Malkani, G. R. Ajñāna.--Das, R. The theory of ignorance in Advaitism.--Murti, T. R. V. Ajñāna.

Hans KELSEN, le plus célèbre philosophe du droit issu du rang des juristes, est surtout connu pour avoir fondé une école juridique (l'Ecole de Vienne) qui radicalise la doctrine du positivisme juridique. Il a défendu, sa vie durant, une conception normativiste du droit et la thèse d'une stricte séparation entre le droit et la science du droit. Si l'on connaît bien en France son ouvrage programmatique sur la Théorie pure du droit, dans sa deuxième édition traduite par Charles Eisenmann, on (...) sait au moins que cette seconde édition, publiée en 1960, n'est pas l'expression définitive de sa pensée. La traduction de la Théorie générale des normes, qui est un ouvrage posthume et inachevé, donne au lecteur français l'occasion de découvrir cette pensée dans ses derniers développements qui rompent en partie avec ceux de l'œuvre précédente. Le Maître viennois y poursuit l'analyse de la norme juridique, entamée dans la Théorie pure du droit, mais il l'approfondit sur certains points et l'infléchit sur d'autres. Il introduit ainsi de nouvelles réflexions sur la signification de la norme et sur ses fonctions, sur l'application et l'interprétation de la norme et également sur le rapport entre la norme et le langage, insistant notamment sur la distinction entre la norme et l'énoncé sur la norme. Par ailleurs, il considère la religion et le droit comme deux ordres normatifs similaires, ce qui le conduit à proposer une théorie vraiment " générale " des normes et non pas seulement une théorie juridique des normes. Il avance une nouvelle interprétation de la norme fondamentale en recourant à l'idée de fiction juridique. Enfin, dans la dernière partie du livre, Kelsen donne le dernier état de sa pensée sur le problème majeur de l'application de la logique au droit. Rompant avec son logicisme antérieur, il nie l'existence d'une logique spécifique au droit et conteste l'application de la logique syllogistique au processus d'application du droit, renouant ainsi avec un volontarisme juridique qu'il avait rejeté au début de son œuvre. Dans cet ouvrage, sous couvert de bâtir une théorie générale des normes, Kelsen construit une théorie de l'interprétation des normes. Il propose donc une herméneutique juridique originale qui intéressera tous ceux qui étudient les sciences normatives (juristes, mais aussi théologiens et spécialistes de l'éthique). Il engage un dialogue avec les représentants anglo-américains de la philosophie du droit, de l'éthique ou de la logique, et il renoue le dialogue avec les auteurs influents à Vienne au début du siècle. (shrink)

This paper responds to the issues raised by D. Chalmers by offering a research direction which is quite radical because of the way in which methodological principles are linked to scientific studies of consciousness. Neuro-phenomenology is the name I use here to designate a quest to marry modern cognitive science and a disciplined approach to human experience, thereby placing myself in the lineage of the continental tradition of Phenomenology. My claim is that the so-called hard problem that animates these Special (...) Issues can only be addressed productively by gathering a research community armed with new pragmatic tools for the development of a science of consciousness. I will claim that no piecemeal empirical correlates, nor purely theoretical principles, will really help us at this stage. We need to turn to a systematic exploration of the only link between mind and consciousness that seems both obvious and natural: the structure of human experience itself. In what follows I motivate my choice by briefly examining the current debate about consciousness at the light of Chalmer’s hard problem. Next, I outline the phenomenological strategy. Finally I conclude by discussing some of the main difficulties and consequences of this strategy. (shrink)

With fascinating historical anecdotes and incisive scientific analysis, this important work combines ancient thought with modern theory to reveal a new way of viewing our universe that can expand our awareness, our lives, and may well point the way to a new science for the twenty-first century.

In this article, the author uses his recent experience of organ transplantation as the basis for reflection on phenomenologically-derived notions of lived experience, temporality, selfhood and medical ethics.

Peirce and Frege both distinguished between the propositional content of an assertion and the assertion of a propositional content, but with different notational means. We present a modification of Peirce’s graphical method of logic that can be used to reason about assertions in a manner similar to Peirce’s original method. We propose a new system of Assertive Graphs, which unlike the tradition that follows Frege involves no ad hoc sign of assertion. We show that axioms of intuitionistic logic can be (...) derived from AGs, and argue that AGs analyse and represent assertions and illocutionary content in a way which is motivated both by its logical properties and its historical connection with the ideas that led to the development of the graphical method. (shrink)

This is a first attempt at the philosophical articulation and projection of the Igbo concept of law and the role of law in the traditional environment. In the Igbo traditional setting, the rules of law are uncodified. The author, who teaches philosophy of law and logic at the University of Nigeria, defines the law of a given community as the body of rules recognised as binding by its members. On this concept of law, he has based his attempt to elucidate (...) the philosophical underpinning of those rules recognised in Igbo traditional legal system as law. Unless the philosphical foundation is understood, the traditional law, machinery for enforcement, and legislative and judicial processes may appear incomprehensible. The first part gives a descriptive insight into the moral, religious, socio-political and legal background of the Igbo. The second part is devoted to the fundamental questions concerning the concept of law, the various types of laws, the reciprocal influence between law and Igbo religion and the end of laws. Finally, the author examines the nature of right in Igbo traditional thought and locates the philosophical background. (shrink)

Globalization; Islamic countries; Arab countries.

Objective: To pilot informed consent materials developed for Aboriginal parents in a vaccine trial, and evaluate their design and the informed consent process.Methods: Cross sectional quantitative and qualitative survey of 20 Aboriginal and 20 non-Aboriginal women in Alice Springs. Information about the proposed research was presented to Aboriginal participants by an Aboriginal researcher, using purpose designed verbal, visual, and written materials. Non-Aboriginal participants received standard materials developed by the sponsor. Questionnaires were used to evaluate recall and understanding immediately and five (...) days later. Qualitative analysis of Aboriginal participants’ interviews was performed.Results: There were no differences between the groups in understanding of diseases prevented by the vaccine, the potential risks of participating, or the voluntary nature of participation. Most Aboriginal participants had difficulty with the concept of a “licensed” versus “unlicensed” vaccine. The non-Aboriginal group had a good understanding of this. Aboriginal participants identified the use of the flipchart, along with a presentation by a doctor and Aboriginal health worker, as preferred delivery modes. Group presentations were preferred rather than one-on-one discussions. The use of the questionnaire posed considerable methodological difficulties.Conclusions: A one-off oral presentation to Aboriginal participants is unlikely to produce “informed consent”. Key but unfamiliar concepts require identification and particularly considered presentation. (shrink)

Dominick T. Armentano 's book, Antitrust and Monopoly: Anatomy of a Policy Failure, 2nd ed., has serious limitations as a scholarly work. Monopolistic price?raising is even more objectionable under plausible interpretations of Armentano 's subjectivist criterion than in the standard case, which assumes equal subjective value for all consumers? dollar expenditures. Armentano 's historical review of leading antitrust cases is also faulty. His evidence on the alleged failure of price?fixing schemes is defective, and his approach to judging whether monopoly power (...) existed proceeds from an inappropriately static theory. (shrink)

Background Artificial intelligence-driven Clinical Decision Support Systems (AI-CDSS) are being increasingly introduced into various domains of health care for diagnostic, prognostic, therapeutic and other purposes. A significant part of the discourse on ethically appropriate conditions relate to the levels of understanding and explicability needed for ensuring responsible clinical decision-making when using AI-CDSS. Empirical evidence on stakeholders’ viewpoints on these issues is scarce so far. The present study complements the empirical-ethical body of research by, on the one hand, investigating the requirements (...) for understanding and explicability in depth with regard to the rationale behind them. On the other hand, it surveys medical students at the end of their studies as stakeholders, of whom little data is available so far, but for whom AI-CDSS will be an important part of their medical practice. Methods Fifteen semi-structured qualitative interviews (each lasting an average of 56 min) were conducted with German medical students to investigate their perspectives and attitudes on the use of AI-CDSS. The problem-centred interviews draw on two hypothetical case vignettes of AI-CDSS employed in nephrology and surgery. Interviewees’ perceptions and convictions of their own clinical role and responsibilities in dealing with AI-CDSS were elicited as well as viewpoints on explicability as well as the necessary level of understanding and competencies needed on the clinicians’ side. The qualitative data were analysed according to key principles of qualitative content analysis (Kuckartz). Results In response to the central question about the necessary understanding of AI-CDSS tools and the emergence of their outputs as well as the reasons for the requirements placed on them, two types of argumentation could be differentiated inductively from the interviewees’ statements: the first type, the clinician as a systemic trustee (or “the one relying”), highlights that there needs to be empirical evidence and adequate approval processes that guarantee minimised harm and a clinical benefit from the employment of an AI-CDSS. Based on proof of these requirements, the use of an AI-CDSS would be appropriate, as according to “the one relying”, clinicians should choose those measures that statistically cause the least harm. The second type, the clinician as an individual expert (or “the one controlling”), sets higher prerequisites that go beyond ensuring empirical evidence and adequate approval processes. These higher prerequisites relate to the clinician’s necessary level of competence and understanding of how a specific AI-CDSS works and how to use it properly in order to evaluate its outputs and to mitigate potential risks for the individual patient. Both types are unified in their high esteem of evidence-based clinical practice and the need to communicate with the patient on the use of medical AI. However, the interviewees’ different conceptions of the clinician’s role and responsibilities cause them to have different requirements regarding the clinician’s understanding and explicability of an AI-CDSS beyond the proof of benefit. Conclusions The study results highlight two different types among (future) clinicians regarding their view of the necessary levels of understanding and competence. These findings should inform the debate on appropriate training programmes and professional standards (e.g. clinical practice guidelines) that enable the safe and effective clinical employment of AI-CDSS in various clinical fields. While current approaches search for appropriate minimum requirements of the necessary understanding and competence, the differences between (future) clinicians in terms of their information and understanding needs described here can lead to more differentiated approaches to solutions. (shrink)

Currently assessment and management of animal welfare are based on the supposition that welfare status is something experienced identically by each individual animal when exposed to the same conditions. However, many authors argue that individual welfare cannot be seen as an ‘objective’ state, but is based on the animal’s own self-perception; such perception might vary significantly between individuals which appear to be exposed to exactly the same challenges. We argue that this has two implications: (1) actual perceived welfare status of (...) individuals in a population may vary over a wide range even under identical environmental conditions; (2) animals that appear to an external observer to be in better or poorer welfare condition may all in fact perceive their own individual status as the same. This would imply that optimum welfare of a social group might be achieved in situations where individual group members differ markedly in apparent welfare status and perceive their own welfare as being optimal under differing circumstances. Welfare phenotypes may also vary along a continuum between self-regarding and other-regarding behaviour; a variety of situations exist where (social) individuals appear to invest in the welfare of other individuals instead of maximising their own welfare; in such a case it is necessary to re-evaluate individual welfare within the context of a social group and recognise that there may be consequences for the welfare of individuals, of decisions made at the group level or by other group members. (shrink)

CCP is not, generally speaking, well-respected today. This is not so much because CCP is impure, being, as it is, all mixed up with dogmatic statements drawn from Scripture, Church teachings, and so on, but because CCP is impure in a certain way. All philosophies are always and everywhere impure in the sense of always and everywhere being embedded in some particular time and culture. Philosophies are written by philosophers, each of whom is taught many things at his mother’s knee (...) long before he ever becomes a philosopher. What he is taught, though, will vary, and some doctrines, it would seem, are more damaging than others to what today is considered good philosophizing. My purpose in this paper is to set out the obnoxious form of impurity which is generally thought to invalidate CCP, and then briefly to provide some hints as to why the situation is not at all as bad as the critics make it out to be. (shrink)