The value-action gap poses a considerable challenge to normative environmental ethics. Because of the wide array of empirical research results that have become available in the fields of environmental psychology, education, and anthropology, ethicists are at present able to take into account insights on what effectively motivates proenvironmental behavior. The emotional aspect apparently forms a key element within a transformational process that leads to an internalization of nature within one's identity structure. We compare these findings with studies on environmental activists, (...) which appear to a significantly lesser degree hampered by the value-action gap, thereby attempting to understand what provides them with the drive to act more consistently on their moral attitudes. Hermeneutics is found to play a crucial role in the processes that lead to lasting and consistent motivation toward proenvironmental behavior. An empirically informed hermeneutical approach could therefore provide a promising impetus for contemporary environmental ethics. (shrink)

The value‐action gap poses a considerable challenge to normative environmental ethics. Because of the wide array of empirical research results that have become available in the fields of environmental psychology, education, and anthropology, ethicists are at present able to take into account insights on what effectively motivates proenvironmental behavior. The emotional aspect apparently forms a key element within a transformational process that leads to an internalization of nature within one's identity structure. We compare these findings with studies on environmental activists, (...) which appear to a significantly lesser degree hampered by the value‐action gap, thereby attempting to understand what provides them with the drive to act more consistently on their moral attitudes. Hermeneutics is found to play a crucial role in the processes that lead to lasting and consistent motivation toward proenvironmental behavior. An empirically informed hermeneutical approach could therefore provide a promising impetus for contemporary environmental ethics. (shrink)

Despite substantial effort, environmental ethics and policy find their aspirations curtailed by what has been denoted as the value-action gap, the discrepancy between values held, and actual behavior. This gap represents a major challenge to adequately address the environmental changes currently confronting us, including a high rate of biodiversity loss, verging on major extinction.1 Yet current policy and educational efforts worldwide appear insufficient to alter individual behavior to a degree that could slow down, let alone reverse, worrying trends registered and (...) forecasted. This raises questions regarding motivation and volition (the... (shrink)

Attitudes toward mission agencies in general, and toward the United Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in particular, were assessed using two 10-item scales completed by 833 recently ordained Anglican clergy from the UK. Clergy were generally positive toward mission agencies and willing for their churches to engage with them, but more reluctant to form personal links. Most clergy felt agencies should give priority to the relief of poverty and to development needs, rather than to spreading specifically Christian beliefs. (...) Results for the USPG indicated more uncertain responses than for mission agencies generally, which probably indicated a lower visibility for this agency among some clergy, especially evangelicals. (shrink)

Le Centre autonome d'enseignement et de pédagogie religieuse (CAEPR) également appelé département de théologie est un département pédagogique de l'UFR de Sciences humaines et sociales de l'université de Lorraine situé à Metz. Les particularités statutaires du CAEPR découlent d’une convention du 25 mai 1974 conclue entre le Saint-Siège et la République française. Elle fixe les prérogatives de l’évêque de Metz dans le fonctionnement de ce département notamment pour la nomination des enseignants chercheurs. L’objectif principal de ce centre est de fournir (...) aux clercs et aux laïcs chargés de l'enseignement religieux catholique dans les écoles primaires et secondaires de la Moselle une formation appropriée. Les autorités religieuses ont de plus sur une longue période demandée aux futurs prêtres de se former dans le cadre du CAEPR. L’évêque de Metz a décidé en 2018 de rompre les liens avec le CAEPER et de mettre fin à la formation universitaire publique des cadres religieux en regrettant que ces formations trop élitistes ne prennent pas en compte les « dimensions humaine, spirituelle et pastorale ». (shrink)

Catholics and Evangelical Protestants often find themselves on the same side on a variety of issues in bioethics. However, some Evangelicals have expressed reluctance to embrace the natural law reasoning used by Catholics in academic and policy debates. In this article, I argue that the primary concerns raised by Evangelicals about natural law reasoning are, ironically, concerns expressed by and intrinsic to the natural law tradition itself. To show this, I address two types of Protestant critics: the Frustrated Fellow Traveler (...) and the Solo Scripturist. (shrink)

Comte’s ideas were spread in Britain through the medium of J S Mill’s System of Logic. Positivism in this version was much like the original in France: it was an historical theory about the classification of knowledge through three progressive stages. Progress referred to both scientific knowledge and civilisation. Comte’s system omitted the subject of psychology, but Mill’s followers, G H Lewes and Alexander Bain, remedied this by incorporating this discipline into the Comtean canon as an evolutionary doctrine.Comte had excluded (...) psychology from the ranks of the sciences because it lacked independence. That is, the mind’s ability to alter its environment by use of volition or will meant that it was not the sort of phenomenon that was analyzable using scientific method. Lewes, in countering this idea, based psychology in biology so as to emphasise those aspect of the discipline that were analogous to other sciences. Lewes saw the mind as the brain and regarded volition as very much like a reflex action or an instinct that might be beyond the mind’s control. Lewes also faulted Comte or classifying knowledge in an intellectual system that was not drawn from science. In place of Comte’s stages, Lewes substituted Herbert Spencer’s empirically-based notion of “ascending complexity”. This developmental thesis was not based upon natural selection, but upon the theory that both biological organism and the mind developed increased functionality as they evolved.Leslie Stephen’s positivism, unlike Lewes’, was not based upon data from neurophysiology. Instead it was a philosophical defence of a secular school of philosophy that began with Hume and Bentham and stretched forward to Lewes and Spencer. Rather perversely for a self-proclaimed member of a school that included Bentham, Stephen’s chief purpose was to attack utilitarianism, which he regarded as the opposition to evolutionary philosophy. Utilitarianism, Stephen argued, attributed too great a role to the intellect at the expense of the feelings. In his view, the latter were the important factors in decision-making and they were analogous to instincts and not subject to a utilitarian calculus. (shrink)

PawPrints On Our Souls is dotted with belief facts, supported by quotes by prominent doctors, philosophers, writers, and celebrities, to build a strong case against vivisection, factory farming, and other animal abuses. Pawprints can be read in any order: Each fact and quote is separated by a double-space... So there's lots of white space for easy reading...

Pour relever le défi de l’irruption dans notre modernité d’une violence radicale, il faut, selon Éric Weil, inscrire la cohérence des discours dans l’espace premier du langage et de sa négativité créatrice. S’il est possible, alors, de procéder à une mise en ordre logique des divers types d’intelligibilité élaborés dans l’histoire, c’est en subordonnant l’ensemble de ces catégories concrètes aux deux catégories formelles du sens et de la sagesse, de la compréhension et de la vie selon la compréhension. La philosophie (...) se comprend ainsi dans le tout de la réalité qui se révèle en elle : sa systématicité dialogique a pour corollaire une ouverture sans réserve à l’extériorité du monde et de l’histoire. Cette transcendance dans l’immanence, à l’épreuve de la relativité de la condition, est-elle susceptible de rencontrer et d’accueillir l’attestation religieuse d’une transcendance absolue? C’est la question que l’on se risque à poser pour finir. In order to face the challenge of the irruption in our modernity of a radical violence, one must, according to Eric Weil, inscribe the coherence of discourses into the primary space of language and of its creative negativity. If it is possible, then, to proceed to put in logical order diverse types of intelligibility elaborated through history, it has to be by subordinating the whole of those concrete categories under the two formal categories of meaning and wisdom, of comprehension and of life in accordance with comprehension. Philosophy is thus understood within the whole of reality that reveals itself in it ; its systematic dialogical character has as a corollary an unreserved opening to the external character of the world and of history. Is this transcendence in immanence, while being proof resistant to the relativity of the condition, able to meet and receive the religious testimony of an absolute transcendence? Such is the question that is risked at the end. (shrink)

There has long been a history of studies investigating how people (“ordinary people”) perform on tasks that involve deductive reasoning. The upshot of these studies is that people characteristically perform some deductive tasks well but others badly. For instance, studies show that people will typically perform MP (“modus ponens”: from ‘If A then B’ and ‘A’, infer ‘B’) and bi-conditional MP (from: ‘A if and only if B’ and ‘A’, infer ‘B’) correctly when invited to make the inference and additionally (...) can discover of their own accord when such inferences are appropriate. On the other hand, the same studies show that people typically perform MT (“modus tollens”: from ‘If A then B’ and ‘not-B’, infer ‘not-A’) and biconditional MT badly. They not only do not recognize when it is appropriate to draw such inferences, but also they will balk at doing them even when they are told that they can make it. Related to these shortcomings seems to be the inability of people to understand that contrapositives are equivalent (that ‘If A then B’ is equivalent to ‘If not-B then not-A’). [Studies of people’s deductive inference-drawing abilities have a long history, involving many studies in the early 20th century concerning Aristotelian syllogisms. But the current spate of studies draws much of its impetus from Wason (Wason, 1968; see also Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972). ] The general conclusion seems to be that there are specific areas where “ordinary people” do not perform very logically. This conclusion will not come as a surprise to teachers of elementary logic, who have long thought that the majority of “ordinary people” are inherently illogical and need deep and forceful schooling in order to overcome this flaw. (shrink)

Adolph Grünbaum has argued that Duhem's conventionalism is false for the case of Euclidean geometry. According to Duhem, any portion of a physical theory can be preserved from falsifiability by providing suitable modifications elsewhere in the theory. Grünbaum argues that physical theory is composed of two parts: A geometrical part H, and a physical part A. For his test case—Euclidean geometry—he contends that by a suitable specification of A, a falsification of H is possible; i.e., H can be rendered “accessible (...) to experimental ascertainment in isolation from other physical regularities.”. (shrink)

The debate on the European Union's democratic deficit usually operates within a national-democratic framework of analysis. This article argues for a change in methodology. It follows the thesis that the EU is a ‘demoicracy’– a polity of multiple demoi– and has to be evaluated as such. Core principles of demoicracy are developed and the EU is assessed accordingly. Such an evaluation is not only more adequate, but also provides original insights: it is found that, whereas the constitutional development of the (...) EU has approached demoicratic standards in general, major deficits remain at the national level. (shrink)

Rousseau's Discourse on Inequality argues that human socio-political inequality is product of human activity and not a function of natural processes. Recent studies have begun to address the role of natural history in the Discourse and have argued that Rousseau anticipated modern developments in evolutionist theory, sociobiology, ethology, and primatology. I take issue with this trend in Rousseau scholarship. In this work I demonstrate that Rousseau should not be counted as a forerunner of either Darwin or more recent attempts at (...) integrating politics and the life sciences; that, on the contrary, Rousseau's Discourse is best understood as a call to resist this approach to political inquiry. ;I begin my discussion by examining the structure and political implications of the dominant eighteenth-century theory of natural history--the "chain of being". I demonstrate that this view of nature held that inequality was both natural and just, and that in order for Rousseau to sustain his egalitarian commitments he needed to refute this claim. ;Next, I begin to reconstruct Rousseau's understanding of natural history in order to demonstrate that Rousseau should not be included as a forerunner of Darwin. I demonstrate that on issues central to natural history he shows a marked willingness to accept key presuppositions of the chain of being. I then examine how he is nonetheless able to escape the inegalitarian implications of this theory of natural history by making the issue of objectivity central to his investigation of the origin and foundation of human inequality. ;I demonstrate how Rousseau argues that competing conceptions of human nature and the natural condition of the human species should be rejected as insufficiently objective. I discuss Rousseau's solution to the problem of objectivity and its effect on his own description of human beings in the state of nature. I conclude by arguing that the main relevance of the Second Discourse to contemporary biopolitics is the extent to which it anticipates the concerns of its critics. (shrink)