Freedom interpreted as absence of restraints, as such, is a vacuous ideal. It requires reference to some setting and course of action in order to distinguish those restraints that block human effort from those, say, that support it. More broadly, this notion of freedom has little meaning and less value without some external criterion for evaluating human action and its conditions. Many thinkers have argued that the. criterion must be the absolute Truth ? truth that is unconditioned, indubitable, and imperative. (...) They have often argued that there is no freedom of error, and that the many persons who do not know such Truth are free only in obeying the few who do. This concept of freedom is often regarded as intolerable. A third possibility is to interpret freedom as a name for a range of significant alternatives for thought and action. Freedom, here, is compatible with truth interpreted in terms of the process of inquiry, rather than as substantive possession. It is a necessary condition for judging which restraints are real obstacles and which courses of action may be harmless, legitimate or good. The third meaning, especially, is illustrated with reference to the freedoms of utterance (expression) and speech (communication). (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Cross‐Cultural Perspectives on Human Rights Democratic Participation in the Cultural Context Development as a Process of Self‐Enhancement from Within Conclusion.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Antiphon on Time (B9 D-K)Francis M. DunnThe simplest and clearest formulation of Antiphon's understanding of time is the statement that time is a concept or measure, not a substance (87 B9 Diels-Kranz). This fragment is regularly cited in discussions of Antiphon, but Richard Sorabji has stated that it belongs not to Antiphon the sophist but to a minor peripatetic. He gives no argument in support of this statement,1 (...) but given the potential importance of this fragment both for the views of Antiphon and for early theories of time, we must consider whether or not its attribution is secure.Antiphon or Antiphanes?Fragment 9 in Diels-Kranz is a brief entry from the Placita of Aetius (1.22.6) under the heading, preserved in Stobaeus (1.8.40b):2P, F mrg., PhotiusIn the text of Diels-Kranz, emphasis is used to distinguish the quote or citation proper (νόημα ) from the gloss or clarification that accompanies it (). The distinction seems to me correct: since it is not immediately obvious what it means to regard time as a "concept or measure" (and two thinkers may have done so in different ways), the gloss is an attempt by the compiler to delimit this (shared) view. The delimiting term is relatively late ( with the implied meaning "substance" is not attested before Aristotle and Theophrastus; [End Page 65] cf. LSJ sv III). So if the first thinker cited is Antiphon the sophist, usage confirms that the term was later supplied by the compiler; on the other hand, if we suspend judgment on the identity of Antiphon (or Antiphanes), this late usage does not help to date the view that time is νόημα.This brings us to the attribution of the fragment: was Diels correct in printing? and was he correct in identifying this figure as the Athenian sophist? Taking the first question first, we must consider the possibility that the marginal gloss in F was meant as a correction, and that the lemma assigning the fragment to Antiphanes should be followed. Context, however, clearly indicates otherwise. Under the rubric, the compiler of the Placita3 has assembled the views of various philosophers: Plato, Xenocrates, Hestiaeus of Perinthus, Straton, Epicurus, Critolaus and the Stoics (1.22.1-7). Antiphon the sophist is repeatedly cited in this compilation (2.20.15, 2.28.4, 2.29.3, 3.16.4), whereas Antiphanes the comic poet is never cited at all. The textual confusion arose because this portion of the Placita was extracted by Stobaeus, who also quoted profusely from Antiphanes and other comic poets. To scribes copying Stobaeus, the playwright's name suggested itself more readily than that of the sophist, and the former therefore began to replace the latter.4I have assumed so far (as all editors have done) that the textual variants and entail a choice between Antiphon the sophist and Antiphanes the comic poet. Faced with such a choice, we must choose Antiphon, but Sorabji suggests a third alternative, namely that Antiphon or Antiphanes is a late and obscure peripatetic philosopher. What are the merits of such a suggestion?A Minor Peripatetic?Sorabji's Antiphon (or Antiphanes) is so obscure that he has otherwise vanished without leaving a trace. We must therefore decide if it is [End Page 66] likely that the Placita not only cited such an individual, but made no attempt to distinguish him from well-known authors who bore the same name. It is worth noting that the compiler of the Placita made no particular attempt to rescue from oblivion the beliefs of insignificant thinkers. Under each rubric he is chiefly concerned with reporting the doctrines of influential philosophers such as Thales, Democritus or Aristotle. The range of views on a given topic may be broadened by including lesser figures, but these are almost always easily identifiable and well-attested in other sources. The reasons for the flooding of the Nile (4.1), for example, are taken from Thales, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Eudoxus, Herodotus and Ephorus; the notion that the river is filled from a fresh-water sea is cited from a lesser figure, Euthymenes of Massilia, who is therefore identified by his place of birth... (shrink)

Excerpt from The Warfare of Democratic Ideals There is at least one novel quality in the current warfare of democratic ideals. Probably never before has there been so much disagreement and confusion as to the determination of the mean ing of democracy. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving (...) the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Council's Solar CalendarFrancis M. DunnIt is well known that for some time during the fifth century, the calendar used by the council in Athens to conduct its business ("prytany calendar") employed a year of a different length from that of the calendar used by the archon to schedule religious events ("festival calendar"). In the fourth century the archon's calendar consisted of twelve or thirteen lunar months, while the (...) council's calendar divided the same year of 354 or 383/4 days into ten prytanies, one for each tribe. For at least part of the fifth century, however, the two calendars ran for different periods, and began and ended at different times. The nature of this independent or noncoterminous year has been debated, and a consensus seems to be emerging that it was a schematic year of 366 days.1 In what follows I show that this schematic year is highly improbable and propose a new reconstruction of the council's calendar.In 1894 Bruno Keil demonstrated that in the late fifth century the archon's calendar of months did not begin or end at the same time as the council's calendar of prytanies.2 This finding was confirmed by subsequent scholars, who offered different explanations: Meritt (1928, esp. 72) argued that the council's calendar followed the solar year and was introduced by Cleisthenes, whereas Dinsmoor (1931, esp. 327–29) argued that it followed a precise astronomical scheme and was introduced by Meton. Meritt was able to show (1932, 152–58) that Dinsmoor's elaborate scheme was not consistent with known dates from the period, but he did not develop or explain his own hypothesis of approximate solar years. One crucial piece of evidence has been the Logistai Inscription (IG I3 369 [423/2]). From the accounts on this stone Kubicki and Meritt had shown that interest for the quadrennium 426/5 to 423/2 was calculated for 1,464 days, so that for those years the council's calendar averaged [End Page 369] 366 days.3 Meritt went on (1928, 70–71) to reconstruct four years of 366, 368, 365, and 365 days respectively for the period 426/5 to 423/2. This approximate solar year seemed to agree with the calendar equations for 423/2 ( = Prytany 10.2, IG I3 369 78–79) and 412/1 (Skirophorion 14 = Prytany 1.1, Arist. Ath. Pol. 32.1), from which he calculated an average of 365 4/11 days for the council's year during the period 423/2 to 412/1 (1928, 84–85). Meritt's view, in other words, was that the independent calendar of the council followed the solar (tropical) year, but because the council's calendar was not rigid or consistent, its agreement with the solar year was not exact.4Pritchett, however, has argued that the council's year consisted of fixed and regular prytanies.5 On this view, it follows that the quadrennium 426/5 to 423/2 consisted of four equal years, and Pritchett was able to show that the accounts on the Logistai Inscription were consistent with a schematic council calendar of 366 days comprising six 37–day prytanies followed by four 36–day prytanies in each year of the quadrennium.6 In support of this view, Pritchett added the negative argument (1964, 40–41, 49–50) that Meritt's average of 365 4/11 days for the subsequent period from 423/2 to 412/1 depends upon a contested reading of the Logistai Inscription and upon speculation concerning the calendar between 423/2 and 412/1. He added the positive argument (Pritchett and Neugebauer 1947, 95–96) that his own scheme is consistent with two additional inscriptions: rates of pay in the Erechtheum accounts imply that there were 37 days in Prytany 6 (IG I3 476 60–63 [408/7]) and 36 days in Prytany 8 (IG I3 476 266–70), while dates on the Choiseul Marble include Prytany 8.36, Prytany 9.36, and Prytany 10.36 (IG I3 375 29–34 [410/9]). The evidence is somewhat circumstantial, but taken as a whole it strongly... (shrink)

Mark McKenna, The Captive Republic: A History of Republicanism in Australia, 1788-1996 , xiv + 334 pp., ?40.00, ISBN 0 521 5728 4. Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government , xii + 304 pp., ?25.00, ISBN 0 19 8290837. Bruce Scates, A New Australia: Citizenship, Radicalism and the First Republic , viii + 261 pp., ?45.00, ISBN 0 521 57296 7.

Beginning with an introduction to the life and times of Plato, this text is a dialogue between a fictional Plato and a contemporary college student with majors both in business and philosophy.

Despite Augustine's reputation as the father of Christian intolerance, one finds in his thought the surprising claim that within non-Christian writings there are 'some truths in regard even to the worship of the One God.' The essays here uncover provocative points of comparison and similarity between Christianity and other religions to further such an Augustinian dialogue.

Here we use two filtered speech tasks to investigate children’s processing of slow (.

"This book explores the ethical implications of using armed contractors, taking a consequentialist approach to this multidisciplinary debate. While privatization is not a new concept for the U.S. military, the public debate on military privatization is limited to legal, financial, and pragmatic concerns. Missing is a critical assessment of the ethical dimensions of military privatization in general; more specifically, in light of the increased reliance upon armed contractors, it must be asked whether it is morally permissible for governments to employ (...) them at all. To this end, this book explores four areas that highlight the ethical implications of using armed contractors: how armed contractors are distinct from soldiers and mercenaries; the commodification of force; the belligerent equality of combatants; and the impact of armed contractors on the professional military. While some take an absolutist position, wanting to bar the use of private military altogether, this book reveals how these absolutist arguments are problematic and highlights that there are circumstances where turning to private force may be the only option. Recognising that outsourcing force will continue, this book thus proposes some changes to account for the problems of commodification, belligerent equality, and the challenge to the military profession. This book will be of interest to students of private security, military studies, ethics, security studies and IR in general."--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

Many of the reasons offered for outsourcing security involve costs and benefits – a consequentialist way of reasoning. Thus, I will explore a consequentialist argument against the use of private security contractors (PSCs) in counterinsurgencies. Discussing the benefits and costs of employing PSCs in these kinds of operations will demonstrate that the hiring of PSCs in many cases (perhaps in most) is consequentially unsound. More precisely, the overall negative consequences of hiring PSCs during counterinsurgencies should preclude their use unless in (...) extreme emergencies. Defenders of the use of PSCs readily point to their financial benefits and expected increase in efficiency as the starting point for their argumentation. On my account, if the benefits really do outweigh the foreseeable and expected costs, then hiring PSCs may, in that case, be a morally viable option. However, I contend that, unless we institute broad contractual control and oversight reform, unless we truly understand the costs and benefits, we should have a standing, prima facie prohibition against employing PSCs in counterinsurgencies. (shrink)