This article describes a case study on the Machiguenga, a remote Indigenous tribe affected by the Camisea Gas Project in the Peru. We introduce the anthropological concept of ‘glocalization’ and integrate this with organizational knowledge of ‘identity work’. Our findings demonstrate that identity work is a multi-faceted and boundary spanning process that significantly affects stakeholder relations and contributes to conflict between local communities and oil and gas companies. Indigenous identity can be both threatened and strengthened in response to natural gas (...) development and is related to how individuals, communities and the Machiguenga engage in identity work. We also discuss broader implications for management ethics, including a discussion of how Indigenous self-identify processes create a challenge for stakeholder theory. (shrink)

Aulis Aarnio addresses the question of how legal interpretations should be justified. Aarnio considers a justification to be rational only if the justification process has been conducted in a rational way, and if the final result of this process is acceptable to the legal community. According to Aarnio, a theory concerning the justification of legal interpretations should contain a procedural component specifying the conditions of rationality for legal discussions, and a substantial component specifying the material conditions of acceptability for the (...) final result. The procedural component of Aarnio’s theory formulates rules for the rationality of legal discussions. The substantial component specifies when the result of a legal interpretation can be called acceptable. Aarnio considers such a result acceptable if it is acceptable to a particular legal community in which there is consensus with respect to certain norms and values. (shrink)

Epistemological disjunctivists make two strong claims about perceptual experience's epistemic value: experience guarantees the knowledgeable character of perceptual beliefs; experience's epistemic value is “reflectively accessible”. In this paper I develop a form of disjunctivism grounded in a presentational view of experience, on which the epistemic benefits of experience consist in the way perception presents the subject with aspects of her environment. I show that presentational disjunctivism has both dialectical and philosophically fundamental advantages over more traditional expositions. Dialectically, presentational disjunctivism resolves (...) a puzzle disjunctivists face in their posture vis-à-vis skeptical scenarios. More systematically, presentational disjunctivism provides an especially compelling view of disjunctivism as an internalist view of perceptual consciousness by explaining the way perceptual presence manifests the subject's rationality in a distinct way. (shrink)

Een van de recente ontwikkelingen binnen evolutiepsychologie is het onderzoek naar evolutionaire esthetica, of darwinistisch geïnspireerd onderzoek naar de kwalitatieve beoordeling van natuurlijke en artificiële stimuli. Esthetica wordt in de westerse traditie echter traditioneel vanuit filosofisch en speculatief oogpunt benaderd. Ik illustreer de ontwikkeling van evolutionaire esthetica binnen een groter kader van wetenschappelijk en empirisch onderzoek, en argumenteer dat schijnbare tegenstellingen zoals deze tussen objectiviteit en subjectiviteit in esthetische oordelen geen stand houden. De kritieken die ten aanzien van evolutionaire esthetica (...) worden geuit, gaan verkeerdelijk uit van de vermeende onverzoenbaarheid van de filosofische en wetenschappelijke studie van esthetica. One of the more recent developments in the field of evolutionary psychology is research on evolutionary aesthetics, otherwise stated: darwinian inspired inquiries into qualitative judgements of natural and aesthetic stimuli. Western thought traditionally approaches aesthetics from a philosophical and conjectural point of view. I illustrate the development of evolutionary aesthetics within a broader framework of scientific and empirical research, and argue that apparent contrasts such as objectivity and subjectivity in aesthetic judgement do not turn out to be valid. Critiques of evolutionary aesthetics wrongly assume the conflicting nature of philosophical and evolutionary aesthetics. (shrink)

Negative disjunctivists like Mike Martin and Bill Fish understand hallucinations in purely epistemic terms, and do not attribute phenomenal character to these visual misfires. However, the approaches by Martin and Fish are importantly different, and there has been little systematic work on how negative disjunctivism is motivated. In this paper, I argue for a version of negative disjunctivism that centers on the idea that perception involves the exercise of a fallible self-conscious capacity. I claim that this at once explains hallucinations (...) in purely negative terms that are close to Martin’s approach, while at the same time providing negative disjunctivism with an explanatory basis that Fish attempts to provide and Martin’s view lacks. (shrink)

In this contribution the prototypical argumentative patterns are discussed in which pragmatic argumentation is used in the context of legal justification in hard cases. First, the function and implementation of pragmatic argumentation in prototypical argumentative patterns in legal justification are addressed. The dialectical function of the different parts of the complex argumentation are explained by characterizing them as argumentative moves that are put forward in reaction to certain forms of critique. Then, on the basis of an exemplary case, the famous (...) Holy Trinity case, the way in which the U.S. Supreme Court uses pragmatic argumentation in this case is discussed by showing how the court instantiates general prototypical argumentative patterns in light of the institutional preconditions of the justification in the context of the specific case. (shrink)

According to epistemological disjunctivism (ED), ordinary perceptual experience ensures an opportunity for perceptual knowledge. In recent years, two distinct models of this idea have been developed. For Duncan Pritchard (Epistemological disjunctivism, 2012, Oxford University Press; Epistemic angst: Radical skepticism and the groundlessness of our believing, 2012, Princeton University Press), perception provides distinctly powerful reasons for belief. By contrast, Clayton Littlejohn (Journal of Philosophical Research, 41, 201; Knowledge first, 2017, Oxford University Press; Normativity: Epistemic and practical, 2018, Oxford University Press) and (...) Alan Millar (The nature and value of knowledge: Three investigations, 2010, Oxford University Press; Philosophical Issues, 21, 332) argue for a version of ED in terms of a “knowledge first” program, on which perception directly provides knowledge, without relying on antecedent reasons or justification. Specifically, both Littlejohn and Millar argue that “reasons first” ED faces a problematic regress. In this article, I defend “reasons first” ED by arguing that experience provides a type of reason that escapes the regress. I also argue that reasons are a fundamental aspect of ED, especially in its anti-skeptical stance. (shrink)

Job evaluation systems are becoming increasingly important in Europe to counter sex‐discrimination, but evaluation criteria can themselves be discriminatory. Dr Jeanne de Bruijn is Professor in Women and Policy at the Free University of Amsterdam.

This paper answers the question how pragmatic argumentation which occurs in a legal context, can be analyzed and evaluated adequately. First, the author surveys various ideas taken from argumentation theory and legal theory on the analysis and evaluation of pragmatic argumentation. Then, on the basis of these ideas, she develops a pragma-dialectical instrument for analyzing and evaluating pragmatic argumentation in a legal context. Finally she demonstrates how this instrument can be used by giving an exemplary analysis and evaluation of pragmatic (...) argumentation in a decision of the Dutch Supreme Court. (shrink)

Evolutionary psychology is among the various evolutionary and cognitive perspectives that have been used to account for the origins of art. It sets out to explain modern human psychology by means of the evolutionary history of the species, and by determining why and how our extant cognitive machinery evolved as adaptations to past environmental surroundings or by-products of such adaptations. In the case of art, evolutionary psychologists seek to track down its cognitive foundations and establish its evolutionary rationale, for instance (...) by determining which function artistic behaviour as a whole might have performed. However, several methodological issues and gaps currently impede evolutionary psychological research on art: empirical support is often lacking, adaptationist claims are not adequately substantiated, and the definition and scope of basic aspects of evolutionary psychology often remain underspecified. This paper reviews the central themes that evolutionary psychology currently advances to account for the emergence of visual arts, music and fiction, addresses the most relevant methodological issues, and provides some suggestions that might help to develop evolutionary research on art. (shrink)

In my paper I discuss belonging to a community as a lived experience aiming at interrogating with Hannah Arendt the dynamics of constituting or reshaping communities through action. The ungraspable »we« of communities allows for both constraining narratives and initiating new forms of belonging as a response to the need to belong. Acting together creates communities which can overturn the often painful experience of belonging to unbearable social units.

In this paper, I am arguing for hermeneutic responsibility in political judgment, as it can be attributed to Arendt’s work. Political judgment is reflective judgment relying on representation by imagination and therefore only has exemplary validity. Along the line of Arendt’s Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, I point out her argument for a different generality in politics than the generality of concepts. This generality of political judgment always refers back to the particular. Only by this reference to the particular, namely (...) to facts and situations of direct interaction, can the spectator, who undertakes the political judgment, create the public realm where action takes place. However, this task attributed to the spectator also implies the task of reshaping the public realm. These acts of giving an account of and reconsidering all over again facts handed over by narration and testimony imply the hermeneutic responsibility to unceasingly retrieve factual truth which is rooted in direct interaction. (shrink)

At the dawn of the Upper Palaeolithic era around 45,000 BP, Homo sapiens migrated into Europe. This process was accompanied by the extinction of Neanderthals, which has led many to believe that this species was cognitively and behaviorally inferior to anatomically modern humans. In recent years, however, this view has been challenged. This paper focuses on art and aesthetic practices among Neanderthals, as one of the exponents of modernity. It explores to what extent central cognitivist accounts of differences with Homo (...) sapiens are supported by both theoretical arguments and empirical evidence. The commonly cited cognitive capacity for symbolism may be less crucial for art than hitherto assumed, and several other variables, such as demography and ecology, adapt the mainstream idea that the crucial difference between Neanderthals and anatomically modern humans is of a cognitive nature. As such, Neanderthals may have been artists as well, challenging longstanding ideas about the uniqueness of our species. (shrink)

This essay proposes a review of the conceptual basis of the Complex Paradigm o Complex Thought. It reviews its core assumptions and give examples in the social sciences.

In this essay, some approaches towards the interpretation of language in the early thought of Heidegger are discussed, especially in Being and Time. Heidegger’s language can be understood by pointing out that he saw life as the main interest of philosophy, and questioned philosophy with regard to how it can determine itself. In contrast to Heidegger’s later writings, language is not the primary issue of discussion in the earlier period of his thinking. Therefore, different approaches to language need to be (...) taken. Language can be understood by following the existential analysis of Dasein , namely the interpretation of Rede . Further, the interpretations of Heidegger on Aristotle need to be discussed. As the Greeks had no word for language, the misleading interpretations of logos, dominating the history of philosophy, had an influence on the theory of language. Finally, taking account of prudence as a way to discover beings, another view on language can be found. In this approach to an understanding of language in the early thought of Heidegger, the manner of thinking about language is different to later approaches through poetry. There are traces of thinking about language in Being and Time and Heidegger’s earlier lectures. However, first of all, they have to be found. (shrink)

RESUMO A crítica de Hume ao contrato social admite um alcance para além do debate com o contratualismo de Locke: nosso autor tem em vista, sobretudo, desconstruir os princípios filosóficos que são a base da prática política dos Whigs. Uma vez que o contrato original organiza esses princípios, Hume se dedicará a analisá-lo em termos filosóficos e históricos, na tentativa de modernizar o pensamento político de sua época. ABSTRACT Hume's criticism of the social contract allows a range beyond the debate (...) with Locke's theory: our author aims mainly to deconstruct the philosophical principles that are the basis of the political practice of the Whigs. Since the original contract organizes these principles, Hume will be devoted to evaluating it in philosophical and historical terms, in an attempt to modernize the political thought of his time. (shrink)

« Le vieil original si intelligent, si fou » que Marcel Proust évoque à travers les autoportraits de Chardin, s'est-il dépeint lui-même sous le masque projectif du sage, dans l'un de ses tableaux les plus célèbres, le Philosophe du Louvre? Le maître de la nature morte, voulant s'élever dans la hiérarchie des rangs de I' Académie, a semble-t-il cherché, dans cette oeuvre de jeunesse, à suppléer à « son défaut d'instruction» dans «les humanités», par la représentation d'un personnage au goût (...) du jour, d'un moderne philosophe. Philosophe, Chimiste dans son laboratoire, Souffleur ou Philosophe occupé de sa lecture, le tableau du Louvre (1734) est-il un emblème? L'hypothèse retenue, que cette peinture donne figure à un philosophe chimiste et non à un charlatan ou à un alchimiste, se construit sur le rapprochement du tableau et du libelle anonyme intitulé Philosophe, mis en circulation d'après Voltaire dans les années 1730. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The Protestant Reformation in the sixteenth century fuelled heated debates about the nature and perception of spirits appearing to people. According to Protestant theology, apparitions of spirits were not souls of the dead but either diabolical illusions, natural phenomena, or ‘mere fantasies’ of a deluded mind. Swiss church minister Louis Lavater (1527–1586) emphasized that particularly melancholic people were prone to devilish deceits and thus inclined to imagine ghosts and other spirits. This paper traces the close connection between early modern (...) concepts of melancholy, imagination, and discourses on ghosts in then-normative perspectives before contrasting theological ideals and legal arguments raised in a 1681 Basel trial featuring an allegedly melancholic woman implicated in necromancy. This paper argues that scholarly discussions about imagination and melancholy regarding ghosts in Post-Reformation Switzerland were less concerned with ontological questions about the reality of ghostly phenomena than with possible sinful interactions with ghost, which in turn mirrored ideas about diabolical temptation. (shrink)

In this paper, I show how a concept of ethics can be derived from Hannah Arendt’s theory of action in The Human Condition , which contains from her call for action. When she looks at the ‘political actor’, as well as at the concept of ‘political situation’, her ethical claim is first of all the need to take initiative, to act. Hence, ‘political situations’ as she defines them are discussed as common responsibilities. But common responsibility is rooted in the in-between (...) of human beings, rather than in individual human nature and is determined by Arendt’s principle of humanity. Therefore, at the centre of an implicit Arendtian ethics stands the world and the in-between of human beings. (shrink)

In this paper I will present Arendt’s concept of judging as related to imagination. Her concept of judging is rooted in Kant’s philosophy, yet bears the potential for the political account of the particular. Inserted in the ongoing debate in intercultural philosophy, as of how to take into account particular circumstances, this paper offers an insight into moral judgment as a possible corrective to normative politics. Reflecting on lived politics through moral judgment in particular situations, this paper highlights the importance (...) of imagination and experience for individual decisions. Bearing as a horizon the intercultural debates it refers only to the question as of how particulars can be taken into account in a political intercultural debate. (shrink)

In this contribution the author develops an argumentation model for the reconstruction of weighing and balancing on the basis of teleological-evaluative considerations. The model is intended as a heuristic and critical tool for the rational reconstruction of the justification of judicial decisions. From the perspective of a rational discussion, it makes explicit the choices underlying the weighing and balancing on the basis of goals and values so that they can be made explicit and submitted to rational critique.

In this article the author develops a framework for a pragma-dialectical reconstruction of teleological argumentation in a legal context. Ideas taken from legal theory are integrated in a pragma-dialectical model for analyzing and evaluating argumentation, thus providing a more systematic and elaborate framework for assessing the quality of teleological arguments in a legal context. Teleological argumentation in a legal context is approached as a specific form of pragmatic argumentation. The legal criteria that are relevant for the evaluation of teleological argumentation (...) are discussed and translated in terms of critical questions that are relevant for the evaluation of the various forms of teleological argumentation. (shrink)

This paper argues that Habermas's conception of the rationality of moral and legal discussions has import for argumentation theorists interested in the rationality of public deliberations in politics and law. I begin with a survey of Haber mas's discourse theory and his criteria of rationality for moral and legal discourse. I then explain why, in his view, the forms of rational discourse in morality and law complement each other. My aim is to show how Habermas's account of this complementary relationship (...) opens up fruitful perspectives for argumentation theory. Specifically, his thought can stimulate research regarding, on the one hand, the ways in which legal procedures provide for presumptively rational resolutions of moral disputes and, on the other hand, the applicability of ideal argumentation-theoretic models to the legal field. I conclude with a proposal for integrating Habermas's ideas in a research program for legal argumentation. (shrink)

The author gives an analysis of the strategic manoeuvring in the justification of legal decisions from a pragma-dialectical perspective by showing how a judge tries to reconcile dialectical and rhetorical aims. On the basis of an analysis and evaluation of the argumentation given by the US Supreme Court in the famous Holy Trinity case, it is shown how in a case in which the judge wants to make an exception to a legal rule for the concrete case tries to meet (...) the dialectical reasonableness norm by seeing to it that his standpoint is sufficiently defended according to the requirements of the burden of proof of a judge in a rational critical discussion and how he tries at the same time to be rhetorically convincing for the legal audience by presenting the decision as a choice that is in line with the argumentation schemes and starting points that can be considered as accepted by the legal community in the US and by the US community as a whole. (shrink)

The paper presents a speculative model for associative memory. It has two layers: the lower layer describes memory of a single cell, the upper layer describes how the work is distributed address-free over a large set of cells. Thinking, consciousness and various features of memory are interpreted in terms of the memory model.

Epistemological disjunctivists hold that perceiving subjects have “reflective access” to factive perceptual support for belief. However, little has been done to elaborate the intended notion of reflection, or introspective awareness more generally. Moreover, critics have pointed out that the disjunctivist conception of “reflective access” can seem vulnerable to varieties of Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument. In this paper I defend disjunctivism from this charge, arguing that it holds the resources for a potent defense of the claim that knowledge of perceptual states is (...) luminous. Indeed, I argue that appreciating the relation between disjunctivism and luminosity sheds critical light on how the disjunctivist conceives of perceptual support for belief. (shrink)

In recent work, Scott Soames (2010, 2013, 2015, 2019) and Peter Hanks (2011, 2013, 2015) have developed a theory of propositions on which these are constituted by complexes of intellectual acts. In this article, I adapt this type of theory to provide an account of perceptual content. After introducing terminology in section 1, I detail the approach proffered by Soames and Hanks in section 2, focusing on Hanks’s version. In section 3, I introduce a problem that these theories face, namely, (...) how to account for the unity among the relevant intellectual acts. Section 4 provides an answer to this problem of unity, while section 5 explicates the relation to Soames and Hanks. In section 6, I extend the model to a theory of the unity of experiential consciousness. Finally, in section 7, I apply the preceding considerations to debates about the nature of perceptual representation. The upshot will be that experiential unity is not simply a phenomenal feature of consciousness, but central to an account of the role perceptual representation plays in perceptual cognition. (shrink)