Hermann Weyl was one of the early contributors to the mathematics of general relativity. This article argues that in 1929, for the formulation of a general relativistic framework of the Dirac equation, he both abolished and preserved in modified form the conceptual perspective that he had developed earlier in his “analysis of the problem of space.” The ideas of infinitesimal congruence from the early 1920s were aufgehoben in the general relativistic framework for the Dirac equation. He preserved the central idea (...) of gauge as a “purely infinitesimal” aspect of symmetries in a group extension schema. With respect to methodology, however, Weyl gave up his earlier preferences for relatively a-priori arguments and tried to incorporate as much empiricism as he could. This signified a clearly expressed empirical turn for him. Moreover, in this step he emphasized that the mathematical objects used for the representation of matter structures stood at the center of the construction, rather than interaction fields which, in the early 1920s, he had considered as more or less derivable from geometrico-philosophical considerations. (shrink)

A successor relation between theories T und T₁ express that T₁, the successor of T, has justifiably superseded T. In physics, for instance, Newton's theory of gravitation has superseded Kepler's laws and, in turn, Einstein's theory has become the successor of Newton's. By now there is no agreement on how a general concept of successor relation would have to be construed. In the present paper attention is drawn to two types of such relations, one deductive the other confirmatory. It seems (...) that what most people are looking for is the deductive type of relation. However, a deductive successor relation has to be justified by showing that if it holds then another, confirmatory relation holds, saying roughly that the actual empirical success of the deducing theory is at least as good as the corresponding success of the deduced theory. Under certain restrictions such a justification is given in the paper. (shrink)

Bd. 1. Darstellung.-- Bd. 2. Kataloge und Anmerkungen.

In this paper I argue that the almost forgotten early dissertation of the phenomenologist Hans Reiner Freiheit, Wollen und Aktivität. Phänomenologische Untersuchungen in Richtung auf das Problem der Willensfreiheit engages with what I call the unity problem of activity. This problem concerns the question whether there is a structure in virtue of which all instances of human activity—and not only “full-blown” intentional actions—can be unified. After a brief systematic elucidation of this problem, which is closely related to the contemporary “problem (...) of action,” I elaborate and critically discuss two relevant threads running through Reiner’s work. The first view concerns the alleged motivational asymmetry between activity and passivity according to which it is essential only for active experiences to be motivated by an underlying passivity. The second view focuses on Reiner’s phenomenology of the will, especially on his notions of “ego-centrality” and “inner will” the latter being introduced in analogy to Brentano’s notion of “inner consciousness.” These two notions are supposed to unify all manifestations of the human will, including “full-blown” intentional actions and non-intentional doings such as laughter. Reiner’s extension of will-based actions to non-intentional activity is one of the most remarkable aspects of his early work. Finally, I show that Reiner ultimately answers the unity problem in the negative because he ends up with the view that besides will-based agency he also acknowledges so-called “motor activity” which is not intrinsically related to the will. I close with a couple of tentative proposals how volitional and motor actions might be unified nonetheless. (shrink)

Erhard Wiersing ; Literaturverz. S. [1013] - 1071 ; Inhaltsverzeichnis ; Volltext // Exemplar mit der Signatur: München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek -- PVA 2007.1762.

Building on Uriah Kriegel's recent work on the varieties of consciousness, I consider the question of how many irreducible and fundamental kinds of consciousness there are. This is the project of a fundamental classification of consciousness (C-taxonomy), which will be approached with reference to two figures from the (early) phenomenological tradition, i.e., Franz Brentano and Alexander Pfänder. Both philosophers advocate tripartite taxonomies, thereby opposing the still widely held view that only algedonic and sensory phenomenology exist. After explaining the project of (...) C-taxonomy, I discuss Brentano's and Pfänder's trialisms. My main aim is to show that Pfänder's view, according to which consciousness is exhausted by “object-consciousness”, feeling, and striving, when supplemented by Husserlian ideas, is to be preferred to Brentano's classification, according to which the basic mental kinds are mere presentations, judgments, and “phenomena of love and hate”. I criticize Brentano's separation of doxastically neutral presentations from “positing” judgments, as well as his unification of feelings, emotions, desires, strivings, decisions, and volitions into one basic class. Finally, I reflect on the deeper reasons for Brentano's and Pfänder's divergent taxonomies, which are rooted in their different views of the “mark of the mental” and their different approaches to the active/passive distinction within the mental realm. (shrink)

Ever since Parmenides, one of philosophy's riddles has been how we are able to direct our thoughts to non-being. Erhard uses the problem of non-existence as the starting point for an analysis of Husserl's phenomenology. He examines Husserl's interpretation of judgments about non-being as judgments made "under assumption" and his analysis of "free fantasy." Erhard thus demonstrates that Husserl is compatible with today's non-relational theories.

Dans un discours prononcé à Zurich vers la fin des années 1940, Hermann Weyl a examiné l'épistémologie dialectique de Ferdinand Gonseth et l'a considérée comme trop strictement limitée aux aspects de changement historique. Son expérience de la philosophie diaclectique post-kantienne, en particulier la dérivation du concept de l'espace et de la matière chez Johann Gottlieb Fichte, avait constitué une base dialectique solide pour ses propres études de 1918 en une géométrie purement infinitésimale et la théorie antérieure d'un champ de matière (...) géométriquement unifié (en prolongement du programme Mie-Hilbert). Bien que Weyl se fût alors éloigné des aspects spéculatifs de la philosophie de sa jeunesse et eût montré, en particulier, moins d'enthousiasme qu'auparavant pour Fichte, il nourrissait encore de nombreux doutes sur la base culturelle de la science mathématique moderne et sur son rôle dans la culture matérielle du modernisme de pointe. Pour Weyl, la « réflexion » philosophique était une nécessité culturelle ; il se tourna alors vers lexistentialisme de Karl Jaspers et de Martin Heidegger pour trouver des raisons plus profondes, dans un mouvement comparable à son orientation vers la philosophie de Fichte après la Première Guerre mondiale. Le débat de la fin des années 1940 peut être compris comme une sorte de supplément postérieur à la Seconde Guerre mondiale par rapport à ses commentaires plus connus sur les mathématiques et les sciences naturelles publiés au milieu des années 1920. (shrink)

Scheibe is one of the most important philosophers of science in Germany. He has written extensively on all the problems that confront the philosophy of physics: rationalism vs. empiricism; reductionism; the foundations of quantum mechanics; space-time, and much more. Since little of his work has been translated into English, he is not yet well known internationally. However, this collection of some 40 of his papers will remedy this unfortunate situation.

Individual questions of the institutional reforms of the representative-democratic parliamentary system, such as issues of electoral law, party law, and parliamentary law, are frequently discussed. But all these reflections - and this is the principal thesis of this article - must eventually remain without success, if they do not address the preceding basic problem concerning the democratically indispensable conditions of the mental constitution of the active citizen, the „civis“. There, a key role, consciously experienced like a paradox, falls upon the (...) renunciation of the claim to absolute truth of one’s own political convictions with regard to equally „relative-absolute“ claims for validity of others. On this base the psychological presuppositions of a modern pluralistic democracy are discussed, which thereupon are to be institutionalized: e. g. the capacity to compromise, the obligation of state neutrality in religious matters, the renunciation of hate speech, the rejection of „denial of reality“, and of allegedly „finalizing“ ideologies of history. (shrink)

Este artículo trata sobre la discusión en torno al conflicto entre la seguridad y la libertad, y, más concretamente, entre la prevención policial y los derechos de los ciudadanos. El autor va más allá de la mera afirmación de que entre esos dos polos existe una relación de tensión, e intenta fijar los elementos que en el Estado de Derecho son absolutamente irrenunciables si es que no se quiere abandonar este tipo de Estado. Analiza para ello, críticamente, la jurisprudencia del (...) Tribunal Constitucional Federal Alemán, con referencias al acervo normativo de la Unión Europea. Su conclusión es que la intervención del Estado en la esfera privada del ciudadano debe estar sujeta a límites infranqueables, también en lo que concierne al control preventivo de riesgos relacionados con el terrorismo. (shrink)

Bd. 1. Metrisierung, Hypothesenbildung, Theoriendynamik.--Bd. 2. Experiment, Erklärung, Prognose.