Results for 'Factualism'

108 found
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  1.  26
    The Factualist Interpretation of the Skeptical Solution and Semantic Primitivism.Michał Wieczorkowski - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-14.
    According to the factualist interpretation, the skeptical solution to the skeptic’s problem hinges on rejecting inflationary accounts of semantic facts, advocating instead for the adoption of minimal factualism. However, according to Alexander Miller, this account is unsound. Miller argues that minimal factualism represents a form of semantic primitivism, a position expressly rejected by Kripke’s Wittgenstein. Furthermore, Miller states that minimal factualism presupposes the conformity of meaning ascriptions with rules of discipline and syntax. However, he contends that this (...)
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  2.  70
    Non-Factualist Dispositionalism.Manuel Heras-Escribano - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (2):607-629.
    This paper aims to defend that the best framework for characterizing dispositions is a Rylean, non-factualist dispositionalism. I follow Tugby, 451–480, 2013) in explaining which are the main candidates for characterizing the ontology of dispositions. Tugby, 451–480, 2013) concludes that the best metaphysical framework for characterizing dispositions is Platonism, because it is the only theory that can account for the central and the intrinsic platitudes. Following this I show that Platonism is not desirable because it is difficult to reconcile with (...)
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  3.  79
    Between Factualism and Substantialism: Structuralism as a Third Way.Steven French - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (5):701-721.
    According to the substantialist, substances should be regarded as the fundamental ontological category. It is substances that are the bearer of properties, that are causally efficacious and that compose the things we see and touch around us. Cumpa has argued that this metaphysics fits poorly with classical physics and Buonomo has extended this argument into the quantum realm. After reviewing their claims, I shall argue that simple reflection on the form of the Standard Model also undermines substantialism. I will then (...)
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  4.  64
    Factualism and the Scientific Image.Javier Cumpa - 2018 - Humana Mente 26 (5):669-678.
    The Sellarsian task of ontology is to reconcile two seemingly divergent images of ordinary objects such as persons, tomatoes and tables, namely, the manifest image of common sense and the scientific image provided by fundamental physics (Sellars, Science, Perception, and Reality, 1963). Can the genuine categories of the ontologies of Substantialism (Heil, The World as We Find It, 2012), Structural Realism (Ladyman and Ross,Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized, 2007; French, The Structure of the World: Metaphysics and Representation, 2014), and (...)
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  5. Factualism, Normativism and the Bounds of Normativity.Thomas M. Besch - 2011 - Dialogue 50 (2):347-365.
    The paper argues that applications of the principle that “ought” implies “can” (OIC) depend on normative considerations even if the link between “ought” and “can” is logical in nature. Thus, we should reject a common, “factualist” conception of OIC and endorse weak “normativism”. Even if we use OIC as the rule ““cannot” therefore “not ought””, applying OIC is not a mere matter of facts and logic, as factualists claim, but often draws on “proto-ideals” of moral agency.
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  6. Non‐Factualism Versus Nominalism.Matteo Plebani - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (3).
    The platonism/nominalism debate in the philosophy of mathematics concerns the question whether numbers and other mathematical objects exist. Platonists believe the answer to be in the positive, nominalists in the negative. According to non-factualists, the question is ‘moot’, in the sense that it lacks a correct answer. Elaborating on ideas from Stephen Yablo, this article articulates a non-factualist position in the philosophy of mathematics and shows how the case for non-factualism entails that standard arguments for rival positions fail. In (...)
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  7. Non-factualism and Evaluative Supervenience.Nils Franzén - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (6):1969-1990.
    Supervenience in metaethics is the notion that there can be no moral dif-ference between two acts, persons or events without some non-moral difference underlying it. If St. Francis is a good man, there could not be a man exactly like St. Francis in non-evaluative respects that is not good. The phenomenon was first systematically discussed by R. M. Hare (1952), who argued that realists about evaluative properties struggle to account for it. As is well established, Hare, and following him, Simon (...)
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  8.  60
    Non-Factualist Interpretation of the Skeptical Solution and the Self-Refutation Argument.Michał Wieczorkowski - 2024 - Acta Analytica 39 (2):295-311.
    The skeptical solution is based on two assumptions — the rejection of semantic facts and the denial of semantic nihilism. On the basis of the non-factualist interpretation of this solution, these two assumptions are reconciled by stating that meaning ascriptions possess non-descriptive function. Nonetheless, Alexander Miller argues that this position is self-refuting since, as despite its non-descriptivism, by rejecting any kind of semantic facts, it inevitably leads to semantic nihilism. In this text, I demonstrate that Miller’s argument is not sound. (...)
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  9.  47
    The factualist fallacy in aesthetics.Melvin Rader - 1970 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 28 (4):435-439.
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  10.  42
    Metaphysics, Sophistry, and Illusion: Toward a Widespread Non-Factualism.Mark Balaguer - 2021 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This book does two things. First, it introduces a novel kind of non-factualist view, and it argues that we should endorse views of this kind in connection with a wide class of metaphysical questions, most notably, the abstract-object question and the composite-object question (so, more specifically, the book argues that there’s no fact of the matter whether there are any such things as abstract objects or composite objects—or material objects of any other kind). Second, the book explains how these non-factualist (...)
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  11. Internalized meaning factualism.Jakob Hohwy - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (3):325-336..
    The normative character of meaning creates deep problems for the attempt to give a reductive explanation of the constitution of meaning. I identify and critically examine an increasingly popular Carnap-style position, which I call Internalized Meaning Factualism (versions of which I argue are defended by, e.g., Robert Brandom, Paul Horwich and Huw Price), that promises to solve the problems. According to this position, the problem of meaning can be solved by prohibiting an external perspective on meaning constituting properties. The (...)
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  12. From relative truth to Finean non-factualism.Alexander Jackson - 2016 - Synthese 193 (3):971-989.
    This paper compares two ‘relativist’ theories about deliciousness: truth-relativism, and Kit Fine’s non-factualism about a subject-matter. Contemporary truth-relativism is presented as a linguistic thesis; its metaphysical underpinning is often neglected. I distinguish three views about the obtaining of worldly states of affairs concerning deliciousness, and argue that none yields a satisfactory version of truth-relativism. Finean non-factualism about deliciousness is not subject to the problems with truth-relativism. I conclude that Finean non-factualism is the better relativist theory. As I (...)
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  13. Rampant Non‐Factualism: A Metaphysical Framework and its Treatment of Vagueness.Alexander Jackson - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (2):79-108.
    Rampant non-factualism is the view that all non-fundamental matters are non-factual, in a sense inspired by Kit Fine (2001). The first half of this paper argues that if we take non-factualism seriously for any matters, such as morality, then we should take rampant non-factualism seriously. The second half of the paper argues that rampant non-factualism makes possible an attractive theory of vagueness. We can give non-factualist accounts of non-fundamental matters that nicely characterize the vagueness they manifest (...)
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  14.  61
    Wittgenstein, Non-Factualism, and Deflationism.James Connelly - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (4):559-585.
    Amongst those views sometimes attributed to the later Wittgenstein are included both a deflationary theory of truth, as well as a non-factualism about certain regions of discourse. Evidence in favor of the former attribution, it is thought, can be found in Wittgenstein’s apparent affirmation of the basic definitional equivalence of ‘p’ is true and p in §136 of his Philosophical Investigations. Evidence in favor of the latter attribution, it might then be presumed, can be found in the context of (...)
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  15. Moral factualism.Peter Railton - 2006 - In James Lawrence Dreier (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 6--201.
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  16. Naturalism, non-factualism, and normative situated behaviour.Manuel Heras-Escribano & Manuel de Pinedo-García - 2018 - South African Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):80-98.
    This paper argues that the normative character of our unreflective situated behaviour is not factual. We highlight a problematic assumption shared by the two most influential trends in contemporary philosophy of cognitive science, reductionism and enactivism. Our intentional, normative explanations are referential, descriptive or factual. Underneath this assumption lies the idea that only facts can make true or false our attributions of cognitive, mental and agential abilities. We will argue against this view by describing the main features and problems of (...)
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  17. Semantic Non-factualism in Kripke’s Wittgenstein.Daniel Boyd - 2017 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 5 (9).
    Kripke’s Wittgenstein is standardly understood as a non-factualist about meaning ascription. Non-factualism about meaning ascription is the idea that sentences like “Joe means addition by ‘plus’” are not used to state facts about the world. Byrne and Kusch have argued that Kripke’s Wittgenstein is not a non-factualist about meaning ascription. They are aware that their interpretation is non-standard, but cite arguments from Boghossian and Wright to support their view. Boghossian argues that non-factualism about meaning ascription is incompatible with (...)
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  18. Factualism and Anti-descriptivism: a challenge to the materialist criterion of fundamentality.Víctor Fernandez Castro - 2022 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 29 (1):109-127.
    Inspired by the work of Sellars, Cumpa (2014, 2018) and Buonomo (2021) have argued that we can evaluate our metaphysical proposals on fundamental categories in terms of their capacity for reconciling the scientific and the manifest image of the world. This criterion of fundamentality would allow us to settle the question of which categories among those proposed in the debate—e.g., substance, structure or facts—have a better explanatory value. The aim of this essay is to argue against a central assumption of (...)
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  19.  50
    Why non-factualists should love conceptual role semantics.Massimiliano Vignolo - 2010 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 80 (1):1-19.
    I argue that conceptual role semantics gives non-factualism the resources to overcome two difficulties: the problem posed by faultless disagreements and the Frege-Geach problem.
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  20. The Root of the Third Dogma of Empiricism: Davidson vs. Quine on Factualism.Ali Hossein Khani - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (1):161-183.
    Davidson has famously argued that conceptual relativism, which, for him, is based on the content-scheme dualism, or the “third dogma” of empiricism, is either unintelligible or philosophically uninteresting and has accused Quine of holding onto such a dogma. For Davidson, there can be found no intelligible ground for the claim that there may exist untranslatable languages: all languages, if they are languages, are in principle inter-translatable and uttered sentences, if identifiable as utterances, are interpretable. Davidson has also endorsed the Quinean (...)
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  21. With factualist friends, Kripke's Wittgenstein needs no enemies: On Byrne's case for Kripke's Wittgenstein being a factualist about meaning attributions.John Humphrey - manuscript
    _Private Language_ is that it almost universally sees KW as offering, in his sceptical solution, an account of meaning attributions (i.e., statements of the form, "X means such-and-so by 's'"; hereafter, MAs) which takes their legitimate attribution to be a function of something other than facts or truth conditions. KW is almost universally read as having rejected any account of meaning attributions which takes them to be stating facts or corresponding to facts. In a word, KW is understood as offering (...)
     
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  22.  95
    Deflationism, Truth-Aptness and Non-Factualism.Massimiliano Vignolo - 2008 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (1):84-103.
    I will argue that the standard formulation of non-factualism in terms of a denial of truth-aptness is consistent with a version of deflationsim. My line of argument assumes the use conception of meaning. This brings out an interesting consequence since mostly the philosophers who endorse the use conception of meaning, e.g. Paul Horwich, hold that deflationism is inconsistent with the strategy of implementing non-factualism in terms of a denial of truth-aptness and thereby urge a reformulation of non-factualism.
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  23.  91
    Revised Factualism.Thomas C. Ryckman - 1994 - The Monist 77 (2):207-216.
    I shall argue that those who hold that there are factual complexes, or facts, and who subscribe to a correspondence theory of truth, according to which truth is analyzed in terms of correspondence to facts, need not hold that, in addition to facts, there are propositions.
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  24. Epistemic Non-Factualism and Methodology.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2019 - In Michael Klenk (ed.), Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology. New York: Routledge.
    I discuss methodology in epistemology. I argue that settling the facts, even the epistemic facts, fails to settle the questions of intellectual policy at the center of our epistemic lives. An upshot is that the standard methodology of analyzing concepts like knowledge, justification, rationality, and so on is misconceived. More generally, any epistemic method that seeks to issue in intellectual policy by settling the facts, whether by way of abductive theorizing or empirical investigation, no matter how reliable, is inapt. The (...)
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  25.  20
    The Semantics of Non‐factualism, Non‐cognitivism, and Quasi‐realism.Simon Blackburn - 2006 - In Michael Devitt & Richard Hanley (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Language. Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 244–252.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction The Frege‐Geach Problem The Impact of Minimalism Conclusion.
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  26. Kripke's Wittgenstein, factualism and meaning.Alexander Miller - 2009 - In Daniel Whiting (ed.), The later Wittgenstein on language. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
     
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  27.  47
    The scientific turn in metaphysics: a factualist approach.Valerio Buonomo - 2017 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 3):793-807.
    In a recent paper, Cumpa : 319–324, 2014) argues that a scientific turn in metaphysics requires the acceptance of a materialist criterion of fundamentality, according to which the most fundamental metaphysical category is the one that provides us with a reconciliation of the ordinary world and the physical universe. He concludes that the dominant category of substance cannot be the most fundamental category, for it does not satisfy this criterion of fundamentality. The most fundamental category is instead the category of (...)
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  28.  57
    Structure and Completeness: A Defense of Factualism in Categorial Ontology.Javier Cumpa - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (2):145-153.
    The aim of this paper is to offer two novel solutions to two perennial problems of categorial ontology, namely, the problem of the categorial structure: how are the categories related to one another? And the problem of categorial completeness: how is the completeness of a proposed list of categories justified? First, I argue that a system of categories should have a structure such that there is a most basic category that is a bearer of all other categories and that has (...)
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  29. A Non-factualist defense of the Reflection principle.Stephanie Beardman - 2013 - Synthese 190 (15):2981-2999.
    Are there plausible synchronic constraints on how a subject thinks of herself extended over time? At first glance, Bas van Fraassen’s principle of Reflection seems to prescribe the sort of epistemic authority one’s future self should be taken by one to have over one’s current epistemic states. (The gist of this principle is that I should now believe what I’m convinced I will believe tomorrow.) There has been a general consensus that, as a principle concerning epistemic authority, Reflection does not (...)
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  30.  79
    On the tenability of non-factualism with regard to the a priori.Joseph Shieber - 1999 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (4):379–390.
    In a number of recent articles, Hartry Field has attempted to reclaim the a priori for his own brand of non‐factualist epistemology by introducing a non‐epistemic notion of the a priori based purely upon the position of individual beliefs within belief systems. In this article we examine (i) whether a robust enough notion of aprioricity is available to Field, and, by extension, to the radical empiricist and (ii) whether it is possible to connect up the non‐epistemic notion of aprioricity with (...)
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  31. From Non-Usability to Non-Factualism.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2022 - Analysis 81 (4):747-758.
    Holly Smith has done more than anyone to explore and defend the importance of usability for moral theories. In Making Morality Work, she develops a moral theory that is almost universally usable. But not quite. In this article, I argue that no moral theory is universally usable, in the sense that is most immediately relevant to action, even by agents who know all the normative facts. There is no moral theory knowledge of which suffices to settle deliberation about what to (...)
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  32. Metaphysics, Sophistry, and Illusion: Toward a Widespread Non-factualism, by Mark Balaguer.Kristie Miller - 2022 - Philosophical Review 131 (3):386-390.
    Neo-positivism is the view that metaphysical questions completely decompose into ordinary empirical questions that can be answered by scientific enquiry (empirical) or ordinary logical or modal questions, which can be answered by appeal to a metaphysically innocent modalism (modal innocence) or questions that are non-factual, that is questions that are such that the world does not provide the question with a determinate answer (nonfactualism). -/- There is much to like about this book. It forcefully, and at times compellingly, presents a (...)
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  33.  59
    (1 other version)Prioritarianism: Ex Ante, Ex Post, or Factualist Criterion of Rightness?Nils Holtug - 2019 - Journal of Political Philosophy 27 (2):207-228.
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  34.  64
    Mark Balaguer. Metaphysics, Sophistry, and Illusion: Towards a Widespread Non-Factualism.Graham Priest - 2022 - Philosophia Mathematica 30 (1):117-120.
  35. Quasi-realism and the Humean defense of normative non-factualism.Matthew McGrath - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 90 (2):113-127.
  36.  16
    Believable Evidence.Veli Mitova - 2017 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Believable Evidence argues that evidence consists of true beliefs. This claim opens up an entirely overlooked space on the ontology of evidence map, between purely factualist positions and purely psychologist ones. Veli Mitova provides a compelling three-level defence of this view in the first contemporary monograph entirely devoted to the ontology of evidence. First, once we see the evidence as a good reason, metaethical considerations show that the evidence must be psychological and veridical. Second, true belief in particular allows epistemologists (...)
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  37. Perceptual reasons.Juan Comesana & Matthew McGrath - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):991-1006.
    The two main theories of perceptual reasons in contemporary epistemology can be called Phenomenalism and Factualism. According to Phenomenalism, perceptual reasons are facts about experiences conceived of as phenomenal states, i.e., states individuated by phenomenal character, by what it’s like to be in them. According to Factualism, perceptual reasons are instead facts about the external objects perceived. The main problem with Factualism is that it struggles with bad cases: cases where perceived objects are not what they appear (...)
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  38. Expressivism about delusion attribution.Sam Wilkinson - 2020 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 16 (2):59-77.
    In this paper, I will present and advocate a view about what we are doing when we attribute delusion, namely, say that someone is delusional. It is an “expressivist” view, roughly analogous to expressivism in meta-ethics. Just as meta-ethical expressivism accounts for certain key features of moral discourse, so does this expressivism account for certain key features of delusion attribution. And just as meta-ethical expressivism undermines factualism about moral properties, so does this expressivism, if correct, show that certain attempts (...)
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  39.  96
    Habitual virtuous action and acting for reasons.Lieke Joske Franci Asma - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 35 (7):1036-1056.
    How can agents act virtuously out of habit? Virtuous actions are done for the right reasons, and acting for (right) reasons seems to involve deliberation. Yet, deliberation is absent if an agent’s action is habitual. That implies that the relationship between reasons and actions should be characterized in such a way that deliberation is unnecessary. In this paper, I examine three possible solutions: radical externalism, unconscious psychologism, and unconscious factualism. I argue that these proposals all fail to cast reasons (...)
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  40.  62
    The long way to “extreme psychologism”.Seyyed Mohsen Eslami - 2018 - South African Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):171-177.
    In “Clearing Space for Extreme Psychologism about Reasons”, Mitova argues against two main views about the ontology of reasons. Instead, she presents an argument by elimination for “extreme psychologism” as a prima facie superior alternative. I will argue for the following claims. First, the case against the Standard Story – the view that normative and motivating reasons are facts and psychological states, respectively – includes premises that are in need of support. Second, the critical examination of factualism – the (...)
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  41. I see actions. Affordances and the expressive role of perceptual judgments.David Sanchez - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (7):1683-1704.
    Originally formulated as a theory of perception, ecological psychology has shown in recent decades an increasing interest in language. However, a comprehensive approach to language by ecological psychology has not yet been developed, as there is neither a naturalist philosophy of language nor one that takes ecological psychology as its scientific background. Our goal here is to argue that a subject naturalist and non-factualist framework can open the possibility of an expressivist analysis of perceptual judgments that is compatible with the (...)
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  42.  20
    Germinal and Zola's Philosophical and Religious Thought.Philip D. Walker - 1984 - John Benjamins.
    The Factualistic, Positivistic Basis . . . this life of suffering, of doubt, which makes you deeply love naked, living reality. Zola "Gustave Doret,"Mex ...
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  43. What is the Sceptical Solution?Alexander Miller - 2020 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 8 (2).
    In chapter 3 of Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Kripke’s Wittgenstein offers a “sceptical solution" to the sceptical paradox about meaning developed in chapter 2 (according to which there are no facts in virtue of which ascriptions of meaning such as “Jones means addition by ‘+’” can be true). Although many commentators have taken the sceptical solution to be broadly analogous to non-factualist theories in other domains, such as non-cognitivism or expressivism in metaethics, the nature of the sceptical solution (...)
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  44. The Law Governed Universe.John T. Roberts - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    The law-governed world-picture -- A remarkable idea about the way the universe is cosmos and compulsion -- The laws as the cosmic order : the best-system approach -- The three ways : no-laws, non-governing-laws, governing-laws -- Work that laws do in science -- An important difference between the laws of nature and the cosmic order -- The picture in four theses -- The strategy of this book -- The meta-theoretic conception of laws -- The measurability approach to laws -- What (...)
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  45. Two Kinds of Mental Realism.Tamás Demeter - 2009 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 40 (1):59-71.
    I argue that there is a distinction to be drawn between two kinds of mental realism, and I draw some lessons for the realism-antirealism debate. Although it is already at hand, the distinction has not yet been drawn clearly. The difference to be shown consists in what realism is about: it may be either about the interpretation of folk psychology, or the ontology of mental entities. I specify the commitment to the fact-stating character of the discourse as the central component (...)
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  46. Semantic Minimalism and the Frege Point.Huw Price - unknown
    Speech act theory is one of the more lasting products of the linguistic movement in philosophy of the mid−Twentieth century. Within philosophy itself the movement's products did not in general prove so durable. Particularly striking in this respect is the perceived fate of what was one of the most characteristic applications of the linguistic turn in philosophy, namely the view that many traditional philosophical problems are such as to yield to an understanding of the distinctive function of a particular part (...)
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  47. Deflating existence away? A critique of Azzouni's nominalism.Yvonne Raley - 2009 - Philosophia Mathematica 17 (1):73-83.
    Yet, he also says that it is philosophically indeterminate which criterion for what exists is correct. Nominalism is the view that certain objects ( i.e ., abstract objects) do not exist, and not the view that it is philosophically indeterminate whether or not they do. I resolve the dilemma that Azzouni's claims pose: Azzouni is a non-factualist about what exists, but he is a factualist about which criterion for what exists our community of speakers has adopted. It is in the (...)
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  48. Rule-Following and Meaning.Alexander Miller & Crispin Wright (eds.) - 2002 - Mcgill-Queen's University Press.
    The rule-following debate, in its concern with the metaphysics and epistemology of linguistic meaning and mental content, goes to the heart of the most fundamental questions of contemporary philosophy of mind and language. This volume gathers together the most important contributions to the topic, including papers by Simon Blackburn, Paul Boghossian, Graeme Forbes, Warren Goldfarb, Paul Horwich, John McDowell, Colin McGinn, Ruth Millikan, Philip Pettit, George Wilson, and José Zalabardo. This debate has centred on Saul Kripke's reading of the rule-following (...)
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  49. Semantic Realism and Kripke’s Wittgenstein.George M. Wilson - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):99-122.
    This article argues, first, that the fundamental structure of the skeptical argument in Kripke's book on Wittgenstein has been seriously misunderstood by recent commentators. Although it focuses particularly on recent commentary by John McDowell, it emphasizes that the basic misunderstandings are widely shared by other commentators. In particular, it argues that, properly construed, Kripke offers a fully coherent reading of PI #201 and related passages. This is commonly denied, and given as a reason for rejecting Kripke's reading of Wittgenstein's text. (...)
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  50.  32
    Can affordances be reasons?Tobias Starzak & Tobias Schlicht - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (7):1656-1682.
    We discuss whether affordances can be reasons, against the background of two interlocked considerations: (1) While the problematic degree of idealization in accounts of reasons that treat them as mental states speaks in favor of the alternative view which treats them as facts, a cognitive consideration relationship is still required to account for the motivating role of reasons. (2) While recent enactive accounts of cognition hold promise to avoid over-intellectualization of acting for reasons, these are so far either underdeveloped or (...)
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