This article is an attempt to provide an example that illustrates Hans Reichenbach’s concept of coordination. Throughout Reichenbach’s career the concept of coordination played an important role in his understanding of the connection between reality and how it is scientifically described. Reichenbach never fully specified what coordination is and how exactly it works. Instead, we are left with a variety of hints and gestures, many not entirely consistent with each other and several that are subject to change over the course (...) of his career. Using the example of how to discover and construct causal variables, I will show that most of the features of coordination that Reichenbach described can be instantiated together and formulated precisely. (shrink)

The causal Bayes net framework specifies a set of axioms for causal discovery. This article explores the set of causal variables that function as relata in these axioms. Spirtes showed how a causal system can be equivalently described by two different sets of variables that stand in a non-trivial translation-relation to each other, suggesting that there is no “correct” set of causal variables. I extend Spirtes’ result to the general framework of linear structural equation models and then explore to what (...) extent the possibility to intervene or a preference for simpler causal systems may help in selecting among sets of causal variables. (shrink)

People intend to do things, try to do things, and do things. Do they also will to do things? More precisely, if people will to do things and their willing bears upon what they do, is willing, or volition, something distinct from intending and trying? This question is central to the intention/volition debate, a debate about the ingredients of the best theory of the nature and explanation of human action. A variety of competing conceptions of volition, intention, and trying have (...) been advanced in the literature; it would be impossible to examine each thoroughly in a single paper. We can show, however, that the major functional roles ascribed to volition are nicely filled by a triad composed of intention, trying, and information feedback. Sections I and II below develop an account of the connection between intention and trying. Section III examines leading arguments for the existence of volitions and decomposes volitions into members of the triad just identified. (shrink)

Kant's distinction between things in themselves and things as they appear, or appearances, is commonly attacked on the ground that it delivers a radical and incoherent ‘two world’ picture of what there is. I attempt to deflect this attack by questioning these terms of dismissal. Distinctions of the kind Kant draws on are in fact legion, and they make perfectly good sense. The way to make sense of them, however, is not by buying into a profligate ontology but by using (...) some rather different tools – surprisingly enough, tools first developed in the area of aesthetics. Once this is done, much of what Kant says begins to look perfectly coherent. In the final part of the paper, I point out that none the less all is not well. Kant's Critical doctrines make it hard for us to accept Kant's own version of this otherwise coherent distinction. (shrink)

Using a variety of different results from the literature, I show how causal discovery with experiments is limited unless substantive assumptions about the underlying causal structure are made. These results undermine the view that experiments, such as randomized controlled trials, can independently provide a gold standard for causal discovery. Moreover, I present a concrete example in which causal underdetermination persists despite exhaustive experimentation and argue that such cases undermine the appeal of an interventionist account of causation as its dependence on (...) other assumptions is not spelled out. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Cognition as Information Processing, as Computation, and as Abiding in the Meaningful Operationalism Is This Merely a Terminological Issue? Conclusion.

Social epistemology may be defined as the conceptual and normative study of the social dimensions of knowledge. It studies the bearing of social relations, interests, roles, and institutions – what I will term “social conditions” – on the conceptual and normative conditions of knowledge. It differs from the sociology of knowledge in being a conceptual and normative, and not primarily empirical, study, and in limning the necessary and not merely the contingent social conditions of knowledge. The central question of social (...) epistemology is whether, and to what extent, the conditions of knowledge include social conditions. Is knowledge a property of knowers in isolation from their social setting (and in what sense of “isolation”), or does it involve a relation between knowers and their social circumstances? This question can take various forms and admit diverse answers, depending on the kinds of knowers, knowledge, and social relations we ask about. (shrink)

The general account of material constitution presented in my article, Spatially Coinciding Objects (Ratio vol. 24.1, June 1982), is further developed. There we saw how distinct objects in the same place at the same time can be strictly ordered by an asymmetrical, transitive relation of material constitution. I show herein how this relation can conceivably form ‘upright trees’ in which one object constitutes two other objects, neither of which constitutes the other. It is, however, impossible to have ‘inverted trees’ in (...) which one thing is constituted by two things neither of which constitutes the other. (This impossibility is implied when supposing that there is just one thing which counts as the proximate matter of a thing.). (shrink)

This paper provides a new solution to the epistemic paradox of belief-instability, a problem of rational choice which has recently received considerable attention (versions of the problem have been discussed by — among others — Tyler Burge, Earl Conee, and Roy Sorensen). The problem involves an ideally rational agent who has good reason to believe the truth of something of the form:[Ap] p if and only if it is not the case that I accept or believe p.

BackgroundTo prevent the planet from catastrophic global warming a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions to net zero is required. Thus, divestment from fossil fuels must be a strategic interest for health insurers. The aim of this study was to analyse the implementation of environmental, social and governance criteria in German private health insurers’ investments.MethodsIn 2019 a survey about ESG strategies was sent to German private health insurance companies. The survey evaluated investment strategies and thresholds for the exclusion of sectors and (...) business practices, as well as company strategies for sustainable business development.FindingsGiven their business reports, German private health insurers manage assets of more than €350 billion. 11 of 40 insurance companies provided quantitative data, 10 refused to answer. According to quantitative data, €66 billion of assets is managed according to any ESG criteria; this equals an average of 76% of each company’s bonds. None of these insurers excluded the production and sale of fossil fuels. All excluded coal mining but only at high thresholds. For €226 billion, no data were provided.InterpretationThe findings are in contrast to the expected intrinsic economic interest of the insurers to stop global warming and improve public health. The majority of assets are managed in a highly problematic manner, especially the absence of capital allocated in fields contrary to medical ethics cannot be presumed. Lack of transparency is a major problem that limits clients in choosing the insurer who has the most advanced ESG criteria. (shrink)

Contains Part I of a First Book of Jurisprudence (1929)and essays from Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics (1882) and Essays in the Law (1922).

Law’s ‘normativity’, its capacity to impose obligations, is among the great mysteries of jurisprudence; or so the bulk of the literature dedicated to the topic strongly suggests. As mysteries typically do, the mystery of law’s ‘normativity’ derives from various sources. One of them is the question as to the interrelation of facts and norms.

Is there 'truth' even if it is not certain and we cannot be certain about it? Sontag answers a resounding 'yes' in Uncertain Truth asserting that, in a skeptical time, truth is still possible but is not ours to possess with certainty. 'Truth' must therefore be reconceived in its philosophical perspective.

In this brief comment on Ted Schoen’s paper, I tend to agree more than I disagree. Methodological isolation has been widely and uncritically accepted by thinkers about religion and science, and Schoen’s dissipation of the isolationist discourse deserves positive notice. For too long, science has been the bully of the epistemic neighborhood, and religious thinkers have taken refuge in methodological isolation. As Schoen argues, neither religion nor science is isolated; rather, both are interacting in the same comprehensive and value-laden domain, (...) which also includes art, poetry, ethics and metaphysics. (shrink)

A comprehensive study of German materialism in the second half of the nineteenth century is long overdue. Among contemporary historians the mere passing references to Karl Vogt, Jacob Moleschott, and Ludwig Buchner as materialists and popularizers of science are hardly sufficient, for few individuals influenced public opinion in nineteenth-century Germany more than these men. Buchner, for example, revealed his awareness of the historical significance of his Kraft und Stoff in comments made in 1872, just seventeen years after its original appearance. (...) A philosophical book which has undergone twelve big German editions in the short span of seventeen years, which further has been issued in non-German countries and languages about fifteen to sixteen times in the same period, and whose appearance (although its author was entirely unknown up to then) has called forth an almost unprecedented storm in the press,... such a book can be nothing ordinary; the world-calling it enjoys at present must be justified through its wholly special characteristics or by the merits of its form and content. ' Vogt, Moleschott and Buchner explicitly held that their materialism was founded on natural science. But other materialists of the nineteenth century also laid claim to the scientific character of their own thought. It is likely that Marx and Engels would have permitted their brand of materialism to have been called scientific, provided, of course, that 'scientific' was understood in their dialectical meaning of the term. Socialism, Engels maintained, had become a science with Marx. (shrink)

In Stability and Justification in Hume's Treatise, Louis Loeb ascribes to Hume a naturalistic account of justified belief, one on which Hume is fundamentally concerned with the question whether stable belief can be achieved. Loeb's interpretation is systematic, richly explanatory, and powerfully argued. He makes a compelling case that stability plays a central role in Hume's epistemology. Loeb's case is so compelling indeed that anyone who wants to defend an alternative interpretation will now have to assimilate or deflect the massive (...) textual evidence in favor of the stability interpretation. I will argue here that, for some passages Loeb cites in favor of the stability interpretation, a veritistic interpretation explains the text at least as well as the stability interpretation does. (shrink)

In response to Baars' contribution, it is argued that crucial elements of Skinner's perspective need to be integrated within a broader context of psychology including consciousness studies. The behaviourists championed processes that are an integral part of our psychological composition. The history of psychology is one of pointless fragmentation, with particular processes being adopted by charismatic advocates and turned into an all-embracing philosophy. Skinner was not alone in doing this. Skinner's double life, it is argued, as an instance of a (...) duality of existence, is a feature that applies to most if not all people. (shrink)

It would be an understatement to say that the New Science is difficult to read. Most contemporary readers conclude with a Russian scholar that Vico's thought "is expressed in extremely naive forms, profound thoughts are interspersed with all sorts of pedantic trifles, the exposition is very confusing, yet it is beyond doubt that the basic idea is a work of genius. " 1 There can be no disputing the fact that the New Science is difficult to read; the dispute emerges (...) in the effort to explain how a work which is at once "confusing," "naive" and "pedantic," can be a "work of genius. " The purpose of this brief study is to suggest that a good deal of the confusion can be dispelled when the New Science is read with care and an eye to the possibility of two levels of meaning. We must never forget that Vico was a professor of rhetoric and was therefore familiar with the techniques of cautious writing. It is our conviction that the New Science is an exoteric book which means that it contains two levels of meaning: one which conveys a popular and orthodox message, and another which 2 conveys a philosophical message addressed to philosophers. A large number of contemporary scholars tend to minimize or dismiss this type of writing. (shrink)

He demonstrates that a broad parallelism exists between developments in ethical theory among Continental philosophers of the phenomenological persuasion and the more analytically inclined philosophers of the English-speaking world.

Strawson offers three accounts of singular predication: a grammatical, a category and a mediating account. I argue that the grammatical and mediating accounts are refuted by a host of counter-examples and that the latter is worse than useless. In later works Strawson defends only the category account. This account entails that singular terms cannot be predicates; it excludes non-denoting singular terms from being logical subjects, except by means of an ad hoc analogy; it depends upon a notion of identification that (...) is too vague; and it is unnecessarily complicated, relying on analogies where a more uniform explanation should be possible. But I show how the account can be corrected to avoid all these difficulties and to provide an accurate account of singular predication. (shrink)

The Cleavage in Our Culture BOYD H. BODE Professor Emeritus of Education, Ohio State University DURING RECENT YEARS there have been occasional opportunities ...