In this paper, we argue that there are epistemic norms on evidence-gathering and consider consequences for how to understand epistemic normativity. Though the view that there are such norms seems intuitive, it has found surprisingly little defense. Rather, many philosophers have argued that norms on evidence-gathering can only be practical or moral. On a prominent evidentialist version of this position, epistemic norms only apply to responding to the evidence one already has. Here we challenge the orthodoxy. First, we argue that (...) there is no significant normative difference between responding to evidence you have and gathering more evidence. Second, we argue that our practices of epistemically criticizing agents for their poor evidence-gathering indicate the existence of epistemic norms on evidence-gathering. Finally, we show that our thesis has important implications for recent debates about the relationship between epistemic norms and inquiry. (shrink)

Beliefs can be resistant to evidence. Nonetheless, the orthodox view in epistemology analyzes beliefs as evidence-responsive attitudes. I address this tension by deploying analytical tools on capacities and masking to show that the cognitive science of evidence-resistance supports rather than undermines the orthodox view. In doing so, I argue for the claim that belief requires the capacity for evidence-responsiveness. More precisely, if a subject believes that p, then they have the capacity to rationally respond to evidence bearing on p. Because (...) capacities for evidence-responsiveness are fallible and may be masked, beliefs can be held in the face of counter-evidence. Indeed, I will argue that our best science of belief supports the claim that evidence-resistant beliefs result from masks on evidence-responsiveness capacities. This account of belief not only allows for resistance to evidence, but provides us with a framework for describing and explaining actual cases of evidence-resistance. (shrink)

Delusions are deeply evidence-resistant. Patients with delusions are unmoved by evidence that is in direct conflict with the delusion, often responding to such evidence by offering obvious, and strange, confabulations. As a consequence, the standard view is that delusions are not evidence-responsive. This claim has been used as a key argumentative wedge in debates on the nature of delusions. Some have taken delusions to be beliefs and argued that this implies that belief is not constitutively evidence-responsive. Others hold fixed the (...) evidenceresponsiveness of belief and take this to show that delusions cannot be beliefs. Against this common assumption, I appeal to a large range of empirical evidence to argue that delusions are evidence-responsive in the sense that subjects have the capacity to respond to evidence on their delusion in rationally permissible ways. The extreme evidence-resistance of delusions is a consequence of powerful masking factors on these capacities, such as strange perceptual experiences, motivational factors, and cognitive biases. This view makes room for holding both that belief is constitutively evidence-responsive and that delusions are beliefs, and it has important implications for the study and treatment of delusions. (shrink)

Epistemic agents interact with evidence in different ways. This can cause trouble for mutual understanding and for our ability to rationally engage with others. Indeed, it can compromise democratic practices of deliberation. This paper explains these differences by appeal to a new notion: epistemic styles. Epistemic styles are ways of interacting with evidence that express unified sets of epistemic values, preferences, goals, and interests. The paper introduces the notion of epistemic styles and develops a systematic account of their nature. It (...) then discusses the implications of epistemic styles for central questions in epistemology, in particular, for issues surrounding rational engagement and for the debate between virtue epistemologists and epistemic situationists. (shrink)

The orthodox view in epistemology is that belief is constitutively evidence-responsive. I offer a novel argument for a version of this view, one that appeals to capacities to rationally respond to evidence. I do so by developing the Sellarsian idea that the concept of belief functions to mark the space of reasons in a non-intellectualist and naturalistic direction. The resulting view does justice to the role of belief in social interactions, joint deliberation, and rational persuasion, while including evidence-resistant beliefs and (...) animal beliefs as genuine beliefs. It has a range of further benefits: it helps us account for epistemic normativity, paves the way for better psychological models of belief revision, distinguishes beliefs from imaginings and mere acceptances, and helps us avoid noxious simplistic takes on human irrationality. (shrink)

Delusions are standardly defined as attitudes that are not amenable to change in light of conflicting evidence. But what evidence do people with delusion have for and against it? Do delusions really go against their total evidence? How are the answers affected by different conceptions of evidence? -/- This chapter focuses on how delusions relate to evidence. I consider what delusions-relevant evidence people with delusions have. I give some reasons to think that people typically have evidence for their delusions, and (...) that the evidence they have against them is often overstated. I draw on this discussion to consider whether delusions are evidentially supported and epistemically rational. Finally, I discuss implications for the nature of delusion, responsibility, and treatment and suggest directions for future research. Throughout, the discussion is sensitive to different conceptions of evidence and rationality in epistemology. -/- A central upshot is that what we should say about the epistemic standing of delusions depends substantively on our positions in epistemology, in particular, on the debate between internalists and externalists about evidence. If we want clarity on the epistemic standing of delusions, we need to incorporate more sophisticated tools from epistemology. (shrink)

This article comprises an up-to-date critical review of the field known as Economic Methodology or Philosophy of Economics (EM/PE). Two edited volumes (Kincaid and Ross 2021; Heilmann and Reiss 2021), a special issue of the Journal of Economic Methodology (2021), and a recent bibliometric analysis of the field (Claveau et al. 2021) constitute the basis of the review. Drawing on these sources, we identify a number of problematic trends in current EM/PE research. We claim that these trends could be interpreted (...) as two kinds of biases, namely a micro-level bias and a mainstream bias. We discuss the respective details of these biases and their normative implications for the discipline. (shrink)

Background: In the last decades, there have been important developments in the scientific and technological areas of healthcare. On certain occasions this provokes conflict between the patients' rights and the values of healthcare professionals which brings about, within this clinical relationship, the problem of conscientious objection. Aims: To learn the opinions that the Nurses of the Madrid Autonomous Community have regarding conscientious objection. Research design: Cross-cutting descriptive study. Participants and research context: The nurses of 9 hospitals and 12 Health Centers (...) in the Madrid Autonomous Community. The study was done by means of an auto completed anonymous questionnaire. The variables studied were social-demographical and their opinions about conscientious objections. Ethical considerations: The study was approved by the Ethical Community of Clinical Research of the University Hospital Príncipe de Asturias. Participants were assured of maximum confidentiality and anonymity. Findings: A total of 421 nurses answered the questionnaire. In total, 55.6% of the nurses confirmed they were religious believers, and 64.3% declared having poor knowledge regarding conscientious objection. The matters that caused the greatest objections were voluntary abortions, genetic embryo selection, refusal of blood transfusions, and therapy refusal. Discussion: Different authors state that the most significant cases of conscientious objections for health professionals are those regarding carrying out or assisting in abortions, euthanasia, the practice of assisted reproduction and, finally, the prescription and dispensing of the morning-after pill. In our study, the most significant cases in which the nurses would declare conscientious objections would be the refusal to accept treatment, the selection of embryos after genetic diagnosis preimplantation, the patient’s refusal to receive blood transfusions due to religious reasons and pregnant women’s request for voluntary abortions within the first 14 weeks. Conclusion: Nurses’ religious beliefs influence their opinions regarding conscientious objection. The nurses who declare themselves as religious believers object in a higher percentage than those without religious beliefs. (shrink)

In this paper I draw on Einstein's distinction between “principle” and “constructive” theories to isolate two levels of physical theory that can be found in both classical and (special) relativistic physics. I then argue that when we focus on theoretical explanations in physics, i.e. explanations of physical laws, the two leading views on explanation, Salmon's “bottom-up” view and Kitcher's “top-down” view, accurately describe theoretical explanations for a given level of theory. I arrive at this conclusion through an analysis of explanations (...) of mass—energy equivalence in special relativity. (shrink)

Commentary on Pablo Hubacher Haerle’s paper “Is OCD Epistemically Irrational?”. I argue for expanding our assessment of rationality in OCD by considering a wider range of epistemic parameters and how they fit together.

What are the roles of scientific causal knowledge in relation to the evidential requirements of policy making? In this chapter, I review the existing approaches in philosophy of science to the policy relevance of causal knowledge. I assess the specific concerns and questions on which these philosophical accounts have focused and show how they only offer a partial perspective of the relation between causal knowledge and policy making. Most existing views are top-down approaches: they start from philosophical concerns about causation (...) and evidence, and then make general claims about (potential) policy implications, but leave the notion of “policy” unanalyzed. As an alternative, I put forward some ideas toward a bottom-up approach: one that understands policy making as a dynamic process with several stages, and that starts from concrete policy problems, to then examine how causal notions and methods can contribute in various ways to the specifics of the process of policy making. (shrink)

In this article, I offer a methodological analysis of the empirical research on the causal effects of trade liberalisation, and assess whether such studies can be of any use for guiding policy prescriptions in real-world economies. The analysis focuses on the mainstream economic research that has been used to support arguments in favour of trade liberalisation during the last decades. Even though there are empirical results that could be taken as valid evidence for a causal connection between free trade and (...) economic gains, none of the existing evidence licences trustworthy inferences about the policy effectiveness of trade liberalisation reforms in real-world cases. There are three aspects of the empirical literature that make it highly problematic for making reliable policy inferences: (a) the criteria used to define the notion of ‘free trade’, (b) the background assumptions embedded in the econometric techniques used for estimating causal effects, and (c) the widespread desire among academic economists to attain scientific results in terms of universally valid generalisations. The analysis exposes a worrisome mismatch between, on the one hand, the research aims and outcomes of scientific economics and, on the other, the kind of evidence that would be useful for guiding actual policy deliberations. (shrink)

Laudato si’, with its articulation of a familial ecology reflecting Francis’s Latin American context, expands the subject of solidarity in Catholic social teaching and thought. Yet, this ecological vision of family fails to attend to the problem of gender subordination latent in Catholic social teaching, including in its approaches to ecology. A vision of solidarity that eradicates gender and ecological subordination must elaborate a familial ecology characterized by both mercy and equality.

A disturbing economic reality confronts consumers today: thousands of farm workers are enslaved in U.S. agricultural fields, forced to work without pay amid deplorable conditions and under the constant threat of violence. If structural economic injustices perpetuate modern‐day agricultural slavery, then it is necessary to promote consumer practices that resist these abusive dynamics. But a consumption‐oriented strategy does not necessarily restore either personal agency or communal relations damaged by agricultural trafficking. This essay proposes a framework for aesthetic solidarity that cultivates (...) affective bonds necessary for building communities of resistance characterized by mutuality, equality, and participation. (shrink)

This text seeks to introduce a question related to the place that philosophy occupies within the contemporary scene, thus opening a problematization regarding whether it can respond to the demands imposed on it by the present. In this regard, we seek to rethink the notion of philosophy from a standpoint that rescues its practical, material, and affective dimensions, making visible the transformative impulse that it can have with respect to the usual meanings associated with disciplinary production linked to the traditional (...) division between theory and practice, thus opening it to a dimension that recognizes the implicating (creative, interventional) role that philosophy has in the production of reality. (shrink)

Interpretations of Einstein’s equation differ primarily concerning whether E = mc2 entails that mass and energy are the same property of physical systems, and hence whether there is any sense in which mass is ever ‘converted’ into energy. In this paper, I examine six interpretations of Einstein’s equation and argue that all but one fail to satisfy a minimal set of conditions that all interpretations of physical theories ought to satisfy. I argue that we should prefer the interpretation of Einstein’s (...) equation that holds that mass and energy are distinct properties of physical systems. This interpretation also carries along the view that while most cases of ‘conversion’ are not genuine examples of mass being ‘converted’ into energy, it is possible that the there are such ‘conversions’ in the sense that a certain amount of energy ‘appears’ and an equivalent of mass ‘disappears’. Finally, I suggest that the interpretation I defend is the only one that does not blur the distinction between what Einstein called ‘principle’ and ‘constructive’ theories. This is philosophically significant because it emphasizes that explanations of Einstein’s equation and the ‘conversion’ of mass and energy must be top‐down explanations. (shrink)

In a time of globalization, Political Philosophy for the Global Age provides a theoretical basis for the convergence of human values in terms of legitimate conceptions of time, language, and notions of self. Sánchez Flores reviews what she considers to be the most important positions in the current debate on political theory (liberalism, communitarianism, feminism, and postcolonialism) and also proposes her own original contribution. Sánchez Flores’s unique approach is a critique of a type of morality formulated solely on the basis (...) of the Judeo-Christian view of reality. It is a theoretical construct that becomes an invitation to explore other notions of human morality and an inquiry into the need to produce a political philosophy that universalizes an ethics of caring and responsibility as well as provides a locus where diverse human cultures can meet. (shrink)

In a time of globalization, Political Philosophy for the Global Age provides a theoretical basis for the convergence of human values in terms of legitimate conceptions of time, language, and notions of self. Sánchez Flores reviews what she considers to be the most important positions in the current debate on political theory (liberalism, communitarianism, feminism, and postcolonialism) and also proposes her own original contribution. Sánchez Flores’s unique approach is a critique of a type of morality formulated solely on the basis (...) of the Judeo-Christian view of reality. It is a theoretical construct that becomes an invitation to explore other notions of human morality and an inquiry into the need to produce a political philosophy that universalizes an ethics of caring and responsibility as well as provides a locus where diverse human cultures can meet. (shrink)

In a time of globalization, Political Philosophy for the Global Age provides a theoretical basis for the convergence of human values in terms of legitimate conceptions of time, language, and notions of self. Sánchez Flores reviews what she considers to be the most important positions in the current debate on political theory (liberalism, communitarianism, feminism, and postcolonialism) and also proposes her own original contribution. Sánchez Flores’s unique approach is a critique of a type of morality formulated solely on the basis (...) of the Judeo-Christian view of reality. It is a theoretical construct that becomes an invitation to explore other notions of human morality and an inquiry into the need to produce a political philosophy that universalizes an ethics of caring and responsibility as well as provides a locus where diverse human cultures can meet. (shrink)

James F. Keenan defines mercy as “the willingness to enter the chaos of another.” Mercy thus defined, he argues, is the distinctive characteristic of Christian morality. This essay asserts that mercy is, in fact, a public virtue, one that can be affirmed across a broad range of religious and moral traditions. As a public virtue, mercy ought to shape both affective and effective responses to the Syrian refugee crisis in the United States.

The COVID-19 pandemic and its related policies (e.g., stay at home and social distancing orders) have increased people’s use of digital technology, such as social media. Researchers have, in turn, utilized artificial intelligence to analyze social media data for public health surveillance. For example, through machine learning and natural language processing, they have monitored social media data to examine public knowledge and behavior. This paper explores the ethical considerations of using artificial intelligence to monitor social media to understand the public’s (...) perspectives and behaviors surrounding COVID-19, including potential risks and benefits of an AI-driven approach. Importantly, investigators and ethics committees have a role in ensuring that researchers adhere to ethical principles of respect for persons, beneficence, and justice in a way that moves science forward while ensuring public safety and confidence in the process. (shrink)

We respond to criticism of our paper “Paradox in Wave-Particle Duality for Non-Perturbative Measurements”. We disagree with Steuernagel’s derivation of the visibility of the Afshar experiment. To calculate the fringe visibility, Steuernagel utilizes two different experimental situations, i.e. the wire grid in the pattern minima and in the pattern maxima. In our assessment, this procedure cannot lead to the correct result for the complementarity properties of a wave-particle in one particular experimental set-up.

Resumen El propósito de este trabajo es profundizar en el concepto de actividad de imagen y defender su utilidad como categoría de estudio para comprender diferentes tipos de comportamiento que afectan a la imagen social de los hablantes en la interacción comunicativa: cortesía, descortesía y actividad de autoimagen. Teniendo como base estudios sociopragmáticos del español desde una perspectiva cultural y estudios teóricos en inglés de la última década, se tratará el concepto de actividad de imagen, el cual se caracteriza de (...) acuerdo con dos conceptos claves: el del efecto social que un comportamiento comunicativo tiene sobre las imágenes de los hablantes y el del continuo social, la conexión que se establece entre sus imágenes en la interacción. De esta forma, se propone tratar la actividad de imagen desde dos perspectivas relacionadas: la de la dirección seguida por el efecto social hacia los interactuantes y la de las características de este efecto, siendo su interrelación el factor que permite identificar y caracterizar el tipo de actividad de imagen. (shrink)

I temi della fede e della religione, e del loro conflitto con la cultura laica, sono da qualche tempo al centro di un interesse mediatico crescente, alimentato anche dalle polemiche politiche suscitate dal moltiplicarsi degli interventi e delle "scomuniche" del papa e della Conferenza Episcopale Italiana contro la modernità. Mancava fin qui, tuttavia, un testo di discussione, da punti di vista diversi e reciprocamente problematici, sulle ragioni dell'ateismo e della fede. Un confronto tra gli esponenti di tre posizioni ideologiche molto (...) lontane tra loro, accomunate però dal rifiuto di ogni appartenenza accademica: il cristianesimo nietzschiano del "pensiero debole" di Gianni Vattimo, la saggezza atea di una tradizione antica rilanciata da Michel Onfray e l'empirismo naturalistico-esistenziale della "filosofia del finito" di Paolo Flores d'Arcais. In questo insolito dialogo a tre voci emergono tutti gli interrogativi essenziali legati al problema, a partire da quello più generale: quali devono essere i rapporti tra filosofia e ateismo? L'"ipotesi Dio" deve ormai essere considerata superflua anche dalla riflessione filosofica, visto che le scienze ne fanno metodologicamente a meno? Quali sono le conseguenze etiche e politiche dell'essere atei o, all'opposto, credenti? (shrink)

What is philosophy? Why does it matter? How have philosophy and its relation to religion and science changed from the ancient to the medieval and modern periods and beyond? What are the central philosophical ideas, from Socrates to Nietzsche? Reexamining Love of Wisdom addresses these questions. It offers a new perspective by organizing the material under the theme of philosophical desire and shows the timeless importance of philosophy understood as the love of wisdom. Flores provides an historical introduction to philosophy (...) suitable for college students that is a resource for more advanced students or scholars interested in the history and nature of philosophy. -- back cover. (shrink)

Through a commentary of a poem by Crates of Thebes, transmitted by Julian (Or. VII, Against Heracleios the Cynic, 9, 213a-214a and Or. XI [VI], Against the ignorant cynics, 17, 199c-200b), this article aims to show that the cynic philosophers borrowed from the animal behavior not only the paradigm of a kata phusin way of life, but also counter-examples of the kinds of attitude men should avoid.

Although higher education understands the need to develop critical thinkers, it has not lived up to the task consistently. Students are graduating deficient in these skills, unprepared to think critically once in the workforce. Limited development of cognitive processing skills leads to less effective leaders. Various definitions of critical thinking are examined to develop a general construct to guide the discussion as critical thinking is linked to constructivism, leadership, and education. Most pedagogy is content-based built on deep knowledge. Successful critical (...) thinking pedagogy is moving away from this paradigm, teaching students to think complexly. Some of the challenges faced by higher education moving to a critical thinking curricula are discussed, and recommendations are offered for improving outcomes. (shrink)

This article is an edited transcript of the roundtable entitled “What is Philo-Performance?” that took place in Paris on 28 June 2014, within the framework of the “Theatre, Performance, Philosophy International Conference: Crossings and Transfers in Anglo-American Thought”. The conference was organized by Julien Alliot, Flore Garcin-Marrou, Liza Kharoubi and Anna Street from the LAPS, a French research group on performance philosophy.

Este artigo apresenta o conceito problemático de sujeito na filosofia de Kant. Iniciamos por apresentar as linhas principais e os sentidos empírico e transcendental da Subjektivität na primeira Crítica de Kant, as suas significações epistemológicas e práticas e a maneira como ela responde à invenção de uma posição radicalmente construtivista em filosofia. O sujeito é, acima de tudo, uma atividade formal de unificação no nível teórico, uma atividade que é também a condição de possibilidade universal de toda experiência coerente. Daí (...) o fato de que a sua realidade não é a de uma alma substancial ou a de uma subjetividade empírica, concebidas como objetos determinados. É a sua constituição como sujeito transcendental que abre a possibilidade para a ideia do sujeito como um agente livre, autor de suas próprias representações e ações. (shrink)

Desde la conquista española ha existido una dicotomía constante en la identidad peruana, la cual se refleja en el arte y especialmente en la literatura. Es en ella en la que existe un personaje que representa en sus obras de manera magistral los encuentros y desencuentros generados por la interacción constante de esos dos hemisferios culturales presentes en la peruanidad. Es José María Arguedas, quien no solamente retrata dicha realidad, sino que a través del indigenismo logra representar y revalorizar la (...) figura del indio y por consiguiente de lo andino, todo en el marco de la problemática constante que aqueja la búsqueda de lo que consiste ser peruano. Tomando como referencia tres importantes obras de su producción intelectual como son: “Los ríos profundos”, “El Sexto” y “El zorro de arriba y el zorro de abajo”. (shrink)

Se presenta una visión de la epistemología como lógica del pensar y se la lleva a una elaboración de la práctica clínica como una lógica del padecimiento psíquico. Esto basado en los planteamientos de Deleuze y Guattari. Para ello se toma como punto de partida la noción de los movimientos aberrantes que, leyendo la obra de Deleuze, elaboró David Lapoujade entendiéndolos como movimientos que se producen en la relación entre distintos términos heterogéneos, pero manteniendo su heterogeneidad. Esto es vinculado con (...) la invitación que hace el mismo Lapoujade a entender la obra deleuzeana como el desarrollo de lógicas irracionales, intentando pensar desde ahí una lógica de la locura y del padecimiento mental con base en, a su vez, una lógica de las obras literarias de Proust y Kafka, tal como las leen los mismos Deleuze y Guattari. En relación con ello destacamos, por un lado, cierta lógica de conjuntos abiertos y no totalizables que estos últimos autores encuentran en la obra de Proust y, por otro lado, una lógica de la contigüidad que encuentran en la obra de Kafka. Al mismo tiempo, se establecen puntos en común entre estas dos lecturas a propósito de lo esquizoide como algo que excede a la significación del discurso, así como a la normatividad de la conducta. Asimismo, en distintos puntos del escrito se extraerán las implicaciones que estos modos de pensar tienen para una práctica clínica en relación con modos de existencia subjetivos que se escapan a lo que está establecido en el campo social. De esa manera, ponemos en conjunción una aproximación epistemológica con una política. (shrink)

Esta investigación, se efectuó en un aula del centro de desarrollo integral de la familia (DIF) en el municipio de Durango, México. En este lugar, se capacitan personas para el trabajo artesanal; ahí fueron seleccionadas 13 madres adolescentes con un rango de edad que fluctúa entre los 15 y 23 años de edad, todas ellas víctimas de maltrato infantil. En este grupo de personas se implementó la propuesta filosófico-pedagógica denominada “Filosofía para Niños y Adolescentes” del filósofo norteamericano Matthew Lipman. El (...) principal objetivo fue conformar una “comunidad de indagación”, donde, a través del dialogo razonado las participantes desarrollaron habilidades cognitivas, posibilitándolas a departir de manera ética y moral sobre sus experiencias de vida dentro de un entorno democrático. Los resultados obtenidos se dan a conocer a través de las revelaciones expresadas por las participantes durante los diálogos filosóficos, además, fueron registradas las habilidades cognitivas detectadas durante 20 sesiones. Los resultados fueron contrastados con las teorías para demostrar el cambio cognitivo de las participantes en las comunidades de diálogo. También se registraron ciertos hallazgos inesperados en otras áreas académicas que favorecen el pensamiento ético y moral. (shrink)

El objeto de profundizar en el análisis de la calidad de vida en adultos mayores, la incidencia de la familia, valores y brechas intergeneracionales, en la ciudad de Torreón Coahuila, México, con analisis cuantitativo aplicado a 230 sujetos, 5 ejes y con variables, validado con Alpha de Cronbach de 0.88 resultado del análisis: la importancia de que adultos cuente con la información en lo referente a: su proceso de envejecimiento, proceso salud-enfermedad y la intervención de políticas públicas gubernamentales, entorno familiar (...) y creencias son determinante en su acompañamiento su fusión demandando una aplicación oportuna de políticas publicas y sociales. (shrink)

Understanding Computers and Cognition presents an important and controversial new approach to understanding what computers do and how their functioning is related to human language, thought, and action. While it is a book about computers, Understanding Computers and Cognition goes beyond the specific issues of what computers can or can't do. It is a broad-ranging discussion exploring the background of understanding in which the discourse about computers and technology takes place. Understanding Computers and Cognition is written for a wide audience, (...) not just those professionals involved in computer design or artificial intelligence. It represents an important contribution to the ongoing discussion about what it means to be a machine, and what it means to be human. Book jacket. (shrink)

En el artículo defiendo la idea de una lectura cómplice constructiva como la mejor manera de lidiar con el problema del canon filosófico. Frente a la conservación complaciente y la eliminación paranoica, mi posición aboga por una lectura menos reverencial que interrogue el papel de los clásicos en los procesos de exclusión racistas y sexistas. La lectura de los clásicos requiere hacer fisuras en la canonización. Como ejemplo de lo anterior reviso el papel de Kant y el neokantismo en la (...) construcción racista y sexista del canon filosófico, así como de las obras canónicas del propio Kant. (shrink)

In the last few years, a great deal of attention has been paid to the effects that the achievements of the Human Genome Project will have on the confidentiality of medical information. The Genetic Privacy Act is an attempt to address the privacy, confidentiality, and property rights relating to obtaining, requesting, using, storing, and disposing of genetic material. The GPA grew out of concerns over the vast amount of genetic information that is a product of the Human Genome Project. The (...) central goals of the GPA are twofold: to define an individual's right to control access to their genetic material and the privilege to control the information derived therefrom; and to prevent potential and actual abuse of genetic information by third parties, such as insurance companies, employers, and government. The GPA is one of a group of proposals that seek to control the flow of medical information from the individual to health care professionals and to other persons. (shrink)

Interest in the nature of religious and mystical experiences (henceforth RMEs) is old. Recently, this interest has shifted toward understanding the relationship between brain function and RMEs. In the first section, I introduce neurocognitive data from three experiments that strongly correlate the report of religious mystical experiences with specific neural activity. Although correlations cannot be considered as “absolute” proof, strong correlations provide us with inductive grounds for justifying the belief or nonbelief of some proposition. These data suggest that the human (...) brain plays a key role in having an RME and will provide support for the claim that our explanations for phenomena should be located in the natural world. In the next section, I explore the meaning of an RME from a Jamesian perspective and discuss the use of RMEs and the apparent design of the world as proof for God’s existence. My point is to show that the whole enterprise of using phenomena “that only God could have brought about” as the proof for God’s existence is inherently question begging and so is no proof that God exists. In the third section, I lay out in detail my assumptions for my main argument in the final section. There, I argue that belief in the supernatural is not justifiable given the data we have from contemporary science and basic rules of reasoning. (shrink)

The Golden Rule is (roughly) as follows: treat others as you would have others treat you. Philosophical reactions to it vary; it has both supporters and detractors. In any case, almost nobody who things critically about morality takes the literal version of the Golden Rule seriously, since there are just too many problems with it. To demonstrate this, I will look at a literal version of the Golden Rule espoused by John C. Maxwell, a well-known and influential motivational speaker, and (...) briefly discuss some of the obvious problems that it faces. I will then examine a more sophisticated version of the Golden Rule espoused by philosopher Harry Gensler. While able to overcome some of the problems of the literal Golden Rule, Gensler's version nevertheless shares a common difficulty with it: in both cases, the moral agent is asked to imagine themselves in the place of another. Maxwell things this is easily done, and Gensler asks for vividness and accuracy in this act of imagination. I wish to show that any version of the Golden Rule that takes seriously the need to imagine oneself in the place of another is to ask one to do the impossible, so any versions of the Golden Rule that require this should be rejected. (shrink)

Components of artificial intelligence (AI) for analysing social big data, such as natural language processing (NLP) algorithms, have improved the timeliness and robustness of health data. NLP techniques have been implemented to analyse large volumes of text from social media platforms to gain insights on disease symptoms, understand barriers to care and predict disease outbreaks. However, AI-based decisions may contain biases that could misrepresent populations, skew results or lead to errors. Bias, within the scope of this paper, is described as (...) the difference between the predictive values and true values within the modelling of an algorithm. Bias within algorithms may lead to inaccurate healthcare outcomes and exacerbate health disparities when results derived from these biased algorithms are applied to health interventions. Researchers who implement these algorithms must consider when and how bias may arise. This paper explores algorithmic biases as a result of data collection, labelling and modelling of NLP algorithms. Researchers have a role in ensuring that efforts towards combating bias are enforced, especially when drawing health conclusions derived from social media posts that are linguistically diverse. Through the implementation of open collaboration, auditing processes and the development of guidelines, researchers may be able to reduce bias and improve NLP algorithms that improve health surveillance. (shrink)

In this article the author focuses mainly in the last part of Ronald Dworkin´s Justice for Hedgehogs and in his argument for a partnership conception of democracy. For that purpose, first, he recalls some of the main features that Dworkin had advanced in previous but intrinsically related works, about political morality, equality and democracy; second, he reassess the arguments for a partnership conception of democracy; third, he reconsiders the resistance produced by Jeremy Waldron in his “A Majority in the Lifeboat” (...) and the response provided by Dworkin, but since it may appear insufficient, he intends to present an alternative —or complemen- tary— riposte in order to meet Waldron’s challenge; and, finally, he insists in the importance of taking Ronald Dworkin seriously.Resumen:En este artículo el autor se enfoca principalmente en la última parte de Justice for Hedgehogs (Justicia para erizos), de Ronald Dworkin y en su argumento a favor de la concepción asociativa o societaria de democracia. Para tal propósito, primero, recuerda algunas de las características centrales que Dworkin ha adelantado en obras anteriores, pero intrínsecamente relacionadas, acerca de moralidad política, la igualdad y la democracia; segundo, reevalúa los argumentos a favor de la concepción asociativa o societaria de democracia; tercero, reconsidera la resistencia producida por Jeremy Waldron en su “A Majority in the Lifeboat” (“Una mayoría en el bote salvavidas”), y la respuesta ofrecida por Dworkin, pero toda vez que puede parecer insuficiente, trata de presentar una respuesta alternativa —o complementaria— para responder al reto de Waldron. Finalmente insiste en la importancia de tomar a Ronald Dworkin seriamente. (shrink)

We reply to a comment by Hargrave and Smith on a paper in which we use Ostrom’s design principles to develop theory about stakeholder governance. We agree with most of the issues that Hargrave and Smith raise, but disagree with their statement that the systems view of stakeholder governance that they advocate stands in contrast to our approach. The two approaches are complementary.

An instrument of wealth accumulation and racial segregation in housing markets, the intersections between zoning and labor are often overlooked. Extending theories of space, race, and class, and drawing on historical and archival evidence, I elaborate three ways that American land-use zoning emerged to shape labor markets in the early 20th century: (1) zoning constrained households from engaging in subsistence and direct market activity, acting as a regulatory source of labor commodification; (2) zoning first emerged as a xenophobic tool for (...) regulating labor competition; and (3) zoning introduced racialized boundaries distinguishing formal work from a sphere of economic informality. I illustrate these theoretical-historical propositions with a study of the frontier origins of American land-use zoning laws in late-19th -century Los Angeles. This first and influential approach to residential zoning emerged amid racial dynamics of western settlement and the class politics of a national “free” labor market. I demonstrate how efforts to regulate the settlement and labor practices of poor urban households and Chinese immigrants on in Los Angeles became the direct legal basis for the dichotomous categories of “residential” and “industrial” districts that the city first defended before the U.S. Supreme Court in 1915. By theorizing the intersections of land-use zoning and labor markets, this paper provides a theoretical framework and historical genealogy for future work to consider entanglements of housing and labor politics amid the concurrent flexibilization of work and land use in the present. (shrink)

This is a personal essay about breasts. It focuses on my experiences as a young girl, moving through adolescence to a history of breast cancer in my family, including my mother’s breast cancer diagnosis. As a physician, patient, and wife, I reflect on the choices that I have to make and what this means for my identity as a woman and mother.

Einstein’s 1935 derivation of mass—energy equivalence is philosophically important because it contains both a criticism of purported demonstrations that proceed by analogy and strong motivations for the definitions of the ‘new’ dynamical quantities. In this paper, I argue that Einstein’s criticism and insights are still relevant today by showing how his derivation goes beyond Friedman’s demonstration of this result in his Foundations of Spacetime ¹heories. Along the way, I isolate three distinct physical claims associated with Einstein’s famous equation that are (...) sometimes not clearly distinguished in philosophical discussions of spacetime theory. (shrink)

Different approaches of environmental problems are described in this paper, considering simplist and complex conceptions, and neomarxist and symbolic interpretations. This article also reviews a brief history of environmental education from an interinstitutional and interdisciplinary perspective, a..