While at first such a comparison may be startling, Whelan argues convincingly that Hume's writing, commonly regarded as moderate and amiable, is indeed a locus of realist liberal political theory.

Theories of epistemically justified belief have long assumed individualism. In its extreme, or Lockean, form individualism rules out justified belief on testimony by insisting that a subject is justified in believing a proposition only if he or she possesses first-hand justification for it. The skeptical consequences of extreme individualism have led many to adopt a milder version, attributable to Hume, on which a subject is justified in believing a proposition only if he or she is justified in believing that there (...) is testimony in favor of the proposition deriving from a reliable source. I argue that this Humean individualism also leads to skepticism in a wide range of cases; it makes it impossible for a layperson to be justified on expert testimony. In addition, I argue that the apparent motivation for the Humean view, an insistence on intellectual autonomy in justification, does not succeed in motivating it. I then explore the contours of a collectivist view of justification on testimony, with special attention to the place of a subject's intellectual autonomy in such justification. I try to bring empirical results of the psychology of persuasion to bear on the epistemological issues. (shrink)

"This book is an intellectual biography of Johann Friedrich, who was one of the most famous philosophers in early 19th century Germany. Herbart was trained in the German idealist tradition under Fichte, but he eventually broke with Fichte and major idealist doctrines. His own philosophy was opposed to the idealist tradition in important respects: he defended a dualism between the factual and normative; he was an ontological pluralist rather than monist; and he accepted crucial Kantian dualisms that had been rejected (...) by the idealists. While Herbart still retained elements of idealism, he was more realistic than his idealistic counterparts, maintaining that elements of the sensible manifold were given rather than posited by the mind. Herbart was also an important forerunner of analytic philosophy, first in breaking with the idealist tradition, and second in insisting that the proper method of philosophy is the analysis of concepts rather than speculation about the universe as a whole"--. (shrink)

Usually, the history of philosophy in the first two decades after the publication of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Critique of Pure Reason) in May 1781 is seen as little more than commentary upon and criticism of Kant's classic text. It is chiefly a story about how Kant's successors tried to defend and systematize, or criticize and dismember, his philosophy. The main theme of this story is the central outstanding problem of Kant's philosophy: the transcendental deduction, the problem of the (...) possibility of empirical knowledge. The various approaches to this problem, their formation and demise, is essentially the history of the Kantian philosophy itself. Such, at any rate, is the picture that emerges from the solid studies of Karl Rosenkranz, Johannes Erdmann, Nicolai Hartmann, Josiah Royce, Richard Kroner, and Ernst Cassirer. (shrink)

This is a critical discussion of the argument that since intentions are "logically connected" with their objects, Intentional actions cannot include intentions as their causes. Various versions of the argument are discussed, And it is argued that none of them shows the causal theory of intention to be inconsistent. It is argued that the causal theory is nevertheless wrong since intentions must be understood teleologically and as being, Therefore, Non-Contingently linked with actions.

Theoretical models propose that attentional biases might account for the maintenance of social anxiety symptoms. However, previous eye-tracking studies have yielded mixed results. One explanation i...

Pierluigi Chiassoni’s Interpretation without Truth1 is a profoundly important book. And the book is important not only because of its deep, thorough, and impeccably fair analysis of numerous perspe...

Translators and commentators find difficulty in offering non-Greek equivalents for hekôn/hekousion and akôn/akousion. In English we do not speak of ordinary human acts as being either voluntary or involuntary. We do not say ordinarily that Jones brushed his teeth voluntarily, for that would falsely suggest that his brushing his teeth was not at all ordinary. But this conforms with ordinary Greek usage as well.

Law’s ‘normativity’, its capacity to impose obligations, is among the great mysteries of jurisprudence; or so the bulk of the literature dedicated to the topic strongly suggests. As mysteries typically do, the mystery of law’s ‘normativity’ derives from various sources. One of them is the question as to the interrelation of facts and norms.