In Plato’s _Laws_ is the earliest surviving fully developed cosmological argument. His influence on the philosophy of religion is wide ranging and this book examines both that and the influence of religion on Plato. Central to Plato’s thought is the theory of forms, which holds that there exists a realm of forms, perfect ideals of which things in this world are but imperfect copies. In this book, originally published in 1959, Feibleman finds two diverse strands in Plato’s philosophy: an (...) idealism centered upon the Forms denying full ontological status to the realm of becoming, and a moderate realism granting actuality equal reality with Forms. For each strand Plato developed a conception of religion: a supernatural one derived from Orphism, and a naturalistic religion revering the traditional Olympian deities. (shrink)

SummaryThe working logician begins with whatever operations are necessary to make computation possible. He does not inquire into the foundations which the carrying out of his operations assumes; no axioms, no assumptions, just the computations themselves. Yet in logic of all places the starting‐point should be defensible. After examining the logical assumptions, the constructions of proofs, individuals and classes, and the metaphysical assumptions, the conclusion is reached that the net effect of operational logic is to assimilate logic to mathematics rather (...) than to consider mathematics an extension of logic. The price to be paid for this preference is to leave them both unexplained. It would mean that the metaphysics of mathematics would have to proceed without logic. (shrink)

Professor Quine in recent articles has raised an old question, an ontological one, concerning the status of universals. It is interesting to note that the same positions recur in symbolic logic that have appeared so often in the past in less exact language. There can be little doubt that the question he raises is crucial; and if the issue is not yet settled, there is at least some hope that it may be clarified. Propositions are required to make propositions clear.

A system of philosophy of the sort presented in this and the following volumes begins with logic. Philosophy properly speaking is characterized by the kind oflogic it employs, for what it employs it assumes, however silently; and what it assumes it presupposes. The logic stands behind the ontology and is, so to speak, metaphysically prior. One word of caution. The philosophical aspects of logic have lagged behind the mathematical aspects in point of view of interest and develop ment. The work (...) of N. Rescher and others have gone a long way to correct this. However, their work on philosophical logic has been more concerned with the logical than with the philosophical aspects. I have in mind another approach, one that would call attention to the ontological (systematic meta physics) or metaphysical (critical ontology) aspects, whichever term you prefer. It is this approach which I have pursued in the following chapters. Since together they stand at the head of a system of philosophy which has been developed in some seventeen books, a system which ranges over all of the topics of philosophy, the chosen approach can be seen as the necessary one. But I have not written any logic, I have merely indicated the sort of logic that has to be written. (shrink)

The range and the reach of beliefs always involve the whole individual. organs are only the agents of organisms: the individual acts through his parts, thinks with his brain, feels through his senses, acts by means of his muscles; but the entire man is always engaged. beliefs are acquired by thought, feeling or action, held in the memory as retention schemata, and issued in individual behavior. beliefs are supported by social pressure, and are stored in the unconscious as ontology.

The complexity and the technical obscurity of the scientific method have rendered science ever likely to be misunderstood both by scientists themselves and by the general public. Difficulties which remain unrecognized constitute the most formidable obstacles to success in any field. There are such difficulties lurking in the treatment which the scientific method accords its subject-matter. In this essay, I propose to point to one such pitfall in the path of the progress of science. By exposing it, something will already (...) be accomplished toward its avoidance and elimination, and the vast public of uninstructed persons will be able to skirt one more confusion in the effort to understand what the scientists are trying to do. (shrink)

The problem of knowledge.--The acquisition of knowledge.--The assimilation of knowledge.--The deployment of knowledge.--Knowing, doing and being.--Absent objects.--The mind-body problem.--The knowledge of the known.--The subjectivity of a realist.--Activity as a source of knowledge.--On beliefs and believing.--Adaptive responses and the ecosystem.--The reality game.

We have undertaken to discuss the nature of mathematical systems, the way in which they are discovered, and the uses to which they are put in the empirical sciences. The empirical sciences employ mathematical systems in framing final formulations, but adopt mathematical techniques long before reaching that stage. It is a prerequisite that the mathematics they employ has been developed separately and within its own domain. We shall return to the relation between mathematics and the empirical sciences before we are (...) done, but in the meanwhile we shall be constrained to begin by discussing the situation in mathematics in isolation from any empirical considerations. (shrink)

The term science is used to cover three separate categories, to which throughout this paper we shall give three separate names. There is the field in which science operates. This is the external world of natural phenomena, partly uniform and partly chance. There is the science itself. This is the laboratory of instruments, techniques, operations, the method by which the field is studied. Finally, there is the laws. This is the level of abstractions, of causal laws or of statistical probability (...) averages, invariant or approaching invariance, mathematically expressed. The three, of course, belong together. Science carries the activity; it studies the field to find the laws. (shrink)