Book 1. Volume I, Greece and Rome ; Volume II, Augustine to Scotus ; Volume III, Ockham to Suarez.

Aquinas' thought is of more than historical interest. There is a large group of contemporary philosophers, the Thomists, who draw inspiration from his writings. Indeed, strange as it may sound, his influence is greater today than it was during the Middle Ages. This book attempts to explain Aquinas' philosophical ideas in a way which can be understood by those who are unacquainted with medieval thought. And where possible, it relates these ideas to problems as discussed today. In a final chapter (...) something is said about the development of Thomism in modern times. (shrink)

Philosophy in Russia covers its subject broadly and in detail from the eighteenth century to Lenin and beyond into the post-Stalin period. It offers a continuous history of the development of philosophical thought in Russia, and portraits of individual and influential thinkers. The author devotes careful analysis to radicals such as Bakunin, Herzen, Chernyshevsky and Lavrov, and to the Marxists such as Plekhanov and Lenin. He also discusses the thought of writers such as Kireevsky, Leontiev and Solovyev, and examines the (...) philosophically relevant ideas of Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. He also discusses Russian thinkers in exile, such as Berdyaev, Frank, N. O. Lossky and Shestov.For historical reasons philosophical thought in Russia has tended to become socially or politically committed thought. To what extent genuine philosophical thought has proved to be compatible with the monopoly enjoyed by Marxism-Leninism in the fields of education and publishing is a crucial question discussed in this authoritative study. (shrink)

In an essay on pantheism Schopenhauer observes that his chief objection against it is that it says nothing, that it simply enriches language with a superfluous synonym of the word “world.” It can hardly be denied that by this remark the great pessimist, who was himself an atheist, scored a real point. For if a philosopher starts off with the physical world and proceeds to call it God, he has not added anything to the world except a label, a label (...) which, if we take into account the ordinary significance of the word “God,” might well appear unnecessary and superfluous: one might just as pertinently say that the world is the world as that the world is God. Neither the Jew nor the Christian nor the Moslem understand by “God” the physical world, so that, if someone calls the physical world God, he cannot be taken to mean that the world is God according to the Jewish or Christian or Moslem understanding of God. Does he mean any more than that the physical world is ultimately self-explanatory, that no Cause external to the world, no transcendent Being is requisite or admissible, i.e. that there is no God? If that were all there is in pantheism, the latter would indeed be indistinguishable from atheism, and those who called Spinoza an atheist would be fully justified. (shrink)

"Revision and enlargement of Medieval philosophy... published in 1952." Bibliography : p. [347]-381.

As we all know, in Freddie Ayer's famous book Language, Truth and Logic metaphysics received short shrift. Metaphysical assertions were dismissed as being all nonsensical . In the work in question Ayer clearly tended to equate metaphysics with what Professor W. H. Walsh was to describe as ‘transcendent’ metaphysics . This tendency is also discernible, I think, in the 1949 debate between Ayer and myself on logical positivism. After all, my defence of metaphysics was largely prompted and certainly strengthened by (...) what I believed to be the religious relevance of metaphysical philosophy. A lot of what Aristotle would have described as ‘first philosophy’ and what some later philosophers would have classified as ‘ontology’ Ayer would have called ‘philosophical analysis’. What he was primarily concerned with undermining was any claim by metaphysicians to be able to extend our knowledge of what exists, of the Absolute or God for example, by metaphysical arguments. (shrink)

F. C. Copleston; XIV*—The Logical Empiricism of Nicholas of Autrecourt, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 74, Issue 1, 1 June 1974, Pages 249–262.

Classic introduction provides readers with insightful, accessible survey of major philosophical trends and thinkers of the Middle Ages--from the thought of Thomas Aquinas and the Averroists to Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. "A better conspectus of medieval philosophy than this would be difficult to conceive ... a notable achievement." The Tablet (London).

Previous ed. published under title: Aquinas. Bibliography: p. 265-267. Includes index.

In the preface to his Philosophy of Right Hegel maintains that a philosophy is its own time apprehended in thought. It is not the philosopher's business to create an imaginary world of his own. His task is to understand the present and actual as subsuming the past in itself, as the culmination of a process of development.

To treat existentialism as a philosophy is no more possible than to treat idealism as a philosophy. The reason is obvious. Jean-Paul Sartre is an existentialist and Gabriel Marcel is also an existentialist; but the philosophy of Sartre is not the same as the philosophy of Marcel. One can no more speak of the philosophy of Kierkegaard, Jaspers, Heidegger, Sartre, Marcel and Berdyaev, as though they maintained the same system, than one could speak of the philosophy of Plato, Berkeley and (...) Hegel, as though one philosophy was common to the three thinkers. Of course, if one took idealism in the sense in which the Marxist uses the term, as meaning the doctrine that mind is prior to matter, i.e. as opposed to materialism , one would have a definite theme to consider; but one would be forced to recognize as idealists thinkers who would never call themselves by that name and who would not be generally recognized as such. Similarly, if one said that existentialism is the doctrine that man is free and that what he makes of himself depends on himself, on his free choices, one would doubtless have mentioned a doctrine which is common to the existentialists and which they insist upon; but one would at the same time be forced to include in the ranks of the existentialists philosophers whose inclusion would be manifestly absurd. (shrink)

v. 1. I problemi della filosofia, di E. Agazzi et al.

The author, using bertrand russell's "human knowledge": "it's scope and limits", makes a point of departure where russell distinguishes between "meaning" and "significance." the author contends that in using these distinctions in a metaphysical argument, his purpose is not to show whether or not the argument is possible, but to show the problem of validity of metaphysical arguments as the remaining fundamental problem in regards to metaphysics. (staff).

"Between them, the movements of Logical Postivism and Existentialism dominated philosophy in Europe for much of the last century, and the influence they exerted can still be felt today. In his widely acclaimed Contemporary Philosophy, Frederick Copleston provides a detailed and objective introduction to these two highly controversial areas of recent thought. Originally written in 1956, and revised in 1972, this book explores the work of many of the most important thinkers of the 20th century, including Ayer, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Sartre (...) and Camus." "Written in a clear and accessible style, this book will prove invaluable to anyone looking for a general introduction to either of these fascinating and influential philosophical movements."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved. (shrink)

IT HAS OFTEN BEEN STATED that Nietzsche's predominantly aphoristic style of writing militated against the construction of any system analogous to those of Spinoza and Hegel. The statement is doubtless true. But it is essential to add that Nietzsche had no wish to construct such a system. Spinoza was convinced that the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things; and Hegel believed that the rational is the real and the real the rational. (...) Nietzsche, however, had no such conviction or belief. Hence it would be rather misleading to say that he "failed" to construct a system comparable to those of Spinoza or Hegel. (shrink)

Many people who have never read the works of Nietzsche possess some vague notion of what he taught. For them the philosophy of Nietzsche is represented by a few floating ideas—“Superman,” “Will to Power,” and even perhaps “blond beast.” Others again have learnt a little more about Nietzsche and perhaps read something of what he actually said; yet the net result is an impression of a passionate and destructive thinker, who launched his attacks on this side and on that, without (...) any regard for consistency. For them there can be no philosophy of Nietzsche: they know that he often wrote in the form of aphorism and they picture his thought in general as a series of detached utterances, many of which are mutually exclusive. It may then be of use to some, if we attempt to set forth the guiding inspiration and leading ideas of Nietzsche, for when these have been grasped, it will be seen that it is by no means absurd to speak of a philosophy of Nietzsche. It may well be impossible to reconcile all his utterances, at least so far as the words are concerned—though Nietzsche is of course not the only philosopher who betrays inconsistency in his thought—but it should be remembered that Nietzsche was not given to standing still: his thought developed. Moreover, he often spoke in an exaggerated form, so that some of the apparent inconsistencies may be ascribed to over-emphasis. In any case, even granting the presence of irreconcilable inconsistencies in his thought, Nietzsche's various theories not only may, but must, be seen as a whole, if they are seen in the light of his guiding ideas and inspiration. (shrink)

Many people who have never read the works of Nietzsche possess some vague notion of what he taught. For them the philosophy of Nietzsche is represented by a few floating ideas—“Superman,” “Will to Power,” and even perhaps “blond beast.” Others again have learnt a little more about Nietzsche and perhaps read something of what he actually said; yet the net result is an impression of a passionate and destructive thinker, who launched his attacks on this side and on that, without (...) any regard for consistency. For them there can be no philosophy of Nietzsche: they know that he often wrote in the form of aphorism and they picture his thought in general as a series of detached utterances, many of which are mutually exclusive. It may then be of use to some, if we attempt to set forth the guiding inspiration and leading ideas of Nietzsche, for when these have been grasped, it will be seen that it is by no means absurd to speak of a philosophy of Nietzsche. It may well be impossible to reconcile all his utterances, at least so far as the words are concerned—though Nietzsche is of course not the only philosopher who betrays inconsistency in his thought—but it should be remembered that Nietzsche was not given to standing still: his thought developed. Moreover, he often spoke in an exaggerated form, so that some of the apparent inconsistencies may be ascribed to over-emphasis. In any case, even granting the presence of irreconcilable inconsistencies in his thought, Nietzsche's various theories not only may, but must, be seen as a whole, if they are seen in the light of his guiding ideas and inspiration. (shrink)