Foundations of Moral Philosophy: Readings in Metaethics is a comprehensive collection of fifty-six contemporary readings and historical sources on major issues in metaethics. It focuses on the meaning of moral terms, the nature of moral psychology, whether we can know moral truths (if there are any), and the role of moral reasons. The book features unparalleled representation of women philosophers, with one-third of the contemporary articles authored or coauthored by women. Wherever appropriate, the articles have been carefully edited to ensure (...) that they will be exceptionally clear and understandable to undergraduate students. The volume is enhanced by a general introduction, introductions and study questions for each selection, and a detailed glossary. (shrink)

Kant has attempted to develop a foundation of his metaphysics of morals and this foundation ultimately turns out to be a religious one. Consequently, the question for Kant is whether morality also provides a practical foundation for independent religious faith. In contrast, we see Confucianism as providing a system of morality which has its own religiousness or sense of ultimateness in terms of a robust form of moral life and its practice of li 禮 and (...) reflective thinking on humanity. In this article, I wish to present these two forms of moral thinking which can be respectively titled moral theology and onto-ethics. A relative evaluation shows how a world morality could be consistent or justified within one's own religious tradition and yet can be and should be open to a common people humanity we experience as couched in an open cosmos we observe. (shrink)

Man's duties and responsibilities in comtemporary society analyzed in the light of moral philosophy and the findings of modern economics.

The paper focuses on MacIntyre’s account of teleology and the role of teleology in explaining value language and grounding ethical normativity. It isolates three distinct albeit interrelated notions of teleology emerging gradually from Macintyre’s philosophical project. It investigates how moral language is explained and moral norms justified on the bases of these three articulations of the teleological motif. It subjects the weakness of this reasoning to criticism.

This article considers the development of the idea of universal moral principles in the work of Thomas Aquinas and his predecessors in the thirteenth century. Like other medieval authors who sought to place the principles of moral practice on a foundation more secure than on the choices of the good person, as described by Aristotle, Thomas chooses to introduce a measure of ethical certitude through the concept of the innate habit of synderesis. This idea, introduced by Jerome in his (...) commentary on Ezekiel, locates an inextinguishable spark of conscience in all humans. Thomas, influenced by Philip the Chancellor and Albert the Great, locates the principles of natural law in this innate habit of synderesis. By so doing he can claim that all human beings have the ability to recognize universally binding moral imperatives, regardless of their background and societal influences. Through this natural ability the human basis for moral action found in Aristotle's Ethics yields to one based upon the eternal immutable laws of a divine being. (shrink)

I might have entitled this lecture ‘The origins of morality’ or, ‘Where does morality come from?’. These titles sound vaguely historical, and would therefore have been misleading; whereas I suppose ‘The Foundations of Morality’ sounds in some sense analytic, and therefore more familiarly, perhaps painfully, philosophical. But I do not think that these different titles would mark a substantial difference in what I aim to explore, albeit superficially, in what follows. What interests me is the question how, (...) or on what, is the moral sense of any individual founded? (shrink)

This book aims to reinvigorate discussions of moral arguments for God's existence.

This essay attempts concisely to articulate the necessary role played within moral theology in general—and within the moral theology of grace in particular—by the metaphysics and natural philosophy of human agency. It argues for the priority of the speculative with respect to the practical inasmuch as speculative knowledge precedes desire, and desire precedes intention; for the centrality of unified normative teleology; for the primacy of being over relation; and for the primacy of sound doctrine regarding the divine causal providence for (...) the moral theology of grace and freedom. (shrink)

In the Western studies of the texts of Mozi, three distinctive views have surfaced in the past few decades: (1) Mozi is inconsistent because he seems to have been committed to both a Utilitarian standard and a divine command theory; (2) Mozi is a divine command theorist who argues that it is right to benefit the world because it is the will of heaven; and (3) Mozi is a utilitarian thinker who has based morality on the criterion of whether (...) actions benefit the world. In this paper, I will argue that the whole debate about whether Mozi is a divine command theorist or a utilitarian is misguided, because it is based on an incorrect understanding of the fundamental cultural perspective associated with the notion of Tian. An adequate understanding of the notion of Tian will reveal its fundamental difference from the Western notion of heaven. Such an understanding will enable us to put Mozi's moral philosophy in the ancient Chinese perspective in which a tension and potential conflict between ‘the will of heaven’ and ‘the benefit of the world’ simply cannot arise. (shrink)

One of the significant factors in the recent rehabilitation of medieval philosophy has been a renewed interest in virtue ethics, so-called, for which the credit must, in large part, go to Alasdair MacIntyre. However, some now working in the field of virtue ethics appear to be embarrassed by the metaphysical or theological context in which virtue ethics had its original expression, and attempts have been made to detach the ethics from the metaphysics and the theology. Two questions frame the structure (...) of Andrew Dell’Olio’s book: first, the historical and exegetical question of how St. Thomas manages to link up the secular and the religious orders of virtue without fragmenting the unity of the moral self; the second, the thematic question of the significance of St. Thomas’s account of the virtues to contemporary discussion. The early chapters of the book attempt to show that a de-theologized presentation of St. Thomas’s ethics fails to do justice to the rich vision of the good he presents in the Summa Theologiae. Dell’Olio, convincingly in my opinion, shows that Thomas succeeds in reconciling both a natural and a supernatural orientation of the will to the good, and thus that his ethics is more than a mere representation of Aristotle’s. The central chapters discuss the issues of God and the human good, and the connection of the virtues. (shrink)

John Rist surveys the history of ethics from Plato to the present and offers a vigorous defence of an ethical theory based on a revised version of Platonic realism. In a wide-ranging discussion he examines well-known alternatives to Platonism, in particular Epicurus, Hobbes, Hume and Kant as well as contemporary 'practical reasoners', and argues that most post-Enlightenment theories of morality depend on an abandoned Christian metaphysic and are unintelligible without such grounding. He also argues that contemporary choice-based theories, whether (...) they take a strictly ethical or more obviously political form, are ultimately arbitrary in nature. His lively and accessible 2001 study is informed by a powerful sense of philosophical history, and will be of interest to both students and scholars of ethics. (shrink)

The claim that they are the ‘Divine Command Theory of Morality’ might seem to be the neatest and most obvious way to account for the moral force of divine commands. In this paper I shall argue that the Divine Command Theory fails as an account of God’s relationship with morality, both in terms of coherence and in terms of fidelity to the traditional theist practice of obedience to God, while a more modest account of how God is to (...) be understood as having a special moral authority can be successful on both counts. (shrink)

Camus famously expresses despair about life's meaninglessness and the radical, existential impotence of human reason. Each human soul, cast into a body, wakes i.

In recent years, William Lane Craig has vigorously championed a moral argument for God's existence. The backbone of Craig's argument is the claim that only God can provide a ' sound foundation in reality' for morality. The present article has three principal aims. The first is to interpret and clarify the account of the ontological foundation of morality proposed by Craig. The second is to press home an important objection to that account. The third is to (...) expose the weakness of Craig's case for saying that without God morality would be groundless and illusory. (shrink)

This book offers a solution to the ancient philosophical problem regarding the nature and the justification of morality. The importance of this subject matter is obvious, not merely as an abstract philosophical problem, but perhaps even more as a practical challenge, regarding the way we ought to live our lives: the values that ought to direct us, and the ends that we ought to pursue. -/- In the course of this inquiry, a wide array of philosophical topics is explored: (...) the nature of intentional action, and the role played by reason and desires in agency; the question of the final end of agency – better known in ancient terminology as the question of the purpose of life, and in modern terms as the question of the meaning of life; the nature of moral obligations and their rational justification; the challenge posed by determinism for the freedom of the will, with its implications on fatalism and moral responsibility; and normative questions regarding the value of life. (shrink)

This paper retraces some of the contrast between Aquinas and Scotus with respect to the metaphysical foundations of morality in order to highlight how subtle differences pertaining to the relationship between the divine will and the divine intellect can tip a thinker toward either an unalloyed natural law theory (NLT) or something that at least starts to move in the direction of divine command theory (DCT). The paper opens with a brief consideration of three distinct elements in Aquinas’s work (...) that might tempt one to view him in a DCT light, namely: his discussion of the divine law in addition to the natural law; his position on the so-called immoralities of the patriarchs; and some of his assertions about the divine will in relation to justice. We then respond to each of those considerations. In the second and third of these cases, following Craig Boyd, we illustrate how Aquinas’s conviction that the divine will follows the ordering of the divine intellect can help inform the interpretive disputes in question. We then turn our attention to Scotus’s concern about the freedom of the divine will, before turning to his discussion of the natural law in relation to the Decalogue as a way of stressing how his two-source theory of the metaphysical foundations of morality represents a clear departure from Aquinas in the direction of DCT. (shrink)

To answer tantalizing questions such as whether animals are moral or how morality evolved, I propose starting with a somewhat less fraught question: do animals have normative cognition? Recent psychological research suggests that normative thinking, or ought-thought, begins early in human development. Recent philosophical research suggests that folk psychology is grounded in normative thought. Recent primatology research finds evidence of sophisticated cultural and social learning capacities in great apes. Drawing on these three literatures, I argue that the human variety (...) of social cognition and moral cognition encompass the same cognitive capacities and that the nonhuman great apes may also be normative beings. To make this argument, I develop an account of animal social norms that shares key properties with Cristina Bicchieri's account of social norms but which lowers the cognitive requirements for having a social norm. I propose a set of four early developing prerequisites implicated in social cognition that make up what I call naïve normativity: the ability to identify agents, sensitivity to in-group/out-group differences, the capacity for social learning of group traditions, and responsiveness to appropriateness. I review the ape cognition literature and present preliminary empirical evidence supporting the existence of social norms and naïve normativity in great apes. While there is more empirical work to be done, I hope to have offered a framework for studying normativity in other species, and I conclude that we should be open to the possibility that normative cognition is yet another ancient cognitive endowment that is not human-unique. (shrink)

Kim examines the fundamental tenets of Immanuel Kant’s theory of morality structural-methodological point of view to highlight the activities of reason vis-à-vis the blind forces of brute nature. The study provides new perspective on Kant's thought to benefit studies of epistemology, modern philosophy, moral theory and philosophy, and ethics.

In his book, Reason and Morality, Gewirth has defended the principle of generic consistency as logically and materially necessary: “Act in accord with the generic rights of your recipients as well as of yourself.” This paper argues that Gewirth can make a good response to the evaluation of Adams that Gewirth gives “no conceptual analysis of ‘X is a necessary good’ and ‘X is a right’ that reveals... an entailment.” The paper also argues that Gewirth has not shown that (...) one who would claim superior rights because of superior intelligence necessarily involves himself in a logical self-contradiction. Finally, the paper considers how the positions of Gewirth and Adams could be used to provide an existentialist, assertoric foundation of morality and suggests how Gewirth would evaluate such a foundation. (shrink)

In this essay I challenge the view, held by philosophers such as Philippa Foot and Bernard Williams, that we can be justified in saying that there is a reason for a rational agent to perform a certain action only if that action can satisfy some desire of the agent. In other words, I argue that there can be extemal reasons.

This book is both a critique of the concept of the rights-holding, free, autonomous individual and attendant ideology dominant in the contemporary West, and an account of an alternative view, that of the role-bearing, interrelated responsible person of classical Confucianism, suitably modified for addressing the manifold problems of today.

이 논문은 쇼펜하우어의 윤리학에 대한 포이어바흐의 비판을 중점적으로 고찰함으로써 이 두 철학자의 윤리학과 형이상학을 비교하는 것이다. 이를 통해 이 두 철학자가 윤리학에서 신체의 형이상학적 의미를 강조한다는 점이 밝혀진다.BR 포이어바흐는 쇼펜하우어가 관념론자이며 도덕에서 행복을 배제하고 추상적인 의지를 주장한다고 비판한다. 그러나 그의 이러한 비판은 쇼펜하우어에 대한 잘못된 해석에서 초래된 것이다. 포이어바흐는 신체와 감각에 근거하는 형이상학을 주장하므로 그의 비판은 경험주의적 비판과 달리 쇼펜하우어의 형이상학에 적용되지 않는다. 오히려 그의 형이상학은 신체와 의지의 동일성에 근거하는 쇼펜하우어의 의지형이상학과 매우 유사하다는 것이 드러난다. 이들은 공통적으로 모든 존재의 동일성이라는 (...) 형이상학을 받아들이며, 신체는 이러한 동일성을 파악하게 하는 매개라는 점에서 그 형이상학적 의미를 갖는다고 본다. 이로써 이 두 철학자는 자연과학에서 출발하여 윤리학에 이르는, 일원론적인 보편학문을 주장하는 것이다. (shrink)