Diderot a fréquenté tous les savoirs dans la circulation de l’ Encyclopédie, mais ce pluriel n’est pas simple énumération : Diderot substitue des codes à un ordre des choses supposé naturel, et dont le renversement entraîne la déstabilisation de la conscience de soi. Cette critique du cogito fait éclater l’unité fondatrice du sujet pensant en un pluriel : « l’anatomie métaphysique ». Au lieu de supposer un Diderot matérialiste ou athée, catégorisation indéformable de l’histoire des idées, et des galeries de (...) portraits des grands hommes, on étudiera donc ici le cheminement des arguments, avec ou sans l’aveu de l’auteur. (shrink)

Faut-il penser l'unite de - la - philosophie des Lumieres comme s'il s'agissait d'un phenomene europeen homogene? Lumieres, Aufklarung, Enlightment, Illuminismo: ces termes ne sont pas la traduction l'un de l'autre. Unifier ces pensees en leur attribuant un commun recours a l'universel a un caractere profondement problematique et peut avoir un sens ideologique et politique. Le present ouvrage, en marquant la persistance de l'argumentaire sceptique, propose, selon la formule de La Mothe Le Vayer, un Decalogue sceptique qui ne se reduit (...) pas au doute generalise: il prescrit et programme une systematicite dans l'etude de la variation des normes. Au temps des Lumieres, en effet, l'universel de toutes les normes, theoriques ou pratiques, fait reellement debat et met en question une philosophie de la lumiere naturelle et une metaphysique du moi suppose etre un point fixe. Cette critique de l'universel s'exprime dans une philosophie du sensible: Diderot etudie la figure paradoxale de l'Aveugle, Condillac erige sa statue, l'abbe de l'Epee restitue les sourds muets a la dimension de la discursivite, La Mettrie invente - Monsieur Machine - tout en invoquant une metaphysique de la tendresse, Rousseau justifie un epicurisme de la raison et un art de jouir, Hume naturalise la religion en l'articulant a des passions fondamentales, Montesquieu, attentif a la logique des histoires singulieres, demonte et compare les machines juridiques. Le pluriel des Lumieres a ete meconnu: il permet pourtant de comprendre le caractere equivoque de leur heritage aujourd'hui, entre la reprise morale d'un universalisme des normes et sa contestation dans un travail juridique et anthropologique.". (shrink)

"En 1754, dans le Traité des sensations, Condillac s'efforce de démontrer que "toutes nos connaissances et toutes nos facultés viennent des sens, ou plutôt des sensations" Pour cela, Condillac développe une fiction, celle d'une statue dont il éveillerait progressivement les sens. Il demande au lecteur de se penser à la place de la statue, de s'imaginer n'avoir qu'un sens lorsque celle-ci n'en a qu'un seul d'éveillé, d'examiner successivement les cinq sens, isolément puis en les associant l'un à l'autre. L'attention, l'imagination, (...) la mémoire, l'entendement ne seraient pas les facultés d'un ego mais seraient distribués sur chaque sens. Au lieu de déterminer des facultés comme les pouvoirs d'un moi substantiel dans une métaphysique créationniste, Condillac construit le paradigme d'un moi pluriel, effet des opérations qu'il effectue. Le présent livre réévalue ainsi ce qu'une tradition philosophique, des idéologues aux positivistes, a décrit comme le sensualisme. Pour interroger cette interprétation, la fiction condillacienne de la statue peut être confrontée aux hypothèses qui lui sont contemporaines La Mettrie et son homme-machine. Diderot et l'idée d'anatomie métaphysique, Boureau-Deslandes et son Pygmalion, l'histoire naturelle de Charles Bonnet et l'homo duplex de Buffon, à des titres différents, retravaillent l'anthropologie. Cette pensée du sensible qui déplace l'homme dans la nature et dans l'histoire inquiète théologiens et moralistes et convoque les lecteurs d'aujourd'hui dans leur critique du subjectivisme."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Don't philosophers die just like all other men? In order to speak of the death of philosophers, why choose an author like Boureau-Deslandes, who collected anecdotes of insolence in the face of death? Undoubtedly, free minds could only disarm theology by joking about it. The mental, moral and playful mechanisms of the mind can be taken apart to reveal the bans inscribed in the conscience through the workings of institutions. Against the philosophies of melancholy, fear, death and power, a philosophy (...) of banter is a cheerful philosophy, an ethics of taste that destabilises the rules. It is this practice of bantering insolence that turns temperament into virtue and a man into a philosopher. (shrink)

Julia Markovits develops a desire-based, internalist account of what normative reasons are--an account which is compatible with the idea that moral reasons can apply to all of us, regardless of our desires. She builds on Kant's formula of humanity to defend universal moral reasons, and addresses the age-old question of why we should be moral.

This essay examines the thought that our right actions have moral worth only if we perform them for the right reasons. It argues against the view, often ascribed to Kant, that morally worthy actions must be performed because they are right and argues that Kantians and others ought instead to accept the view that morally worthy actions are those performed for the reasons why they are right. In other words, morally worthy actions are those for which the reasons why they (...) were performed (the reasons motivating them) and the reasons why they morally ought to have been performed (the reasons morally justifying them) coincide. The essay calls this the Coincident Reasons Thesis and argues that it provides plausible necessary and sufficient conditions for morally worthy action, defending the claim against proposed counterexamples. It ends by showing that the plausibility of the thesis, which it argues is largely independent of any particular ethical standpoint, gives us some reason to doubt a class of ethical theories that includes utilitarianism. (shrink)

A growing frustration with “spin doctors,” doublespeak, and outright lying by public officials has resulted in a deep public cynicism regarding politics today. It has also led many voters to seek out politicians who engage in “straight talk,” out of a hope that sincerity signifies a dedication to the truth. While this is an understandable reaction to the degradation of public discourse inflicted by political hype, Elizabeth Markovits argues that the search for sincerity in the public arena actually constitutes (...) a dangerous distraction from more important concerns, including factual truth and the ethical import of political statements. Her argument takes her back to an examination of the Greek notion of _parrhesia_, and she draws from her study of the Platonic dialogues a nuanced understanding of this ancient analogue of “straight talk.” She shows Plato to have an appreciation for rhetoric rather than a desire to purge it from public life, providing insights into the ways it can contribute to a fruitful form of deliberative democracy today. (shrink)

Luck egalitarianism — the theory that makes individual responsibility central to distributive justice, so that bad luck underwrites a more compelling case for redistribution than do the bad choices of the disadvantaged — has recently come under a sustained attack from critics who are deeply committed to the broader struggle for equality. These egalitarian critics object, first, that luck egalitarianism’s policy recommendations are often unappealing. Second, they add that luck egalitarianism neglects the deep political connection between equality and non-subordination, in (...) favor of a shallowly distributive regime. This Article argues that both objections to luck egalitarianism have been exaggerated. Insofar as the criticisms are accurate, they apply only to a particular, maximalist strand of luck egalitarianism, whose distributive principle does not merely adjust allocations in light of responsibility but instead proposes that allocations should precisely track responsibility. However, this responsibility-tracking view does not represent the best or truest development of the basic luck egalitarian ideal. Moreover, the pathologies of the responsibility-tracking view help to cast the appeal of more judicious luck egalitarianism into sharp relief. The redistributive policies that more moderate developments of luck egalitarianism recommend are less objectionable than critics have supposed. And, more importantly, such modest luck egalitarianism is not a purely distributive ideal but instead contains, at its core, a vision of political solidarity among free and equal citizens. (shrink)

Three clinical cases of very ill neonates exemplifying extreme ethical situations for nurses are interpreted through Arendt's concepts of life and natality, and Agamben's critique of bare life. Agamben's notions of form-of-life, as the inseparability of zoe/bios, and testimony are offered as the potential foundation of nursing ethics.

This essay explores the question of how to be good. My starting point is a thesis about moral worth that I’ve defended in the past: roughly, that an action is morally worthy if and only it is performed for the reasons why it is right. While I think that account gets at one important sense of moral goodness, I argue here that it fails to capture several ways of being worthy of admiration on moral grounds. Moral goodness is more multi-faceted. (...) My title is intended to capture that multi-facetedness: the essay examines saintliness, heroism, and sagacity. The variety of our common-sense moral ideals underscores the inadequacy of any one account of moral admirableness, and I hope to illuminate the distinct roles these ideals play in our everyday understanding of goodness. Along the way, I give an account of what makes actions heroic, of whether such actions are supererogatory, and of what, if anything, is wrong with moral deference. At the close of the essay, I begin to explore the flipside of these ideals: villainy. (shrink)

In the period 1893–1897 Charles Dodgson, writing as Lewis Carroll, published two books and two articles on logic topics. Manuscript material first published in 1977 together with letters and diary entries provide evidence that he was working toward a visual proof system for complex syllogistic propositional logic based on a mechanical tree method that he devised.

This paper examines the idea that straight talk can actually pose certain dangers for democracy by asking two interrelated questions. First, does our belief in the importance of sincerity necessarily improve political deliberation? Second, does our belief cause us to under-appreciate other important communicative resources? We will see that much hinges on our answers to these questions because they deal directly with whose voices are to be considered legitimate and authoritative in our public sphere. This paper begins from a deliberative (...) democratic standpoint: democracy is a logocentric enterprise—that is, language is at the center of democratic political projects. So it is critical that we pay attention to how we evaluate political words. Otherwise, not only can we not really understand what is going on in the public sphere, but we are also more likely to make poor judgments about what sort of speech and speakers make our democracy more robust. -/- To explore these questions, this paper examines the discourse ethics that underwrite much of deliberative democratic theory (section I). It then goes on to discuss some of the dangers that the particular ethic of sincerity poses for democratic communication. The paper argues that the emphasis on sincerity: -/- 1) too easily collapses the relation between claims to truthfulness and truth claims and contributes to an undemocratic epistemology; 2) oversimplifies human psychology, ignoring the possibility of multiple and complexly related intentions; 3) denigrates “rhetorical” forms of speech; and 4) privileges a seemingly non-rhetorical mode of communication: hyper-sincerity. (shrink)

“Doing Gender,” West and Zimmerman's landmark article, highlighted the importance of social interaction, thus revealing the weaknesses of socialization and structural approaches. However, despite its revolutionary potential for illuminating how to dismantle the gender system, doing gender has become a theory of gender persistence and the inevitability of inequality. In this article, the author argues that we need to reframe the questions to ask how we can undo gender. Research should focus on when and how social interactions become less gendered, (...) whether gender can be irrelevant in interaction, whether gendered interactions always underwrite inequality, how the institutional and interactional levels work together to produce change, and interaction as the site of change. (shrink)

A Modern Legal Ethics proposes a wholesale renovation of legal ethics, one that contributes to ethical thought generally. Daniel Markovits reinterprets the positive law governing lawyers to identify fidelity as its organizing ideal. Unlike ordinary loyalty, fidelity requires lawyers to repress their personal judgments concerning the truth and justice of their clients' claims. Next, the book asks what it is like--not psychologically but ethically--to practice law subject to the self-effacement that fidelity demands. Fidelity requires lawyers to lie and to (...) cheat on behalf of their clients. However, an ethically profound interest in integrity gives lawyers reason to resist this characterization of their conduct. Any legal ethics adequate to the complexity of lawyers' lived experience must address the moral dilemmas immanent in this tension. The dominant approaches to legal ethics cannot. Finally, A Modern Legal Ethics reintegrates legal ethics into political philosophy in a fashion commensurate to lawyers' central place in political practice. Lawyerly fidelity supports the authority of adjudication and thus the broader project of political legitimacy. Throughout, the book rejects the casuistry that dominates contemporary applied ethics in favor of an interpretive method that may be mimicked in other areas. Moreover, because lawyers practice at the hinge of modern morals and politics, the book's interpretive insights identify--in an unusually pure and intense form--the moral and political conditions of all modernity. (shrink)

ABSTRACTStudies examining the interpretation that is given to if–then statementstypically use what are referred to as basic conditionals, which give contextless relations between two unrelated concrete terms. However, there is some evidence that basic conditionals require a more abstract form of representation. In order to examine this, we presented participants with truth-table tasks involving either basic conditionals or conditionals referring to imaginary categories, and standard conditional inference tasks with abstract and familiar premises. As expected, fewer typical defective conditional interpretations were (...) given to basic conditionals. In addition, partial correlations showed a unique relationship between the interpretation of basic conditionals and abstract inferential reasoning. Results suggest that people process basic conditionals as a form of abstract reasoning, and that the interpretation of conditionals... (shrink)

Lewis Carroll: Logic Charles L. Dodgson, 1832-1898, was a British mathematician, logician, and the author of the ‘Alice’ books, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass and What Alice Found There. His fame derives principally from his literary works, but in the twentieth century some of his mathematical … Continue reading Lewis Carroll: Logic →.

ExcerptI remember it well. It was in the spring of 1987 when I commenced my lecture in Osnabrück on the German left with these remarks: “So that we understand each other: Regardless of my heavy criticisms and profound objections to many facets of its current affairs, I fully accept the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany and do not want its destruction!” People looked at me as if I had lost my mind!

Charles L. Dodgson's reputation as a significant figure in nineteenth-century logic was firmly established when the philosopher and historian of philosophy William Warren Bartley, III published Dodgson's ?lost? book of logic, Part II of Symbolic Logic, in 1977. Bartley's commentary and annotations confirm that Dodgson was a superb technical innovator. In this paper, I closely examine Dodgson's methods and their evolution in the two parts of Symbolic Logic to clarify and justify Bartley's claims. Then, using more recent publications and unpublished (...) letters, I argue that Dodgson approached the elimination problem in class logic differently than his contemporaries, and in doing so, anticipated several important concepts and techniques in automated deductive reasoning. These materials also provide additional insight into his reasons for writing this book. (shrink)

The law of contracts, at least in its orthodox expression, concerns voluntary, or chosen, legal obligations. When Brody accepts Susan’s offer to sell him a canoe for a set price, the parties’ choices alter their legal rights and duties. Their success at changing the legal landscape depends on a background system of rules that specify when and how contractual acts have legal effects, rules that give the offer and acceptance of a bargain-exchange a central role in generating obligations. Contract law (...) conceived as a body of rules empowering individuals to shape their own rights and responsibilities presents an object of philosophical study. The philosophy of contract includes two broad sets of projects. One set, the focus of the first part of this entry, targets the basic structure and normative justification of the law of contracts. The aim is to subsume a salient body of contract law rules under general principles in order to clarify contract law’s conceptual categories, distinguish it from other areas of law, and specify criteria relevant to its normative appraisal. This kind of philosophical work presupposes detailed knowledge of the law in existing legal regimes, and the entry begins by outlining the common law of contracts. A second set of projects draws on resources from the philosophy of language, philosophy of action, and moral and political philosophy to address debates within contract law. Questions about the nature of meaning and interpretation, intentionality, freedom in contract, and distributive justice drive contemporary legal debates concerning contract formation, interpretation, and enforcement. Philosophical work on these topics has attracted significant commentary which serves as the focus of the second part of this entry. (shrink)

This article documents and provides explanations for levels of and trends in earnings inequality, with a central focus on international differences in these outcomes. It concentrates on OECD countries, which are largely advanced industrialized nations, and typically have similar levels of labour productivity but often very different labour market institutions and changes in the supply of or demand for labour of various skill levels. As a result, one can use international differences to test hypotheses about the role of supply and (...) demand and institutions in influencing levels and trends in earnings inequality. The article first provides an analytical framework for understanding earnings inequality in which labour earnings are distinguished from wage rates. It then places inequality of wage rates in a supply and demand framework, augmented by consideration of labour market institutions. Next, after providing some data on the extent of earnings and wage inequality across countries and over time, it discusses evidence on the determinants of differences and changes in earnings inequality. (shrink)

Publication du matériel amphorique recueilli dans le remblai au moyen duquel on a comblé vers 330 le puits monumental de la place au Nord-Est du Passage des Théores. Exceptés de rares fragments du ve siècle, l'ensemble du matériel date du ive siècle. On a dénombré près de 1500 amphores, dont 82 % sont d'origine thasienne, avec une nette prédominance de l'amphore biconique par rapport à l'amphore «en toupie». Les amphores importées viennent surtout de Grèce de l'Est (Chios et Samos) et (...) de Grèce du Nord (Mendè essentiellement), et, à un degré moindre, de la Mer Noire (Sinope notamment). (shrink)

Η Ιπποκρατική Συλλογή παρέχει δύο τύπους πληροφοριών σχετικά με τα αγγεία : άλλοτε συμπληρώνει τις πληροφορίες που υπάρχουν για ήδη γνωστά σχήματα αγγείων (χύτρες με διάτρητα πώματα) και άλλοτε αναφέρει σπάνια ονόματα αγγείων (« φακός », « άρυστήρ », « βομβυλιός »), αλλά που τα συνδέει με συγκεκριμένες χρήσεις* επομένως, η λειτουργία που αποδίδεται στα αγγεία αυτά, μέσα από κείμενα χρονολογημένα με ακρίβεια, καθώς και η εξέταση του συνόλου όπου αναφέρονται, βοηθά ασφαλώς στον ακριβέστερο καθορισμό του σχήματος τους. Γίνεται προσπάθεια (...) να βρεθεί μια πλήρης απεικόνιση των όρων που χρησιμοποιούνται για την κεραμική της εποχής της Ιπποκρατικής Συλλογής. (shrink)

Un sondage fait par Y. Garlan et Fr. Queyrel dans le jardin de l'École française à Limenas, Thasos, a livré un très abondant matériel de céramique, très varié, aussi bien attique (figures rouges, vernis noir) que locale (poterie commune, céramique fine, poterie grossière). Chronologiquement, la plupart des tessons se situent à la fin du Ve et surtout dans la première moitié du IVe s. Aucun fragment semble être postérieur au début du troisième quart du IVe s. La datation est confirmée (...) par des monnaies et des timbres d'amphores venant du même lot et étudiés séparément par O. Picard et Y. Garlan. (shrink)

In Knights, Aristophanes represents the dangers of parrhēsia run amuck with the near-destruction of an elderly man’s Athenian household by Paphlagon. In this setting, Paphlagon’s invocations of his own parrhēsia and goodwill become a destructive form of flattery, causing chaos in the household and threatening its viability. This article begins with a discussion of the problem of parrhēsia in democratic Athens and the ways in which Cleon exemplified those problems. Moving to an examination of Aristophanes’ Knights, the author tracks the (...) playwright’s exploration and response. Aristophanes uses the figure of the elderly Demos as a metaphor for the decline of the city, allowing him to both critique the demos and to align himself with it. Moreover, even as he must win the audience over in order to achieve the theatrical success he craves, Aristophanes removes himself from the perverse logic of dēmophilia-turned-pandering by claiming to be motivated not by goodwill for the audience, but by his hatred of Cleon, an enemy shared by both the playwright and the city. (shrink)

Intergenerational justice and democratic theory -- A narrative turn -- Archê, finitude, and community in Aristophanes -- Mothers, powerlessness, and intergenerational agency in Euripides -- Freedom, responsibility, and transgenerational orientation in Aeschylus -- Art, space, and possibilities for intergenerational justice in our time.