"This book is the first of two volumes on belief and counterfactuals. It consists of six of a total of eleven chapters. The first volume is concerned primarily with questions in epistemology and is expository in parts. Among others, it provides an accessible introduction to belief revision and ranking theory. Ranking theory specifies how conditional beliefs should behave. It does not tell us why they should do so nor what they are. This book fills these two gaps. The consistency argument (...) tells us why conditional beliefs should obey the laws of ranking theory by showing them to be the means to attaining the end of holding true and informative beliefs. The conditional theory of conditional belief tells us what conditional beliefs are by specifying their nature in terms of non-conditional belief and counterfactuals. In addition, the book contains several novel arguments, accounts, and applications. These include an argument for the thesis that there are only hypothetical imperatives and no categorical imperatives; an account of the instrumentalist understanding of normativity, or rationality, according to which one ought to take the means to one's ends; as well as solutions to the problems of conceptual belief change, logical learning, and learning conditionals. A distinctive feature of the book is its unifying methodological approach: means-end philosophy. Means-end philosophy takes serious that philosophy is a normative discipline, and that philosophical problems are entangled with each other. It also explains the importance of logic to philosophy, without being a technical theory itself"--. (shrink)

How can the propositional attitudes of several individuals be aggregated into overall collective propositional attitudes? Although there are large bodies of work on the aggregation of various special kinds of propositional attitudes, such as preferences, judgments, probabilities and utilities, the aggregation of propositional attitudes is seldom studied in full generality. In this paper, we seek to contribute to filling this gap in the literature. We sketch the ingredients of a general theory of propositional attitude aggregation and prove two new theorems. (...) Our first theorem simultaneously characterizes some prominent aggregation rules in the cases of probability, judgment and preference aggregation, including linear opinion pooling and Arrovian dictatorships. Our second theorem abstracts even further from the specific kinds of attitudes in question and describes the properties of a large class of aggrega tion rules applicable to a variety of belief-like attitudes. Our approach integrates some previously disconnected areas of investigation. (shrink)

How can the propositional attitudes of several individuals be aggregated into overall collective propositional attitudes? Although there are large bodies of work on the aggregation of various special kinds of propositional attitudes, such as preferences, judgments, probabilities and utilities, the aggregation of propositional attitudes is seldom studied in full generality. In this paper, we seek to contribute to filling this gap in the literature. We sketch the ingredients of a general theory of propositional attitude aggregation and prove two new theorems. (...) Our first theorem simultaneously characterizes some prominent aggregation rules in the cases of probability, judgment and preference aggregation, including linear opinion pooling and Arrovian dictatorships. Our second theorem abstracts even further from the specific kinds of attitudes in question and describes the properties of a large class of aggregation rules applicable to a variety of belief-like attitudes. Our approach integrates some previously disconnected areas of investigation. (shrink)

What is the relationship between degrees of belief and binary beliefs? Can the latter be expressed as a function of the former—a so-called “belief-binarization rule”—without running into difficulties such as the lottery paradox? We show that this problem can be usefully analyzed from the perspective of judgment-aggregation theory. Although some formal similarities between belief binarization and judgment aggregation have been noted before, the connection between the two problems has not yet been studied in full generality. In this paper, we seek (...) to fill this gap. The paper is organized around a baseline impossibility theorem, which we use to map out the space of possible solutions to the belief-binarization problem. Our theorem shows that, except in limiting cases, there exists no belief-binarization rule satisfying four initially plausible desiderata. Surprisingly, this result is a direct corollary of the judgment-aggregation variant of Arrow’s classic impossibility theorem in social choice theory. (shrink)

A group is often construed as one agent with its own probabilistic beliefs (credences), which are obtained by aggregating those of the individuals, for instance through averaging. In their celebrated “Groupthink”, Russell et al. (2015) require group credences to undergo Bayesian revision whenever new information is learnt, i.e., whenever individual credences undergo Bayesian revision based on this information. To obtain a fully Bayesian group, one should often extend this requirement to non-public or even private information (learnt by not all or (...) just one individual), or to non-representable information (not representable by any event in the domain where credences are held). I pro- pose a taxonomy of six types of ‘group Bayesianism’. They differ in the information for which Bayesian revision of group credences is required: public representable information, private representable information, public non-representable information, etc. Six corre- sponding theorems establish how individual credences must (not) be aggregated to ensure group Bayesianism of any type, respectively. Aggregating through standard averaging is never permitted; instead, different forms of geometric averaging must be used. One theorem—that for public representable information—is essentially Russell et al.’s central result (with minor corrections). Another theorem—that for public non-representable information—fills a gap in the theory of externally Bayesian opinion pooling. (shrink)

There has been much discussion on the two-envelope paradox. Clark and Shackel (2000) have proposed a solution to the paradox, which has been refuted by Meacham and Weisberg (2003). Surprisingly, however, the literature still contains no axiomatic justification for the claim that one should be indifferent between the two envelopes before opening one of them. According to Meacham and Weisberg, "decision theory does not rank swapping against sticking [before opening any envelope]" (p. 686). To fill this gap in the (...) literature, we present a simple axiomatic justification for indifference, avoiding any expectation reasoning, which is often considered problematic in infinite cases. Although the two-envelope paradox assumes an expectation-maximizing agent, we show that analogous paradoxes arise for agents using different decision principles such as maximin and maximax, and that our justification for indifference before opening applies here too. (shrink)

The objective of this article is to introduce a new concept for grouping all countermajoritarian instruments which became the true casualties of polity design during the New Latin American Constitutionalism (NLAC). This theoretical endeavor, which has not been undertaken until now, will be discussed on the basis of the constitutional upheavals that occurred between 1999 and 2009 in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia. By addressing a specific theme of this experience, namely its implications for the relationship between democracy and countermajoritarian devices, (...) this article shows why an aggregating concept such as state ataraxy is needed. This concept fills the gap that hinders understanding of what has been institutionally dismantled in the course of these reforms. The article then challenges the claim that with the collapse of countermajoritarian institutions, democracy necessarily collapses. It concludes with a new assessment of the novelty that the NLAC may have brought concerning the tension between democracy and countermajoritarian institutions. The findings contribute to understand one of the most enduring concerns of state theory in general, the tension between democracy and the rule of law. (shrink)

Before now, there has been no comprehensive analysis of the multiple relations between A. Comte’s and J.S. Mill’s positive philosophy and Franz Brentano’s work. The present volume aims to fill this gap and to identify Brentano’s position in the context of the positive philosophy of the 19th century by analyzing the following themes: the concept of positive knowledge; philosophy and empirical, genetic and descriptive psychology as sciences in Brentano, Comte and Mill; the strategies for the rebirth of philosophy (...) in these three authors; the theory of the ascending stages of thought, of their decline, of the intentionality in Comte and Brentano; the reception of Comte’s positivism in Whewell and Mill; induction and phenomenalism in Brentano, Mill and Bain; the problem of the "I" in Hume and Brentano; mathematics as a foundational science in Brentano, Kant and Mill; Brentano’s critique of Mach’s positivism; the concept of positive science in Brentano’s metaphysics and in Husserl’s early phenomenology; the reception of Brentano’s psychology in Twardowski; The Brentano Institute at Oxford. The volume also contains the translation of the most significant writings of Brentano regarding philosophy as science. I. Tănăsescu, Romanian Academy; A. Bejinariu, Romanian Society of Phenomenology; S. Krantz Gabriel, Saint Anselm College; C. Stoenescu, University of Bucharest. (shrink)

In 1924 the artist Luise Staudinger issued a bronze medal featuring a portrait of Kant on one side and a famous passage from Kant on the other: “Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence […]: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me.” To this Staudinger added an illustration of a naked young man kneeling with outstretched arms, described by the artist as a man in prayer. Yet this does not (...) seem to fit the meaning of Kant’s words. This paper shows that Luise Staudinger was implicitly referring to her father, Franz Staudinger. In his writings, Staudinger taught that he who truly lives up to the moral law always does what he ought to do out of his own free will and with devotion. It is in fact devotion (Hingabe) that is the key to Luise Staudinger’s illustration. The young man is not in prayer; instead, the figure symbolizes a state of mind, namely obedience to the moral law out of devotion to it. (shrink)

On Jewish Learning collects essays, speeches, and letters that express Rosenzweig's desire to reconnect the profound truths of Judaism with the lives of ordinary people.

"Today, more than three-quarters of a century after it was written, the critique of philosophy in this book is what makes it of such great interest.

Zusammenfassung Der dargelegte Befund deutet darauf hin, daß es in Konstantinopel wie in Rom und anderen Provinzmetropolen zahlreiche Statuen hoher Beamter und Würdenträger gab. Allerdings fehlt ein entsprechender Befund für die Regierungszeit Konstantins d. Gr.; erst unter der Regierung Konstantius' II. lassen sich die ersten Beamtenstatuen feststellen. Das mag am Zufall der Überlieferung liegen, deckt sich aber immerhin damit, daß erst unter diesem Kaiser der Rahmen für eine breite magistratische Repräsentation gegeben war. Unter Konstantius II. wurde der Konstantinopler Senat zahlenmäßig (...) beträchtlich erweitert, zudem gleichberechtigt neben den römischen Senat gestellt, wurde das Amt des Stadtpräfekten eingeführt und, wie Paul Speck gezeigt hat, zugleich die Allpräsenz des Gründerkaisers Konstantin im Stadtbild relativiert, so daß überhaupt erst die Grundlagen für die öffentliche Repräsentation der Senatsaristokratie gegeben waren. Hatte Konstantin die nach ihm benannte Stadt zunächst als Residenzstadt errichtet, deren Bauten und Ausstattung ganz auf seine Person ausgerichtet waren, so schuf sein Sohn Konstantius die Voraussetzungen für die Entwicklung einer selbstbewußten Senatsaristokratie und einer entsprechenden Präsenz im Stadtbild. Die wenigen Indizien deuten darauf hin, daß sich die Statuen dieser Würdenträger, sofern es sich um senatorische Beamte handelte, beim Senat am Augusteion befanden. Stets dürfte es sich dabei um ‚einfache’ Statuen gehandelt haben, die allenfalls vergoldet waren, um bronzene Statuen oder um solche aus Marmor, die den Beamten in der Toga mit seinen Insignien zeigten. Seit dem fünften Jahrhundert läßt sich beobachten, daß eine kleine Gruppe einflußreicher Beamter und Heerführer entweder durch eine Vielzahl verschiedener Bildnisse an verschiedenen Orten oder aber durch die wesentlich aufwendigere Denkmalform eines Reiterstandbilds an prominenten Orten geehrt wird. Nie jedoch fand sich die Statue eines Nichtkaisers auf einem Ehrenbogen oder einer Säule, von denen es in Konstantinopel so viele gab. Diese blieben dem Kaiser und seiner Familie vorbehalten, der so im Denkmal den Abstand zu den aufwendigen Monumenten einflußreicher Personen wahren und auch erhöhen konnte. Doch beschränkte sich das kaiserliche Denkmal nicht nur auf einfache Ehrensäulen. Mehrfach sind Gruppen von Ehrensäulen überliefert, die städtebaulich an zentralen Stellen plaziert wurden. Zudem begegnet in der Spätantike zum erstenmal die Reiterstatue auf einem Säulenmonument, werden also zwei zunächst verschiedene Monumentformen miteinander verbunden (Abb. 7). Diese für die Spätantike typische Potenzierung der Wirkungsstrukturen und die Kombination bislang verschiedener Repräsentationsformen des imperialen Monuments ist wohl auch Folge des Konkurrenzdrucks durch allmächtige Militärs, die ihrerseits solche Selbstdarstellungsmodi aufgriffen. Die Kaiserdenkmäler bestimmen bis heute unser Bild von der Stadt Konstantinopel und lassen bisweilen vergessen, daß sie vor dem Hintergrund zahlreicher kleinerer Denkmäler hochrangiger Beamter errichtet wurden, unter denen einige so aufwendig waren, daß sie den Kaiser zum Aufgriff neuer, bislang noch nicht dagewesener Monumentformen zwangen. (shrink)

Both in research on Auditory Verbal Hallucinations (AVHs) and in their clinical assessment, it is common to distinguish between voices that are experienced as ‘inner’ (or ‘internal’, ‘inside the head’, ‘inside the mind’,...) and voices that are experienced as ‘outer’ (‘external’, ‘outside the head’, ‘outside the mind’,...). This inner/outer-contrast is treated not only as an important phenomenological variable of AVHs, it is also often seen as having diagnostic value. In this article, we argue that the distinction between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ (...) voices is ambiguous between different readings, and that lack of disambiguation in this regard has led to flaws in assessment tools, diagnostic debates and empirical studies. Such flaws, we argue furthermore, are often linked to misreadings of inner/outer-terminology in relevant 19th and early twentieth century work on AVHs, in particular, in connection with Kandinsky’s and Jaspers’s distinction between hallucinations and pseudo-hallucinations. (shrink)

Description logics are a family of knowledge representation formalisms that are descended from semantic networks and frames via the system Kl-one. During the last decade, it has been shown that the important reasoning problems (like subsumption and satisfiability) in a great variety of description logics can be decided using tableau-like algorithms. This is not very surprising since description logics have turned out to be closely related to propositional modal logics and logics of programs (such as propositional dynamic logic), for which (...) tableau procedures have been quite successful.Nevertheless, due to different underlying institutions and applications, most description logics differ significantly from run-of-the-mill modal and program logics. Consequently, the research on tableau algorithms in description logics led to new techniques and results, which are, however, also of interest for modal logicians. In this article, we will focus on three features that play an important rôle in description logics (number restrictions, terminological axioms, and role constructors), and show how they can be taken into account by tableau algorithms. (shrink)

Three main types of subjectivist ethics are distinguished and specified by the use of elementary game-theoretical notions. It will be argued that all these theories run into difficulties that cannot be overcome within the self-imposed limits of subjectivism.