This book offers a new reading of Aquinas' views on faith. The author argues that the theological nature of faith is crucial to Aquinas' thought, and that it gives rise to a peculiar and otherwise incomprehensible relationship with reason. The first part of the book examines various modern and contemporary accounts of the relationship between faith and reason in Aquinas' thought. The author shows that these accounts are unconvincing because they exhibit what he calls a Lockean view of faith and (...) reason, which maintains that the relationship in question should only be treated by way of evidence. In other words, this view ignores the specific nature of the Christian faith and the equally specific way it needs to relate to reason. The second part offers a comprehensive account of Aquinas' view of faith. It focuses on the way the divine grace and charity shape the relationship between evidence and human will. The final part of the book ties these ideas together to show how Christian faith, with its specifically theological nature, is perfectly compatible with rational debates. It also argues that employing the specificity of faith may constitute the best way to promote autonomous and successful rational investigations. Aquinas on Faith, Reason, and Charity will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working on Aquinas, philosophy of religion, Christian theology, and medieval philosophy. (shrink)

Aquinas’s thought is often considered an exemplary balance between Christian faith and natural reason. However, it is not always sufficiently clear what such balance consists of. With respect to the relation between philosophical topics and the Christian faith, various scholars have advanced perspectives that, although supported by Aquinas’s texts, contrast one another. Some maintain that Aquinas elaborated his philosophical view without being under the influence of faith. Others believe that the Christian faith constitutes an indispensable component of Aquinas’s view; at (...) least when Aquinas focused on those statements that, though maintainable by mere reason, belong to the Christian revelation. In this essay I intend to show that the aforementioned perspectives can be reconciled on the basis of Aquinas’s concept of faith. If we do not limit ourselves to considering faith as the assent to the revealed truth, but also look at what leads the believer to assent—i.e., charity that unites the believer with God and is gratuitously conceded by God himself—then the relation between faith and reason appears to be twofold. On the one hand, the truths of faith cannot participate in the rational inquiry, because according to Aquinas faith lacks the evidence searched for by natural reason. On the other hand, since Aquinas holds that faith is the assent to the revelation due to the love for God that is granted by God himself, the believer will take faith as more certain than intellect and science, and the truths of faith will constitute the orientation and criterion of her/his rational investigation. The truths shall constitute orientation because the believer aims to confirm by reason what she/he already believes. They will also be criterion, because in case of a contradiction between rational arguments and revealed truths, reason must be considered mistaken and the rational investigation must start anew from the beginning. (shrink)

The paper contains an axiomatic treatment of the intuitionistic theory of hereditarily finite sets, based on an induction axiom-schema and a finite set of single axioms. The main feature of the principle of induction used (due to Givant and Tarski) is that it incorporates Foundation. On the analogy of what is done in Arithmetic, in the axiomatic system selected the transitive closure of the membership relation is taken as a primitive notion, so as to permit an immediate adaptation of the (...) theory to cases of restricted induction (in particular primitive recursive induction). At the end of the paper several different forms of induction, which play an important role in the development of the theory, are compared. An alternative axiomatization of the theory, which is of intrinsic interest, is also discussed. (shrink)

In a recent essay Duncan Pritchard argues that there is no fundamental epistemological distinction between religious belief and ordinary or non-religious belief. Both of them – so he maintains in the footsteps of Wittgenstein's On certainty – are ultimately grounded on a-rational commitments, namely, commitments unresponsive to rational criteria. I argue that, while this view can be justified theologically, it cannot be advanced philosophically as Pritchard assumes.I offer an account of Aquinas's reflection on faith and reason to show that the (...) theologian – not the philosopher – is entitled to deal with a-rational commitments, because the truths of faith can be seen as simply intellectual – like the rational statements considered by the philosopher – but also as decisions made by way of divine grace. I also suggest that Pritchard's thesis may be re-proposed on a new basis, if Aquinas's theological stance were reinterpreted so as to point out unexpected connections between theology and philosophy. (shrink)

In a recent book devoted to the axiology of theism, Kirk Lougheed has argued that the ‘complete understanding’ argument should be numbered among the arguments for anti-theism. According to this argument, God’s existence is detrimental to us because, if a supernatural and never completely understandable God exists, then human beings are fated to never achieve complete understanding. In this article, I argue that the complete understanding argument for anti-theism fails for three reasons. First, complete understanding is simply impossible to achieve. (...) Second, even if achieving complete understanding were possible, it would not be beneficial. Third, the only type of complete understanding that is possible to achieve and is beneficial to human beings is the understanding of that which is of primary importance to us, and not the understanding of everything, as Lougheed seems to assume. God can grant us complete understanding of that which is of primary importance to us. As a consequence, God’s existence ends up being beneficial and not detrimental to us. (shrink)

Karl Popper and Paul Feyerabend were among the most influential philosophers of science of the twentieth century. Extensive studies have been dedicated to the development of their controversial relationship, which saw Feyerabend turning from a student and supporter of Popper to one of his harshest critics. Yet, it is not as well known that the rift between Popper and Feyerabend arose mainly in the context of their studies on the foundations of quantum mechanics, which has been the main subject of (...) their discussions for about two decades. This paper reconstructs in detail their diatribe over the foundations of quantum mechanics, emphasising also the major role that their personal relationship played in their distancing. (shrink)

In an essay titled Aquinas on the Foundations of Knowledge, Eleonore Stump rejects the idea that Aquinas's epistemology is foundationalist. I agree with Stump, and share in her conviction that the Angelic doctor developed instead what can be seen as a kind of theological reliabilism. In this article, I intend to take her position a step further. First, I would like to show that Thomistic reliabilism falls into a vicious circle if seen as based on a merely rational theism. Second, (...) I am going to argue that for Aquinas such reliabilism depends instead on Christian faith, construed as the act of believing the revealed truth by virtue of the love relationship that God allows human beings to have with him. (shrink)

In this essay, I propose two arguments from Thomas Aquinas’s reflection on theism and faith to rebut Schellenberg’s claim that divine hiddenness justifies atheism. One of those arguments, however, may be employed so as to re-propose Schellenberg’s conviction, which is crucial to his argument, that there are ‘non-resistant’ or ‘inculpable’ unbelievers. I then advance what I call the suffering unbeliever argument. In short, the unbelievers mentioned by Schellenberg are expected to suffer because of their non-belief, which—as Schellenberg says—prevents them from (...) achieving the greatest possible well-being. If they suffer, however, they cannot consider themselves unbelievers, since one cannot suffer from not having been given a certain good if one believes that the good in question has never existed. If they do not suffer, on the other hand, there is simply nothing for which they can consider themselves inculpable. (shrink)

In this book, Roberto Di Ceglie offers an historical, theological, and epistemological investigation exploring how commitments to God and/or the good generate the optimum condition to achieve knowledge. Di Ceglie criticizes the common belief that to attain knowledge, one must always be ready to replace one's convictions with beliefs that appear to be proven. He defends a more comprehensive view, historically exemplified by outstanding Christian thinkers, whereby believers are expected to commit themselves to God and to related beliefs (...) no matter how convincing the evidence contradicting such beliefs appear to be. He also argues that both believers and unbelievers can commit themselves to God and the good, respectively, thereby creating a spiritual turn in epistemology that enables them to generate the best possible condition for conducting rational enquiries and discussion. (shrink)

The Italian semiotician and novelist Umberto Eco (1932-2016) offered an insightful interpretation of Thomas Aquinas' thought on beauty. Eco's book, translated into English in 1988, is considered an authoritative source of reflection on the subject and has been widely cited by those who have focused on Aquinas' aesthetics in recent decades. In this article, I first assess the depth and richness of Eco's interpretation, including his critique of Aquinas' view. I then reject this critique by arguing that Aquinas' reflection on (...) beauty is grounded in his theological interests, the connections of which with his aesthetic views are overlooked by Eco. (shrink)

A arte hoje não se define mais como aparição sensível da ideia ou da verdade. Ela não diz mais. No máximo, sugere. Isso quer dizer que sua significação é algo que apenas se acena de longe pelos significados postos e propostos pela obra. Ela é antes ausência que presença, antes um balbuciar do que uma fala. Como diz Paul Celan: NENHUMA ARTE DE AREIA MAIS, nenhum livro de areia, mestre nenhum. Nada de lance de dados. Quantosmudos?Dez e sete. Tua pergunta (...) – tua resposta.Teu canto, o que sabe? Fundonaneve, Uonaeve, U – e – e. (shrink)

Na sua principal obra política, os _Dois Tratados Sobre o Governo_, Locke defende o direito do indivíduo de resistir ao soberano. Entretanto, segundo Locke, o ser humano abandona o estado de natureza voluntariamente para criar o Estado político com a esperança de que o poder político amenize as inconveniências do estado de natureza. Se a criação do Estado político foi voluntária, em que circunstâncias se deve resistir às determinações do soberano? Além disso, como fundamentar o direito de resistência ao soberano (...) que foi instituído com a permissão do próprio indivíduo que agora pretende resistir as suas determinações? O objetivo do presente texto é discutir os motivos pelos quais a defesa do direito de resistência se torna necessária no pensamento político de Locke, e de que forma e com quais fundamentos Locke defende tal direito no _Segundo Tratado Sobre o Governo_. Pretende-se reconstruir o argumento de Locke em defesa do direito de resistência a partir da análise da referida obra e seu contraste com o _Patriarcha _; do contexto histórico e de alguns dos seus principais comentadores.Ainda que, segundo Locke, o Estado tenha surgido para proteger os direitos individuais como a liberdade e a propriedade, o governante está sujeito a se corromper e utilizar sua posição para praticar a injustiça contra seus súditos. O direito de resistência, apoiado na lei da natureza que permanece em vigor mesmo no estado civil, é o último recurso dos indivíduos contra a tirania praticada pelo governante corrompido. (shrink)

O trabalho pretende demonstrar que a teoria da racionalidade comunicativa, desenvolvida por Jürgen Habermas, permite um posicionamento, a um só tempo, crítico e positivo, quanto às redes digitais. Porquanto seu desempenho não é apenas crítico no sentido de uma negação, mas principalmente criativo e dinâmico, visto que oferece o modelo de um procedimento discursivo – público e democrático – que permite avaliar pretensões de validade das redes digitais.

Normal 0 21 The main goal of this paper is to maintain that the skeptical hypotheses in the First Meditation, and especially the doubt about material things, should be interpreted as a kind of mental exercise whose purpose is both to weaken our confidence in the senses and to prepare the reader of the Meditation for the learning of the truths accessible through the light of reason. Thus, the paper purports to show that in the economy of the Meditations skeptical (...) doubts play a positive and constructive role, which is distinct from their role of bringing about philosophical skepticism that prevails in contemporary epistemological debates. The strategy that allowed for this reading consisted in both valuing the emergence of skeptical doubts within a text written in a meditative style and highlighting certain aspects of the intellectual context that were part of the scientific revolution experienced by Descartes. (shrink)

O pensamento de Hume pode ser comparado ao dos céticos modernos em muitos aspectos. Com relação ao tópico da racionalidade dos animais, Hume parece seguir de perto a leitura de alguns céticos modernos e se afastar consideravelmente da de Descartes. Por outro lado, diferente de filósofos como Montaigne, Charron e La Mothe Le Vayer, Hume não tinha por finalidade colocar a racionalidade humana num nível próximo dos animais para apenas provar a fraqueza do intelecto diante do desconhecido, mas intentava comparar (...) o nosso modo de proceder ao do animal para avaliar, com mais precisão, as suas teorias acerca da natureza humana. Neste artigo analiso o modo como os primeiros céticos da modernidade trataram da questão da razão dos animais e o comparo com as ideias de Hume sobre o assunto, sem deixar de mencionar as contribuições de Descartes e de Pierre Bayle. (shrink)

In recent decades, Richard Swinburne has offered an influential view of the relationship between faith and reason. In doing so, he focused to a considerable extent on Aquinas’s view of faith. For Swinburne, Aquinas’ view of faith is that to have faith in God is simply to have a belief-that. In contrast, it is another view of faith, which Swinburne calls ‘Lutheran,’ that involves both theoretical beliefs-that and a trust in the Living God. In this article, I argue that Swinburne’s (...) view is not faithful to Aquinas’s doctrine of faith. In the first section, I will explain Swinburne’s view of belief in detail and its application to Aquinas’s doctrine of faith. In the second section, I will bolster my argument by showing that Swinburne’s reading is inconsistent with Aquinas’ statements regarding three relationships, which are essential to Aquinas’s faith. I am referring to the relationships between faith and will, between faith and merit and between faith and doubt. (shrink)

In Advice to Christian philosophers Alvin Plantinga suggested that Christians who propose to be philosophers should not limit themselves to being philosophers who happen, incidentally, to be Christians. Instead, they should develop a Christian philosophy. From this, however, a problem followed, which is still seen as a reason to deny that a Christian philosophy is possible. It seems implausible that the outcome of the interaction between faith and philosophy is, really, philosophy and not merely theology. Plantinga did not deal with (...) this problem. Unlike him, thinkers of various orientations, especially scholars of Thomas Aquinas, had discussed it during the French querelle in the 1930s. In this article, I argue that they did not solve this problem because they did not examine the relationship between faith and philosophy by considering what faith requires in order to relate to reason. Instead, this consideration was suggested by Plantinga’s Advice and, long before, it had been developed in detail by Thomas Aquinas. It is, therefore, time to propose Thomist Advice to Christian Philosophers. (shrink)

Theodicy is often rejected because a suffering person is hardly interested in abstract argu ments—even if these arguments were convincing, they might not change the suffering she is experienc ing. I propose a twofold theodicy. First, Christians are invited to promote positive apologetics—they should show the internal consistency of divine revelation, which recommends that they should alleviate suffering and promote flourishing. Second, Christians should develop negative apologetics and show the untenability of objections to the Christian view of evil and suffering, (...) including the seemingly uncontro versial objection that a world without innocent suffering would be better in terms of justice than the one we live in. My argument is that in both positive and negative apologetics believers should be guided by devotion and commitment to God. The more they love and trust God, and consequently believe what God has revealed, the more they are expected to encourage both flourishing and rational confrontation. (shrink)

Shape Dynamics is a radical yet soundly based reinterpretation of Einstein's theory of gravity that has opened up new approaches to gravity research. This text offers both a brief introduction and a detailed walk-through of the motivations for the theory, its development from first principles and an in-depth look at its present status.

The capability approach developed by Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen has become an important new paradigm in thinking about development. However, despite its theoretical and philosophical attractiveness, it has been less easy to measure or to translate into policy. This volume addresses these issues in the context of poverty and justice. Part I offers a set of conceptual essays that debate the strength of the often misunderstood individual focus of the capability approach. Part II investigates the techniques by which we can (...) measure and compare capabilities, and how we can integrate them into poverty comparisons and policy advice. Finally, Part III looks at how we can apply the capability approach to different regions and contexts. Written by a team of international scholars, The Capability Approach is a valuable resource for researchers and graduate students concerned with the debate over the value of the capability approach and its potential applications. (shrink)

For over three decades, the capability approach proposed and developed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum has had a distinct impact on development theories and approaches because it goes beyond an economic conception of development and engages with the normative aspects of development. This book explores the new frontiers of the capability approach and its links to human development in three main areas. First, it delves into the philosophical foundations of the approach, re-examining its links to concepts of common good, (...) collective agency and epistemic diversity. Secondly, it addresses its 'operational frontier', aiming to give inclusive explanations of some of the most advanced methods available for capability researchers. Thirdly, it offers a wide range of the applications of this approach, as carried out by a mix of renowned capability scholars and researchers from different disciplines. This broad interdisciplinary range includes the areas of human and sustainable development, inequalities, labour markets, education, special needs, cities, urban planning, housing, social capital and happiness studies, among others. (shrink)

Nell’ambito degli studi su fede e ragione nel pensiero di Tommaso d’Aquino, si è solitamente scelto di mostrare l’armonia dell’una e dell’altra attraverso ciò che le accomuna, ossia il fatto che la fede abbia un carattere intellettuale in quanto essa è assenso dell’intelletto alla rivelazione. Limitare la fede a questo, tuttavia, la espone al giudizio della ragione e quindi alla possibilità di essere rifiutata, se ciò è richiesto dal criterio dell’evidenza. In questa sede, dopo aver ricordato che per Tommaso la (...) fede è sì assenso intellettuale alla rivelazione ma in quanto dovuto principalmente alla carità, mostro come questo porti il credente a credere fermamente, anche nel caso l’evidenza sembrasse smentire l’atto di fede. E mostro che in tal modo il credente sembra messo nella migliore condizione possibile per promuovere l’attività intellettuale. (shrink)

In this article, I focus on what emerges from Thomas Aquinas’s religious epistemology once taken into consideration in the light of the contemporary debates on Christian philosophy. I argue that Aquinas profitably explores what is specific to Christian faith – its being under the command of the will moved by God’s grace. According to Aquinas, it seems that it is precisely that which is specific to faith and distinguishes it from human reason that puts believers in an ideal condition to (...) develop intellectual activities. (shrink)

Scholars of Aquinas have usually focused on the intellectual aspect of the Christian faith, i.e., on the view that faith is a propositional belief. In this view, faith can be subjected to ra - tional scrutiny, and at least in principle rejected, if this is required by contrary evidence. In this article, I intend to show that for Aquinas, faith is not only a propositional belief. Consequently, it cannot be limited to the intellectual dimension. A moral and a religious one (...) should be included, since faith is also a matter of good choice and relationship with God. Because of this relationship – which is the religious dimension of faith – faith is caused by charity, which makes the faithful firmly believe the fundamental tenets of divine revelation, however convincing contrary evidence may appear to be. Furthermore, when it comes to the relationship between faith and rational arguments, such a firm faith leads the believer to promote intellectual virtues, among which, open-mindedness stands out. The believer is led to follow reason wherever it leads, which means that he is put in the optimum condition to conduct research and debates. (shrink)

Secondo i sostenitori della prospettiva transumanista, la tecnologia contemporanea può condurci a ridefinire la natura umana attraverso il superamento dei suoi limiti. Tra i limiti in questione, si ricordano di frequente quelli biologici e quelli cognitivi. Risulta infatti di generalizzato interesse la possibilità di prevenire ed evitare l’insorgenza di malattie più o meno curabili come pure quella di aumentare le prestazioni intellettuali, compresa la generazione di strumenti di cosiddetta intelligenza artificiale. Forse interessa meno la possibilità di superare limiti di natura (...) morale, per esempio intervenendo sul codice genetico o impiantando appositi neurotrasmettitori per farci desiderare le cose migliori e quindi migliorare il nostro agire morale. Che sia vero o no che il progresso morale indotto dalla tecnologia (moral enhancement) risulti di minore interesse per il grande pubblico, la possibilità di migliorare l’agire morale è comunque un tema di enorme importanza. Questo per tre ragioni. La prima, praticamente ovvia, è che, considerata la storia di dolore arrecata all’umanità da una tensione al male che sembra ineliminabile, renderci migliori sotto un profilo morale sarebbe di straordinario valore. La seconda ragione consiste nel fatto che ogni altro tipo di miglioramento, da quello biologico a quello psicologico e cognitivo, risulterebbe ancora maggiore una volta che ci si fosse assicurati quello morale. È infatti difficilmente negabile che anche una condizione ottimale sotto il profilo fisico e psicologico e un invidiabile livello cognitivo non avrebbero risvolti positivi se conseguiti in assenza di un’adeguata formazione morale. La terza ragione è che, mentre il miglioramento cognitivo e soprattutto quello biologico sembrano costituire un obiettivo effettivamente realizzabile, per cui la discussione a proposito è unicamente tesa a considerarne il valore e le potenzialità come pure gli effetti collaterali, del progresso morale si possono offrire invece ragioni atte a sostenere la tesi che esso, per via tecnologica, sia altamente improbabile. In questo articolo sosterrò questa tesi. Nella prima parte, al modo di una premessa, mi soffermerò sul significato che la riflessione transumanista solitamente attribuisce al legame tra progresso morale e progresso tecnologico. Procederò poi, nella seconda e terza parte, a evidenziare l’esistenza di tre limiti sostanziali alla possibilità che il progresso tecnologico generi progresso morale. Li chiamerò “ignoranza tecnologica”, “passività tecnologica” e “facilità tecnologica”. Infine, mostrerò che essi possono aggravarsi data la visione del futuro della tecnologia come ignoto, visione che è tipica della riflessione transumanista. (shrink)

Theodicy is often rejected because a suffering person is hardly interested in abstract arguments—even if these arguments were convincing, they might not change the suffering she is experiencing. I propose a twofold theodicy. First, Christians are invited to promote positive apologetics—they should show the internal consistency of divine revelation, which recommends that they should alleviate suffering and promote flourishing. Second, Christians should develop negative apologetics and show the untenability of objections to the Christian view of evil and suffering, including the (...) seemingly uncontroversial objection that a world without innocent suffering would be better in terms of justice than the one we live in. My argument is that in both positive and negative apologetics believers should be guided by devotion and commitment to God. The more they love and trust God, and consequently believe what God has revealed, the more they are expected to encourage both flourishing and rational confrontation. (shrink)