El presente artículo tiene por objeto analizar la noción salesiana de ira desde una perspectiva filosófica, algo poco habitual entre sus intérpretes. Para ello, me propongo (1) primeramente encuadrar el tema a partir de la polémica de la filosofía antigua entre Séneca y Aristóteles sobre la moralidad de la ira y su valor antropológico, seguida de un análisis de la ira en Agustín de Hipona. Posteriormente (2), abordaré algunas consideraciones filosóficas de la ira realizadas por Francisco de Sales a través (...) de los autores griegos, medievales y monásticos con los que se relaciona su pensamiento. Finalmente, (3) haré una valoración general de la postura salesiana sobre el valor moral de la ira, poniendo de relieve que, sin tratarse de un pensador propiamente estoico, Francisco de Sales se desmarca a grandes rasgos de la postura aristotélica. (shrink)

This work aims to contribute new elements to the debate which took place in Tópicos, Revista de Filosofía between Ezequiel Téllez Maqueo and Jörg Alejandro Tellkamp about Thomas Aquinas’s theory of sensitive knowledge. The concepts of spiritus and immutatio spiritualis will be the key to solve the dilemma between the coherence or inconsistency of that theory.

"Un escritor ejemplar", texto de Hernando Téllez sobre Gómez Dávila, quizás una de las primeras aproximaciones hechas a una figura autoral que ya empezaba a despertar un profundo interés en la crítica literaria colombiana.

How we select, prepare, and support teachers has become a surprisingly common topic among journalists, politicians, and policymakers. Contemporary recommendations on teaching and teachers, whatever their intentions, fail to assess this deeply human activity from its historical roots. In _The Teaching Instinct: Explorations Into What Makes Us Human_, Kip Téllez invites us to reappraise teaching through a wide lens and argues that our capacity to teach is one part culture, two parts genetic. By rescuing the field of instinct psychology (...) from the margins, this challenging book explores topics as diverse as teaching in other species, teaching across human cultures, and the development of teaching in young children, finally drawing readers into a discussion about how our teaching instinct influences modern teacher learning, selection, and preparation. Drawing on disciplines as diverse as comparative biology, evolutionary psychology, and teacher education policy, Téllez warns us that ignoring or contradicting our teaching instinct results in unhappy teachers and dysfunctional school systems. (shrink)

What is the primary function of consciousness in the nervous system? The answer to this question remains enigmatic, not so much because of a lack of relevant data, but because of the lack of a conceptual framework with which to interpret the data. To this end, we have developed Passive Frame Theory, an internally coherent framework that, from an action-based perspective, synthesizes empirically supported hypotheses from diverse fields of investigation. The theory proposes that the primary function of consciousness is well-circumscribed, (...) serving the 'somatic nervous system[. For this system, consciousness serves as a frame that constrains and directs skeletal muscle output, thereby yielding adaptive behavior. The mechanism by which consciousness achieves this is more counterintuitive, passive, and “low level” than the kinds of functions that theorists have previously attributed to consciousness. Passive frame theory begins to illuminate (a) what consciousness contributes to nervous function, (b) how consciousness achieves this function, and (c) the neuroanatomical substrates of conscious processes. Our untraditional, action-based perspective focuses on olfaction instead of on vision and is 'descriptive' (describing the products of nature as they evolved to be) rather than 'normative' (construing processes in terms of how they should function). Passive frame theory begins to isolate the neuroanatomical, cognitive-mechanistic, and representational (e.g., conscious contents) processes associated with consciousness. (shrink)

Este trabajo cuestiona el supuesto carácter intuitivo o natural del escepticismo acerca del mundo externo. En §1 examinamos una versión del argumento escéptico que se sostiene a partir de dos principios: clausura del conocimiento e indiferencia. Para profundizar la postura que ha defendido Michael Williams, en §2 ofrecemos un examen novedoso de la argumentación escéptica cartesiana que nos permite establecer que en dos argumentos de esta estrategia argumentativa resulta claro que la presunta naturalidad que el escéptico reclama es falsa y (...) que, antes bien, para lograr su conclusión, necesita asumir compromisos con el realismo epistémico, es decir, con la tesis de que nuestras creencias se ubican al interior de una jerarquía epistemológica de acuerdo únicamente con su contenido y en abstracto. Finalmente, basados en argumentos de inspiración wittgensteiniana, en §3 mostramos cómo es que, en contra del realismo epistémico, cada creencia desempeña un papel justificativo según el contexto pertinente. (shrink)

The purpose of the paper is to cast doubt on the alleged intuitive or natural character of the skeptical argument about the external world. In §1, we examine a version of the skeptical argument based on the epistemic closure principle and the indifference principle. In §2, in order to deepen the view defended by Michael Williams, we offer a novel examination of the Cartesian skeptical argumentation to show that it is clear that the alleged naturalness claimed by the skeptic is (...) nowhere to be found in two arguments which can be found in such argumentative strategy; moreover, to reach her conclusion, the skeptic needs to commit to epistemological realism, namely, the claim that each of our beliefs belongs to an epistemological hierarchy based solely on its content. In §3, based on arguments inspired by Wittgenstein, contra epistemological realism, we show how each belief has a justificatory role based on its context. (shrink)

El contexto actual de las desigualdades sociales en Latinoamérica cuestiona y, al mismo tiempo, desafía el escenario de la educación superior en la búsqueda de procesos de transformación social. Estos desafíos se comprenden, en el marco de esta ponencia, desde la justicia educativa, entendida como la posibilidad de acceso con calidad a la enseñanza-aprendizaje como consecuencia de prácticas individuales y acciones colectivas. A partir de este panorama, y desde una reflexión teórica, se intentan identificar los aportes que ofrece la perspectiva (...) pedagógica y filosófica de la Fundación Universitaria Claretiana en su apuesta de educación superior de frontera, con mirada humanista, liberadora, crítica y contextual, como respuesta a las aspiraciones que tienen aquellas comunidades que afrontan realidades de pobreza, exclusión y violencia sociopolítica, especialmente indígenas, afrodescendientes y campesinas, de acceder a una universidad que se ajuste a su contexto y dinámicas de vida; no obstante, las exigencias del modelo socioeconómico y del sistema educativo en particular dificultan su materialización. (shrink)

Está escrito que escribe ensayísticamente el que compone experimentando, el que vuelve, interroga, palpa, examina y atraviesa el objeto de su reflexión. Por ser así, la escritura ensayística está presente en novelas, cuentos, poemas y en mayor grado en los ensayos. El parecido de la escritura ensayística con el "pensar" es evidente. Exceptuando al monologo interior –hallazgo de la narrativa– no hay ninguna escritura que se asemeje más al fluir del pensamiento.

Les philosophes écrivent avec une aisance surprenante, presque sans retenue pourrait-on dire. Par ailleurs, ils semblent faire usage d’une force d’affirmation qui peut paraître énigmatique. Ils sont ainsi portés à soutenir des choses qui vont contre le sens commun, qui sont même manifestement fausses, mais jouissent malgré tout de prestige et de légitimité. On ajoutera que peu d’entre eux sont enclins à s’expliquer clairement sur ce qui les fait philosopher. Eh bien, entrons dans l’ambiance, dans l’état psychologique et intime où (...) se forge une philosophie. On y découvrira peut-être l’une des plus anciennes formes d’addiction psychique. Quelle est alors la drogue philosophique ? Plus précisément, en quelle manière la philosophie peut-elle relever d’une ivresse, d’un vertige comparable à un état narcotique ? Bien entendu, il faut s’empresser de relever la part d’humour de cette approche. Elle n’en est pas moins utile, car elle aide à s’approprier le geste philosophique. La philosophie pourrait ainsi se défaire de son visage d’aristocratie intellectuelle. (shrink)

Un philosophe devient célèbre à vingt-neuf ans, avec un livre, La Barbarie à visage humain, qui se présente comme le manifeste d’une « nouvelle philosophie ». L’affaire déchaîne les passions. Quelle sorte de bombe est cet ouvrage? Par la suite, tous ses essais philosophiques font scandale. Ce philosophe fait de l’édition, du journalisme, du grand reportage, du roman, du théâtre, des films, de l’humanitaire, de la politique, de la diplomatie... Il s’est lancé au secours des persécutés, célèbres ou anonymes. Il (...) incarne un phénomène singulier, médiatique, sociologique, culturel, peut-être même historique, matière d’une glose infinie pour les analystes. Le phénomène se nomme « BHL ». « BHL » est le nom d’un phénomène. Il définit sa philosophie comme une guerre. A quoi peut bien ressembler une philosophie guerrière? Il était intéressant de faire le point sur cette question. (shrink)

Barrero, Tomás Andrés. “Aserción, expresión y acción. Una lectura de J. L. Austin.” Dianoia 60.74 (2015): 81-107.

Using 10 women's narratives, participant observation, archival research, and a focus group, this article analyzes women's social activism in a settler community in northern Mexico near the border. I argue that women's activism and emerging political consciousness provides a lens through which women critique structural violence and intimate partner violence and that ultimately provides new women-centered subjectivities. This article contributes to gender and social movements literature by examining the generation of a political consciousness engendered from women's grounded experience of living (...) on the U.S./mexico border. Furthermore, despite the unique sociopolitical conditions of the border, this article demonstrates that border residents have the agency to challenge, and more importantly, change their situation. (shrink)

Resumen La mayoría de los comentarios y estudios tradicionales sobre Tomás de Aquino, como los que han predominado en la escolástica y la neoescolástica, se han caracte rizado por el intelectualismo de su pensamiento basado principalmente, aunque no exclusivamente, en la primacía ontológica del intelecto sobre la voluntad; en la afir mación de la ignorancia como una de las causas primordiales del mal actuar, y en la existencia de una facultad como la voluntad que tiende a seguir el juicio de (...) la razón. En los últimos cincuenta años, sin embargo, esta interpretación ha sido revisada crí ticamente poniendo a la luz de los textos el valor de la voluntad en la antropología y la ética de Tomás de Aquino. Sin tratar de negar la presencia de elementos intelec- tualistas en su obra, el objetivo de este trabajo es reflexionar en torno a la existencia de cierto voluntarismo psicológico de santo Tomás con base en el papel que ejerce la voluntad en la realización del mal moral.Most of the studies and commentaries on Thomas Aquinas such as those made from the scholastic and neo-scholastic perspective have emphasized the intelectualism of his thought. This intelectualism is based mainly but non exclusively on the ontologicalprimacy of the intellect over the will, on the affirmation that the ignorance is one of the pivotal causes of evil actions, and on the fact that the will tends to follow the judgment of reason. Over the last fifty years, however, this reading has been the object of a critical revision by bringing to light in the texts the value of the will in Ethics and Philosophical Anthropology of Thomas Aquinas. Without the least intention of questioning the presence of intelectualist elements in his works, the aim of this paper is to reflect on some kind of psychological voluntarism in Thomas Aquinas, grounded on the role of the will in realiging the moral evil. (shrink)

This paper focuses in the panorama and diagnosis that Frochaux outlines in his text L’homme Seul about culture and civilization as distancing of man with respect to nature. Such idea is resumed in his theses “The history is biology engrafted on the geographical.” For the author one of the several consequences of this situation is that such distancing was consolidated and arts were stagnated, just as the progress made profane all the reality and all mystery and holiness vanished from it. (...) The canon disappeared. Reality was divided between the sacred and the profane; profane was all that was conquered by man, sacred all unconquered by man. So history could be perceived as the permanent struggle between sacred and profane. The distancing is promoted by society’s eagerness for material development. Linked with it, progress has generated in us some guilt. Progress implies guilt, as a fatality. For man, distancing from the animal world where was created, is the price that should be paid for becoming the man of today, erected as the centre of all creation. But one could ask watching the ways of the current world: ¿Was not such that was lost more valuable that such that was won? ¿Was that rupture and distancing from the natural and animal world worthy of the society we now have? This betrayal of man to both nature and animals creates him a permanent guilt, guilt that do not disappears despite the progress achieved by him. This guilt is the original guilt. Seeking putting himself above the natural and animal world man believes he is superior. But man has only refined the animal skills and has used them for the destruction of nature and the animal world. All that is animal is extremely multiplied when transformed into human. Man is a synthesis of a little bit of all animals. But no animal species makes war among its own members as man do. Frochaux faces history, economics and arts with all these theses, leaving on us a strong feeling of scepticism. (shrink)

Resumen William James hace del sentimiento de esfuerzo un elemento característico del querer; de modo que su presencia sería señal indiscutible de que se trata de un acto propiamente voluntario, y su ausencia una prueba de que la voluntad estaría faltando. Esta consideración aún vigente ha contribuido a la afirmación de que el poder de la voluntad depende del mayor o menor esfuerzo para ejecutar un acto: de donde, a mayor esfuerzo, mayor voluntad. El propósito de este artículo es mostrar (...) que una consideración de la voluntad en estos términos está en desacuerdo con la perspectiva de Tomás de Aquino, el cual enseña la existencia de actos voluntarios que no cuestan trabajo. Como consecuencia de la postura aquiniana, la popular creencia de que los actos más valiosos son los más difíciles termina siendo cuestionable.William James puts forth the feeling of effort as an essential feature of the mil ¿n such a way that its presence would be an undeniable sign of a voluntary act, and its absence proves that the mil is missing. This historically accepted consideration has contributed to the prevailing assumption that the power of will depends on the more or less effort to execute an act: the more effort one puts into operation, the more will one have. The purpose of this article is to show a consideration of the will according to these terms disagree with Thomas Aquinas's vision, who teaches that there are voluntary actions that don't take hard work. As a result of the aquinian stance, the common belief that the most valuable actions are the most difficult ends up being disputable. (shrink)

En este breve comentario discuto algunos aspectos de la interpretación de la epistemología de Davidson que sugiere Willian Duica en su reciente libro. Luego de una presentación somera del libro me centro en tres asuntos centrales de la interpretación de Duica. En primer lugar, argumento que su lectura de la crítica de Davidson al dualismo esquema/contenido es muy restrictiva y deja abierta la posibilidad de un realismo directo empirista. En segundo lugar, argumento que en su lectura el propio Duica se (...) compromete inadvertidamente con un empirismo de este tipo y, de este modo, su interpretación entra en tensión con el coherentismo de Davidson. Finalmente, discuto algunos aspectos de la interpretación que hace Duica de la tesis davidsoniana de la triangulación. In this short comment I discuss some aspects of William Duica's interpretation of Davidson's epistemology in a recent book. After a brief review of the book, I focus on three central issues of Duica's interpretation. First, I argue that his reading of Davidson's criticism of the scheme/content dualism is too restrictive and leaves open the possibility of an empiricist direct realism. Second, I argue in his reading Duica inadvertently commits himself to an empiricism of this sort and, as a result, his interpretation is in tension with Davidson's own coherentism. Finally, I discuss some aspects of Duica's interpretation of Davidsonian triangulation. (shrink)

La religión es un tema apasionante, aunque sembrado por escollos. Si bien el estudio de su constitución, finalidad y pertinencia ha sido emprendido por diferentes campos de investigación, gran parte de sus más significativos aportes no consiguen más que rebatirse entre sí. Esta investigación, que aborda los planteamientos principales del filósofo estadounidense Daniel Dennett sobre el tema de la religión como fenómeno natural en contraste con los planteamientos de distinguidos filósofos de la religión, tiene como propósito señalar terrenos menos inhóspitos (...) en medio del debate en los que sea posible, haciendo una apuesta interdisciplinar, una comprensión menos conflictiva de la religión que pueda franquear esos límites que se le imponen a veces de manera tan concluyente ya sea por parte de las certezas científicas, de los postulados biologicistas, o incluso de las especulaciones metafísicas de algunas formulaciones teológicas. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Daniel Whiting has argued that there are no exclusionary reasons (i.e., second-order reasons not to act for a reason). The premise of the argument is what he calls the motivation constraint, according to which for the fact that p to be a reason for you to ϕ, it must be possible for you to ϕ for the reason that p. However, the argument goes, it is not possible to act (or not to act) for a reason (...) for a reason. Therefore, he concludes, there are no second-order reasons. In this paper, I shall argue that Whiting's argument ought to be rejected. Thus, I will argue that we should not accept the motivation constraint on which it is based. It is true that for the fact that p to be a reason for you to ϕ, it must be possible for you to ϕ guided in the right way by the consideration that p favours you ϕing. However, I shall argue that it is possible for exclusionary reasons to guide us in the right way, even if it not possible for us to not to ϕ for a reason for a reason. (shrink)

By promising, requesting and commanding we can give ourselves and each other reasons for acting as promised, requested, and commanded. Call this our capacity to give reasons robustly. According to the triggering account, we give reasons robustly simply by manipulating the factual circumstances in a way that triggers pre-existing reasons. Here I claim that we ought to reject the triggering account. By focusing on David Enoch’s sophisticated articulation of it, I argue that it is overinclusive; it cannot adequately distinguish between (...) threats and robust reason-giving; and it cannot adequately explain why epistemic reasons cannot be robustly given. I suggest that when we give reasons robustly, we do so directly, without explanatory intermediaries. (shrink)

Mark Greenberg argues that legal obligations are those moral obligations created by the actions of legal institutions in the legally proper way. Here I defend three main claims. First, I argue that, although very often misunderstood, Joseph Raz is also a defender of MITL. Secondly, I argue that while both Greenberg and Raz are committed to MITL, they disagree about the conditions under which a moral obligation can be said to be created in the legally proper way. Finally, I argue (...) that Raz’s variant of MITL is better than Greenberg’s. It rests on a more plausible account of authority and it avoids one of the crucial defects threatening Greenberg’s view, namely, its overinclusiveness. (shrink)

Passive frame theory attempts to illuminate what consciousnessis, in mechanistic and functional terms; it does not address the “implementation” level of analysis (how neurons instantiate conscious states), an enigma for various disciplines. However, in response to the commentaries, we discuss how our framework provides clues regarding this enigma. In the framework, consciousness is passive albeit essential. Without consciousness, there would not be adaptive skeletomotor action.

In this paper I first present Dan Korman’s (2015) recent defence of a conservative view as regards the existence and composition of material objects, and then go on to criticize some of his arguments. I will focus on two related issues: on the one hand, I argue that his defense of that kind of view by making use of what he calls “arguments from counterexamples” has some metaontological presuppositions that are indeed unacceptable for someone defending the revisionist views he opposes; (...) on the other hand, I also claim that his defence of the epistemic authority of the singular intuitions allegedly backing some key premisses in those arguments is also flawed, as it seems to be in tension with his realist commitments. (shrink)

A novel theoretical framework for an embodied, non-representational approach to language that extends and deepens enactive theory, bridging the gap between sensorimotor skills and language. -/- Linguistic Bodies offers a fully embodied and fully social treatment of human language without positing mental representations. The authors present the first coherent, overarching theory that connects dynamical explanations of action and perception with language. Arguing from the assumption of a deep continuity between life and mind, they show that this continuity extends to language. (...) Expanding and deepening enactive theory, they offer a constitutive account of language and the co-emergent phenomena of personhood, reflexivity, social normativity, and ideality. Language, they argue, is not something we add to a range of existing cognitive capacities but a new way of being embodied. Each of us is a linguistic body in a community of other linguistic bodies. The book describes three distinct yet entangled kinds of human embodiment, organic, sensorimotor, and intersubjective; it traces the emergence of linguistic sensitivities and introduces the novel concept of linguistic bodies; and it explores the implications of living as linguistic bodies in perpetual becoming, applying the concept of linguistic bodies to questions of language acquisition, parenting, autism, grammar, symbol, narrative, and gesture, and to such ethical concerns as microaggression, institutional speech, and pedagogy. (shrink)

In our research, we examine the efforts made by Latin American business schools in the last decade to deliver a value-based education. We carry out a survey with a sample of faculty members and program directors from the whole region. We find that societal demands influenced the direction of managerial education toward values and social responsibility, changing contents and teaching methodologies in the process. Our research shows that the teaching of value-based contents—social responsibility, business ethics and environmental sustainability—has gained ground (...) in the region in the last decade, and that the emphasis on value-based contents goes hand-in-hand with a more intensive use of active learning methodologies—the case method in particular. From the perspective of respondents, the emphasis on active learning seems to correlate positively with observed changes in students’ civility. (shrink)

This volume brings together this new knowledge in a single, concise source, covering most if not all of the basic questions regarding human action: What are the ...

I consider some of the objections that have been raised against a conceptualist solution to the “grounding problem”, I address in particular two objections that I call Conceptual Validity and Instantiation, and I attempt to answer them on behalf of the conceptualist. My response, in a nutshell, is that the first of these objections fails because it ascribes to the conceptualist some commitments that do not really follow from the view’s basic insight, while the second objection also fails because it (...) denies the conceptualist resources that the alternative positions are allowed to use. (shrink)

El artículo que sigue fue publicado originalmente con el título "Causation" en el Journal of Philosophy 70.17 : 556-567, y luego reimpreso en Lewis, D. Philosophical Papers. Vol. II. Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1986. 159-172. Esta traducción se publica conla autorización del Journal of Philosophy y de Oxford University Press.Querría agradecer aquí a Santiago Erpen, María José García Encinas,Diego Morales y Carolina Sartorio por diversos comentarios y sugerencias que me han permitido, espero, mejorar la traducción.

Let ${\cal I}$ be an ideal on ω. By cov${}_{}^{\rm{*}}$ we denote the least size of a family ${\cal B} \subseteq {\cal I}$ such that for every infinite $X \in {\cal I}$ there is $B \in {\cal B}$ for which $B\mathop \cap \nolimits X$ is infinite. We say that an AD family ${\cal A} \subseteq {\cal I}$ is a MAD family restricted to${\cal I}$ if for every infinite $X \in {\cal I}$ there is $A \in {\cal A}$ such that $|X\mathop (...) \cap \nolimits A| = \omega$. Let a$\left$ be the least size of an infinite MAD family restricted to ${\cal I}$. We prove that If $max${a,cov${}_{}^{\rm{*}}\}$ then a$\left = {\omega _1}$, and consequently, if ${\cal I}$ is tall and $\le {\omega _2}$ then a$\left = max$ {a,cov${}_{}^{\rm{*}}\}$. We use these results to prove that if c$\le {\omega _2}$ then o$= \overline o$ and that as$= max${a,non$\}$. We also analyze the problem whether it is consistent with the negation of CH that every AD family of size ω1 can be extended to a MAD family of size ω1. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that two claims usually included in any minimally detailed presentation of the epistemic closure principle are inconsistent, namely, that closure explains how we extend our knowledge through deduction and that it is different from another epistemic principle, to wit, transmission. The attempt to offer a correct diagnosis of reasonings such as the one involved in Dretke’s zebra case is an instance of a discussion in which the distinction takes part. My argument has the following structure. (...) First, I introduce the distinction between closure and transmission following the standard presentation. Second, I introduce the main motivations behind the principles; in particular, I establish that the main motivation behind closure consists in explaining the phenomenon of the advancement of knowledge through deductive reasoning. Third, based on the identification of a restriction on any plausible formulation of closure capable of explaining the phenomenon aforementioned, I cast doubts on the distinction between this principle and transmission. I conclude that any formulation of the epistemic principle of closure which satisfies its main motivation collapses into the epistemic principle of transmission. (shrink)

Reflective essay focusing on a discussion with third grade students over the nature of observation on determining if something is real or fantasy. The problems of illusions, specifically magic tricks, is a central issue in the discussion.