotiate in the spirit of democratic compromise between competing and conflicting values in the process of psychiatric treatment, a principle of equal consideration of interests is vital.The essence of the principle of equal consideration of interests is that we give equal weight in our [End Page 101] moral deliberation to the like interests of all those affected by our actions (Singer 1979, 19). In other words, an interest is an interest whoever's interest that may be. So, for example, if the principle is about relieving pain, then the moral principle is about relieving the undesirability of pain as such, and not the undesirability of A's pain, which might be different from the undesirability of B's pain. Naturally, one may be able to distinguish that A's pain is greater than B's pain, in which case, under the equal consideration of interests principle, A's pain should be given greater weighting than B's pain in any conflict of interests. In short, in the evaluation of like interests, major interests outweigh minor interests.The significance of the principle of equal consideration of interests in decisions about mental health treatment in general, and about involuntary psychiatric detention and treatment more specifically, is that it should be possible (in theory at least) to able to democratically arbitrate on the basis of utility, whose interests take precedence when legitimate conflicts arise. The great practical advantage to the principle of equal consideration of interests is that it weighs' interests impartially—like well-balanced weighing scales; they favor where the interest is stronger or where several interests combine to outweigh a smaller number of similar interests. Most important, in the case of psychiatric treatment, it is a principle that takes no account of whose interests they are, avoiding any discriminatory stigma that may arise because of having made certain assumptions about being mentally ill. From the point of view of the equal consideration of interests, who the bearer is and how they are classified is, in itself, incidental to what the actual bearer's interests are and how they compete and conflict with others who have like interests. There are a number of practical consequences that flow from the principle of equal consideration when applied to psychiatric treatment (voluntary and involuntary) that need to be pinned down.Simple Negative DiscriminationClearly... (shrink)

Unequal treatment of human research subjects is a significant ethical concern, because justice in research involving human subjects requires equal protection of rights and equal protection from harm and exploitation. Disputes sometimes arise concerning the issue of unequal treatment of research subjects. Allegedly unequal treatment occurs when subjects are treated differently and there is a genuine dispute concerning the appropriateness of equal treatment. Patently unequal treatment occurs when subjects are treated differently and (...) there is not a genuine dispute about the appropriateness of equal treatment. Allegedly unequal treatment will probably always occur in research with human subjects due to disagreements about fundamental questions of justice. The best way to deal with allegedly unequal treatment is to promote honest and open discussions of the issues at stake. Research regulations can help to minimize patently unequal treatment by providing rules for investigators, ethical review boards, institutions, and sponsors to follow. However, patently unequal treatment may still occur because the regulations are subject to interpretation. Federal agencies have provided interpretive guidance that can help promote consistent review and oversight of human subjects research. Additional direction may be needed on topics that are not adequately covered by current guidance or regulations. International guidelines can help promote equal treatment of human subjects around the globe. While minor variations in the treatment of research subjects should be tolerated and even welcomed, major ones (i.e. those that significantly impact human rights or welfare) should be avoided or minimized. (shrink)

:A norm of equal treatment is cited regularly in the American jurisprudence of property “takings” under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, as a benchmark of fair treatment of owners. According to an increasingly prevalent version of this equality norm, courts should look to parity of treatment among property owners in investigating whether particular regulations “take” property. This essay argues, however, that such an equality norm is misplaced, and that courts should judge fairness by (...) the criterion of expectation—including reasonable expectations of regulation.A norm of equality becomes problematic in the face of the economic theory of the evolution of property. This theory posits that as resources become more congested, their uses carry increasing common pool costs or “externalities”—a scenario that should predictably result in more stringent resource management—up to and including the establishment of regulatory regimes as well as property rights themselves. This evolutionary pattern, however, places earlier and later resource users in different positions vis-à-vis both common pool externalities and regulatory responses, and their different temporal positions fragment the meaning of equal treatment and destabilize it as a jurisprudential norm. This essay argues that while equal treatment may be a benchmark for special or invidious cases, like those relating to civil rights, the great bulk of takings cases involve regulatory responses to congesting resources, where a norm of equal treatment breaks down. Thus, in seeking fair treatment, takings jurisprudence should downplay equality and instead look to the understanding of property as a basis of expectations—but those expectations should include the anticipation of reasonable regulatory responses to resource congestion. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine the scope and limits of Brian Barry’s uniform treatment approach to cultural differences through a critical assessment of its two main arguments. The first maintains that under a regime of institutions serving legitimate public purposes, equal opportunity is an objective state of affairs, and religious or cultural maladjustments to laws and public policies are morally irrelevant to the issue of equal opportunity. The other maintains that unlike physical disabilities, religious and cultural affiliations (...) are the result not of morally arbitrary factors over which one has no control but of life choices for which people must assume responsibility. To the first argument, I respond that equal opportunity is best viewed as an interactive phenomenon encompassing subjective and objective components and that a deliberative approach to cultural claims is more likely than Barry’s uniform approach does to grant religious and cultural minorities equal opportunities and equal treatment. To the second argument, I respond that, even if they arise out of the life choices made by people, religious conducts and cultural practices deserve to be accommodated through law exemption because it is sometimes the only way our liberal democracies can show respect for citizens as ethical subjects. (shrink)

This paper proposes that the question “What should I believe?” is to be answered in the same way as the question “What should I do?,” a view I call Equal Treatment. After clarifying the relevant sense of “should,” I point out advantages that Equal Treatment has over both simple and subtle evidentialist alternatives, including versions that distinguish what one should believe from what one should get oneself to believe. I then discuss views on which there is (...) a distinctively epistemic sense of should. Next I reply to an objection which alleges that non-evidential considerations cannot serve as reasons for which one believes. I then situate Equal Treatment in a broader theoretical framework, discussing connections to rationality, justification, knowledge, and theoretical vs. practical reasoning. Finally, I show how Equal Treatment has important implications for a wide variety of issues, including the status of religious belief, philosophical skepticism, racial profiling and gender stereotyping, and certain issues in psychology, such as depressive realism and positive illusions. (shrink)

Addressing distributive justice issues in health policy—ranging from the allocation of health system funding to the allocation of scarce COVID-19 interventions like intensive care unit beds and vaccines—involves the application of ethical principles. Should a principle of sustainability be among them? I suggest that while the value of temporal neutrality underlying such a principle is compelling, it is already implicit in the more basic principle of equal treatment. Munthe et al imagine sustainability accompanying four other principles: need, prognosis, (...) equal treatment and cost-effectiveness. Some are spelled out, however, in ways that are ambiguous or incomplete. (shrink)

This paper attempts to identify a principle of equal treatment that gives specific structure to our widely shared judgments about the circumstances in which we have moral reason to object to the differential adverse treatment of others. I formulate what I call a “substantive” principle of equal treatment (to be distinguished from principles of formal equality) that describes a moral constraint on the reasons we can have for picking out individuals for differentially adverse action. I (...) argue that this constraint is violated when an action, in view of its rationale, expresses lesser respect for the moral status of an individual under some differentiating description, compared to the respect reserved to another class of individuals who are not picked out by that description. I show that this substantive demand of equal treatment is not morally otiose and reveal the fallacy underlying accounts that have concluded otherwise. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In From Chance to Choice, Allen Buchanan, Dan Brock, Norman Daniels and Daniel Wikler propose a new way of defending the moral significance of the distinction between genetic treatments and enhancements. They develop what they call a ‘normal function model’ of equality of opportunity and argue that it offers a ‘limited’ defence of this distinction. In this article, I critically assess their model and the support it (allegedly) provides for the treatment‐enhancement distinction. First, I argue that there is (...) a troubling tension in the normal function model. Secondly, I argue that neither of the rationales invoked by Buchanan et al. really serves to justify this model or the results they seek to derive from it with respect to the significance of the distinction between treatments and enhancements. (shrink)

Discrimination, understood as differential treatment of individuals on the basis of their respective group memberships, is widely considered to be morally wrong. This moral judgment is backed in many jurisdictions with the passage of equality of opportunity legislation, which aims to ensure that racial, ethnic, religious, sexual, sexual-orientation, disability and other groups are not subjected to discrimination. This chapter explores the conceptual underpinnings of discrimination and equality of opportunity using the tools of analytical moral and political philosophy.

Kierkegaard's "Works of Love" provocatively presses for a reconsideration of impartiality, partiality, and equality. Past readings of this text have typically (1) criticized its focus on the abstract category of "human being," ignoring its attention to distinctiveness and difference; (2) defended it from the charge of abstraction by accenting its treatment of distinctiveness and difference, playing down its assumptions about the "essentially" human; (3) acknowledged its emphases on both essence and difference, arguing that they are incompatible and irreconcilable; or (...) (4) acknowledged both emphases, assuming they are compatible without exploring or accounting for the apparent incompatibility. As a means of resolving this seeming inconsistency, I will focus on Kierkegaard's recommendation of moral blindness and its implications for moral vision, and I will argue that "Works of Love" contains resources for an understanding of impartiality that allows moral attention to concrete difference. (shrink)

The social and legal implications of forensic DNA are paramount. For this reason, forensic DNA enjoys ample attention from legal, bioethics, and science and technology studies scholars. This article contributes to the scholarship by focusing on the neglected issue of sameness. We investigate a forensic courtroom case which started in the early ’90s and focus on three modes of making similarities: creating equality before the law, making identity, and establishing standards. We argue that equality before the law is not merely (...) a principle but a practice. In the context of DNA research, equality refers to using standardized technology and procedures to identify the criminal suspect. Our case shows the work at stake in introducing a new technology into the courtroom and serves as a lens, magnifying how contingencies and uncertainties are managed and ordered in everyday court practices to arrive at an equal treatment of the suspect. (shrink)

We live with the legacy of injustice, political as well as personal. Even if our governments are now democratically elected and governed, our societies are scarred by forms of power and privilege accrued from a time in which people’s race, sex, class and religion were grounds for denying them a role in government, or in the selection of those who governed them. What does that past imply for the treatment of religion in democratic states? The problem is particularly pressing (...) once one accepts that religious freedom is not just a matter of individuals’ freedom of conscience and worship, but of people’s claims to associate with others through institutions whose powers, status and commitment to equality are very different (Laborde, 2015). If this means that churches pose some of the same philosophical and practical problems as families, from a democratic perspective, the fact that churches have no obvious point or justification, beyond being the repository of the claims to conscience of their members, appears to distinguish them from the former. In principle, this should make it easier to think about the claims of government, as compared to those of churches. In practice, however, it may simply bring into sharper focus philosophical and political challenges to equality that contemporary democracies now face. (shrink)

This paper deals with the policy of affirmative action as an additional means for achieving equality of opportunity in society. It assumes that in modem society-at least in principle-the superior positions are distributed according to merit, and on the basis of fair competition. I argue that formal equality of opportunity injects apparently neutral requirements, such as experience, into the selection procedure for top positions, that, in fact, act particularly against women, since they allow the past employment situation to affect the (...) new selection. I use a statistical argument to show that without preferential treatment towards women, they will not overcome structural obstacles that prevent them from getting top positions. I also use the same argument to show that affirmative action at present contributes to equality of opportunity in the future. (shrink)

The purpose of this work is to bring the legal status of third-country citizens closer to that of member states, as a different special regime according to the relative agreements concluded for certain categories of foreigners without disregarding the value of some elements of fact, such as residence, family ties, performance of specific economic activities or interests of international politics for respect of these obligations, with the not always uniform content that the union evidently had to entrust to member states (...) a union of intent through “supervision" as well as the interpretation carried out by The Court of Justice of the European Union which has strongly reduced state's competences aiming at a European integration still in progress and especially after Brexit. (shrink)

The author attempts here to sketch the beginnings of an adequate interpretation of Plato's treatment of the tall and the equal in the "Phaedo". The paper consists of seven sections (roman numerals). In I-II, he (a) argues that any attempt to solve the puzzle stated at "Phaedo" 102 bc within the parameters there set down would "eo ipso" be an attempted theory of relational statements; (b) formulates that puzzle; and (c) shows that Frege solved it by denying its (...) presuppositions. In IV the author proposes an interpretation of Plato's solution: that the "than y" in "x is taller than y" modifies the "is." In V-VI he shows how this theory fits in with and sheds light on other aspects of the theory of forms: the connection to Non-Contradiction, The doctrines of degrees of reality and of immanent characters. Finally in VII he shows that the puzzle of relational statements as formulated in the "Phaedo" need not extend to "equal." the paper also includes (iii) a discussion of H-N Castañeda's interpretation of Plato's theory. (shrink)

The concept of equality is subject to many different interpretations, and it is closely connected to similar concepts such as equity, justice, fairness, and human rights. As an ideal, equality entails many aspects that are untenable. For instance, genetic and social inequalities may never be extinct, but they can both be ameliorated by proper distribution of society's resources. Likewise, within the context of health care, equality can be promoted by proper rationing of health resources, amongst which nursing care stands out. (...) In the field of nursing, the principle of equality presents itself in various forms of ethical and deontological mandates. However, beyond good intentions and abstract notions, there is a need to examine the ways in which nurses enforce this principle in practice, within the reality of modern health systems. Although there is scarcity of qualitative evidence in the nursing care rationing literature, existing studies suggest that fair treatment pertains to a largely intuitive sense of equality which involves subjective perceptions and judgements about rationing. Nurses’ initial predisposition is to view all patients as equal and treat them in an equal manner; yet, on an individual basis, each patient has a different starting point, different needs and different prospects that render rationing decisions complex and uncertain. Equality should be accepted with its unavoidable limitations in practice and be further examined within the context of nursing care rationing, in the hope that it can be advanced in a consistent way, despite the idealistic nature in many of its aspects. (shrink)

Patients have a right to refuse medical treatment. But what should happen after a patient has refused recommended treatment? In many cases, patients receive alternative forms of treatment. These forms of care may be less cost-effective. Does respect for autonomy extend to providing these alternatives? How for does justice constrain autonomy? I begin by providing three arguments that such alternatives should not be offered to those who refuse treatment. I argue that the best argument which refusers (...) can appeal to is based on the egalitarian principle of equality of outcome. However, this principle does not ultimately support a right to less cost-effective alternatives. I focus on Jehovah's Witnesses refusing blood and requesting alternative treatments. However, the point applies to many patients who refuse cost-effective medical care. (shrink)

Much of the literature on basic equality has focused on the question of what grounds the equal moral status of persons, typically understood as fully competent adults. However, less has been said about what justifies the equal moral status of those human beings who do not hold a wide range of sophisticated cognitive capacities, such as severely cognitively disabled human beings and children. This chapter contributes to filling this gap by developing a novel theory of the basis of (...) children’s moral equality. Specifically, I argue that children’s moral equality is entailed by a commitment to a kind of respect which requires providing children with those social conditions that foster their development into well-adjusted adults who hold a proper and stable capacity for moral personality. This is because unequal consideration and treatment precludes, or at least is a significant obstacle to, the provision of some goods that are crucial to the cultivation of a proper and stable capacity for moral personality. Children’s moral equality, then, is a constitutive requirement of what is owed to them qua moral status-holders. (shrink)

This article examines, through a theoretical lens, two issues concerning equality under international law thrown up by the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War: the equal treatment of belligerents on different sides under international humanitarian law (IHL), which is being contested by revisionist just war theorists, and the unequal treatment of Ukrainians with different genders assigned at birth who are trying to flee Ukraine, which is being contested under international human rights law (IHRL). By examining different conceptions of equality through (...) the lens of social ontology, this article distinguishes between the regulatory focus of IHL on individual agency and the regulatory focus of IHRL on social structures, which directly influence how ‘difference’ and ‘sameness’ are recognized and determined for the purpose of conceptualizing equality. Because of IHL’s focus on individuals, whose agency is limited in war, only highly agential conduct (e.g. targeting civilians) makes a ‘difference’ under IHL. Meanwhile, outside IHL’s regulatory focus, the different causes of states’ participation in war are evened out as the ‘same’ structured positions occupied by different individuals, warranting their same treatment according to belligerent equality. On the other hand, because of IHRL’s focus on social structures, which heavily condition the individuals, structural arrangements make a ‘difference’ under IHRL. Outside IHRL’s regulatory focus, individuals’ different innate characteristics such as sexual characteristics are evened out as the ‘same’ agential quality of being human, warranting their same treatment according to sex equality. The article argues that the contestations about these equality principles find deeper roots in their divergent social ontological visions, the revelation of which can open up new spaces for dialogue on and inquiry into a common social world that grounds the legal conceptions of equality. (shrink)

The classical theory of types in question is essentially the theory of Martin-Löf [1] but with the law of double negation elimination. I am ultimately interested in the theory of types as a framework for the foundations of mathematics and, for this purpose, we need to consider extensions of the theory obtained by adding ‘well-ordered types,’ for example the type N of the finite ordinals; but the unextended theory will suffice to illustrate the treatment of extensional equality.

It is often supposed that Confucianism is opposed to the idea of equality insofar as the key ideals to which it is committed, such as meritocracy and li , are incompatible with equality. Sympathetic commentators typically defend Confucianism by saying that (a) the Confucian person is not a free-standing individual but a social being embedded in a social structure with different and unequal roles, and (b) social inequality has to be traded in for other values. This paper argues that in (...) advocating meritocracy, Confucianism does not abandon the idea of equality. Indeed, invoking Aristotle's account of equality in the Nicomachean Ethics , it can be argued that the unequal distribution of rights and benefits reflects one aspect of equality, namely the vertical aspect, or the unequal treatment of unequals. (shrink)

While supporters argue that exemptions are needed to equalize opportunities, critics claim they are unwarranted in principle and discriminatory in practice: equal treatment requires only facial neutrality whereas exemptions treat citizens unequally insofar as individuals with idiosyncratic commitments similarly burdened by general rules are rarely given an exemption.The upshot of this critique is that the burdens of cultural and religious commitments ought to be treated as expensive tastes. I argue that religious and cultural commitments cannot be reduced to (...) expensive tastes that can be revised in the face of resource expectations and that, for this reason, opportunities are not equal when minorities must choose between adherence to such commitments and availing of valuable opportunities, when members of more dominant communities need not. I also explain why treating religious and cultural commitments in this way does not entail the adoption of a primordial view of culture that puts these commitments beyond revision and choice. (shrink)

The allocation of scarce medical treatments, such as antivirals and antibody therapies for COVID-19 patients, has important legal dimensions. This Essay examines a currently debated issue: how will courts view the consideration of characteristics shielded by equal protection law, such as race, sex, age, health, and even vaccination status, in allocation? Part II explains the application of strict scrutiny to allocation criteria that consider individual race, which have been recently debated, and concludes that such criteria are unlikely to succeed (...) under present Supreme Court precedent. Part III analyzes the use of sex-based therapy allocation criteria, which are also in current use, and argues that they also face substantial legal obstacles, despite only being subject to intermediate scrutiny. Parts IV and V examine the use of age and health status in allocation. Part VI discusses how the nascent law on “vaccination status” discrimination might apply to therapy allocation. (shrink)

Assessing what counts as infertility has practical implications: access to (state-funded) fertility treatment is usually premised on meeting the criteria that constitute the chosen definition of infertility. In this paper, I argue that we should adopt the expression “involuntary childlessness” to discuss the normative dimensions of people’s inability to conceive. Once this conceptualization is adopted, it becomes clear that there exists a mismatch between those who experience involuntary childlessness and those that are currently able to access fertility treatment. (...) My concern in this article is explaining why such a mismatch deserves attention and what reasons can be advanced to justify addressing it. My case rests on a three-part argument: that there are good reasons to address the suffering associated with involuntary childlessness; that people would decide to insure against it; and that involuntary childlessness is characterized by a prima facie exceptional kind of desire. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Equal Freedom and Utility: Herbert Spencer’s Liberal Utilitarianısm by David WeinsteinDaniel PalmerDavid Weinstein. Equal Freedom and Utility: Herbert Spencer’s Liberal Utilitarianısm. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Pp. xii + 235. Cloth, $69.95.Herbert Spencer, though influential and widely read in the nineteenth century, has been largely neglected by contemporary philosophers. David Weinstein argues that this neglect is unjustified, and that Spencer’s moral and political thought deserves the (...) same attention that has been afforded to Spencer’s contemporary John Stuart Mill. The comparison with Mill is particularly important for Weinstein. Indeed, he claims that, like Mill, Spencer was a liberal utilitarian who attempted to preserve a place for strong moral rights within a broadly utilitarian framework.A large part of Weinstein’s study is devoted to delineating the precise nature of Spencer’s utilitarianism. Weinstein argues that Spencer is both more consistently utilitarian and more systematic than has often been alleged. In the first two chapters he discusses Spencer’s utilitarianism in relation to his metaphysical principles and his account of moral psychology. Weinstein convincingly demonstrates that Spencer’s liberal utilitarianism follows from his views on social evolution. Spencer viewed evolutionary processes as leading to increasing differentiation among phenomena, which implied for Spencer a trend towards greater individuation of persons as societies evolve. Evolutionary principles also led Spencer to view happiness as largely dependent upon the exercise of faculties. Together, these views lend support to what Weinstein sees as the centerpiece of Spencer’s liberal utilitarianism, his principle of equal freedom, or the claim that “each shall have as much liberty to pursue his ends as consists with maintaining like liberties to pursue their ends by others” (38). The increasing individuation of individuals coupled with the dependence of happiness upon the free exercise of our faculties guaranteed for Spencer that the greatest happiness will be generated through the adoption of the principle of equal freedom.Weinstein’s central argument is that Spencer’s moral philosophy offers a distinctive version of indirect utilitarianism. In chapters 3 through 5 he outlines the main contours of Spencer’s liberal utilitarianism and its relevance to contemporary discussions, maintaining that Spencer accepted the utilitarian principle as the ultimate criterion of actions. However, much like Mill, and in reaction to Bentham, he argued that any direct pursuit of the greatest happiness is self-defeating. Spencer’s indirect utilitarianism sought to promote the conditions upon which happiness is founded through the principle of equal freedom. Moral rights were for him merely corollaries of the principle that flesh out its empty formalism, providing the basis for deliberation. Concrete moral rights such as property rights, contract rights, and exchange rights are therefore the basis for our primary obligations and yet find their ultimate justification in the principle of utility.Spencer’s two-tiered account of our moral obligations is thus remarkably similar to Mill’s account of moral rights in Chapter 5 of Utilitarianism. The difference between them concerns the stringency of moral rights. While Mill saw moral rights as important, but ultimately defeasible, Spencer viewed them as indefeasible. While Mill’s position seems more plausible from the utilitarian perspective, Weinstein shows that Spencer’s stronger position must be judged in terms of his beliefs about the exercise of human [End Page 685] faculties. Weinstein correctly shows that if Spencer is wrong, it is not because, as critics have charged, his position is logically inconsistent, but because he held mistaken views about human nature and society.While the heart of Equal Freedom and Utility concerns the relation between utility and moral rights in Spencer’s work, the final two chapters are devoted to metaethics and applied ethics respectively. Weinstein marshals strong textual support to show that Spencer never simply defined the good as happiness and that G. E. Moore’s use of Spencer in Principia Ethica as an example of someone who committed a glaring version of the naturalistic fallacy was not justified. Spencer simply avoided prolonged treatments of such metaethical concerns. In the last chapter Weinstein argues that Spencer’s evolving views on land nationalization reveals both the general nature of Spencer’s derivation of moral rights from the principle... (shrink)

This paper investigates the relationship between the role that information technology (IT) has played in the development of women’s employment, the possibility of women having a significant influence on the technology’s development, and the way that the IT industry perceives women as computer scientists, users and consumers. The industry’s perception of women and men is investigated through the portrayal of them in computing advertisements. While women are increasingly updating their technological skills and know-how, and through this process are entering some (...) positions in the workplace traditionally occupied by men, these achievements are not mirrored in their social and occupational status. The computer industry and higher education have worryingly low numbers of women, while the possibility of women influencing the development of computer technology is just emerging in feminist research. This paper argues that, though the IT industry, through their self-regulatory codes, subscribes to equal treatment of sexes, races and persons with disabilities, the industry nevertheless paints a stereotyped picture of inequality when portraying men and women in computer advertisements. As long as such a perception of women prevails within the industry, it will stand as a barrier to women having equal access to computer technology. If advertisements influence the way society perceives major social constructs and issues, then the computing industry has a social responsibility to portray men and women in an equal and non-stereotypical fashion. (shrink)

Extant business research has not addressed the ethical treatment of individuals with psychiatric disabilities. This article will describe previous research on individuals with psychiatric disabilities drawn from rehabilitation, psychological, managerial, legal, as well as related business ethics writings before presenting a framework that illustrates the dynamics of (un)ethical behavior in relation to the employment of such individuals. Individuals with psychiatric disabilities often evoke negative reactions from those in their environment. Lastly, we provide recommendations for how employees and organizations can (...) become more proactive in providing individuals with such disabilities equal employment opportunities for both access and accommodation in the workplace. (shrink)

Abstract:This essay aims to bring two important lines of inquiry and criticism together. It first lays out an institutionally enriched account of what a just world economic order will look like. That account prescribes, via the requisites to that mechanism which most directly instantiates the account, “three realms of equal treatment and market completion”—the global products, services, and labor markets; the global investment/financial markets; and the global preparticipation opportunity allocation. The essay then suggests how, with minimal if any (...) departure from familiar canons of traditional international legal mandate interpretation, each of the Bretton Woods institutions—particularly the GATT/WTO and the IMF—can be viewed at least in part as charged with the task of fostering equal treatment and ultimate market completion within one of those three realms. The piece then argues that one of the institutions in particular—the World Bank—has, for reasons of at best negligent and at worst willful injustice on the part of influential state actors in the world community, fallen farthest short in pursuit of what should be viewed as its proper mandate. The article accordingly concludes that a fuller empowerment of the Bank to effect its ideal mission will press the Bretton Woods system more nearly into ethical balance, and with it the world into justice; and that full empowerment of the GATT/WTO and IMF should be partly conditioned upon the fuller empowerment of the Bank. (shrink)

The term “value of life” can refer to life’s intrinsic dignity: something nonincremental and time-unaffected in contrast to the fluctuating, incremental “value” of our lives, as they are longer or shorter and more or less flourishing. Human beings are equal in their basic moral importance: the moral indignities we condemn in the treatment of e.g. those with dementia reflect the ongoing human dignity that is being violated. Indignities licensed by the person in advance remain indignities, as when people (...) might volunteer their living, unconscious bodies for surrogacy or training in amputation techniques. Respect for someone’s dignity is significantly impacted by a failure to value that person’s very existence, whatever genuine respect and good will is shown by wanting the person’s life to go well. Valuing and respecting life is not, however, vitalism: there can be good and compelling reasons for eschewing some means of prolonging life. (shrink)

This article proposes "equality" as a topic for interactionist research. By drawing on the perspectives of Herbert Blumer, Alfred Schutz, and Harold Garfinkel, an attempt is made to lay the theoretical groundwork for studying the interpretive and experiential aspects of equality. Blumer's fundamental premises of symbolic interactionism, Schutz's analysis of relevance and typification, and Garfinkel's treatment of reflexivity and indexicality are explicated and applied to the subject of equality. I then draw upon the moral theory of John Dewey to (...) suggest the positive role that interactionist theory and research might play in the resolution of problematic situations that are framed in terms of equality. Collectively, the complementary aspects of Blumer's, Schutz's, Garfinkel's, and Dewey's thought are used to justify and launch a program of research on a neglected yet important topic: the social construction of equality in everyday life. (shrink)

The literature on multiculturalism currently splits parties into two camps : those favorable to the uniform treatment of cultural differences and those favorable to their differential treatment. Brian Barry, perhaps of the most influential present supporters of the first camp, has recently developed a severe criticism of the second approach. I intend in this paper to examine the scope and limits of Barry’s own uniform treatment approach. First, I will present the grounds Barry has for supporting it. (...) Second, I will examine one of its most important difficulties, that of excluding the particular treatment of cultural differences on the grounds that they are a matter of choice. (shrink)

BackgroundIn precision medicine biomarkers stratify patients into groups that are offered different treatments, but this may conflict with the principle of equal treatment. While some patient characteristics are seen as relevant for unequal treatment and others not, it is known that they all may influence treatment decisions. How biomarkers influence these decisions is not known, nor is their ethical relevance well discussed.MethodsWe distributed an email survey designed to elicit treatment preferences from Norwegian doctors working with (...) cancer patients. In a forced-choice conjoint analysis pairs of hypothetical patients were presented, and we calculated the average marginal component effect of seven individual patient characteristics, to estimate how each of them influence doctors’ priority-setting decisions.ResultsA positive biomarker status increased the probability of being allocated the new drug, while older age, severe comorbidity and reduced physical function reduced the probability. Importantly, sex, education level and smoking status had no significant influence on the decision.ConclusionBiomarker status is perceived as relevant for priority setting decisions, alongside more well-known patient characteristics like age, physical function and comorbidity. Based on our results, we discuss a framework that can help clarify whether biomarker status should be seen as an ethically acceptable factor for providing unequal treatment to patients with the same disease. (shrink)

Directive 2002/73 enacted by the Council and Parliament of the European Union introduces substantial and procedural amendments to the European Community's `old' Equal Treatment Directive 76/207, providing, in particular, clarification of the definitions of concepts such as direct and indirect discrimination and harassment. Yet, while the European Commission has praised the progressive nature of the new European legislation, a critical assessment of its provisions reveals some serious shortcomings and a host of missed opportunities. Although the new Directive generally (...) reflects the spirit of the case law of the E.C.J., it does so without any originality or pro-activism meaning that the European legislature has once again left the initiative of pursuing sex equality in the E.U. to the Court. (shrink)

Equality in Liberty and Justice is an integrated collection of essays in political philosophy, divided into two parts. The first examines (classically) liberal ideas-the ideas of the Founding Fathers of the American republic-and some of the applications and the rejections of such ideas in our contemporary world. Among other questions about liberty and responsibility it considers, in the context of the imprisonment and psychiatric treatment of dissidents in the psychiatric hospitals of the former Soviet Union, Plato's suggestion that all (...) delinquency is an expression of mental disease. The second part examines the relations and the lack of relations between old fashioned, without prefix or suffix, justice and what is called by its promoters social justice. It therefore presses such questions as "Equal outcomes or equal justice?" and "Enemies of poverty or of inequality?" Equality in Liberty and Justice was originally published before the winning of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Empire. This second edition updates the arguments of the previous editor and draws present day moral conclusions. This book will appeal to those for whom the classical liberal and conservative debates still have great meaning. Flew might well be the most significant sunthesizer of Tocqueville and Mill. (shrink)

Presumption of Equality requires that individuals be treated equally in the absence of relevant information that would discriminate between them. Our objective is to make this principle more precise, if viewed as a principle of fairness, and to determine why and under what conditions it should be obeyed. Presumption norms are procedural constraints, but their justification can be sought in the possible or expected outcomes of the procedures they regulate. This is the avenue pursued here. The suggestion is that in (...) the absence of information that would discriminate between the individuals, equal treatment minimizes the expected unfairness of the outcome. A related suggestion is that equal treatment under these circumstances also minimizes the maximal possible unfairness of the outcome. Whether these suggestions are correct or not depends on the properties of the underlying unfairness measure. The required properties are specified. The essay also considers the normative status of equal lotteries on unequal treatments. (shrink)

Presumption of Equality requires that individuals be treated equally in the absence of relevant information that would discriminate between them. Our objective is to make this principle more precise, if viewed as a principle of fairness, and to determine why and under what conditions it should be obeyed. Presumption norms are procedural constraints, but their justification can be sought in the possible or expected outcomes of the procedures they regulate. This is the avenue pursued here. The suggestion is that in (...) the absence of information that would discriminate between the individuals, equal treatment minimizes the expected unfairness of the outcome. A related suggestion is that equal treatment under these circumstances also minimizes the maximal possible unfairness of the outcome. Whether these suggestions are correct or not depends on the properties of the underlying unfairness measure. The required properties are specified. The essay also considers the normative status of equal lotteries on unequal treatments. (shrink)

Both Kymlicka and Patten argue that the equal treatment of different national groups require that the state officially recognize the right of each to create its own autonomous government. After carefully examining their arguments, I show that they both make the false assumption that, in a multinational state, the state belongs only to the majority group but not the minority, and that a multination state can never treat minority groups equally. Both claims are inherently anti-pluralistic. Thus, the (...) class='Hi'>equal treatment of different national cultures does not require that each be granted the right to self-government. (shrink)

The principle of equal consideration of interests is a very popular principle in animal ethics. Peter Singer employs it to ground equal treatment and solve the problem of the basis of equality, namely the problem of why we should grant equal treatment despite the variability of people’s features. In this paper, I challenge Singer’s argument because ECOI does not provide plausible grounds to presume that the interests of diverse individuals are actually equal. Analyzing the (...) case of pain and the interest in not suffering in particular, I contend that there are some insurmountable epistemic and axiological problems in accounting for the equality of interests. Besides criticizing ECOI as a basis of equality, I argue that we need to rely on an equality of moral status. I conclude by providing some considerations on the relation between equality and the principle of proportionality. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Seneca, Ethics, and the Body: The Treatment of Cruelty in Medieval ThoughtDaniel BarazIn an impassioned article written in 1941 Lucien Febvre urges the writing of a history of human sensibility and suggests in particular writing a history of cruelty. 1 The general direction indicated by Febvre has been followed, but as far as cruelty is concerned his plea is still as relevant today as it was five decades (...) ago. And since cruelty is one of the attributes commonly associated with the Middle Ages, 2 it is particularly interesting to examine what and how medieval thinkers wrote on the subject.An examination of sources dealing with cruelty from late antiquity to the early modern period yields surprising results. Whereas the writings of the thinkers of late classical antiquity and of the early modern period do include discussions of the issue, the writings of medieval thinkers before the thirteenth century contain only brief remarks. The first and only exception until the end of the Middle Ages is a short question on cruelty in Thomas Aquinas’s Summa theologiae. Other types of medieval sources, such as legal texts, chronicles, and literary texts, reveal the same scarcity of references to the subject during most of the Middle Ages. Thus this period seems to represent a gap between antiquity and the early modern period, with a reawakening of interest in the issue of cruelty towards the end of the Middle Ages.The relative silence of medieval sources calls for identifying the factors which affected the treatment of cruelty by medieval thinkers. What are the [End Page 195] reasons for the neglect of the subject as well as for the late revival of interest in it? And when the issue is discussed, what factors shape the discussion? Two issues seem crucial to me in answering these questions: the conception of the relation between body and soul and the relative weight given to actions vs. intentions in the dominant ethical framework. A third issue, of equal importance, provides a focus for the investigation of the treatment of cruelty in the Middle Ages and the factors affecting it; and this is the reception of Seneca. As interest in Seneca’s writings grew, so did the preoccupation with cruelty. There is a close thematic interaction between these two processes, beyond the chrono-logical coincidence.Most obviously, discussions of cruelty as a subject per se referred explicitly to Seneca’s writings on the subject. Less directly, when cruelty was treated only in passing in the context of the Christian tradition, the manner in which the subject was addressed reflected a lack of Senecan influence, so that Seneca’s influence was felt through its absence. Nevertheless, the Christian tradition continued to influence references to cruelty even after the revival of Senecan influence during the high Middle Ages and to a certain degree even served as a filter, determining which aspects of Seneca’s writings on cruelty were used.Thomas Aquinas and SenecaThe first medieval discussion of cruelty as a subject per se is the question De crudelitate (2-2-159) in the section on temperance in Thomas Aquinas’s Summa theologiae. Aquinas bases his discussion almost exclusively on classical sources, primarily Seneca’s De clementia. 3 Seneca referred to cruelty in detail both in this work and in another moral essay, De ira. His De clementia was written at the beginning of Nero’s reign, and it is addressed to the young emperor, his former pupil. Its stated aim is to praise Nero for possessing the quality of clementia, and to show how important this quality is for rulers. 4 The concept of clementia describes a quality of political men, the term having acquired political significance since the times of Caesar and Augustus. 5De clementia was written before most of the actions which earned Nero his reputation were perpetrated; the only concrete action which may have inspired Seneca to write it was the murder of Britannicus, of which Nero was suspected. Regardless, the emperors preceding Nero were certainly not renowned for their [End Page 196] clemency. Suetonius tells that one of Caligula’s amusements was to attend sessions of torture and execution; that he insisted on slow... (shrink)

These essays, with one exception originally published in Philosophy & Public Affairs, consider the moral problems associated with improving the social and economic position of disadvantaged groups.

In this paper I criticize the claim that fair trade entails a commitment to an ideal of formal equality according to which all members of the trade regime are to receive and offer equal, or uniform, treatment. I first elaborate on the idea of formal equality and its rationales, identify several positive arguments for departing from formal equality, and respond to a number of objections to “special and differential treatment” for poor countries. I then consider in more (...) detail one specific element of formal equality in the trade regime, namely, the principle of reciprocity. Several distinct reciprocity principles are identified, none of which, I argue, should be regarded as a requirement of fairness. Next I consider a more recent interpretation of formal equality that requires trading countries to “harmonize” domestic laws and policies. I argue that harmonization is not required by fairness. (shrink)