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An analysis of the 1784 essays by immanuel kant and moses mendelssohn on the question "what is enlightenment?" emphasis is placed on discussions of the nature and limits of enlightenment within the berlin "aufklarung" as evidenced by debates within the berlin "mittwochsgesellschaft" (a secret society of "friends of the enlightenment") and articles in the "berlinische monatsschrift". Among the views surveyed are those of the publicists johann erich biester, Friedrich gedike, And friedrich nicolai, The jurists karl gottlieb svarez and ernst (...) ferdinand klein, The physician johann karl wilhelm mohsen, And the theologian johann friedrich zollner. (shrink)

Almost two decades ago, Prahalad and Hammond [Harv Bus Rev, 80(9):48–59, 2002] introduced the base/bottom of the pyramid (BOP) approach to profitably serving the poor with business models adapted from developed markets while alleviating poverty. In response to disappointing results and ethical criticism, the BOP approach evolved from a just-for-profit approach with a passive role of the poor to an inclusive development approach that integrates the principles of the triple bottom line. A recent review of the BOP literature [Dembek et (...) al., J Bus Ethics 165(3):365–382, 2020], however, reveals a lack of empirical evidence to support the sustainable BOP approach. In this paper, we specify the assumptions underlying the sustainable BOP approach and test them using structural equation modeling with clustered robust standard errors on a unique dataset of 212 firms. Our findings show that BOP business model involvement and adaptive capacity are significant drivers of the triple bottom line at the BOP; however, business model adaptive capacity does not guarantee an ecologically sustainable performance at the BOP. We find that there is a need for further extension of the ethical foundations of the sustainable BOP approach. (shrink)

As Thomas Uebel has recently argued, some early logical positivists saw American pragmatism as a kindred form of scientific philosophy. They associated pragmatism with William James, whom they rightly saw as allied with Ernst Mach. But what apparently blocked sympathetic positivists from pursuing commonalities with American pragmatism was the concern that James advocated some form of psychologism, a view they thought could not do justice to the a priori. This paper argues that positivists were wrong to read James as (...) offering a psychologistic account of the a priori. They had encountered James by reading Pragmatism as translated by the unabashedly psychologistic Wilhelm Jerusalem. But in more technical works, James had actually developed a form of conventionalism that anticipated the so-called “relativized” a priori positivists themselves would independently develop. While positivists arrived at conventionalism largely through reflection on the exact sciences, though, James’s account of the a priori grew from his reflections on the biological evolution of cognition, particularly in the context of his Darwin-inspired critique of Herbert Spencer. (shrink)

Ludwig Alsdorf, Kleine Schriften. Ed. Albrecht Wezler., Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 2001. xxiii, 750 pp. €86.00. ISBN 3-515-07737-5. Ernst Windisch: Kleine Schriften. Ed. Karin Steiner, Jörg Gengnagel., Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 2001. xxvii, 717 pp. €116.00. ISBN 3-515-07120-2.

Gegenstand vorliegender Arbeit ist das Problem des fehler haften Staatsakts. Dementsprechend besteht ihre eigentliche Auf gabe darin, jene Schwierigkeiten darzulegen und zu iiberwinden, welche eine Theorie des fehlerhaften Staatsakts bietet. Die Ge winnung grundsatzlicher Klarheit iiber Ziel und Weg schien dabei um so mehr gefordert, als die bisherigen Versuche einer wissen schaftlichen Behandlung des Gegenstandes zwar unbestreitbar wert volle Einzelausfiihrungen, keineswegs aber methodische Sicherheit gebracht haben. Insoweit dieser Mangel nach hier vertretener Ansicht an der Haltlosigkeit des angewandten formalistischen Ver fahrens (...) liegt, bilden nachfolgende Untersuchungen einen Beitrag zu einer teleologischen Methode der Rechtsauslegung iiberhaupt. Herr Dr. med. hon. c. Ferdinand Springer iibernahm hoch herzigerweise auch unter den gegenwartigen Verhaltnissen die Drucklegung meiner Arbeit. Wieviel ich ihm damit verdanke, kann nur ganz ermessen, wer in heutiger Zeit seine wissenschaft liche Laufbahn erst beginnt. Berlin, Dezember 1923. Ernst von Hippel. Inhaltsverzeichnis. Seite Erster Teil. Einfiihrung. § 1. Der Begriff des fehlerhaften Staatsakts im Sinne vorliegender Arbeit... •....... 3 a) Der Begriff des Staatsakts 1 b) Der Begriff des Fehlers. 1 Zweiter Teil. Die formalistische Behandlung des fehlerhaften Staatsakts. (shrink)

Amsterdam University Press is a leading publisher of academic books, journals and textbooks in the Humanities and Social Sciences. Our aim is to make current research available to scholars, students, innovators, and the general public. AUP stands for scholarly excellence, global presence, and engagement with the international academic community.

ABSTRACT In Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra, Jacob Klein contrasts ancient Greek philosophy's direct engagement with things through arithmetic with the ancient science of numeric calculation, logistic. By chronicling the later development of logistic, by means of increasing symbolization, ultimately into algebra, he argues that logistic has come to displace arithmetic and, thereby, to submerge the ontological issues at the center of Greek thought. This article argues, first, that Klein's target is Ernst Cassirer's notion (...) of number as a “symbolic function”—what Cassirer would later call “symbolic form.” In Substance and Function Cassirer argues that number constitutes a conceptual structure progressively extended by thought so as to include the results of different sorts of calculation within itself and, thereby, to be a closed system. Drawing upon Dedekind, Cassirer claims that no individual number can be understood apart from the entire conceptual structure. This article argues, second, that Cassirer recognizes, as it were, a different set of things, namely, relations, and that it is possible to engage these “things” directly by recognizing the ontological issues they raise. (shrink)

The ArgumentCassirer's analyses of twentieth-century physics from the perspective of the philosophy of science focuses on the concept of the object of scientific experience. Within his concept of functional knowledge, he takes a structural stance and claims that it is specifically this concept of the object that has paved the way for modern science. This article aims, first, to show that Cassirer's interpretation of Felix Klein's “Erlanger Programm” provided the impetus for this view. Then, it analyzes Kant's conception of (...) objectivity in order to examine whether Cassirer can rightfully claim that his view is a further development of transcendental principles. Finally, it is argued that it is Cassirer's concept of the object that enables him to integrate one decisive feature of scientific progress, namely, the increasinggeneralizationof the basic concepts of a science, into his conception of knowledge. This is illustrated in more detail through the example of the progression from Newton's mechanics to relativity theory. (shrink)

This article deals with the construction and performance of antisemitism in Nazi children’s books. It provides an explorative discourse analysis of _Trust No Fox_ as reported (Bauer, Trau keinem Fuchs auf grüner Heid und keinem Jud bei seinem Eid! Ein Bilderbuch für Gross und Klein, Stürmer-Verlag, Nuremberg, 1936) and _The Poisonous Mushroom_ as reported (Hiemer, Der Giftpilz—ein Stürmerbuch für Jung u. Alt, Stürmer-Verlag, Nuremberg, 1938) through the lens of Critical applied legal linguistics (CrALL). It seeks to elucidate how ‘Jewishness’ (...) is constructed in the two books, with a view to enhancing our understanding of the intertextual and interdiscursive embeddedness of anti-Semitic rhetoric generally and nomination and predication strategies specifically. To this end, a specialised corpus of 10,002 tokens, 2,345 types and 43 illustrations was compiled. Subsequently XML annotation was applied with the data being parsed into headings, sentences and/or lines. It was found that the books follow a Jewish/non-Jewish dichotomy, consistently referring to breaches of custom, morality, religion and law. Both works purport to provide descriptive accounts of ‘Jews as they are,’ when, in fact, they generate the normative illusion of ‘Jews as they ought to be’ according to Nazi ideology. It is suggested to use the insights gained into the anti-Semitic rhetoric of children’s books to detect, describe and critique patterns of anti-Semitic rhetoric today. (shrink)

Ernst Friedrich Ferdinand Zermelo transformed the set theory of Cantor and Dedekind in the first decade of the 20th century by incorporating the Axiom of Choice and providing a simple and workable axiomatization setting out generative set-existence principles. Zermelo thereby tempered the ontological thrust of early set theory, initiated the delineation of what is to be regarded as set-theoretic, drawing out the combinatorial aspects from the logical, and established the basic conceptual framework for the development of modern set (...) theory. Two decades later Zermelo promoted a distinctive cumulative hierarchy view of models of set theory and championed the use of infinitary logic, anticipating broad modern developments. In this paper Zermelo's published mathematical work in set theory is described and analyzed in its historical context, with the hindsight afforded by the awareness of what has endured in the subsequent development of set theory. Elaborating formulations and results are provided, and special emphasis is placed on the to and fro surrounding the Schröder-Bernstein Theorem and the correspondence and comparative approaches of Zermelo and Gödel. Much can be and has been written about philosophical and biographical issues and about the reception of the Axiom of Choice, and we will refer and defer to others, staying the course through the decidedly mathematical themes and details. (shrink)

The paper investigates Ernst Cassirer’s structuralist account of geometrical knowledge developed in his Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff. The aim here is twofold. First, to give a closer study of several developments in projective geometry that form the direct background for Cassirer’s philosophical remarks on geometrical concept formation. Specifically, the paper will survey different attempts to justify the principle of duality in projective geometry as well as Felix Klein’s generalization of the use of geometrical transformations in his Erlangen program. The (...) second aim is to analyze the specific character of Cassirer’s geometrical structuralism formulated in 1910 as well as in subsequent writings. As will be argued, his account of modern geometry is best described as a “methodological structuralism”, that is, as a view mainly concerned with the role of structural methods in modern mathematical practice. (shrink)

Memory of past episodes provides a sense of personal identity — the sense that I am the same person as someone in the past. We present a neurological case study of a patient who has accurate memories of scenes from his past, but for whom the memories lack the sense of mineness. On the basis of this case study, we propose that the sense of identity derives from two components, one delivering the content of the memory and the other generating (...) the sense of mineness. We argue that this new model of the sense of identity has implications for debates about quasi-memory. In addition, articulating the components of the sense of identity promises to bear on the extent to which this sense of identity provides evidence of personal identity. (shrink)

Journal of Political Philosophy, EarlyView.

Episodic memory often is conceptualized as a uniquely human system of long-term memory that makes available knowledge accompanied by the temporal and spatial context in which that knowledge was acquired. Retrieval from episodic memory entails a form of first–person subjectivity called autonoetic consciousness that provides a sense that a recollection was something that took place in the experiencer’s personal past. In this paper I expand on this definition of episodic memory. Specifically, I suggest that (a) the core features assumed unique (...) to episodic memory are shared by semantic memory, (b) episodic memory cannot be fully understood unless one appreciates that episodic recollection requires the coordinated function of a number of distinct, yet interacting, “enabling” systems. Although these systems – ownership, self, subjective temporality, and agency – are not traditionally viewed as memorial in nature, each is necessary for episodic recollection and jointly they may be sufficient, and (c) the type of subjective awareness provided by episodic recollection (autonoetic) is relational rather than intrinsic – i.e., it can be lost in certain patient populations, thus rendering episodic memory content indistinguishable from the content of semantic long-term memory. (shrink)

Dieses kleine Buch, wiewohl seine Teile auf eigenen Füßen stehen können, Teile, die einander zunächst nicht kannten, kommend aus verschiedenen Ländern, ihren Ursprung der Gelegenheit dankend, dem Zufall oder dem Einfall, will doch als Einheit verstanden werden, als die Einheit einer Idee. Sie kommen vom Gedanken her, alle aber niemals ohne das Bild, weil niemals ohne die Liebe für das Konkrete, das lndividuale, das Persönliche. Das ist die Art dieses Autors, für die er nichts kann als Anlage, die er übernimmt (...) als Aufgabe, als sein Talent im biblischen Sinne, nicht sich rühmend, nicht fordernd, daß andere auf die gleiche Weise der Wahrheit sich nähern, die über alles ist, oder von der erkannten persönlich Besitz ergreifen, wohl aber hoffend, daß manche sie und ihn verstehen werden. [Notiz zu Begin des Buches]. (shrink)

Common wisdom, philosophical analysis and psychological research share the view that memory is subjectively positioned toward the past: Specifically, memory enables one to become re-acquainted with the objects and events of his or her past. In this paper I call this assumption into question. As I hope to show, memory has been designed by natural selection not to relive the past, but rather to anticipate and plan for future contingencies -- a decidedly future-oriented mode of subjective temporality. This is not (...) to say memory makes no reference to the past. But, I argue, past-oriented subjectivity is a by-product of a system designed by natural selection to help us face and respond to the "now and the next". I discuss the implications of the proposed temporal realignment for research agendas as well as the potential limitations of measures designed to explore memory by focusing on its retentive capabilities. (shrink)

The comparison of Ernst Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms and Levi-Strauss’ structural anthropology requires a clarification of their definitions of morphology, transformation and translatability. We will expose the morphological field where Cassirer’s aesthetics emerges in relation to Goethe, who represents an important source for Levi-Strauss as well. Defining the concept of transformation is supposed to follow his modifications of the key ideas of the German poet and biologist, by taking account of the new point of view provided by the (...) theory of groups of transformation which the mathematician Felix Klein developed in the »circle of Erlangen «. Then we will show how Edgar Wind, a brilliant student of Cassirer, invents a kind of morphological aesthetics to provide art history with a methodology, and we will give some examples for the application of the concept of building series of pictures in the field of art history. We will examine the global function of the tables of Aby Warburg’s Atlas Mnemosyne, Erwin Panofsky’s wellknown iconological interpretation of Durer’s Melencolia I and then, by contrast, the creation of a virtual series of masks through an imaginative variation which Levi-Strauss creates to give sense to a particular Ameridian mask found during his investigations. Finally, we will investigate the problems appearing by the definition of transformation as translatability in both Cassirer’s and Levi-Strauss’ semiologies. We will ask for their uses of the model of translation in linguistics to compare different forms of structural homologies. (shrink)

I will argue for two main points. First, the regress imbedded in infinitism need not be subject to the Structural Objection; and second, the Structural Objection does not pose a real problem for any regress. I will not be arguing for the correctness of my proposal directly. That is, as will become apparent soon, my proposal rests on two principles of reasoning which together entail infinitism and I will not present my arguments for those principles here. The purpose of this (...) paper is to show that the objections raised by Gillett do not pose a grave problem for infinitism. (shrink)

The explanatory challenge of sentience is known as the “hard problem of consciousness”: How does subjective experience arise from physical objects and their relations? Despite some optimistic claims, the perennial struggle with this question shows little evidence of imminent resolution. In this article I focus on the “why” rather than on the “how” of sentience. Specifically, why did sentience evolve in organic lifeforms? From an evolutionary perspective this question can be framed: “What adaptive problem(s) did organisms face in their evolutionary (...) past and how were those challenges met? I argue that sentience was a critical component of the adaptive solution (i.e., adopting an agentic stance) to increasingly complex and unpredictable demands placed on vertebrates approximately 500 million years ago (the so-called Cambrian explosion). One consequence of taking an agentic stance is that it freed the organism from its neural moorings, positioning it within phenomenal space outside its brain. (shrink)

The responses to the questions of why? when?, how?, where?, and in what ways? business ethics should be taught in the BusinessEthics classroom inundate the scholarly literature. Yet, to date, despite some very interesting ideas, with respect to the answers givento the above question, not only has nothing even close to consensus been reached, but this particular area of pedagogy is instagnation—authors still challenge both the very idea of teaching business ethics as well as the practical value of such courses (...) for ourstudents once they graduate to the corporate world.In this paper I will suggest that the reason for this lack of pedagogical progress is that there has been a serious oversight regarding the most important teaching question of all: Who? I will show that the pedagogical issue of whom should be teaching Business Ethics has been largely ignored, skirted or answered incorrectly. I will then boldly argue that the only necessary condition for successful courses inBusiness Ethics is that they be taught by experts in ethics, i.e., Ph.D.s in philosophy. (shrink)

Consciousness supervenes on activity; computation supervenes on structure. Because of this, some argue, conscious states cannot supervene on computational ones. If true, this would present serious difficulties for computationalist analyses of consciousness (or, indeed, of any domain with properties that supervene on actual activity). I argue that the computationalist can avoid the Superfluous Structure Problem (SSP) by moving to a dispositional theory of implementation. On a dispositional theory, the activity of computation depends entirely on changes in the intrinsic properties of (...) implementing material. As extraneous structure is not required for computation, a system can implement a program running on some but not all possible inputs. Dispositional computationalism thus permits episodes of computational activity that correspond to potential episodes of conscious awareness. The SSP cannot be motivated against this account, and so computationalism may be preserved. (shrink)

This article discusses contemporary response to the epistemic regress problem or Agrippa's trilemma. The epistemic regress problem is considered the most crucial in the entire theory of knowledge and it is a major concern for many contemporary epistemologists. However, only two of the three alternative solutions have been developed in any detail, foundationalism and coherentism. Infinitism was not seriously considered as a solution because of the finite-mind objection. This article also provides a brief evaluation of foundationalism, emergent coherentism, and infinitism.

Distinguishing mechanistic components from mere causally relevant background conditions remains a difficulty for mechanistic accounts of explanation. By distinguishing resources from mechanical parts, I argue that we can more effectively draw this boundary. Further, the distinction makes obvious that there are distinctive resource explanations which are not captured by a traditional part-based mechanistic account. While this suggests a straightforward extension of the mechanistic model, I argue that incorporating resources and resource explanations requires moving beyond the purely local account of levels (...) that some mechanists advocate. (shrink)

As the Pyrrhonians made clear, reasons that adequately justify beliefs can have only three possible structures: foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism. Infinitism—the view that adequate reasons for our beliefs are infinite and non-repeating—has never been developed carefully, much less advocated. In this paper, I will argue that only infinitism can satisfy two intuitively plausible constraints on good reasoning: the avoidance of circular reasoning and the avoidance of arbitrariness. Further, I will argue that infinitism requires serious, but salutary, revisions in our evaluation (...) of the power of reasoning. Thus, reasoning can not provide a basis for assenting to a proposition—where to assent to a proposition, p, means to believe that we know that p. A non-dogmatic form of provisional justification will be sketched. Finally, the best objections to infinitism, including those posed by the Pyrrhonians, will be shown (at least provisionally!) to be inadequate. (shrink)