_Peirce’s Speculative Grammar: Logic as Semiotics _offers a comprehensive, philologically accurate, and exegetically ambitious developmental account of Peirce’s theory of speculative grammar. The book traces the evolution of Peirce’s grammatical writings from his early research on the classification of arguments in the 1860s up to the complex semiotic taxonomies elaborated in the first decade of the twentieth century. It will be of interest to academic specialists working on Peirce, the history of American philosophy and pragmatism, the philosophy of language, the (...) history of logic, and semiotics. (shrink)

Experimental “localism” stresses the importance of context‐specific knowledge, and the limitations of universal theories in science. I illustrate Latour's radical approach to localism and show that it has some unpalatable consequences, in particular the suggestion that problems of external validity (or how to generalize experimental results to nonlaboratory circumstances) cannot be solved. In the last part of the paper I try to sketch a solution to the problem of external validity by extending Mayo's error‐probabilistic approach.

This is the first book to trace the doctrine of the guise of the good throughout the history of Western philosophy. It offers a chronological narrative exploring how the doctrine was formulated, the arguments for and against it, and the broader role it played in the thought of different philosophers. -/- In recent years there has been a rich debate about whether value judgment or value perception must form an essential part of mental states such as emotions and desires, and (...) whether intentional actions must always be done for reasons that seem good to the agent. This has sparked new theoretical interest in the classical doctrine of the guise of the good: whenever we desire (to do) something, we see it under the guise of the good; that is, we conceive of what we desire as good, desirable, or justified by reasons, in some way or another. This book offers a systematic historical treatment of the guise of the good. The chapters span from Ancient and Medieval philosophy (Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas), through the early modern period (Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, Hume, Kant) and up to Elizabeth Anscombe's rediscovery in the 20th century after a period of relative neglect. Together they demonstrate how history can offer potential new models of the guise of the good—or new arguments against it—as well as to give a sense of how the guise of the good can bear on other philosophical issues. -/- The Guise of the Good: A Philosophical History is an excellent resource for scholars and students working on the history of ethics, philosophy of action, and practical reason. -/- 1. Introduction 2. Socrates and Plato 3. Aristotle and the Stoics 4. The Canon in Christian Philosophy 5. The Canon Doubted and Reaffirmed (1300-1600) 6. Descartes and Spinoza: Revision and Rejection 7. Empiricism: The Guise of the Good between Desire and Pleasure 8. The Guise of the Good in Hume and Kant 9. After Kant, Before Anscombe 10. Epilogue. A Fresh Start. (shrink)

First language attrition in adulthood offers new insight on neuroplasticity and the role of language experience in shaping neurocognitive responses to language. Attriters are multilinguals for whom advancing L2 proficiency comes at the cost of the L1, as they experience a shift in exposure and dominance. To date, the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying L1 attrition are largely unexplored. Using event-related potentials, we examined L1-Italian grammatical processing in 24 attriters and 30 Italian native-controls. We assessed whether attriters differed from non-attriting native speakers (...) in their online detection and re-analysis/repair of number agreement violations, and whether differences in processing were modulated by L1-proficiency. To test both local and non-local agreement violations, we manipulated agreement between three inflected constituents and examined ERP responses on two of these. Our findings revealed group differences in amplitude, scalp distribution, and duration of LAN/N400 + P600 effects. We discuss these differences as reflecting influence of attriters’ L2-English, as well as shallower online sentence repair processes than in non-attriting native speakers. ERP responses were also predicted by L1-Italian proficiency scores, with smaller N400/P600 amplitudes in lower proficiency individuals. Proficiency only modulated P600 amplitude between 650 and 900 ms, whereas the late P600 depended on group membership and amount of L1 exposure within attriters. Our study is the first to show qualitative and quantitative differences in ERP responses in attriters compared to non-attriting native speakers. Our results also emphasize that proficiency predicts language processing profiles, even in native-speakers, and that the P600 should not be considered a monolithic component. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss and try to remove some major stumbling blocks for a Moorean buck-passing account of reasons in terms of value (MBP): There is a pro tanto reason to favour X if and only if X is intrinsically good, or X is instrumentally good, or favouring X is intrinsically good, or favouring X is instrumentally good. I suggest that MBP can embrace and explain the buck-passing intuition behind the far more popular buck-passing account of value, and has (...) the means to avoid the wrong kind of reasons problem. Further, I counter the common suspicion that a Moorean account cannot make sense of deontological views such as Ross’s, and that it generally leaves no room for agent-relative reasons. In order to do this, I appeal to the idea that a Moorean account does not dictate the substantive view that values have to be maximized. In some cases, expressing them might be a better response. Finally I lay out and reply to a potentially devastating argument to the effect that a Moorean account makes oughts and reasons non-normative. I also criticize Scanlon’s attempt to favour his own buck-passing account via consideration of the open question argument. MBP thus emerges as a live option in the buck-passing debate. (shrink)

Starting from the distinction between concept and conception, the author proposes a pluralistic view of toleration focussed on the equality of individuals and cultures and on legal‐rational control of social relationship. Analyzing the basic marks of toleration (toleration and power, the costs of toleration, toleration and value) the author shows how the option for toleration is a choice for subjecting social relations to reason and rules (law) instead of passions and violence (war).

ABSTRACT The current analytical debate on time is full of attempts to adjudicate from a purely theoretical standpoint among competing temporal ontologies. Little attention has instead been devoted to the existential attitudes -- emotional or ethical -- that may lurk behind, or ensue from, the endorsement of one of them. Some interesting opinions have however been voiced regarding the two most prominent views in the arena, namely eternalism and presentism; it has been said that the former is nourished by a (...) fear of death, or more generally by a desire of preservation for whatever we find precious and valuable, and that the latter is fuelled by a propensity to reap whatever fruits the present brings, as enshrined in the carpe diem motto. This paper explores such a territory by focusing on the reality of past sentience, whether joyful or painful, and on the open future. The first part contrasts the reality of past sentience that comes with eternalism with the denial of this reality that follows from presentism, and argues that from an emotional, or perhaps even moral, standpoint the latter is preferable to the former. The second part clarifies why the eternalist must renounce the open future, whereas presentism is consistent with it, and considers how its rejection or acceptance, as the case may be, could be emotionally, or even morally, significant for our conception of ourselves as free agents. The conclusion offers a tentative proposal regarding which temporal ontology is superior from an existential perspective and some ruminations on the impact that all this may have on the theoretical side of the issue. (shrink)

Medieval Sovereignty examines the idea of sovereignty in the Middle Ages and asks if it can be considered a fundamental element of medieval constitutional order.

Scholarship in rhetorical political analysis and parliamentary studies devoted little attention to study how politicians employ intellectuals’ authority and theories in their discourses. We offer methodological directions to navigate this territory, combining quantitative and qualitative analyses to investigate the employment of Machiavelli’s figure in the Italian Parliament. We show that Machiavelli is regarded as a contested authority and that appeals to his arguments can perform different rhetorical functions, which are countered with different rhetorical tactics. In particular, we show that the (...) right appropriates the realist Machiavelli, especially in foreign policy, both as a national symbol and as a legitimate source of insights on political affairs, while the left and the centre resist these claims with alternative rhetorical tactics. Finally, we provide an original dataset and a new theoretical framework for future explorations of intellectuals and other authoritative figures’ rhetorical influence on politics. (shrink)

Il rapporto di Nietzsche con Platone è più complesso di quanto larga parte della letteratura secondaria sia solita riconoscere. Aurora, opera poco considerata da questo punto di vista, offre numerosi motivi di interesse. Nietzsche vi ripropone una caratterizzazione plurale, sovrabbondante della personalità platonica la cui fondamentale dimensione politica viene ripensata in prossimità ai temi della libertà del filosofo e della potenza. Non meno interessanti la discussione nietzschiana della passione della conoscenza in rapporto a Platone e la sua utilizzazione della sensibilità (...) e delle prospettive della filosofia greca in chiave di critica alla eticità dei costumi cristiano-moderna. (shrink)

Ontology is one of today’s buzzwords. It is back in fashion in analytical philosophy and Artificial Intelligence, and major projects and research centres get funding around the world (cf. e.g. the Buffalo Centre for Ontological Research, the Laboratory for Ontology in Turin, the Institute for Formal Ontology and Medical Information Science in Saarland). In the philosophy of science ontology has arguably always been a key area of research, under the guise of ‘The foundations of __’ (physics, biology, chemistry, etc.). Economics (...) however is an exception. Because of economics’ hybrid status, philosophers’ interest in its foundations has traditionally focused on normative issues – typically the theory of rationality that lies at the core of the neoclassical paradigm. What is relatively new, then, 1 is the current growth of interest for the metaphysics of economics as a descriptive scientific discipline (see e.g. Mäki, ed. 2001). (shrink)

Mutualistic theory explains convincingly the prevalence of fairness norms in small societies of foragers and in large contemporary democratic societies. However, it cannot explain the U-shaped curve of egalitarianism in human history. A theory based on bargaining power is able to provide a more general account and to explain mutualism as a special case. According to this approach, social norms may be more variable and malleable than Baumard et al. suggest.

We review studies that indicate a dissociation between the perceptual estimate and the resulting cognitive representation of given properties of a seen object, on the one hand, and the motor action exerted on the same object. We propose that there exist multiple levels of organization of sensorimotor loops and that internal models may be made accessible to one level of organization while remaining inaccessible to another level.

This paper outlines a version of instantaneous presentism, according to which the present is a point-like instant, and defends it from two prominent objections. The first one has to do with the difficulty of accounting, from the point of view of instantaneous presentism, for the existence of events that take time, dynamic events, which cannot be confined to a single instant. The second objection is of a Zenonian nature and arises once time is viewed as a continuum that can be (...) subdivided ad infinitum. In response to the first problem, it is argued that the presentist can appeal to past and future instants as long as it is not assumed that there are events that occur at them. Once they are granted, one can then appeal to "past-oriented" and "future-oriented" properties such as *was P at t* (or *will be P at t*), where t is a past or future instant, in order to view dynamic events as occurring at the present instant. In response to the second problem, one must accept the idea that, as a new instant becomes present, there is no preceding instant which is immediately past. There can only be infinitely many past instants with increasingly lower degrees of pastness. (shrink)

Unlike many neotomists, the evaluation of modernity in De Lubac is not totally negative. The value of the subject, as in Pico della Mirandola, is positive. The sense of justice, as in Proudhon, is positive. A new value of the material world is positive. The problem is not to absolutize these values, such as in Comte or in Marx or in Nietzsche.

In a society that becomes more and more multicultural, is it still possible to guarantee harmonious coexistence, based on shared values? Or do we have to resign ourselves to the idea of an inevitable clash, or at least an inevitable incommunicability, between "us" and "them"? This question refers to this other: is there objectively an essential commonality among all human beings? And is human reason capable of grasping truly universal truths and values, therefore universally shared? In this text, the affirmative (...) response goes hand in hand with the thesis that the objective truth must be sought collaboratively, as the title says: with a dia -logue in which each subject does not renounce the logos, that is, his inexhaustible competence to know the truth. (shrink)

Guala does not go far enough in his critique of the assumption that human decisions about sharing made in the context of experimental game conditions accurately reflect decision-making under real conditions. Sharing of hunted animals is constrained by cultural rules and is not as assumed in models of weak and strong reciprocity. Missing in these models is the cultural basis of sharing that makes it a group property rather than an individual one.

This paper critically examines Richard Kraut’s attack on the notion of absolute value, and lays out some of the conceptual work required to defend such a notion. The view under attack claims that absolute goodness is a property that provides a reason to value what has it. Kraut’s overall challenge is that absolute goodness cannot play this role. Kraut’s own view is that goodness-for, instead, plays the reason-providing role. My targets are Kraut’s double-counting objection, and his ethical objection against absolute (...) value. After explaining the double-counting objection, and discussing the idea of non-additive reasons, I examine and reject Kraut’s reasons for holding that nonadditivity can rescue relative value but not absolute value. I proceed then to explore a different reply to the double-counting objection by introducing a distinction between normative reasons for action and reasons that explain why a certain consideration is a reason for action. Such a distinction (hinted at by Kraut) would either help both Kraut and the friend of absolute value, or neither of them. I defend the distinction from the objection that it would make absolute value just a ‘shadow’. Finally, I reply to Kraut’s ethical objection that being motivated by absolute value is depersonalizing, on two grounds: 1) if thinking in terms of absolute value depersonalizes relationships, then we have absolute-value-given reasons not to think in those terms; 2) the distinction between normative and explanatory reasons explains why even a motivation centred on absolute value need not be depersonalizing. (shrink)

Francesco Fronterotta | : La psychologie platonicienne de la République semble être affectée par une contradiction en relation avec la thèse de la tripartition de l’âme. Celle-ci est esquissée dans le livre IV et est toujours présente dans les livres VIII et IX ; Socrate semble pourtant l’abandonner lorsque, dans le livre X, il introduit la thèse selon laquelle l’âme est une réalité double, et peu après parvient, dans la suite du livre X, à démontrer son immortalité, en la (...) décrivant comme une réalité simple, unique et unitaire. J’essaierai de montrer que ces changements de perspective dépendent du point de vue assumé par Platon dans son traitement de la nature et de la fonction de l’âme, dans les contextes que j’appellerai « génétiques », c’est-à-dire là où l’analyse touche à la question du statut ontologique de l’âme, et dans les contextes que j’appellerai « opérationnels », c’est-à-dire lorsque ce sont les fonctions, les compétences et les motivations de l’âme dans sa direction du corps qui font l’objet de l’analyse. | : There is a seeming contradiction in the Republic in Plato’s psychology of the tripartite soul, which is dealt with in Book IV and which recurs in Books VIII and IX. Socrates seems to retract this view when in Book X he introduces the theory that the soul is actually dual, and then later in the same Book demonstrates its immortality, presenting it in this case as something simple, single and unitary. I shall try to show how this see-sawing depends on the different point of view that Plato takes when he deals with the nature and the function of the soul, respectively in the “genetic” contexts, where his examination touches directly on the question of the soul’s ontological status, and the “operative” contexts, when what is being analysed are the functions, scope and motivations of the soul that intervene in its action of controlling the body. (shrink)

La experiencia de la pobreza llama a la economía a humanizarse y a la filosofía a pensar etimológicamente desde las “normas de la casa”. Se descubre, entonces, el sentido de las épocas y de las generaciones filosóficas, la razón de su fecundidad y de su pobreza, así como la relación entre estas y la justicia.